Heating law, corporate taxes, child basic security – the traffic light coalition parties are now at odds on almost every occasion. BDI President Siegfried Russwurm views this behavior with concern: “The democrats should come together on a minimal consensus and stop these sandbox games,” he urges in an interview with Table.Media. The coalition partners’ conduct is “childish”.
In both Brussels and Berlin, Russwurm observes a growing mistrust towards the economy: More and more entrepreneurs wonder, “Does politics fundamentally consider me a wrongdoer who must be monitored at every step?” As an example, he cites the planned EU Supply Chain Act, which he warns could become “entirely inappropriate”. The former Siemens executive also doubts that reporting obligations on a large scale will be reduced, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has suggested.
Russwurm is also critical of von der Leyen’s industrial policy initiatives, such as the Net-Zero Industry Act. He finds the discussion about strategic sovereignty too vague: “We should specify which technologies we want to have in Europe and to what extent,” he demands, “as industry representatives, we can attach concrete price tags to them and determine the cost.” Moreover, medium-sized companies get lost in the complexity of various EU funding programs.
Wishing you an enlightening read and a wonderful weekend. The political machinery in Brussels will also kick back into gear next week.
Mr. Russwurm, the term “sick man of Europe” is making its rounds again. How sick is Germany?
“Sick” is a strong word. But this athlete competing in the global race is currently not particularly high-performing. Partly due to its lifestyle, partly due to some conditions that are difficult to influence. But partly also due to self-made restrictions. To continue with the athlete analogy: Even the clothing and equipment of the Germany athlete are anything but functional.
Politicians, including the Chancellor, constantly talk about the need to reduce bureaucracy. Yet, is there still too little action?
There are occasional attempts and things are done at specific points. But the general trend remains: more and more queries, reporting obligations and documentation requirements. It’s getting worse, not better. I believe that some very fundamental questions need to be asked. Federalism is good and proper in many respects, but the fact that a heavy-duty transport on its way from Emden to Lower Bavaria needs a new permit at every state border is absurd. This kind of micro-management cries out to the heavens. And there are many such examples. The answer should be: We need to address the structures.
Despite all the fine words, didn’t the politicians get it?
Yes, they did. There is no lack of knowledge, but the courage to break up outdated rules falls by the wayside. Back to the example of heavy transports: Why not a continuous permit for the entire route?
Should the EU and the federal government invest more money, similar to the US with the Inflation Reduction Act?
If I consider all the programs that the EU has launched, we are in a comparable range. It’s not just a question of money but also of streamlined organization. With the IRA, I can easily calculate how much funding I receive as a company and can rely on it being swift. In Brussels, on the other hand, you face a maze of different programs, funding pots, and application conditions. A large corporation with its own presence in Brussels might be able to navigate that. For medium-sized enterprises, it’s completely impossible. In contrast, when a entrepreneur comes to the US and talks to their local congressman, they are welcomed with open arms: “Nice to have you here, how can I help you?” There’s a world of difference between these approaches.
The EU struggles to abandon the grown funding structures.
But it’s less difficult to understand where the differences lie. If we take a somewhat simplified view, the US has chosen to make green energy cheaper. In Europe, we’ve decided to make fossil fuels more expensive to encourage the shift to green. The impulse might be the same, but in international competition, energy has become cheaper in the US and more expensive here. That’s a huge difference in its impact on companies and the competitiveness of each location.
There’s a lot of talk about the looming departure of companies, even deindustrialization. How great is the actual danger?
We’re trying to quantify this through surveys we conduct with medium-sized companies. From that, we know that 30 percent have begun serious plans for increased foreign investments, and 16 percent are already more deeply involved in implementation. My urgent request to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs is: Let’s find indicators for corporate investment behavior so we can get reliable data. The existing indicator for overall economic development, the unemployment rate, doesn’t work anymore due to demographics – even in an economic downturn, there’s a shortage of skilled workers. That’s why we advocate for an investment indicator. Just as we used to measure the pulse of the economy with the official unemployment statistics every month, we should now regularly collect official data on investment behavior and draw appropriate conclusions from it.
Frustration is growing in companies; it’s also reflected in the survey numbers for the AfD. How worried are you?
To me, those are two different issues. One is the AfD; the other is the question: Is something slipping away here? I wouldn’t frame it initially in terms of party politics. However, there’s a growing distrust in politics and the state, coupled with the question: Do they really understand our real life? Or is there a level of detachment that has nothing to do with our reality? But that doesn’t mean that everyone who struggles with the situation will automatically vote for this or that party. The world isn’t that simple.
What does it mean then?
More and more entrepreneurs are asking: Does politics fundamentally view me as a wrongdoer, someone who needs to be monitored at every step and told what to do, must do, or cannot do? Or does politics accept that I have a reasonable ethical compass, that I’m motivated to do a good job, that I take responsibility for others, and that I have an understanding of what I’m leaving behind for my children and grandchildren? Something is indeed slipping away. This applies particularly to those who don’t have the option to go to another country if necessary, and who are therefore so important here; who love their work but are forced to submit reports, fill out applications, and deal with paperwork every weekend, and who are desperately looking for labor. This is what brings many to the brink of despair.
Has Berlin politics understood this?
I think it’s starting to sink in there increasingly. But I also see a great perplexity. Many politicians wonder what they could really do substantively without getting lost in the minutiae of individual measures.
And in Brussels, is your message getting through there?
Probably less so. It’s likely due to the fact that German politicians are more often and for longer periods in their constituencies and confronted with reality. The complex structure of institutions and compromise in Brussels, including the Commission, Council, and European Parliament, tends to lead to an autonomy removed from the citizens’ daily lives.
Is EU disillusionment growing among business owners?
No, I don’t see that. Business owners are aware of how important the European Union is for our economic success. But the expectation is also that a country like Germany, due to its size and economic weight, should have a certain influence in Brussels. I use the subjunctive here because even in the traffic light coalition and under previous constellations, there was often disagreement, and as a result, Germany often abstains in the Council, thus neutralizing itself.
The proverbial German Vote …
Take the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act as an example. We have a law that’s valid in Germany, and France has a comparable one. As a European with a German passport, I ask myself: If Germany and France agree, why can’t the existing laws serve as the basis for an EU-wide regulation? Instead, discussions are taking place in Brussels about the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which threatens to be entirely unsuitable.
As a consolation, von der Leyen has announced plans to cut a quarter of the reporting requirements for companies.
Well, there will probably be some anecdotal examples. But I doubt that the Commission will fundamentally change anything while we are simultaneously discussing a complete ban on thousands of different materials from the PFAS group.
The new mantra in Brussels is “European sovereignty”. What does this mean for the internationally positioned German industry?
What’s missing in the discussion about strategic sovereignty is an overall picture with specific goals and numbers. We should say which technologies we want in Europe and to what extent. Then, as industry representatives, we can put specific price tags on that and determine the cost. And based on that, politics should discuss with us how it can be financed. Let’s take the example of the chip industry: If the goal is to produce semiconductors in the EU with less than ten nanometers grid spacing and we’re competing with subsidies from other countries, then we have to accept that and support investments with billions. Otherwise, we’ll come away empty-handed.
There are timid approaches like the Net-Zero Industry Act, which defines and promotes climate-friendly technologies.
I would prefer a more concrete approach. If a European solar industry is declared a strategic goal, meaning we define that we want to produce x percent of our solar modules here, then we need to clarify: What needs to happen for that to occur? We would need to speak with experts and quantify the capacities we need and how we can build them in a way that’s globally competitive.
You’ve described many shortcomings. If you had one wish, how would you reorganize this country and the relationship between politics and business?
We are in a massive transformation, mentioning decarbonization, digitalization and demographics. I would wish for a basic consensus among democratic parties with broad acceptance in business and society for these processes that can be relied upon over a longer period than just one legislative term. I still hope that a consensus of all democrats can be found about the German path to decarbonization, for example. That would give companies investment security over many years. And then democrats could also stand together against the pied pipers who pretend that complex future issues can be solved with simple solutions or who simply claim that everything can remain as it has always been.
The parties, even in the traffic light coalition, are mainly focused on themselves.
The democrats should come together on a minimum consensus and stop the sandbox games: You took my shovel away, so I’ll steal your shovel. And then we go into retreat together to Meseberg and distribute the shovels anew – that’s just childish.
To read what the BDI chief has to say about the German government’s China strategy and the planned stricter investment control, you can find it here at China.Table.
Four months after its naming, the DSA obligations for the 19 identified offerings classified as particularly large entities are now in effect. “They’ve had enough time to adapt their systems to the new regulations,” says EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton. The Commission will enforce the DSA diligently and utilize its new powers, the Commissioner announced.
However, for the extensive regulatory framework to be enforced, the EU Commission needs the appropriate personnel. Around 100 full-time positions are already filled at the Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content and Technology at the start of DSA implementation. By the following year, there will be a total of 123 positions, supported by 30 employees at the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT). But whether this will be sufficient to oversee the largest companies in the digital world is in question.
SPD Member of the European Parliament Tiemo Wölken warns that the “rather thin staffing” concerns him. For the significantly less extensive Network Enforcement Act, 200 employees were assigned to the Federal Office of Justice. “In the worst case, we could fall into a trap where the rules are well-intentioned in theory but can hardly be enforced in practice,” warns Wölken. “This must definitely be prevented.”
Green Party member Alexandra Geese praises: “The EU Commission has exemplarily developed extensive knowledge about the companies affected by the DSA, increased personnel, and sought external expertise.” Nevertheless, it’s still a “Herculean task where member states must provide vigorous support“. Geese sees a well-staffed independent agency as necessary in the long run, “which can ensure consistent legal enforcement against these powerful corporations, independent of state and politics.”
The 19 platforms identified as particularly large online platforms (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSE) must now comply with almost all rules of the Digital Services Act from today. Only the rules that additionally require a National Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) will remain excluded until February 2024.
The DSA obliges providers to a variety of new duties. The most important one concerns illegal content: While the liability regime of the E-Commerce Directive remains fundamentally intact. Providers don’t need to actively search for illegal content. However, they must take action from the moment they become aware of potentially illegal activity. And they must inform about deletion, blocking, or inactivity in a comprehensible procedure. Affected individuals must also be able to object to such categorization – so there are several changes coming for operators as well as users.
In Germany, the DSA thus replaces the Network Enforcement Act: Due to the precedence of European law, this largely no longer applies to major social networks such as Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn and Telegram. The DSA also covers much more than the closed catalog of the Network Enforcement Act: illegal content prohibited under national law, provided this law itself doesn’t contradict European law.
The new rules also apply not only to social networks: User-generated content on other platforms, such as reviews on major marketplaces, must be treated comparably. This particularly affects Amazon and Zalando, as well as app stores or reviews on mapping services starting today. The DSA also demands significant changes in recommendation systems. These must also be available in a profile independent of the individual user.
Another example that new regulation leads to concrete product changes is evident: “On TikTok, Instagram and Facebook, users can now turn off algorithmically determined feeds, which is a requirement of the DSA,” explains Julian Jaursch, DSA expert at the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung. “Although such measures existed to some extent already: The fact that some platforms are making changes to their products shows that the DSA has consequences.” Specifically, TikTok and Instagram had previously refused to allow non-algorithmic representations of their content, and Facebook had originally started without such a feature.
By today’s deadline, operators of offerings classified as VLOPs or VLOSE must submit reports on so-called systemic risks. In these reports, they are to explain which potentially problematic effects they have identified through their platforms.
Examples of this could be life-threatening challenges on TikTok, anorexia guides on Instagram, election influence attempts on Facebook, data protection violations or the spread of illegal content. Article 34 of the DSA contains only an exemplary, non-exhaustive list. Which risks companies see and what steps they must take to contain the dangers also determine each other. This can be achieved, for instance, by adjusting algorithms, terms and conditions or content moderation mechanisms.
However, this area will cause discussions. To what extent is an advertising-funded, data-driven business model inherently a threat to the fundamental right to personal data protection? To what extent can interaction-based content ranking algorithms be considered a genuine societal risk? Many of these questions are not so scientifically clear-cut that they would be legally definitive as well. Years of intense debate are looming.
MEP Alexandra Geese, in any case, expects the Commission to take a particularly close look at one area in the beginning: In the European election year 2024, a special focus must be placed on social networks. “The dissemination of disinformation as well as hate and incitement through algorithms and microtargeting disproportionately and precisely endangers our democracy, as they give extremist parties enormous reach,” Geese told Table.Media. “Ranking criteria must be examined.”
The last item of the 94-point manifesto adopted by the BRICS countries today packs a punch: “Brazil, India, China and South Africa extend their full support to Russia for its BRICS Chairship in 2024 and the holding of the XVI BRICS Summit in the city of Kazan, Russia.” The five founding members of the BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – agreed on the 26-page paper on Thursday.
Russia’s President Putin could not travel to the BRICS summit, which is being held in Johannesburg from Tuesday until Thursday, because an international arrest warrant has been issued against him. Next year, he will host it instead. The will to oppose US dominance is apparently so strong that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is completely omitted.
The original BRICS also agreed to admit six more countries. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the list of future members:
will join the group on Jan. 1, 2024. “We have consensus on the first phase of this expansion process and other phases will follow,” Ramaphosa said.
Observers already expected some of the newcomers. But there are surprises. First and foremost, Iran: The Islamic Republic is considered a pariah by the West and is considered to belong to the camp around China and Russia. For example, Iran is one of the most important suppliers of military drones to Russia, which are deployed in Ukraine.
In the run-up to the BRICS summit, experts had still considered Iran’s accession unlikely. They argued that the democracies Brazil, India and South Africa, which are also interested in maintaining good relations with the West, could hardly be interested in allowing BRICS to become a rogue group.
But apparently, other considerations outweighed for the five BRICS countries. Energy could have been an important factor. After all, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE and Brazil, the group will include some of the world’s largest energy producers. Iran is home to the world’s second-largest gas reserves and a quarter of the Middle East’s oil reserves.
In point 21 of the manifesto, Iran is mentioned as an explicit criticism of the West’s Iran policy: “We reiterate the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful and diplomatic means in accordance with the international law.”
By contrast, experts had predicted Saudi Arabia’s accession. Ahead of the summit, China and Brazil had already voiced their support for the accession. Enlargement of the BRICS group only makes economic sense if Saudi Arabia joins, the inventor of the BRICS acronym, economist Jim O’Neill, told Bloomberg.
The kingdom, which also seeks good relations with the West, is the world’s largest oil producer, while China is the largest oil consumer. Since most of the world’s energy trade is denominated in dollars, the enlargement also facilitates the transition of trade to alternative currencies. Along with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia is also an important new contributor to the BRICS countries’ New Development Bank (NDB). The Emirates has been a member of the NDB since 2021.
Egypt has also been a shareholder in NDB since March. The country is one of the main recipients of US aid, but has long maintained close ties with Russia and has growing trade relations with China. Russia is building Egypt’s first nuclear power plant and China is developing parts of the new capital. Egypt is experiencing a currency crisis and is counting on trading within the BRICS group without the dollar.
Argentina is also struggling with a foreign exchange crisis. The country wants to gain access to alternative financing through the NDB. Its supporters within BRICS include its main trading partner and neighbor Brazil, as well as India and China.
Ethiopia ranks among the more unexpected newcomers. The country is the third-largest economy south of the Sahara and even ranks second in terms of population. The Ethiopian economy has also grown rapidly recently. However, its GDP is just half the size of the smallest BRICS member, South Africa. In addition, the country is currently being shaken again by armed conflicts.
Many observers had expected Indonesia to be one of the new BRICS members. However, Indonesia had asked to postpone its membership in order to consult with its ASEAN partners, South Africa’s BRICS ambassador Anil Sooklal said in an interview. He said that Indonesia may join in the next year or two.
The debate on the enlargement of the BRICS group was driven primarily by China. The People’s Republic hopes to create alternatives to the Western-dominated world order and wants to win over as many supporters as possible. Russia remains internationally isolated due to the Ukraine war and also hopes to gain new supporters by expanding the BRICS group.
India and Brazil have recently been more hesitant – even though they had agreed to the enlargement in principle. They fear a rushed enlargement could turn the economic bloc into an anti-Western club. Both countries reject such a positioning. India is also concerned about China’s dominance of the BRICS group.
In their manifesto, the BRICS states call for “a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council,” in which the victorious powers of World War II, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as the two BRICS states, Russia and China, are permanent members with veto rights.
This repeatedly causes controversy, as does the selection procedure for non-permanent members. The BRICS states demand that the UN Security Council become “more democratic, representative, effective and efficient” and more representative of the developing countries. Arne Schuette/Christian von Hiller
On Thursday evening, in Moscow, none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin indirectly confirmed the death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. Without mentioning his name, Putin spoke of a tragedy and emphasized Wagner’s significant contribution to the war against Ukraine. However, some of Russia’s prominent political analysts, such as Valery Solovei, also don’t rule out the possibility of deception.
However, the scholar who has long dealt with the effects of propaganda doesn’t seem to take this theory entirely seriously himself. In a conversation with Russian journalist Alexander Plushev on Thursday on YouTube, he pointed out that Prigozhin’s death serves the purpose of arranging the transfer of power after Putin. “He (Putin) is dying. His environment knows that and Prigozhin’s death is supposed to secure the planned transfer of power and prevent interference.“
According to Russian authorities, the remains of ten individuals have been recovered from the crash site. Contradictory reports emerged in Russian media and Telegram channels regarding the identification of the bodies, suggesting that the bodies of Prigozhin and his key representative, Dmitry Utkin, were either identified or were burned beyond recognition. Images surfaced on social media purportedly showing bullet holes in sections of the jet’s fuselage. The version of an “accidental” shootdown was already spread on the evening of the crash.
Political analyst Ekaterina Schulmann evaluates the event negatively. “Everything that is happening right now is very bad. There’s nothing good about it,” she said on Plushev’s YouTube show. “These are signs of a failed state. It’s absurd to assume that this revenge on Prigozhin, which is now being read on the front pages of the world press, secures Putin’s position.” If Putin has to hold his environment in check with such violence, then the question arises, is there nothing else that scares them more? Schulmann recently explained in an interview with Table.Media that the increasing repression in Russia is a sign of regime decay, not stabilization.
Alexey Yusupov, a Russia expert and head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s country program, stated in response to Table.Media’s inquiry: “Prigozhin had done something that was actually reserved for the president: he addressed the people. He spoke to the public with a political intention. He had broken a taboo, and that needed to be corrected.”
Yusupov added that the attack on Prigozhin now turns the system against its own people, which hadn’t occurred to this extent before. “Until the revolt two months ago, the system had regulated internal conflicts itself. It was over with the coup attempt. That’s an important point.” And the current retaliation indicates that something is in progress and a new dynamic is emerging within the elites.
The probable death is unlikely to have immediate effects on the war in Ukraine, which celebrated its Independence Day on Aug. 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy hurried to assure that Ukraine had not been involved.
More impacts can be expected for Belarus. The Wagner camp appears to be dismantling its base there. The independent journalistic project Hajun, which monitors the military in Belarus, reported the dismantling of the camp southeast of Minsk.
Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported the withdrawal of Wagner forces since the beginning of August. A total of 2,000 personnel were reportedly stationed there. The relocation of Wagner units to Belarus shortly after the coup attempt in June had raised concerns about an increased threat in Poland and Baltic states.
The situation for the Wagner Group in African states such as Mali, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso is still unclear. Prigozhin’s last video for the public was said to have been recorded in Mali, and it was disseminated earlier this week. Whether the death of the militia leader will change Russia’s presence in the mentioned countries remains uncertain for now.
And what will become of the Wagner Group itself? Russian Telegram channels announced after reports of Prigozhin’s death that there is a backup plan. The Kremlin-critical channel Gulagu.net, citing sources in Wagner structures, wrote that compromising material about the Russian power elite will be released in the near future. Whether and in what form Wagner itself will continue to exist is currently not reliably ascertainable.
The Dutch government intends to nominate Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra as EU Commissioner on Friday. Hoekstra would succeed Frans Timmermans as the Dutch Commissioner, who resigned from his position to run in the parliamentary elections in his country.
Timmermans is running to become Prime Minister and successor to the prematurely resigned Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Liberals after the Nov. 22 election. In the European Commission, Timmermans was responsible for the Green Deal. This responsibility is now assumed by Slovak Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič.
Hoekstra served as the Dutch finance minister from 2017 to 2022. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to comment. A representative from the Netherlands’ permanent representation to the European Union stated that they could not confirm the report. tho/rtr
Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics has assigned Evika Siliņa with forming the government in the Baltic EU and NATO country. A week after the resignation of Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins and talks with all seven parties represented in the parliament, the president nominated the 48-year-old former Welfare Minister on Thursday.
“I am convinced that Ms. Siliņa can fulfill the task in a sufficiently short time. Her experience and knowledge are a good start for creating a functioning ministerial cabinet,” Rinkevics said at a press conference in Riga. The Latvian president, who advocated for a broad coalition, expressed hope that government formation will be completed by mid-September.
Siliņa also cited this timeframe as a goal, and she indicated that she would begin coalition negotiations with four parties on Friday. The politician from the liberal-conservative government party, Jauna Vienotiba, was the sole candidate officially nominated by the parties for the position of prime minister in the Baltic state. dpa
On June 9, 2024, the French will be called to vote for their 79 members of the European Parliament. Historically, this election has mobilized few people in France: Barely half of the French voters show significant interest. However, the political challenges are not insignificant: This election could solidify the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) and the governing party Renaissance as the main forces in the country. However, it could also lead to an ascent of the left-wing parties, under one condition: that they can overcome their deep divisions.
The focus is on the four left-wing parties – La France Insoumise (LFI), Socialist Party (PS), Communist Party (PC) and Europe Ecology/The Greens (EELV) – which have been united under the banner of the Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale (Nupes) since the parliamentary elections in June 2022.
For months, La France Insoumise has been pushing for the formation of a single Nupes list for the upcoming European elections. However, last July, the French Greens (EELV) approved their strategy for a separate list with an 86 percent majority. The ecologists intend to run alone in the next European elections and have even already named their lead candidate: MEP Marie Toussaint. The “Ecolos” undoubtedly recalled that in 2019, the Greens could elect thirteen MEPs, while the “Insoumis” and the Socialists each only secured six seats.
A survey published in May by Cluster17 for Le Point nevertheless sparked some discussions: A joint Nupes list would lead the election with 27 percent of the votes, followed by the Rassemblement National (25.5 percent) and the governing party (23 percent).
In the case of separate left-wing lists, the sum of the left-wing votes – LFI (11 percent), EELV (11 percent), PS (9 percent) and PCF (4 percent), totaling 35 percent – would be higher than the result of a joint list. Then, the Rassemblement National (24 percent) would be in the lead, followed by the governing party, which would achieve a lower result (19.5 percent).
This could explain why La France Insoumise, and especially its leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is known for his less-than-friendly views towards Germany, have increased pressure on the Greens in recent months. The “Insoumis” almost weekly emphasize to the Greens’ leader, Marine Tondelier, the necessity of a single list. Tondelier responded with a clear message: “The Greens will not change their minds just because a guy says the same thing five times, louder each time.” – Quite an atmosphere.
Behind this power struggle lies a political battle in France, where the other left-wing parties, particularly the Greens, want to balance a Nupes that has been dominated by LFI since its inception. LFI, in turn, recognizes the importance of left-wing unity in 2024 for the survival of Nupes and otherwise predicts their disintegration.
These tensions may now fall on Marie Toussaint, who stands more positively towards Nupes and whose appointment by LFI was received as a “signal”. While she is relatively unknown to the general public, she has made a name for herself in the world of activists with the “Affaire du siècle” (Case of the Century): In 2019, together with her environmental law NGO Notre affaire à tous, she jointly sued the French government, along with three other organizations (Greenpeace, Fondation pour la nature et l’homme, and Oxfam), demanding that it uphold its climate action commitments.
More than two million citizens signed the parallel petition. In 2021, France was condemned by the Council of State for inaction on climate action. “My main weapon is the law,” said the international environmental law graduate. From now on, however, she will have to leave legal language behind in favor of a much more political one.
Heating law, corporate taxes, child basic security – the traffic light coalition parties are now at odds on almost every occasion. BDI President Siegfried Russwurm views this behavior with concern: “The democrats should come together on a minimal consensus and stop these sandbox games,” he urges in an interview with Table.Media. The coalition partners’ conduct is “childish”.
In both Brussels and Berlin, Russwurm observes a growing mistrust towards the economy: More and more entrepreneurs wonder, “Does politics fundamentally consider me a wrongdoer who must be monitored at every step?” As an example, he cites the planned EU Supply Chain Act, which he warns could become “entirely inappropriate”. The former Siemens executive also doubts that reporting obligations on a large scale will be reduced, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has suggested.
Russwurm is also critical of von der Leyen’s industrial policy initiatives, such as the Net-Zero Industry Act. He finds the discussion about strategic sovereignty too vague: “We should specify which technologies we want to have in Europe and to what extent,” he demands, “as industry representatives, we can attach concrete price tags to them and determine the cost.” Moreover, medium-sized companies get lost in the complexity of various EU funding programs.
Wishing you an enlightening read and a wonderful weekend. The political machinery in Brussels will also kick back into gear next week.
Mr. Russwurm, the term “sick man of Europe” is making its rounds again. How sick is Germany?
“Sick” is a strong word. But this athlete competing in the global race is currently not particularly high-performing. Partly due to its lifestyle, partly due to some conditions that are difficult to influence. But partly also due to self-made restrictions. To continue with the athlete analogy: Even the clothing and equipment of the Germany athlete are anything but functional.
Politicians, including the Chancellor, constantly talk about the need to reduce bureaucracy. Yet, is there still too little action?
There are occasional attempts and things are done at specific points. But the general trend remains: more and more queries, reporting obligations and documentation requirements. It’s getting worse, not better. I believe that some very fundamental questions need to be asked. Federalism is good and proper in many respects, but the fact that a heavy-duty transport on its way from Emden to Lower Bavaria needs a new permit at every state border is absurd. This kind of micro-management cries out to the heavens. And there are many such examples. The answer should be: We need to address the structures.
Despite all the fine words, didn’t the politicians get it?
Yes, they did. There is no lack of knowledge, but the courage to break up outdated rules falls by the wayside. Back to the example of heavy transports: Why not a continuous permit for the entire route?
Should the EU and the federal government invest more money, similar to the US with the Inflation Reduction Act?
If I consider all the programs that the EU has launched, we are in a comparable range. It’s not just a question of money but also of streamlined organization. With the IRA, I can easily calculate how much funding I receive as a company and can rely on it being swift. In Brussels, on the other hand, you face a maze of different programs, funding pots, and application conditions. A large corporation with its own presence in Brussels might be able to navigate that. For medium-sized enterprises, it’s completely impossible. In contrast, when a entrepreneur comes to the US and talks to their local congressman, they are welcomed with open arms: “Nice to have you here, how can I help you?” There’s a world of difference between these approaches.
The EU struggles to abandon the grown funding structures.
But it’s less difficult to understand where the differences lie. If we take a somewhat simplified view, the US has chosen to make green energy cheaper. In Europe, we’ve decided to make fossil fuels more expensive to encourage the shift to green. The impulse might be the same, but in international competition, energy has become cheaper in the US and more expensive here. That’s a huge difference in its impact on companies and the competitiveness of each location.
There’s a lot of talk about the looming departure of companies, even deindustrialization. How great is the actual danger?
We’re trying to quantify this through surveys we conduct with medium-sized companies. From that, we know that 30 percent have begun serious plans for increased foreign investments, and 16 percent are already more deeply involved in implementation. My urgent request to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs is: Let’s find indicators for corporate investment behavior so we can get reliable data. The existing indicator for overall economic development, the unemployment rate, doesn’t work anymore due to demographics – even in an economic downturn, there’s a shortage of skilled workers. That’s why we advocate for an investment indicator. Just as we used to measure the pulse of the economy with the official unemployment statistics every month, we should now regularly collect official data on investment behavior and draw appropriate conclusions from it.
Frustration is growing in companies; it’s also reflected in the survey numbers for the AfD. How worried are you?
To me, those are two different issues. One is the AfD; the other is the question: Is something slipping away here? I wouldn’t frame it initially in terms of party politics. However, there’s a growing distrust in politics and the state, coupled with the question: Do they really understand our real life? Or is there a level of detachment that has nothing to do with our reality? But that doesn’t mean that everyone who struggles with the situation will automatically vote for this or that party. The world isn’t that simple.
What does it mean then?
More and more entrepreneurs are asking: Does politics fundamentally view me as a wrongdoer, someone who needs to be monitored at every step and told what to do, must do, or cannot do? Or does politics accept that I have a reasonable ethical compass, that I’m motivated to do a good job, that I take responsibility for others, and that I have an understanding of what I’m leaving behind for my children and grandchildren? Something is indeed slipping away. This applies particularly to those who don’t have the option to go to another country if necessary, and who are therefore so important here; who love their work but are forced to submit reports, fill out applications, and deal with paperwork every weekend, and who are desperately looking for labor. This is what brings many to the brink of despair.
Has Berlin politics understood this?
I think it’s starting to sink in there increasingly. But I also see a great perplexity. Many politicians wonder what they could really do substantively without getting lost in the minutiae of individual measures.
And in Brussels, is your message getting through there?
Probably less so. It’s likely due to the fact that German politicians are more often and for longer periods in their constituencies and confronted with reality. The complex structure of institutions and compromise in Brussels, including the Commission, Council, and European Parliament, tends to lead to an autonomy removed from the citizens’ daily lives.
Is EU disillusionment growing among business owners?
No, I don’t see that. Business owners are aware of how important the European Union is for our economic success. But the expectation is also that a country like Germany, due to its size and economic weight, should have a certain influence in Brussels. I use the subjunctive here because even in the traffic light coalition and under previous constellations, there was often disagreement, and as a result, Germany often abstains in the Council, thus neutralizing itself.
The proverbial German Vote …
Take the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act as an example. We have a law that’s valid in Germany, and France has a comparable one. As a European with a German passport, I ask myself: If Germany and France agree, why can’t the existing laws serve as the basis for an EU-wide regulation? Instead, discussions are taking place in Brussels about the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, which threatens to be entirely unsuitable.
As a consolation, von der Leyen has announced plans to cut a quarter of the reporting requirements for companies.
Well, there will probably be some anecdotal examples. But I doubt that the Commission will fundamentally change anything while we are simultaneously discussing a complete ban on thousands of different materials from the PFAS group.
The new mantra in Brussels is “European sovereignty”. What does this mean for the internationally positioned German industry?
What’s missing in the discussion about strategic sovereignty is an overall picture with specific goals and numbers. We should say which technologies we want in Europe and to what extent. Then, as industry representatives, we can put specific price tags on that and determine the cost. And based on that, politics should discuss with us how it can be financed. Let’s take the example of the chip industry: If the goal is to produce semiconductors in the EU with less than ten nanometers grid spacing and we’re competing with subsidies from other countries, then we have to accept that and support investments with billions. Otherwise, we’ll come away empty-handed.
There are timid approaches like the Net-Zero Industry Act, which defines and promotes climate-friendly technologies.
I would prefer a more concrete approach. If a European solar industry is declared a strategic goal, meaning we define that we want to produce x percent of our solar modules here, then we need to clarify: What needs to happen for that to occur? We would need to speak with experts and quantify the capacities we need and how we can build them in a way that’s globally competitive.
You’ve described many shortcomings. If you had one wish, how would you reorganize this country and the relationship between politics and business?
We are in a massive transformation, mentioning decarbonization, digitalization and demographics. I would wish for a basic consensus among democratic parties with broad acceptance in business and society for these processes that can be relied upon over a longer period than just one legislative term. I still hope that a consensus of all democrats can be found about the German path to decarbonization, for example. That would give companies investment security over many years. And then democrats could also stand together against the pied pipers who pretend that complex future issues can be solved with simple solutions or who simply claim that everything can remain as it has always been.
The parties, even in the traffic light coalition, are mainly focused on themselves.
The democrats should come together on a minimum consensus and stop the sandbox games: You took my shovel away, so I’ll steal your shovel. And then we go into retreat together to Meseberg and distribute the shovels anew – that’s just childish.
To read what the BDI chief has to say about the German government’s China strategy and the planned stricter investment control, you can find it here at China.Table.
Four months after its naming, the DSA obligations for the 19 identified offerings classified as particularly large entities are now in effect. “They’ve had enough time to adapt their systems to the new regulations,” says EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton. The Commission will enforce the DSA diligently and utilize its new powers, the Commissioner announced.
However, for the extensive regulatory framework to be enforced, the EU Commission needs the appropriate personnel. Around 100 full-time positions are already filled at the Directorate-General for Communication Networks, Content and Technology at the start of DSA implementation. By the following year, there will be a total of 123 positions, supported by 30 employees at the European Centre for Algorithmic Transparency (ECAT). But whether this will be sufficient to oversee the largest companies in the digital world is in question.
SPD Member of the European Parliament Tiemo Wölken warns that the “rather thin staffing” concerns him. For the significantly less extensive Network Enforcement Act, 200 employees were assigned to the Federal Office of Justice. “In the worst case, we could fall into a trap where the rules are well-intentioned in theory but can hardly be enforced in practice,” warns Wölken. “This must definitely be prevented.”
Green Party member Alexandra Geese praises: “The EU Commission has exemplarily developed extensive knowledge about the companies affected by the DSA, increased personnel, and sought external expertise.” Nevertheless, it’s still a “Herculean task where member states must provide vigorous support“. Geese sees a well-staffed independent agency as necessary in the long run, “which can ensure consistent legal enforcement against these powerful corporations, independent of state and politics.”
The 19 platforms identified as particularly large online platforms (VLOPs) and search engines (VLOSE) must now comply with almost all rules of the Digital Services Act from today. Only the rules that additionally require a National Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) will remain excluded until February 2024.
The DSA obliges providers to a variety of new duties. The most important one concerns illegal content: While the liability regime of the E-Commerce Directive remains fundamentally intact. Providers don’t need to actively search for illegal content. However, they must take action from the moment they become aware of potentially illegal activity. And they must inform about deletion, blocking, or inactivity in a comprehensible procedure. Affected individuals must also be able to object to such categorization – so there are several changes coming for operators as well as users.
In Germany, the DSA thus replaces the Network Enforcement Act: Due to the precedence of European law, this largely no longer applies to major social networks such as Twitter/X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn and Telegram. The DSA also covers much more than the closed catalog of the Network Enforcement Act: illegal content prohibited under national law, provided this law itself doesn’t contradict European law.
The new rules also apply not only to social networks: User-generated content on other platforms, such as reviews on major marketplaces, must be treated comparably. This particularly affects Amazon and Zalando, as well as app stores or reviews on mapping services starting today. The DSA also demands significant changes in recommendation systems. These must also be available in a profile independent of the individual user.
Another example that new regulation leads to concrete product changes is evident: “On TikTok, Instagram and Facebook, users can now turn off algorithmically determined feeds, which is a requirement of the DSA,” explains Julian Jaursch, DSA expert at the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung. “Although such measures existed to some extent already: The fact that some platforms are making changes to their products shows that the DSA has consequences.” Specifically, TikTok and Instagram had previously refused to allow non-algorithmic representations of their content, and Facebook had originally started without such a feature.
By today’s deadline, operators of offerings classified as VLOPs or VLOSE must submit reports on so-called systemic risks. In these reports, they are to explain which potentially problematic effects they have identified through their platforms.
Examples of this could be life-threatening challenges on TikTok, anorexia guides on Instagram, election influence attempts on Facebook, data protection violations or the spread of illegal content. Article 34 of the DSA contains only an exemplary, non-exhaustive list. Which risks companies see and what steps they must take to contain the dangers also determine each other. This can be achieved, for instance, by adjusting algorithms, terms and conditions or content moderation mechanisms.
However, this area will cause discussions. To what extent is an advertising-funded, data-driven business model inherently a threat to the fundamental right to personal data protection? To what extent can interaction-based content ranking algorithms be considered a genuine societal risk? Many of these questions are not so scientifically clear-cut that they would be legally definitive as well. Years of intense debate are looming.
MEP Alexandra Geese, in any case, expects the Commission to take a particularly close look at one area in the beginning: In the European election year 2024, a special focus must be placed on social networks. “The dissemination of disinformation as well as hate and incitement through algorithms and microtargeting disproportionately and precisely endangers our democracy, as they give extremist parties enormous reach,” Geese told Table.Media. “Ranking criteria must be examined.”
The last item of the 94-point manifesto adopted by the BRICS countries today packs a punch: “Brazil, India, China and South Africa extend their full support to Russia for its BRICS Chairship in 2024 and the holding of the XVI BRICS Summit in the city of Kazan, Russia.” The five founding members of the BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – agreed on the 26-page paper on Thursday.
Russia’s President Putin could not travel to the BRICS summit, which is being held in Johannesburg from Tuesday until Thursday, because an international arrest warrant has been issued against him. Next year, he will host it instead. The will to oppose US dominance is apparently so strong that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is completely omitted.
The original BRICS also agreed to admit six more countries. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa announced the list of future members:
will join the group on Jan. 1, 2024. “We have consensus on the first phase of this expansion process and other phases will follow,” Ramaphosa said.
Observers already expected some of the newcomers. But there are surprises. First and foremost, Iran: The Islamic Republic is considered a pariah by the West and is considered to belong to the camp around China and Russia. For example, Iran is one of the most important suppliers of military drones to Russia, which are deployed in Ukraine.
In the run-up to the BRICS summit, experts had still considered Iran’s accession unlikely. They argued that the democracies Brazil, India and South Africa, which are also interested in maintaining good relations with the West, could hardly be interested in allowing BRICS to become a rogue group.
But apparently, other considerations outweighed for the five BRICS countries. Energy could have been an important factor. After all, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE and Brazil, the group will include some of the world’s largest energy producers. Iran is home to the world’s second-largest gas reserves and a quarter of the Middle East’s oil reserves.
In point 21 of the manifesto, Iran is mentioned as an explicit criticism of the West’s Iran policy: “We reiterate the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful and diplomatic means in accordance with the international law.”
By contrast, experts had predicted Saudi Arabia’s accession. Ahead of the summit, China and Brazil had already voiced their support for the accession. Enlargement of the BRICS group only makes economic sense if Saudi Arabia joins, the inventor of the BRICS acronym, economist Jim O’Neill, told Bloomberg.
The kingdom, which also seeks good relations with the West, is the world’s largest oil producer, while China is the largest oil consumer. Since most of the world’s energy trade is denominated in dollars, the enlargement also facilitates the transition of trade to alternative currencies. Along with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia is also an important new contributor to the BRICS countries’ New Development Bank (NDB). The Emirates has been a member of the NDB since 2021.
Egypt has also been a shareholder in NDB since March. The country is one of the main recipients of US aid, but has long maintained close ties with Russia and has growing trade relations with China. Russia is building Egypt’s first nuclear power plant and China is developing parts of the new capital. Egypt is experiencing a currency crisis and is counting on trading within the BRICS group without the dollar.
Argentina is also struggling with a foreign exchange crisis. The country wants to gain access to alternative financing through the NDB. Its supporters within BRICS include its main trading partner and neighbor Brazil, as well as India and China.
Ethiopia ranks among the more unexpected newcomers. The country is the third-largest economy south of the Sahara and even ranks second in terms of population. The Ethiopian economy has also grown rapidly recently. However, its GDP is just half the size of the smallest BRICS member, South Africa. In addition, the country is currently being shaken again by armed conflicts.
Many observers had expected Indonesia to be one of the new BRICS members. However, Indonesia had asked to postpone its membership in order to consult with its ASEAN partners, South Africa’s BRICS ambassador Anil Sooklal said in an interview. He said that Indonesia may join in the next year or two.
The debate on the enlargement of the BRICS group was driven primarily by China. The People’s Republic hopes to create alternatives to the Western-dominated world order and wants to win over as many supporters as possible. Russia remains internationally isolated due to the Ukraine war and also hopes to gain new supporters by expanding the BRICS group.
India and Brazil have recently been more hesitant – even though they had agreed to the enlargement in principle. They fear a rushed enlargement could turn the economic bloc into an anti-Western club. Both countries reject such a positioning. India is also concerned about China’s dominance of the BRICS group.
In their manifesto, the BRICS states call for “a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council,” in which the victorious powers of World War II, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as the two BRICS states, Russia and China, are permanent members with veto rights.
This repeatedly causes controversy, as does the selection procedure for non-permanent members. The BRICS states demand that the UN Security Council become “more democratic, representative, effective and efficient” and more representative of the developing countries. Arne Schuette/Christian von Hiller
On Thursday evening, in Moscow, none other than Russian President Vladimir Putin indirectly confirmed the death of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. Without mentioning his name, Putin spoke of a tragedy and emphasized Wagner’s significant contribution to the war against Ukraine. However, some of Russia’s prominent political analysts, such as Valery Solovei, also don’t rule out the possibility of deception.
However, the scholar who has long dealt with the effects of propaganda doesn’t seem to take this theory entirely seriously himself. In a conversation with Russian journalist Alexander Plushev on Thursday on YouTube, he pointed out that Prigozhin’s death serves the purpose of arranging the transfer of power after Putin. “He (Putin) is dying. His environment knows that and Prigozhin’s death is supposed to secure the planned transfer of power and prevent interference.“
According to Russian authorities, the remains of ten individuals have been recovered from the crash site. Contradictory reports emerged in Russian media and Telegram channels regarding the identification of the bodies, suggesting that the bodies of Prigozhin and his key representative, Dmitry Utkin, were either identified or were burned beyond recognition. Images surfaced on social media purportedly showing bullet holes in sections of the jet’s fuselage. The version of an “accidental” shootdown was already spread on the evening of the crash.
Political analyst Ekaterina Schulmann evaluates the event negatively. “Everything that is happening right now is very bad. There’s nothing good about it,” she said on Plushev’s YouTube show. “These are signs of a failed state. It’s absurd to assume that this revenge on Prigozhin, which is now being read on the front pages of the world press, secures Putin’s position.” If Putin has to hold his environment in check with such violence, then the question arises, is there nothing else that scares them more? Schulmann recently explained in an interview with Table.Media that the increasing repression in Russia is a sign of regime decay, not stabilization.
Alexey Yusupov, a Russia expert and head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s country program, stated in response to Table.Media’s inquiry: “Prigozhin had done something that was actually reserved for the president: he addressed the people. He spoke to the public with a political intention. He had broken a taboo, and that needed to be corrected.”
Yusupov added that the attack on Prigozhin now turns the system against its own people, which hadn’t occurred to this extent before. “Until the revolt two months ago, the system had regulated internal conflicts itself. It was over with the coup attempt. That’s an important point.” And the current retaliation indicates that something is in progress and a new dynamic is emerging within the elites.
The probable death is unlikely to have immediate effects on the war in Ukraine, which celebrated its Independence Day on Aug. 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy hurried to assure that Ukraine had not been involved.
More impacts can be expected for Belarus. The Wagner camp appears to be dismantling its base there. The independent journalistic project Hajun, which monitors the military in Belarus, reported the dismantling of the camp southeast of Minsk.
Ukrainian Telegram channels also reported the withdrawal of Wagner forces since the beginning of August. A total of 2,000 personnel were reportedly stationed there. The relocation of Wagner units to Belarus shortly after the coup attempt in June had raised concerns about an increased threat in Poland and Baltic states.
The situation for the Wagner Group in African states such as Mali, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso is still unclear. Prigozhin’s last video for the public was said to have been recorded in Mali, and it was disseminated earlier this week. Whether the death of the militia leader will change Russia’s presence in the mentioned countries remains uncertain for now.
And what will become of the Wagner Group itself? Russian Telegram channels announced after reports of Prigozhin’s death that there is a backup plan. The Kremlin-critical channel Gulagu.net, citing sources in Wagner structures, wrote that compromising material about the Russian power elite will be released in the near future. Whether and in what form Wagner itself will continue to exist is currently not reliably ascertainable.
The Dutch government intends to nominate Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra as EU Commissioner on Friday. Hoekstra would succeed Frans Timmermans as the Dutch Commissioner, who resigned from his position to run in the parliamentary elections in his country.
Timmermans is running to become Prime Minister and successor to the prematurely resigned Prime Minister Mark Rutte of the Liberals after the Nov. 22 election. In the European Commission, Timmermans was responsible for the Green Deal. This responsibility is now assumed by Slovak Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič.
Hoekstra served as the Dutch finance minister from 2017 to 2022. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to comment. A representative from the Netherlands’ permanent representation to the European Union stated that they could not confirm the report. tho/rtr
Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics has assigned Evika Siliņa with forming the government in the Baltic EU and NATO country. A week after the resignation of Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins and talks with all seven parties represented in the parliament, the president nominated the 48-year-old former Welfare Minister on Thursday.
“I am convinced that Ms. Siliņa can fulfill the task in a sufficiently short time. Her experience and knowledge are a good start for creating a functioning ministerial cabinet,” Rinkevics said at a press conference in Riga. The Latvian president, who advocated for a broad coalition, expressed hope that government formation will be completed by mid-September.
Siliņa also cited this timeframe as a goal, and she indicated that she would begin coalition negotiations with four parties on Friday. The politician from the liberal-conservative government party, Jauna Vienotiba, was the sole candidate officially nominated by the parties for the position of prime minister in the Baltic state. dpa
On June 9, 2024, the French will be called to vote for their 79 members of the European Parliament. Historically, this election has mobilized few people in France: Barely half of the French voters show significant interest. However, the political challenges are not insignificant: This election could solidify the far-right Rassemblement National (RN) and the governing party Renaissance as the main forces in the country. However, it could also lead to an ascent of the left-wing parties, under one condition: that they can overcome their deep divisions.
The focus is on the four left-wing parties – La France Insoumise (LFI), Socialist Party (PS), Communist Party (PC) and Europe Ecology/The Greens (EELV) – which have been united under the banner of the Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale (Nupes) since the parliamentary elections in June 2022.
For months, La France Insoumise has been pushing for the formation of a single Nupes list for the upcoming European elections. However, last July, the French Greens (EELV) approved their strategy for a separate list with an 86 percent majority. The ecologists intend to run alone in the next European elections and have even already named their lead candidate: MEP Marie Toussaint. The “Ecolos” undoubtedly recalled that in 2019, the Greens could elect thirteen MEPs, while the “Insoumis” and the Socialists each only secured six seats.
A survey published in May by Cluster17 for Le Point nevertheless sparked some discussions: A joint Nupes list would lead the election with 27 percent of the votes, followed by the Rassemblement National (25.5 percent) and the governing party (23 percent).
In the case of separate left-wing lists, the sum of the left-wing votes – LFI (11 percent), EELV (11 percent), PS (9 percent) and PCF (4 percent), totaling 35 percent – would be higher than the result of a joint list. Then, the Rassemblement National (24 percent) would be in the lead, followed by the governing party, which would achieve a lower result (19.5 percent).
This could explain why La France Insoumise, and especially its leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who is known for his less-than-friendly views towards Germany, have increased pressure on the Greens in recent months. The “Insoumis” almost weekly emphasize to the Greens’ leader, Marine Tondelier, the necessity of a single list. Tondelier responded with a clear message: “The Greens will not change their minds just because a guy says the same thing five times, louder each time.” – Quite an atmosphere.
Behind this power struggle lies a political battle in France, where the other left-wing parties, particularly the Greens, want to balance a Nupes that has been dominated by LFI since its inception. LFI, in turn, recognizes the importance of left-wing unity in 2024 for the survival of Nupes and otherwise predicts their disintegration.
These tensions may now fall on Marie Toussaint, who stands more positively towards Nupes and whose appointment by LFI was received as a “signal”. While she is relatively unknown to the general public, she has made a name for herself in the world of activists with the “Affaire du siècle” (Case of the Century): In 2019, together with her environmental law NGO Notre affaire à tous, she jointly sued the French government, along with three other organizations (Greenpeace, Fondation pour la nature et l’homme, and Oxfam), demanding that it uphold its climate action commitments.
More than two million citizens signed the parallel petition. In 2021, France was condemned by the Council of State for inaction on climate action. “My main weapon is the law,” said the international environmental law graduate. From now on, however, she will have to leave legal language behind in favor of a much more political one.
