It’s crunch time for the Green Deal in Strasbourg this week, with trilogues, votes and the next climate policy vision for Europe.
This afternoon, the European Commission will present its climate target for 2040. A proposal with a 90 percent reduction in CO2 compared to 1990 levels is considered likely. Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra had promised this beforehand. It is still unclear what role technological carbon capture and storage (CCSU) will play in achieving the goal. Contrary to previous announcements, it seems that the Commission may propose CCS not only for residual emissions from certain industrial sectors but also for fossil fuel power plants. Additionally, the Commission will establish an industry alliance for small and modular nuclear power plants to bring all stakeholders to the table and accelerate the development of SMEs.
Negotiators for the Net-Zero Industry Act will convene for the third trilogue on Tuesday morning. The previous meeting had remained largely inconclusive, but the outlines of an agreement are emerging: Member states have moved closer to the European Parliament on one of the main sticking points and are willing to accept a unified list of eligible “net-zero technologies”. Previously, they had insisted on a second list of “strategic” projects that would enjoy additional benefits, such as improved access to financing. The Council has also shown willingness to shorten approval deadlines for processes such as the establishment of new solar module factories.
The European Parliament will vote on its position on the revision of EU genetic engineering law on Wednesday afternoon. The preceding debate on Tuesday is expected to be intense. Supporters and opponents of the project have submitted numerous amendments. Nevertheless, even among critics, it is expected that the plenary will vote in favor of loosening the rules on new breeding techniques following the decision of the Committee on the Environment at the end of January.
There’s a lot happening this week in Strasbourg. We’ll keep you updated.
The non-affiliated MEP Ždanoka was already known as an open supporter of Russia. She dedicated much of her career to what she claimed was the persecution of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic states. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, she traveled to the region to observe the referendum, which was not recognized by most countries. In 2016, she traveled to Syria to meet with Bashar al-Assad, who was already under EU sanctions at the time.
This dubious activism has, however, never been enough to prove that Ždanoka is a Russian asset, until the leaked emails exposed that she met Russian officers in Brussels. Journalists, including those from “The Insider” portal, found out that she was exchanging information with Russia and asked for money for political events.
Other Latvian MEPs now say that they have always suspected that Ždanoka was working for Russia. European People’s Party Sandra Kalniete says that pro-Russian activists like Ždanoka are used by Russian propaganda. In Russian media Ždanoka was portrayed as proof that Russia has support in the West, and that Europe poses threats to human rights.
However, Ždanoka, who has been in the European Parliament since 2004, had little influence in Brussels. “Her activities in EP, they had no impact. They were mostly for internal use in Russia,” says Kalniete. All her activities in Parliament, all events were filmed to be broadcast in Russia on social media and television as evidence that the EP supported Russia.
Lithuanian MEP Rasa Juknevičienė says Ždanoka raised suspicions as early as 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. “She was always on those shows. The fact that an MEP goes to Moscow, appears on TV programs, and spreads messages that benefit the Kremlin is enough. All of us who have been interested in Russian information warfare have known about her activities for a very long time,” says Juknevičienė.
Baltic representatives in the European Parliament stress that the so-called Ždanokagate is not the only case where they suspect Russian influence; however, they refused to give names, saying it is up to secret services to disclose it. In Ireland, eyes are on MEPs Clare Daly and Mick Wallace, close allies of Ždanoka who accompanied her on some travels.
Sandra Kalniete suggests looking at the voting for the EP’s resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 – Ždanoka was one of 13 members who voted against it.
“These people are actively taking a pro-Russian stance,” says Kalniete, adding that multiple political groups in EP have now expressed support on the investigation of Ždanoka’s activities as they expect to find out more about Russian influence in different countries. Immediately after the allegations surfaced, the European Parliament initiated an investigation against Ždanoka. Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the allegations raised in a media report were taken “very seriously,” the Parliament said on Tuesday.
Rasa Juknevičienė, also a former Lithuanian minister of defense, raises concern that Belgium’s secret services are not capable of identifying foreign agents in Brussels. She points out multiple cases when Russia has been possibly interfering in the politics of other countries, also mentioning Germany’s AfD, when its representative, just like Ždanoka, visited Russian-occupied Crimea, therefore justifying its annexation.
Russia has been influencing European politicians through business or, like in Ždanoka’s case, through culture, its interest being to saw distrust and raise support for the right-wing parties, as well as fuel separatist sentiments. According to Juknevičienė, in Brussels, not only Russia but also China, Iran and Turkey are known to exert their influence; however, Russia is most systematic with its effort.
“Some ask what secrets has Ždanoka revealed? The European Parliament has no secrets. Her task was different – not to collect secrets, but to make connections, to influence, to spread narratives that benefit the Kremlin. This is how Russia is using the possibilities of democracy to destroy it,” says Juknevičienė.
The EU Parliament is voting today on the trilogue outcome for an amendment to the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive. This is to align the law with a ruling from the European Court of Justice. Part of the agreement is also a reassessment of the directive by the EU Commission, which is already underway.
The EU Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE Directive) sets requirements for the disposal of these devices. In Germany, this was implemented through the Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (ElektroG). The basic principle is the product responsibility of manufacturers: They bear the waste management responsibility for their products throughout their entire lifecycle.
Eleven kilograms of electronic waste per EU inhabitant were collected in 2021. This corresponds to a laptop, a vacuum cleaner and a smartphone that each EU citizen disposed of within a year – a massive amount of old devices that continues to increase. Electronic waste is one of the fastest-growing waste streams.
Electronics contain rare and expensive materials. Therefore, it is important, not only for the sake of the circular economy and greater supply security, to collect, recycle and reuse electronic waste. Furthermore, it contains materials that are hazardous and can cause significant environmental and health problems if the devices are not properly disposed of.
Photovoltaic modules also fall into this waste stream. Since 2012, the modules have been covered by the WEEE Directive. It prescribes a collection rate of 85 percent; 80 percent must be returned to the material cycle. Manufacturers and distributors have been required to register and take back PV modules since then, and they are also responsible for disposal. Due to their relatively long lifespan of at least 25 years, the return volumes are still limited, according to the German Solar Industry Association (BSW). Since 2023, requirements for the recyclability of PV modules have also been based on the Ecodesign Directive.
At the end of November, the Council and Parliament agreed on changes that initially aim to bring the directive in line with a court ruling: The European Court of Justice had declared some parts of the directive invalid due to unjustified retroactivity. On Jan. 11, the EU Parliament’s Committee on the Environment accepted the agreement, and today the plenary will vote on it.
The background: In 2012, with the entry into force of the new WEEE Directive, photovoltaic modules were included in the scope of the previous directive. In addition, from Aug. 15, 2018, an “open scope” was introduced: All electrical and electronic equipment now fell under the directive unless explicitly excluded. The ECJ found that as a consequence, the extended producer responsibility (i.e., the financing of the costs for waste management) would also apply retroactively to PV modules placed on the market between 2005 and 2018 according to the new directive. According to the ruling, this violates the principle of legal certainty.
The agreement between the Council and Parliament also introduces a review clause, according to which the Commission must examine by no later than 2026 whether a revision of the directive is necessary. If necessary, the Commission must submit a legislative proposal accompanied by a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment. According to the agreement, the Commission should also ensure that the costs of disposing of electrical and electronic waste are not unreasonably passed on to consumers or citizens. The deadline for implementing the directive amendment should be extended from twelve months (as proposed by the Commission) to 18 months.
Currently, the Commission is already conducting an evaluation of the WEEE Directive. It aims to determine whether the directive is still appropriate, identify opportunities for simplification and assess whether a revision is necessary. The corresponding public consultation has already been completed, and a study has been conducted in parallel. The Commission intends to publish the final report by September 2024.
Feb. 7, 2024; 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgium)/online
ERCST, Discussion Hydrogen Bank: A Game Changer?
The European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST) aims at fuelling and informing the discussion on the different Hydrogen Bank’s instruments. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 7, 2024; 1-3:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgiun)/online
ERCST, Presentation ‘Climate Change Policy Priorities in the Next EU Political Cycle’ Report
The European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST) focuses on the qualitative analysis of the initiative “Climate Change Policy Priorities in the Next EU Political Cycle”. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 7, 2024; 4:30-6:00 p.m., online
Eurogas, Conference Union Database: Is the EU Ready?
Eurogas addresses the challenges related to the Union Database’s implementation timeline and its impact on imports from third countries. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 8, 2024; 12:30-1:30 p.m., online
DGAP, Panel Discussion IPQ Debate on Europe’s Geostrategic Turn
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) discusses strategies for the EU to live up to its geopolitical aspirations and to strengthen Europe’s security. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 8, 2024; 4:30-5:30 p.m., online
HBS, Seminar Back on track to Paris? Stock-taking of EU climate and energy targets beyond 2030
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) discusses what needs to be the level of the EU’s climate and energy ambitions until 2040. INFO & REGISTRATION
The EU Commission has rejected the European solar industry’s call for help against price pressure from China for the time being. The EU must continue to have access to affordable solar modules for the green transition, explained Finance Commissioner Mairead McGuinness in the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Monday. “Given that we currently rely to a very important degree on imports to reach EU solar deployment targets, any potential measure needs to be weighed against the objectives we have set ourselves when it comes to the energy transition,” said McGuinness.
The EU Commissioner admitted that the supply of the EU market is heavily dependent on imports. Imports mainly come from China. The “surge in imports” was an “opportunity for citizens and solar panel installers” but “clearly a challenge to EU solar panels producers,” said McGuinness. She added that the EU has instruments at its disposal to counter unfair trade practices such as dumping.
MEPs were unhappy with the Commissioner’s speech and warned of Chinese dominance in the solar industry. Several MEPs, such as Engin Eroglu (Free Voters), accused the Commission of underestimating the problem. Green Party MEP Henrike Hahn called for the EU Commission to stand by European companies.
Last week, European solar module manufacturers requested the EU to take immediate action so that local companies do not have to close under the price pressure of Chinese imports. “Over the next 4-8 weeks, major EU PV module producers and their European suppliers are poised to shut down manufacturing lines unless substantial emergency measures are promptly implemented,” reads the letter from the industry association European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC) to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Without rapid assistance, the EU would risk losing more than half of its production capacity for photovoltaic modules in a very short time.
The European solar industry has come under severe pressure since last summer due to a price collapse, mainly triggered by a flood of cheap Chinese solar modules. ari
With its initiative for a power plant strategy, the federal government disregards a new European legal acceleration option for tendering secured capacity. The desired technological neutrality could have been ensured by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) not only through the introduction of a capacity mechanism until at least 2028 but also through another approach.
The new Electricity Market Regulation provides for so-called flexibility support measures. In principle, this is nothing more than a lean capacity mechanism specifically for electricity storage, industrial demand management and other technological alternatives to power plants.
EU member states have introduced the new support measures as a turbo option to circumvent the lengthy approval process for comprehensive capacity mechanisms. However, this could play into the hands of the federal government, as member states also want to introduce capacity mechanisms themselves more quickly.
According to the new Electricity Market Regulation, the European Commission must propose ways to simplify their introduction by the turn of the year. The requirement that capacity markets are only permissible as a last resort has already been abolished.
Currently, the regulation still imposes high requirements on the introduction of capacity mechanisms – with the definition of such financial injections being very broad and hardly allowing any loopholes. For example, the member state must identify market failure in detail in the electricity market.
A “comprehensive study on the possible effects of these mechanisms on neighboring member states” and consultation with European neighbors are also required. Therefore, the interpretation in the government camp that the new EU electricity market design has fundamentally smoothed the hurdles for capacity mechanisms is highly questionable. ber
Originally, EU member states were scheduled to vote on the Commission’s proposal yesterday to once again allow exemptions from the fallow land regulation (GAEC 8) within the CAP for this year. However, the vote has been postponed, as confirmed by a Commission spokesperson. Member states are now expected to provide written comments on the proposal by tomorrow.
It is considered likely that EU countries will give the green light. The reason for the delay is that the Commission has made further changes to its proposal from last week.
This concerns compatibility with eco-schemes. The Commission’s proposal suggests that for 2024, as an alternative to four percent fallow land, the GAEC 8 standard can also be met by cultivating legumes or catch crops on seven percent of the land. However, this would conflict with eco-schemes in some member states based on GAEC 8.
This is also the case in Germany: Among others, the German farmers’ association Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (AbL) had warned that the use of the exemption would contradict the promotion of legume cultivation through eco-schemes. The Commission’s revised draft (available here) proposes to temporarily adjust the relevant eco-schemes.
If the member states’ vote on Wednesday is positive, the German government will have 15 days to inform the Commission whether it intends to implement the exemption. This would then come into effect retrospectively from Jan. 1, 2024. Despite his previous criticism of relaxing fallow land requirements, Federal Minister of Agriculture Cem Özdemir has spoken out in favor of the exemption for 2024 and intends to advocate for Germany’s approval in Brussels within the coalition. In the past, Özdemir has repeatedly warned against pitting goals such as climate and biodiversity protection against food security.
Just a few months ago, the EU Commission rejected an exemption for GAEC 8 for 2024 – its proposal now can be seen as a response to the farmer protests that have recently reached Brussels as well. However, the exemption for 2024 is more narrowly defined than the one in place last year.
In 2023, member states were still allowed to cultivate cereals on the actual fallow land. The goal is different now, according to senior Commission officials: While previously the aim was to ramp up domestic agricultural production in the face of high grain prices due to the Ukraine war, the focus is now on providing economic relief to farms. jd
Following the debacle over agricultural diesel cuts, Federal Minister of Agriculture Cem Özdemir wants to make concessions to farmers. To financially assist livestock farmers in converting their barns, he plans to introduce an “animal welfare cent”. As exclusively learned by Table.Media, the BMEL presented key points for this to the SPD, Greens and FDP factions last week. However, there are doubts about whether the concept is compatible with European law.
According to faction sources, the BMEL proposes a so-called non-harmonized consumption tax on certain animal products. The BMEL aims to ensure compatibility with European law. It is understood that the levy – similar to the coffee tax in Germany – would be exempt from EU harmonization. In this case, specific European legal requirements, such as those for fuel tax, would not apply.
Tax lawyer Till Valentin Meickmann from the University of Passau doubts whether the financing concept of the animal welfare cent is legally watertight. He sees “significant European legal risks”, particularly in the fact that the additional revenue from the tax is intended to be used for restructuring animal husbandry towards better animal welfare.
“A tax where the additional burden is at least partially offset economically for domestic producers would likely violate the European prohibition of discriminatory taxes,” says Meickmann. EU countries generally cannot use the revenue from a tax levied on both domestic and foreign products to promote domestic production of those products.
According to Meickmann, this problem could only be legally resolved by levying the tax solely on products from the country. However, he doubts that the animal welfare tax could then be passed on to the end consumer. “Ultimately, an animal welfare tax solely on domestic products could leave domestic livestock farmers economically burdened with the additional tax burden.” This would defeat the purpose of an “animal welfare cent”.
Politically, it is also likely to be difficult to convince coalition partners of the financing instrument. This is because tax increases, as outlined in the paper by the BMEL, are not feasible with the FDP. Just in December, Federal Finance Minister Lindner declared tax increases a red line in the traffic light coalition. heu
For the AfD, the EU is “an undemocratic and incapable-of-reform construct”. For the new alliance led by Sahra Wagenknecht, “the European integration process is at a standstill”. Both parties, therefore, enter the upcoming European election campaign with plenty of EU-critical messages.
How much do such messages resonate with the German electorate? Not too much, according to a new study by the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation. Last summer, the KAS surveyed 4,000 eligible voters in a representative poll about their attitudes towards the EU. The result: 17 percent, according to author Jochen Roose, belong to the group of “resigned populists” who view politicians at the European level as detached from the people and disinterested in the common good. According to this group, the clear majority of surveyed AfD supporters belong.
The opposite pole of the “enthusiastic Europhiles” is twice as large at 34 percent, including most Green voters. In between are the “critical Europhiles” (24 percent) and the “calmly pragmatic” (22 percent). In these two groups, only one in six doubts that Germany is better off in the EU. But the number of undecided is significant. Many in these two groups consider the EU complex and admit to knowing little about “Brussels”, some also doubt the sincerity of EU politicians. So, there are certainly points of contact for EU critics here. Till Hoppe
It’s crunch time for the Green Deal in Strasbourg this week, with trilogues, votes and the next climate policy vision for Europe.
This afternoon, the European Commission will present its climate target for 2040. A proposal with a 90 percent reduction in CO2 compared to 1990 levels is considered likely. Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra had promised this beforehand. It is still unclear what role technological carbon capture and storage (CCSU) will play in achieving the goal. Contrary to previous announcements, it seems that the Commission may propose CCS not only for residual emissions from certain industrial sectors but also for fossil fuel power plants. Additionally, the Commission will establish an industry alliance for small and modular nuclear power plants to bring all stakeholders to the table and accelerate the development of SMEs.
Negotiators for the Net-Zero Industry Act will convene for the third trilogue on Tuesday morning. The previous meeting had remained largely inconclusive, but the outlines of an agreement are emerging: Member states have moved closer to the European Parliament on one of the main sticking points and are willing to accept a unified list of eligible “net-zero technologies”. Previously, they had insisted on a second list of “strategic” projects that would enjoy additional benefits, such as improved access to financing. The Council has also shown willingness to shorten approval deadlines for processes such as the establishment of new solar module factories.
The European Parliament will vote on its position on the revision of EU genetic engineering law on Wednesday afternoon. The preceding debate on Tuesday is expected to be intense. Supporters and opponents of the project have submitted numerous amendments. Nevertheless, even among critics, it is expected that the plenary will vote in favor of loosening the rules on new breeding techniques following the decision of the Committee on the Environment at the end of January.
There’s a lot happening this week in Strasbourg. We’ll keep you updated.
The non-affiliated MEP Ždanoka was already known as an open supporter of Russia. She dedicated much of her career to what she claimed was the persecution of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic states. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, she traveled to the region to observe the referendum, which was not recognized by most countries. In 2016, she traveled to Syria to meet with Bashar al-Assad, who was already under EU sanctions at the time.
This dubious activism has, however, never been enough to prove that Ždanoka is a Russian asset, until the leaked emails exposed that she met Russian officers in Brussels. Journalists, including those from “The Insider” portal, found out that she was exchanging information with Russia and asked for money for political events.
Other Latvian MEPs now say that they have always suspected that Ždanoka was working for Russia. European People’s Party Sandra Kalniete says that pro-Russian activists like Ždanoka are used by Russian propaganda. In Russian media Ždanoka was portrayed as proof that Russia has support in the West, and that Europe poses threats to human rights.
However, Ždanoka, who has been in the European Parliament since 2004, had little influence in Brussels. “Her activities in EP, they had no impact. They were mostly for internal use in Russia,” says Kalniete. All her activities in Parliament, all events were filmed to be broadcast in Russia on social media and television as evidence that the EP supported Russia.
Lithuanian MEP Rasa Juknevičienė says Ždanoka raised suspicions as early as 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. “She was always on those shows. The fact that an MEP goes to Moscow, appears on TV programs, and spreads messages that benefit the Kremlin is enough. All of us who have been interested in Russian information warfare have known about her activities for a very long time,” says Juknevičienė.
Baltic representatives in the European Parliament stress that the so-called Ždanokagate is not the only case where they suspect Russian influence; however, they refused to give names, saying it is up to secret services to disclose it. In Ireland, eyes are on MEPs Clare Daly and Mick Wallace, close allies of Ždanoka who accompanied her on some travels.
Sandra Kalniete suggests looking at the voting for the EP’s resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2022 – Ždanoka was one of 13 members who voted against it.
“These people are actively taking a pro-Russian stance,” says Kalniete, adding that multiple political groups in EP have now expressed support on the investigation of Ždanoka’s activities as they expect to find out more about Russian influence in different countries. Immediately after the allegations surfaced, the European Parliament initiated an investigation against Ždanoka. Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the allegations raised in a media report were taken “very seriously,” the Parliament said on Tuesday.
Rasa Juknevičienė, also a former Lithuanian minister of defense, raises concern that Belgium’s secret services are not capable of identifying foreign agents in Brussels. She points out multiple cases when Russia has been possibly interfering in the politics of other countries, also mentioning Germany’s AfD, when its representative, just like Ždanoka, visited Russian-occupied Crimea, therefore justifying its annexation.
Russia has been influencing European politicians through business or, like in Ždanoka’s case, through culture, its interest being to saw distrust and raise support for the right-wing parties, as well as fuel separatist sentiments. According to Juknevičienė, in Brussels, not only Russia but also China, Iran and Turkey are known to exert their influence; however, Russia is most systematic with its effort.
“Some ask what secrets has Ždanoka revealed? The European Parliament has no secrets. Her task was different – not to collect secrets, but to make connections, to influence, to spread narratives that benefit the Kremlin. This is how Russia is using the possibilities of democracy to destroy it,” says Juknevičienė.
The EU Parliament is voting today on the trilogue outcome for an amendment to the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive. This is to align the law with a ruling from the European Court of Justice. Part of the agreement is also a reassessment of the directive by the EU Commission, which is already underway.
The EU Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE Directive) sets requirements for the disposal of these devices. In Germany, this was implemented through the Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (ElektroG). The basic principle is the product responsibility of manufacturers: They bear the waste management responsibility for their products throughout their entire lifecycle.
Eleven kilograms of electronic waste per EU inhabitant were collected in 2021. This corresponds to a laptop, a vacuum cleaner and a smartphone that each EU citizen disposed of within a year – a massive amount of old devices that continues to increase. Electronic waste is one of the fastest-growing waste streams.
Electronics contain rare and expensive materials. Therefore, it is important, not only for the sake of the circular economy and greater supply security, to collect, recycle and reuse electronic waste. Furthermore, it contains materials that are hazardous and can cause significant environmental and health problems if the devices are not properly disposed of.
Photovoltaic modules also fall into this waste stream. Since 2012, the modules have been covered by the WEEE Directive. It prescribes a collection rate of 85 percent; 80 percent must be returned to the material cycle. Manufacturers and distributors have been required to register and take back PV modules since then, and they are also responsible for disposal. Due to their relatively long lifespan of at least 25 years, the return volumes are still limited, according to the German Solar Industry Association (BSW). Since 2023, requirements for the recyclability of PV modules have also been based on the Ecodesign Directive.
At the end of November, the Council and Parliament agreed on changes that initially aim to bring the directive in line with a court ruling: The European Court of Justice had declared some parts of the directive invalid due to unjustified retroactivity. On Jan. 11, the EU Parliament’s Committee on the Environment accepted the agreement, and today the plenary will vote on it.
The background: In 2012, with the entry into force of the new WEEE Directive, photovoltaic modules were included in the scope of the previous directive. In addition, from Aug. 15, 2018, an “open scope” was introduced: All electrical and electronic equipment now fell under the directive unless explicitly excluded. The ECJ found that as a consequence, the extended producer responsibility (i.e., the financing of the costs for waste management) would also apply retroactively to PV modules placed on the market between 2005 and 2018 according to the new directive. According to the ruling, this violates the principle of legal certainty.
The agreement between the Council and Parliament also introduces a review clause, according to which the Commission must examine by no later than 2026 whether a revision of the directive is necessary. If necessary, the Commission must submit a legislative proposal accompanied by a socio-economic and environmental impact assessment. According to the agreement, the Commission should also ensure that the costs of disposing of electrical and electronic waste are not unreasonably passed on to consumers or citizens. The deadline for implementing the directive amendment should be extended from twelve months (as proposed by the Commission) to 18 months.
Currently, the Commission is already conducting an evaluation of the WEEE Directive. It aims to determine whether the directive is still appropriate, identify opportunities for simplification and assess whether a revision is necessary. The corresponding public consultation has already been completed, and a study has been conducted in parallel. The Commission intends to publish the final report by September 2024.
Feb. 7, 2024; 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgium)/online
ERCST, Discussion Hydrogen Bank: A Game Changer?
The European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST) aims at fuelling and informing the discussion on the different Hydrogen Bank’s instruments. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 7, 2024; 1-3:30 p.m., Brussels (Belgiun)/online
ERCST, Presentation ‘Climate Change Policy Priorities in the Next EU Political Cycle’ Report
The European Roundtable on Climate Change and Sustainable Transition (ERCST) focuses on the qualitative analysis of the initiative “Climate Change Policy Priorities in the Next EU Political Cycle”. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 7, 2024; 4:30-6:00 p.m., online
Eurogas, Conference Union Database: Is the EU Ready?
Eurogas addresses the challenges related to the Union Database’s implementation timeline and its impact on imports from third countries. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 8, 2024; 12:30-1:30 p.m., online
DGAP, Panel Discussion IPQ Debate on Europe’s Geostrategic Turn
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) discusses strategies for the EU to live up to its geopolitical aspirations and to strengthen Europe’s security. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 8, 2024; 4:30-5:30 p.m., online
HBS, Seminar Back on track to Paris? Stock-taking of EU climate and energy targets beyond 2030
The Heinrich Böll Foundation (HBS) discusses what needs to be the level of the EU’s climate and energy ambitions until 2040. INFO & REGISTRATION
The EU Commission has rejected the European solar industry’s call for help against price pressure from China for the time being. The EU must continue to have access to affordable solar modules for the green transition, explained Finance Commissioner Mairead McGuinness in the plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Monday. “Given that we currently rely to a very important degree on imports to reach EU solar deployment targets, any potential measure needs to be weighed against the objectives we have set ourselves when it comes to the energy transition,” said McGuinness.
The EU Commissioner admitted that the supply of the EU market is heavily dependent on imports. Imports mainly come from China. The “surge in imports” was an “opportunity for citizens and solar panel installers” but “clearly a challenge to EU solar panels producers,” said McGuinness. She added that the EU has instruments at its disposal to counter unfair trade practices such as dumping.
MEPs were unhappy with the Commissioner’s speech and warned of Chinese dominance in the solar industry. Several MEPs, such as Engin Eroglu (Free Voters), accused the Commission of underestimating the problem. Green Party MEP Henrike Hahn called for the EU Commission to stand by European companies.
Last week, European solar module manufacturers requested the EU to take immediate action so that local companies do not have to close under the price pressure of Chinese imports. “Over the next 4-8 weeks, major EU PV module producers and their European suppliers are poised to shut down manufacturing lines unless substantial emergency measures are promptly implemented,” reads the letter from the industry association European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC) to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Without rapid assistance, the EU would risk losing more than half of its production capacity for photovoltaic modules in a very short time.
The European solar industry has come under severe pressure since last summer due to a price collapse, mainly triggered by a flood of cheap Chinese solar modules. ari
With its initiative for a power plant strategy, the federal government disregards a new European legal acceleration option for tendering secured capacity. The desired technological neutrality could have been ensured by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) not only through the introduction of a capacity mechanism until at least 2028 but also through another approach.
The new Electricity Market Regulation provides for so-called flexibility support measures. In principle, this is nothing more than a lean capacity mechanism specifically for electricity storage, industrial demand management and other technological alternatives to power plants.
EU member states have introduced the new support measures as a turbo option to circumvent the lengthy approval process for comprehensive capacity mechanisms. However, this could play into the hands of the federal government, as member states also want to introduce capacity mechanisms themselves more quickly.
According to the new Electricity Market Regulation, the European Commission must propose ways to simplify their introduction by the turn of the year. The requirement that capacity markets are only permissible as a last resort has already been abolished.
Currently, the regulation still imposes high requirements on the introduction of capacity mechanisms – with the definition of such financial injections being very broad and hardly allowing any loopholes. For example, the member state must identify market failure in detail in the electricity market.
A “comprehensive study on the possible effects of these mechanisms on neighboring member states” and consultation with European neighbors are also required. Therefore, the interpretation in the government camp that the new EU electricity market design has fundamentally smoothed the hurdles for capacity mechanisms is highly questionable. ber
Originally, EU member states were scheduled to vote on the Commission’s proposal yesterday to once again allow exemptions from the fallow land regulation (GAEC 8) within the CAP for this year. However, the vote has been postponed, as confirmed by a Commission spokesperson. Member states are now expected to provide written comments on the proposal by tomorrow.
It is considered likely that EU countries will give the green light. The reason for the delay is that the Commission has made further changes to its proposal from last week.
This concerns compatibility with eco-schemes. The Commission’s proposal suggests that for 2024, as an alternative to four percent fallow land, the GAEC 8 standard can also be met by cultivating legumes or catch crops on seven percent of the land. However, this would conflict with eco-schemes in some member states based on GAEC 8.
This is also the case in Germany: Among others, the German farmers’ association Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (AbL) had warned that the use of the exemption would contradict the promotion of legume cultivation through eco-schemes. The Commission’s revised draft (available here) proposes to temporarily adjust the relevant eco-schemes.
If the member states’ vote on Wednesday is positive, the German government will have 15 days to inform the Commission whether it intends to implement the exemption. This would then come into effect retrospectively from Jan. 1, 2024. Despite his previous criticism of relaxing fallow land requirements, Federal Minister of Agriculture Cem Özdemir has spoken out in favor of the exemption for 2024 and intends to advocate for Germany’s approval in Brussels within the coalition. In the past, Özdemir has repeatedly warned against pitting goals such as climate and biodiversity protection against food security.
Just a few months ago, the EU Commission rejected an exemption for GAEC 8 for 2024 – its proposal now can be seen as a response to the farmer protests that have recently reached Brussels as well. However, the exemption for 2024 is more narrowly defined than the one in place last year.
In 2023, member states were still allowed to cultivate cereals on the actual fallow land. The goal is different now, according to senior Commission officials: While previously the aim was to ramp up domestic agricultural production in the face of high grain prices due to the Ukraine war, the focus is now on providing economic relief to farms. jd
Following the debacle over agricultural diesel cuts, Federal Minister of Agriculture Cem Özdemir wants to make concessions to farmers. To financially assist livestock farmers in converting their barns, he plans to introduce an “animal welfare cent”. As exclusively learned by Table.Media, the BMEL presented key points for this to the SPD, Greens and FDP factions last week. However, there are doubts about whether the concept is compatible with European law.
According to faction sources, the BMEL proposes a so-called non-harmonized consumption tax on certain animal products. The BMEL aims to ensure compatibility with European law. It is understood that the levy – similar to the coffee tax in Germany – would be exempt from EU harmonization. In this case, specific European legal requirements, such as those for fuel tax, would not apply.
Tax lawyer Till Valentin Meickmann from the University of Passau doubts whether the financing concept of the animal welfare cent is legally watertight. He sees “significant European legal risks”, particularly in the fact that the additional revenue from the tax is intended to be used for restructuring animal husbandry towards better animal welfare.
“A tax where the additional burden is at least partially offset economically for domestic producers would likely violate the European prohibition of discriminatory taxes,” says Meickmann. EU countries generally cannot use the revenue from a tax levied on both domestic and foreign products to promote domestic production of those products.
According to Meickmann, this problem could only be legally resolved by levying the tax solely on products from the country. However, he doubts that the animal welfare tax could then be passed on to the end consumer. “Ultimately, an animal welfare tax solely on domestic products could leave domestic livestock farmers economically burdened with the additional tax burden.” This would defeat the purpose of an “animal welfare cent”.
Politically, it is also likely to be difficult to convince coalition partners of the financing instrument. This is because tax increases, as outlined in the paper by the BMEL, are not feasible with the FDP. Just in December, Federal Finance Minister Lindner declared tax increases a red line in the traffic light coalition. heu
For the AfD, the EU is “an undemocratic and incapable-of-reform construct”. For the new alliance led by Sahra Wagenknecht, “the European integration process is at a standstill”. Both parties, therefore, enter the upcoming European election campaign with plenty of EU-critical messages.
How much do such messages resonate with the German electorate? Not too much, according to a new study by the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation. Last summer, the KAS surveyed 4,000 eligible voters in a representative poll about their attitudes towards the EU. The result: 17 percent, according to author Jochen Roose, belong to the group of “resigned populists” who view politicians at the European level as detached from the people and disinterested in the common good. According to this group, the clear majority of surveyed AfD supporters belong.
The opposite pole of the “enthusiastic Europhiles” is twice as large at 34 percent, including most Green voters. In between are the “critical Europhiles” (24 percent) and the “calmly pragmatic” (22 percent). In these two groups, only one in six doubts that Germany is better off in the EU. But the number of undecided is significant. Many in these two groups consider the EU complex and admit to knowing little about “Brussels”, some also doubt the sincerity of EU politicians. So, there are certainly points of contact for EU critics here. Till Hoppe