Today’s Environment Council will be crucial on the road to the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai at the end of the year (COP28). Firstly, the member states want to define their negotiating mandate for the COP. It is, so to speak, the guideline with which the EU negotiators will meet the representatives of other countries in Dubai. And it also reflects the level of ambition. However, the EU will also have to be measured against this paper in Dubai: It cannot credibly demand from others what the paper does not contain.
Particularly with regard to the role of CCS, this could be decisive. In Dubai, the EU Commission would like to work toward a fossil-free energy system by 2050 without the use of Carbon Capture (CCS). But there is still no consensus among the member states as to whether it would be better to work only for an end to fossil energies for which no Carbon Capture is possible (“unabated fossil fuels”).
The second landmark decision of the environment ministers is the update of the EU climate target. Announced many times before, today is actually to be the day: The EU is raising its carbon reduction target for 2030 to minus 57 percent compared to 1990. This is also important for COP28 because the EU always demands new, more ambitious climate targets from other countries and can also present its own update in the future. This strengthens its negotiating position.
However, there is one shortcoming with this update: In all likelihood, the official climate target (NDC) filed with the UN of currently “at least minus 55 percent” will not be increased. Only in the technical explanation of how this target is to be achieved will the new value of minus 57 percent play a role. It remains to be seen how convincing the new EU climate target will be on the international stage.
Have a good start to the week.
Mr. O’Sullivan, has the EU failed with its sanctions regime against Russia? Latest figures suggest that Vladimir Putin is getting what he needs for arms production…
No, I don’t share that view. I think the sanctions are working. The three main objectives were, first, to weaken the technological capabilities of the Russian military; second, to deprive the Russian Government of revenue to continue the war; and third, to impose a high cost of unprovoked aggression on Russia’s economy. I think we can see clear effects in all three areas.
Ukraine reported that plenty of Western technology is found even in newer Russian missiles…
It is true that some semi-military components still find their way to Russia, but the quality of Russian weapons is declining. You can see that in the Russian missiles that were intercepted by the Ukrainians. Russia is now turning to North Korea for components. This shows how problematic it is for Putin to continue the production of technologically sophisticated weapons.
The figures, however, speak a different language. Russia’s imports from Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia or Turkey increased by 37 percent in the first half of the year, and at the same time exports from the EU to Central Asia and Turkey increased by a similar amount.
Those were the earlier figures. In the meantime, we are seeing a significant slowdown. It is paying off that we were able to reach an agreement with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Serbia to prevent the re-export of products that can be used for armaments. All of these countries, as well as the United Arab Emirates, have agreed to ban the re-export of a whole list of products to Russia. Therefore, I think we have managed to close that loophole. We hope that Turkey will follow in the next few days.
Ukraine’s Sanctions Coordinator says all kinds of Western products have been found in new weapons, missiles and drones from Russia.
We know that these products are in stock and the Russians have been able to acquire them from various sources. I mean, these are everyday things. Chips, integrated circuits, flash memory cards, optical readers. A lot of it circulates in the world economy and some of it finds its way to Russia. But I think we are increasingly cutting off the source of that technology from Europe or the United States and making it harder and harder for Russia to acquire it. We know for a fact, and the Ukrainians confirmed this to us when they were here, that Russia’s supply of this kind of product is shrinking, and they are struggling to maintain the technological quality of their weapons.
You have made a trip through third countries, what is the feedback?
We have two countries that we would have expected to join our sanctions. Those are Serbia and Turkey. We are disappointed, of course, that the two candidate countries have not done so. Both countries have their own reasons. Serbia has its own painful history from the 1990s. In Turkey, Mr. Erdogan is trying to find some kind of middle ground and does not want to take sides. But they all recognize that they don’t want to become a platform for evading sanctions, especially when it comes to military goods supplied to the military-industrial complex.
Your title is Sanctions Coordinator, which sounds like little power …
My task is to approach the countries. But of course, the EU can use its new instruments against countries that participate in circumvention deals in the future. Everyone knows that this threat exists. And, of course, the fight against circumvention deals starts at home. When European goods find their way to Russia, they still originate somewhere in Europe.
You mentioned the new instruments against sanctions violations. Do you think that these will soon be applied against third countries?
We continue to try to work with all countries in a cooperative spirit, recognizing their sovereignty, their independence, and their territorial integrity. But if we are unable to come to a negotiated agreement on how to deal with some of these circumvention issues, then of course we have the option of resorting to these punitive measures. I hope that we don’t have to do that. But I also hope we will not hesitate to use these tools if necessary.
The oil price cap does not seem to be working either…
Well, it works. But naturally, we have two problems. One is the very high price of oil. That means, of course, that Russia can get higher prices for its oil than it would have before. And secondly, there are problems with the circumvention of regulations by shipping and transporting this oil.
What do you mean specifically?
There are indications that some shipping companies are manipulating the transport costs and the price of the oil. And we also have indications that there are so-called shadow fleets with very old, sometimes extremely dilapidated tankers that are apparently not insured by Western insurers but by Russia or China. But with what guarantee? If there is an environmental disaster at some point and one of these tankers dumps oil somewhere on a coast, I don’t know if the affected country would actually be compensated by this insurance. The G7 industrialized countries are actively addressing this and considering how to address this kind of circumvention. And I think we will see further action in the coming weeks.
Ukraine calls for lowering the price cap. Would that be a possibility?
I think the general view is that the problem is not the price cap. It is working, but not as effectively as we had originally hoped. The price of oil is now close to $100 a barrel. That, of course, makes oil trading much more interesting and benefits Russia. If the oil price is $100, lowering the price ceiling from $60 to $40 will not have much impact. I think the main focus is on circumventing the price cap through shadow fleets or by falsifying waybills and documentation about the cost of transportation versus the cost of freight. People are actively working on closing those loopholes.
The debate on the 12th sanctions package has begun. What should be included?
I am not involved in the drafting of new sanctions. Frankly, I think there’s a long way to go before we get to that. And in the meantime, there will be all kinds of speculation about what should be in it and what people want. But that’s not my issue.
Thierry Breton has ambitions: Formally just a simple EU Commissioner, albeit one with important issues, the former telecommunications and IT manager has identified a field where he can shine. Breton is currently signaling clearly: He could imagine another term in office in Brussels.
He realized early on: Appointments with Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Tim Cook and other more or less glamorous IT company stars also benefit the attention of the shrewd head of the Brussels administrative authority. Breton staged himself as an actor on a par with the IT giants – or even above them. Not without a hint of irony, he announced the DSA as the “end of the Wild West” on the Internet. And in doing so, he cast himself as the sheriff.
But like a real policeman, the EU Commission had little choice but to take action in the current crisis surrounding the events in the Gaza Strip: Only a few weeks after the Digital Services Act became applicable, it has to show that the DSA is not just a theoretical supervisory framework. After all, X, formerly Twitter, hardly seems capable of dealing with hate, depictions of violence, and incitement in accordance with the rules. And with TikTok, too, there are at least big question marks as to whether the platform is actually capable of removing illegal content in a timely manner.
However, some essential building blocks are still missing for the DSA to be fully effective. In particular, the fact that the national coordinators (DSC) have not started their work is problematic for the overall supervisory system. They are actually supposed to receive reports as national contacts and – if they are responsible – indicate critical problems at an operator.
And the EU Commission itself was actually not in a position to take the first procedural steps at this stage. Transparency reports from operators of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) are not due to arrive until the next few days. The processes are still in progress, not all planned staff positions have been filled. And the committee of DSA regulators, the European Body for Digital Services, does not exist either. For some decisions, however, this is a necessary precondition.
But the situation left the Commission with few options, so Thierry Breton rushed ahead and wrote letters. First to X, then a slightly different one to Meta, then to TikTok. He said he feared the platforms were being used to spread illegal content and misinformation in the EU. “After I wrote the letter, X responded immediately,” Breton says. “They contacted my team. And it explained where our concerns were exactly.” X said in all discussions that it wants to fully comply with DSA requirements, he said. Breton sees his role in naming the problems. Then, he said, he would review the results. All operators know, he said, that the Commission will measure platforms against DSA obligations and enforce them.
In fact, the correspondence with the platform operators is only the prelude to something bigger: formal investigations. To this end, the Commission can request information on facts from the operators at the VLOPs. They must comply with the request. In the case of X, formerly Twitter, the Commission has now done just that: The platform must provide answers on the activation of the crisis protocol in the context of the Middle East crisis by October 18, and on other issues by October 31.
However, if operators like X fail to contribute information to the satisfaction of the Commission, it can impose more than just fines, as it does in antitrust investigations, for example. It can take measures ranging from questioning witnesses to seizure in order to obtain the necessary and correct documents. It may also order access to databases and algorithms, for example.
Moreover, it does not necessarily have to wait for the platform operators: it may also take interim measures – such as obliging a platform to hire more moderators for a language area, to block certain content effectively. This remedy is obvious in the context of the Middle East events. Whether the platforms prefer to act first will be seen in the coming weeks. At any rate, Thierry Breton’s will to enforce DSA will hardly fail a good six months before the European elections.
In 2019, Russia unveiled the Avangard hypersonic glide missile and Ukraine is deploying the Kinschal hypersonic cruise missile. China and the US are following suit in research on the projectiles. Whether the hypersonic cruise missiles can already do as promised – change direction several times at more than five times the speed of sound – is unclear. But they show: Europe must act if it wants to protect itself against them in the future.
The EU has been funding a Spanish-led consortium uniting 13 companies under the name EU Hydef (Hypersonic Defense) with €100 million from the European Defense Fund (EDF) since July 2022. This year, the EU Commission decided that another consortium led by European missile builder MBDA would receive €80 million. With a similar name: Hydis² (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study), it aims to be better than Hydef. In ten to 15 years, a defense system should be able to fire maneuverable hypersonic weapons.
Hydef or Hydis² should get in line with the Pesco project Twister (Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater surveillance). Pesco is the EU’s military cooperation platform, Twister a Pesco project for air defense.
That two projects are funded in parallel can be described as a negligent use of taxpayers’ money. After Hydef was awarded the contract, France is said to have exerted pressure. In parallel, MBDA filed a lawsuit against the Commission and was also awarded the contract. Without a tender. MBDA does not want to comment on whether the lawsuit is still pending, although MBDA is now also receiving EU funds for development. Industry sources say that French policy primarily promotes the interests of its own defense manufacturers – at the expense of European partners.
Now the MBDA consortium Hydis² is competing with Hydef for the better completion of the development phase. Paris should be satisfied because a large part of the sum flows to France, to MBDA. Germany has no objections because four German partners are represented in the consortium with MBDA Deutschland, Bayern-Chemie, OHB and the German Aerospace Center. In the case of Hydef, only Diehl is involved for Germany.
And Diehl is likely to be quite upset. Even if the missile manufacturer’s CEO, Helmut Rauch, carefully wraps up his words to Table.Media. “The EU Commission decided that Hydef was better in all respects.” And, “Hydef is the lower-risk project because it uses existing technologies.”
The foreign policy spokesman for the conservative EPP group in the European Parliament, Michael Gahler, would like to see the projects “merged in the medium term.” Financing two systems would “unnecessarily burden the already narrow EDF budget and also limit interoperability in European air defense,” he says upon request. Having two consortia researching development, however, could provide added value, he says.
Green Party member of the Bundestag Philip Krämer takes a different view: “Funding two congruent projects is wasteful.” It does make sense to develop a defense system against hypersonic glide missiles at the European level. “National sensitivities,” however, should be overcome in the process.
In addition, it must be clarified “which threats can be specifically combated.” In combating hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic stratospheric glide missiles, there are “major differences that are difficult for one system to combat,” Krämer says. Product descriptions from the industry would not clearly separate the two. “This is not reputable.”
Chancellor Olaf Scholz took the first steps toward closing the gaps in air defense with the joint procurement project European Sky Shield Initiative (Essi) in October 2022:
Arrow 3 is suitable for ballistic missiles that can fly at 20 times the speed of sound, but their trajectory is also easier to calculate than hypersonic cruise missiles or gliders. The latter fly lower and can flexibly change their trajectory.
The new defense systems are then expected to fill this gap. “There is currently nothing on the world market that protects against these maneuverable hypersonic weapons,” says Emmanuel Delorme, project manager for the Hydis² tender at MBDA. During the concept phase, which is scheduled to begin in January 2024, he said, the first six months will be spent evaluating the requirements for the system with the four partner countries. Before that, however, the contracts with the European procurement authority Occar have to be finalized.
The consortia now have three years to convince the EU Commission of their developments. The deadline for the MBDA consortium is extended slightly to make up for the head start the Spanish-led group had. The contractual details for Hydis² would still be settled by the end of 2023, and the actual development phase would then begin in the new year. It has already started at Hydef. With Thomas Wiegold
When Thomas Schmidt joined the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in July 2020, the Saxon minister was already familiar with European work. For example, through his previous position: from 2014 to 2019, he was responsible for the environment and agriculture in Saxony. “I believe that European agriculture and also environmental policy are the now most regulated areas at the European level,” he explains. Events in Brussels are almost a home game for him: “I was always preceded by the reputation of being in Brussels as often as my cabinet colleagues as a whole.”
So, it was only logical to seek a mandate in the CoR to complement his current role as Minister of State for Regional Development. Meetings of CoR members focus on the regional view of European policy. “And I also believe that this regional view benefits the European Commission as well as the bodies in the Parliament so that feasible decisions on European policy can be made.” Frustration and unnecessary readjustments can be avoided if the CoR’s “wealth of knowledge” is used.” According to the Saxon minister, this has been happening increasingly in recent years. And there is also the other side, he said: “You must never forget that you also communicate European policy in the region itself.”
In addition to his memberships in the Commissions for Economic Policy (ECON) and Energy, Climate and Environment (ENVE), Thomas Schmidt is also chairman of the Automotive Intergroup (CoRAI) in the CoR. Until this fall, he will also chair the Alliance of Automotive Regions. As Saxony is a key automotive region that also turned to electromobility at an early stage, he can bring valuable impetus from the region to the CoR with regard to the structural change already taking place in the automotive industry in Europe, some of which is still pending.
Schmidt is convinced that the focus of the work is not so much on the OEMs, i.e. the manufacturers, “because they are so big, they will certainly make their decisions at national level, but also internationally.” “Our focus is very much on the suppliers, that is, on the chain from the supplier to the service issue. Both are hard hit. Service is often forgotten.” He said this restructuring could succeed by creating a European support instrument similar to the Just Transition Fund specifically for the automotive sector.
As the CoR’s former rapporteur for the European Chips Act (ECA), he has closely followed important decisions regarding the future development of Europe’s industry. The result is not just to produce more microchips or semiconductors in Europe. “The goal is to stabilize industrial production in Europe – resilience is the key word of our time.”
Here, it was important to Thomas Schmidt to include not only Saxony but also the other major semiconductor regions in Europe, such as Noord-Brabant and Overijssel in the Netherlands, Carinthia and Styria in Austria, and Grenoble in France. On the other hand, the wishes of the regions that want to expand their economic efforts in the semiconductor sector should also be taken into account. He also attaches great importance to the topic of education and training in this rather new branch of technology.
With such intensive commitment at the European level, it does not seem surprising that people in Brussels were already speculating on Schmidt as successor in the EU Parliament when MEP Peter Jahr announced he would not be running again.
However, the Saxon minister rejected this idea in favor of continuing his work in the CoR. “I would like to continue my mandate in the Committee of the Regions if possible,” he says. “I would like to hold the fort for Saxony even after the state elections in 2024. I don’t want to give up what we’ve achieved in the last three years.” Juliane Scholübbers
Today’s Environment Council will be crucial on the road to the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai at the end of the year (COP28). Firstly, the member states want to define their negotiating mandate for the COP. It is, so to speak, the guideline with which the EU negotiators will meet the representatives of other countries in Dubai. And it also reflects the level of ambition. However, the EU will also have to be measured against this paper in Dubai: It cannot credibly demand from others what the paper does not contain.
Particularly with regard to the role of CCS, this could be decisive. In Dubai, the EU Commission would like to work toward a fossil-free energy system by 2050 without the use of Carbon Capture (CCS). But there is still no consensus among the member states as to whether it would be better to work only for an end to fossil energies for which no Carbon Capture is possible (“unabated fossil fuels”).
The second landmark decision of the environment ministers is the update of the EU climate target. Announced many times before, today is actually to be the day: The EU is raising its carbon reduction target for 2030 to minus 57 percent compared to 1990. This is also important for COP28 because the EU always demands new, more ambitious climate targets from other countries and can also present its own update in the future. This strengthens its negotiating position.
However, there is one shortcoming with this update: In all likelihood, the official climate target (NDC) filed with the UN of currently “at least minus 55 percent” will not be increased. Only in the technical explanation of how this target is to be achieved will the new value of minus 57 percent play a role. It remains to be seen how convincing the new EU climate target will be on the international stage.
Have a good start to the week.
Mr. O’Sullivan, has the EU failed with its sanctions regime against Russia? Latest figures suggest that Vladimir Putin is getting what he needs for arms production…
No, I don’t share that view. I think the sanctions are working. The three main objectives were, first, to weaken the technological capabilities of the Russian military; second, to deprive the Russian Government of revenue to continue the war; and third, to impose a high cost of unprovoked aggression on Russia’s economy. I think we can see clear effects in all three areas.
Ukraine reported that plenty of Western technology is found even in newer Russian missiles…
It is true that some semi-military components still find their way to Russia, but the quality of Russian weapons is declining. You can see that in the Russian missiles that were intercepted by the Ukrainians. Russia is now turning to North Korea for components. This shows how problematic it is for Putin to continue the production of technologically sophisticated weapons.
The figures, however, speak a different language. Russia’s imports from Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia or Turkey increased by 37 percent in the first half of the year, and at the same time exports from the EU to Central Asia and Turkey increased by a similar amount.
Those were the earlier figures. In the meantime, we are seeing a significant slowdown. It is paying off that we were able to reach an agreement with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Serbia to prevent the re-export of products that can be used for armaments. All of these countries, as well as the United Arab Emirates, have agreed to ban the re-export of a whole list of products to Russia. Therefore, I think we have managed to close that loophole. We hope that Turkey will follow in the next few days.
Ukraine’s Sanctions Coordinator says all kinds of Western products have been found in new weapons, missiles and drones from Russia.
We know that these products are in stock and the Russians have been able to acquire them from various sources. I mean, these are everyday things. Chips, integrated circuits, flash memory cards, optical readers. A lot of it circulates in the world economy and some of it finds its way to Russia. But I think we are increasingly cutting off the source of that technology from Europe or the United States and making it harder and harder for Russia to acquire it. We know for a fact, and the Ukrainians confirmed this to us when they were here, that Russia’s supply of this kind of product is shrinking, and they are struggling to maintain the technological quality of their weapons.
You have made a trip through third countries, what is the feedback?
We have two countries that we would have expected to join our sanctions. Those are Serbia and Turkey. We are disappointed, of course, that the two candidate countries have not done so. Both countries have their own reasons. Serbia has its own painful history from the 1990s. In Turkey, Mr. Erdogan is trying to find some kind of middle ground and does not want to take sides. But they all recognize that they don’t want to become a platform for evading sanctions, especially when it comes to military goods supplied to the military-industrial complex.
Your title is Sanctions Coordinator, which sounds like little power …
My task is to approach the countries. But of course, the EU can use its new instruments against countries that participate in circumvention deals in the future. Everyone knows that this threat exists. And, of course, the fight against circumvention deals starts at home. When European goods find their way to Russia, they still originate somewhere in Europe.
You mentioned the new instruments against sanctions violations. Do you think that these will soon be applied against third countries?
We continue to try to work with all countries in a cooperative spirit, recognizing their sovereignty, their independence, and their territorial integrity. But if we are unable to come to a negotiated agreement on how to deal with some of these circumvention issues, then of course we have the option of resorting to these punitive measures. I hope that we don’t have to do that. But I also hope we will not hesitate to use these tools if necessary.
The oil price cap does not seem to be working either…
Well, it works. But naturally, we have two problems. One is the very high price of oil. That means, of course, that Russia can get higher prices for its oil than it would have before. And secondly, there are problems with the circumvention of regulations by shipping and transporting this oil.
What do you mean specifically?
There are indications that some shipping companies are manipulating the transport costs and the price of the oil. And we also have indications that there are so-called shadow fleets with very old, sometimes extremely dilapidated tankers that are apparently not insured by Western insurers but by Russia or China. But with what guarantee? If there is an environmental disaster at some point and one of these tankers dumps oil somewhere on a coast, I don’t know if the affected country would actually be compensated by this insurance. The G7 industrialized countries are actively addressing this and considering how to address this kind of circumvention. And I think we will see further action in the coming weeks.
Ukraine calls for lowering the price cap. Would that be a possibility?
I think the general view is that the problem is not the price cap. It is working, but not as effectively as we had originally hoped. The price of oil is now close to $100 a barrel. That, of course, makes oil trading much more interesting and benefits Russia. If the oil price is $100, lowering the price ceiling from $60 to $40 will not have much impact. I think the main focus is on circumventing the price cap through shadow fleets or by falsifying waybills and documentation about the cost of transportation versus the cost of freight. People are actively working on closing those loopholes.
The debate on the 12th sanctions package has begun. What should be included?
I am not involved in the drafting of new sanctions. Frankly, I think there’s a long way to go before we get to that. And in the meantime, there will be all kinds of speculation about what should be in it and what people want. But that’s not my issue.
Thierry Breton has ambitions: Formally just a simple EU Commissioner, albeit one with important issues, the former telecommunications and IT manager has identified a field where he can shine. Breton is currently signaling clearly: He could imagine another term in office in Brussels.
He realized early on: Appointments with Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Tim Cook and other more or less glamorous IT company stars also benefit the attention of the shrewd head of the Brussels administrative authority. Breton staged himself as an actor on a par with the IT giants – or even above them. Not without a hint of irony, he announced the DSA as the “end of the Wild West” on the Internet. And in doing so, he cast himself as the sheriff.
But like a real policeman, the EU Commission had little choice but to take action in the current crisis surrounding the events in the Gaza Strip: Only a few weeks after the Digital Services Act became applicable, it has to show that the DSA is not just a theoretical supervisory framework. After all, X, formerly Twitter, hardly seems capable of dealing with hate, depictions of violence, and incitement in accordance with the rules. And with TikTok, too, there are at least big question marks as to whether the platform is actually capable of removing illegal content in a timely manner.
However, some essential building blocks are still missing for the DSA to be fully effective. In particular, the fact that the national coordinators (DSC) have not started their work is problematic for the overall supervisory system. They are actually supposed to receive reports as national contacts and – if they are responsible – indicate critical problems at an operator.
And the EU Commission itself was actually not in a position to take the first procedural steps at this stage. Transparency reports from operators of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) are not due to arrive until the next few days. The processes are still in progress, not all planned staff positions have been filled. And the committee of DSA regulators, the European Body for Digital Services, does not exist either. For some decisions, however, this is a necessary precondition.
But the situation left the Commission with few options, so Thierry Breton rushed ahead and wrote letters. First to X, then a slightly different one to Meta, then to TikTok. He said he feared the platforms were being used to spread illegal content and misinformation in the EU. “After I wrote the letter, X responded immediately,” Breton says. “They contacted my team. And it explained where our concerns were exactly.” X said in all discussions that it wants to fully comply with DSA requirements, he said. Breton sees his role in naming the problems. Then, he said, he would review the results. All operators know, he said, that the Commission will measure platforms against DSA obligations and enforce them.
In fact, the correspondence with the platform operators is only the prelude to something bigger: formal investigations. To this end, the Commission can request information on facts from the operators at the VLOPs. They must comply with the request. In the case of X, formerly Twitter, the Commission has now done just that: The platform must provide answers on the activation of the crisis protocol in the context of the Middle East crisis by October 18, and on other issues by October 31.
However, if operators like X fail to contribute information to the satisfaction of the Commission, it can impose more than just fines, as it does in antitrust investigations, for example. It can take measures ranging from questioning witnesses to seizure in order to obtain the necessary and correct documents. It may also order access to databases and algorithms, for example.
Moreover, it does not necessarily have to wait for the platform operators: it may also take interim measures – such as obliging a platform to hire more moderators for a language area, to block certain content effectively. This remedy is obvious in the context of the Middle East events. Whether the platforms prefer to act first will be seen in the coming weeks. At any rate, Thierry Breton’s will to enforce DSA will hardly fail a good six months before the European elections.
In 2019, Russia unveiled the Avangard hypersonic glide missile and Ukraine is deploying the Kinschal hypersonic cruise missile. China and the US are following suit in research on the projectiles. Whether the hypersonic cruise missiles can already do as promised – change direction several times at more than five times the speed of sound – is unclear. But they show: Europe must act if it wants to protect itself against them in the future.
The EU has been funding a Spanish-led consortium uniting 13 companies under the name EU Hydef (Hypersonic Defense) with €100 million from the European Defense Fund (EDF) since July 2022. This year, the EU Commission decided that another consortium led by European missile builder MBDA would receive €80 million. With a similar name: Hydis² (Hypersonic Defence Interceptor Study), it aims to be better than Hydef. In ten to 15 years, a defense system should be able to fire maneuverable hypersonic weapons.
Hydef or Hydis² should get in line with the Pesco project Twister (Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based Theater surveillance). Pesco is the EU’s military cooperation platform, Twister a Pesco project for air defense.
That two projects are funded in parallel can be described as a negligent use of taxpayers’ money. After Hydef was awarded the contract, France is said to have exerted pressure. In parallel, MBDA filed a lawsuit against the Commission and was also awarded the contract. Without a tender. MBDA does not want to comment on whether the lawsuit is still pending, although MBDA is now also receiving EU funds for development. Industry sources say that French policy primarily promotes the interests of its own defense manufacturers – at the expense of European partners.
Now the MBDA consortium Hydis² is competing with Hydef for the better completion of the development phase. Paris should be satisfied because a large part of the sum flows to France, to MBDA. Germany has no objections because four German partners are represented in the consortium with MBDA Deutschland, Bayern-Chemie, OHB and the German Aerospace Center. In the case of Hydef, only Diehl is involved for Germany.
And Diehl is likely to be quite upset. Even if the missile manufacturer’s CEO, Helmut Rauch, carefully wraps up his words to Table.Media. “The EU Commission decided that Hydef was better in all respects.” And, “Hydef is the lower-risk project because it uses existing technologies.”
The foreign policy spokesman for the conservative EPP group in the European Parliament, Michael Gahler, would like to see the projects “merged in the medium term.” Financing two systems would “unnecessarily burden the already narrow EDF budget and also limit interoperability in European air defense,” he says upon request. Having two consortia researching development, however, could provide added value, he says.
Green Party member of the Bundestag Philip Krämer takes a different view: “Funding two congruent projects is wasteful.” It does make sense to develop a defense system against hypersonic glide missiles at the European level. “National sensitivities,” however, should be overcome in the process.
In addition, it must be clarified “which threats can be specifically combated.” In combating hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic stratospheric glide missiles, there are “major differences that are difficult for one system to combat,” Krämer says. Product descriptions from the industry would not clearly separate the two. “This is not reputable.”
Chancellor Olaf Scholz took the first steps toward closing the gaps in air defense with the joint procurement project European Sky Shield Initiative (Essi) in October 2022:
Arrow 3 is suitable for ballistic missiles that can fly at 20 times the speed of sound, but their trajectory is also easier to calculate than hypersonic cruise missiles or gliders. The latter fly lower and can flexibly change their trajectory.
The new defense systems are then expected to fill this gap. “There is currently nothing on the world market that protects against these maneuverable hypersonic weapons,” says Emmanuel Delorme, project manager for the Hydis² tender at MBDA. During the concept phase, which is scheduled to begin in January 2024, he said, the first six months will be spent evaluating the requirements for the system with the four partner countries. Before that, however, the contracts with the European procurement authority Occar have to be finalized.
The consortia now have three years to convince the EU Commission of their developments. The deadline for the MBDA consortium is extended slightly to make up for the head start the Spanish-led group had. The contractual details for Hydis² would still be settled by the end of 2023, and the actual development phase would then begin in the new year. It has already started at Hydef. With Thomas Wiegold
When Thomas Schmidt joined the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in July 2020, the Saxon minister was already familiar with European work. For example, through his previous position: from 2014 to 2019, he was responsible for the environment and agriculture in Saxony. “I believe that European agriculture and also environmental policy are the now most regulated areas at the European level,” he explains. Events in Brussels are almost a home game for him: “I was always preceded by the reputation of being in Brussels as often as my cabinet colleagues as a whole.”
So, it was only logical to seek a mandate in the CoR to complement his current role as Minister of State for Regional Development. Meetings of CoR members focus on the regional view of European policy. “And I also believe that this regional view benefits the European Commission as well as the bodies in the Parliament so that feasible decisions on European policy can be made.” Frustration and unnecessary readjustments can be avoided if the CoR’s “wealth of knowledge” is used.” According to the Saxon minister, this has been happening increasingly in recent years. And there is also the other side, he said: “You must never forget that you also communicate European policy in the region itself.”
In addition to his memberships in the Commissions for Economic Policy (ECON) and Energy, Climate and Environment (ENVE), Thomas Schmidt is also chairman of the Automotive Intergroup (CoRAI) in the CoR. Until this fall, he will also chair the Alliance of Automotive Regions. As Saxony is a key automotive region that also turned to electromobility at an early stage, he can bring valuable impetus from the region to the CoR with regard to the structural change already taking place in the automotive industry in Europe, some of which is still pending.
Schmidt is convinced that the focus of the work is not so much on the OEMs, i.e. the manufacturers, “because they are so big, they will certainly make their decisions at national level, but also internationally.” “Our focus is very much on the suppliers, that is, on the chain from the supplier to the service issue. Both are hard hit. Service is often forgotten.” He said this restructuring could succeed by creating a European support instrument similar to the Just Transition Fund specifically for the automotive sector.
As the CoR’s former rapporteur for the European Chips Act (ECA), he has closely followed important decisions regarding the future development of Europe’s industry. The result is not just to produce more microchips or semiconductors in Europe. “The goal is to stabilize industrial production in Europe – resilience is the key word of our time.”
Here, it was important to Thomas Schmidt to include not only Saxony but also the other major semiconductor regions in Europe, such as Noord-Brabant and Overijssel in the Netherlands, Carinthia and Styria in Austria, and Grenoble in France. On the other hand, the wishes of the regions that want to expand their economic efforts in the semiconductor sector should also be taken into account. He also attaches great importance to the topic of education and training in this rather new branch of technology.
With such intensive commitment at the European level, it does not seem surprising that people in Brussels were already speculating on Schmidt as successor in the EU Parliament when MEP Peter Jahr announced he would not be running again.
However, the Saxon minister rejected this idea in favor of continuing his work in the CoR. “I would like to continue my mandate in the Committee of the Regions if possible,” he says. “I would like to hold the fort for Saxony even after the state elections in 2024. I don’t want to give up what we’ve achieved in the last three years.” Juliane Scholübbers
