In Brussels, the shutters are slowly being put up – the parliamentary summer recess has begun. But current developments do not allow for a real break as is evident by the fact that the EU Commission was in Nigeria this weekend to explore possibilities for additional gas supplies. Read more about this in the News.
Should Europe build up reserves for rare earths, magnesium, and cobalt in view of the current supply crises? With strategic raw material stocks, companies could bridge supply bottlenecks, cushion price risks, and thus reduce their dependence on suppliers. So far, this has been too expensive for the industry – but there could be political support soon: The instrument is being discussed by the BMWK and in the EU Commission as part of the raw materials strategy. Leonie Düngefeld has the details.
Cooperation between European and Chinese universities and research institutes is not uncommon and is actually also a sign of good cross-border cooperation. However, much of this joint research benefits the Chinese defense sector – especially in Germany and Austria. Forced technology transfers are the biggest risk here, as Matej Šimalčík of the think tank CEIAS points out in an interview with Amelie Richter. The think tank has studied the links between academic institutions and Chinese cooperation partners.
In today’s profile, you can read how Virginijus Sinkevičius, only 31 years old, made it from Minister of the Economy in Lithuania to the youngest EU Commissioner to date.
I wish you a good start to the new week.
When Peter Handley, Head of Energy-Intensive Industries and Raw Materials, DG GROW, presented the first building blocks for the EU’s raw materials package in mid-July (Europe.Table reported), he did not reveal whether strategic raw materials stocks would also be part of it. The industry has been calling for political support for this tool since the beginning of the pandemic. This is because higher stock levels provide a buffer that companies can use to bridge supply bottlenecks in the short to medium term, cushion price risks, and thus reduce their dependence on suppliers.
The EU Commission is at least currently examining “possible options for strategic stocks at EU level”, an EU official told Europe.Table. In the Versailles Declaration, EU leaders had given the Commission a mandate to explore strategic stockpiling of critical raw materials. The Parliament’s report, adopted in November 2021, also calls on the Commission to include “strategic stockpiling” in its action plan. This involves the most economically important raw materials with a high supply risk, which the Commission last put on a list in 2020.
“However, the responsibility for ensuring a steady supply for manufacturing processes lies primarily with industry,” the commission representative said. “They should pay attention to their security of supply, diversify their supplies and invest in resilient supply chains.”
This is also supported by Matthias Wachter, Head of Department for Raw Materials at the Federation of German Industries (BDI). “Companies know their raw material requirements and the procurement markets better than government institutions.” That’s why stockpiling under the responsibility of industry is the most efficient solution, he says. The problem: Until now, it has had a negative impact on the balance sheet when companies store raw materials – hence the just-in-time production that has been practiced for decades. “Warehousing is always associated with additional costs for companies,” explains Wachter. Stored material also means a significantly higher capital commitment. “There is thus no incentive to stockpile critical raw materials for a rainy day.”
In July 2020, the first year of the pandemic, the BDI surveyed its members about the impact of the pandemic on raw material supplies. More than half of the companies surveyed had increased their own stockpiling at that time. Most of them wanted greater political support for this, for example, through tax breaks for stockpiling. The BDI proposes a “raw material stockpiling reserve”. In balance sheet and tax terms, the storage should only take effect when the stock is liquidated again and the corresponding raw material is used.
In other countries, it is quite common to stockpile non-fossil raw materials as well. For example, the Chinese Food and Strategic Reserves Administration stores copper, aluminum, and zinc. Government loans allow imports during periods of low prices. When commodity prices rise, the authority then releases reserves to relieve the burden on companies.
Japan is also considered a successful example. There, companies participate in international mining projects. “This is an indirect way of stockpiling because there is a proportionate long-term availability through direct participation in a mine,” explains Peter Buchholz, head of the German Mineral Resources Agency (DERA). “With long-term supply contracts, you can organize just-in-time production well across the supply chain and secure stable prices in the long term.”
In addition, the state-owned Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) coordinates raw material requirements with companies for crisis situations, then purchases and stores them on world markets. JOGMEC also explores new raw material deposits and then sells the licenses to Japanese companies.
In Germany, too, state reserves beyond strategic oil and gas stocks could make sense, Buchholz explains. “If the state is responsible for a certain stockpile, it can better manage risk provisioning in terms of the national economy, for example, for strategically relevant industries and population protection.” One possibility, therefore, could be the US model: There, the Defense Logistics Agency, which is part of the Department of Defense, stocks certain raw materials relevant to defense. Currently, 42 metals – ranging from base metals such as zinc, cobalt, chromium, and manganese to precious metals such as iridium and platinum – with a market value of around $1.1 billion are stored at six different locations in the USA.
In Europe, France, Sweden, Slovakia, and Great Britain stockpiled strategically important metals from the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the Federal Republic also planned to build up a raw materials reserve for economic purposes. One option discussed at the time was tax incentives for the private sector, which would bear responsibility for the stockpiles. However, the government feared that stockpiling could thus be used as a means of private-sector speculation. The plan was therefore abandoned a short time later.
Today, they think about it again: The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology is considering “support measures that go beyond the measures adopted in the German government’s raw materials strategy in 2020”, a spokeswoman told Europe.Table. “This also includes various aspects of stockpiling.” The reviews of possible measures are still ongoing, and so far, there are no results, according to the BMWK.
The time frame for stockpiling by companies should be set by policymakers, believes Matthias Wachter of the BDI. He suggests: “If you have a few months’ buffer, you could continue to produce in the event of a supply disruption and secure alternative sources of supply in the meantime.” If inventories last for at least half a year, you can usually weather short- and medium-term crises well, according to DERA head Peter Buchholz.
In view of the high raw material prices, however, setting up storage facilities would currently only make sense to maintain production, Buchholz said. For strategic storage, one would have to wait until prices fall again. “Commodity markets are cyclical and very volatile,” he explains. “Countercyclical behavior would have to be much more ingrained in the industry.” China is in a better strategic position in this regard. Their import figures for copper show: China imports massively when prices are low.
According to a study commissioned by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), three factors are crucial for the successful implementation and use of raw material storage facilities: constant demand and therefore, predictable sales, material specifications, and the relationship between raw material prices and available financial resources. Peter Buchholz suggests a planning horizon of about five years. During this period, it would be possible to purchase materials at low prices, store them and then produce them competitively when prices rise again. In strategically important sectors, it would also be possible to plan for ten years and replenish stocks again and again during favorable phases.
Which raw materials are suitable for storage at all is another question. Some metals are not weather-resistant and rust quickly. In addition, unprocessed raw materials are better suited for storage than processed materials – although processing currently takes place mainly in China. “It makes no sense to store raw materials here if you can’t process them further,” says Peter Buchholz.
Strategic raw material stocks must therefore be part of a larger package. Matthias Wachter speaks of the multi-pillar model: “We also need diversification of supply sources, more recycling and more extraction in Germany and Europe.”
Which universities and research institutes in Europe are cooperating with Chinese institutions? The “Academic Engagement Tracker” of the Central European think tank The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) has recorded more than 2,300 ties of academic institutions with Chinese cooperation partners and summarized details on their respective scientific cooperation.
Mr. Šimalčík, what areas of academic cooperation are you most concerned about?
There are some worrying trends that we have observed: First, we see a high share of collaboration with Chinese entities linked to the defense sector, such as the People’s Liberation Army, and military research and development. On average, over 40 percent of all connections are to military-linked entities. This share is highest in Austria and Germany, where it is around 55 percent. All but one of the top 10 most active Chinese universities are linked to the Chinese defense sector.
Are there other problematic connections?
Yes, we can observe that in the Central and Eastern European countries there is a very high level of dependence in China-focused education on Confucius Institutes which provide teachers, materials and finances to otherwise under-financed departments. That is a big problem. Future generations of China experts will be educated in an environment controlled by the Communist Party of China.
The third point of concern is that several European universities are cooperating with Chinese universities based in Xinjiang. These are mainly German and Polish institutions, but also from Bulgaria, Hungary and Georgia. What is worrying is the fact that many of these links were established after information about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became publicly available.
Is China focusing on specific academic fields for collaboration?
There is a predominant focus on STEM fields. Social sciences and humanities are only of secondary importance in the China-Europe academic engagement. Consequently, the direst risk European academia faces in collaborating with China is forced technology transfers. This risk is increasingly being highlighted by Western security agencies, including a joint statement by the directors of the FBI and MI5 intelligence agencies. Secret services in Central and Eastern Europe have also warned of the risks of technology theft.
In which country did you find the closest connection network?
The tracker focuses on eleven European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The most active were the German and Polish universities and research institutes. Looking at the top 10 most active academic institutions, all of them were either from Germany or Poland.
How did you collect all the data?
To map the interaction of European academic institutions and Chinese entities, we have relied on data collected from various open sources. The methodology constituted firstly of gathering data through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the public universities and research institutes. When that wasn’t possible, we used similar approaches. We have used this method to gather data on the scope and outcomes of cooperation with Chinese entities and evaluate the financial flows between them.
Filing the FOIA requests has also helped us assess the overall openness of public academic institutions regarding their dealings with China. Then we juxtaposed the collected data with media coverage of various academic interactions and other public sources to broaden the scope of the information where possible. In cases where it is allowed, such as Slovakia or Czechia, we also relied on publicly disclosed contracts to help supplement and check the transparency of agreements signed as a part of various interactions.
In the tracker, they also assessed the risk of individual cooperation. How did you go about it?
Where available, we have also cross-referenced the collected data with the China Defense University Tracker by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which has allowed us to note instances of cooperation with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army and assign approximate risk levels. At this moment, the Tracker relies only on this cross-reference.
This is merely the first layer of risk assessment that should be conducted, as the actual risk assignment should consider more factors. For example, on the transfer of intellectual property or in which scientific area exactly the cooperation takes place. These factors can lead us to conclude that risk is higher or lower than the ASPI-assigned institutional risk level.
This is a task that universities should do themselves. In reality, however, they rarely do so. Conducting a rigorous risk assessment can help universities develop appropriate mitigation measures while continuing to collaborate academically with Chinese partners.
I studied sinology at the LMU in Munich. I spent my year abroad at Tongji in Shanghai, which was and is essential for my studies at the time and still is for my work today. Is every cooperation with Chinese universities equally “bad”?
No, obviously not all academic interaction with China is problematic. Mutual exchange can benefit European academics, provided that it is done sustainably and equitably. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, which relies on a whole-of-society approach to achieve its interests – including academic institutions, civil society and corporations – engaging with Chinese entities carries specific risks.
What do you think European universities need to know or be better prepared for when it comes to cooperation with Chinese institutions?
Currently, universities are not prepared to deal with the challenges posed by academic cooperation with China. Only a few of the studies’ countries have specific guidelines and measures to prevent link abuse. As a result, there is a high level of variance among the countries in their awareness of potential risks. Response to these challenges should be three-pronged and focused on awareness raising, risk assessment and tailored risk mitigation measures, and transparency promotion.
When Virginijus Sinkevičius was born in Vilnius in November 1990, Lithuania had just regained its independence. 27 years later, he went on to become Lithuania’s Minister of the Economy. He is his country’s first minister born after the fall of the Iron Curtain. On December 1, 2019, he became the youngest EU commissioner to date. Since then, Sinkevičius has headed the Environment, Maritime Affairs, and Fisheries portfolio at the Brussels-based agency.
When the Lithuanian took office, the English-language news portal Lithuania Tribune, for which Sinkevičius had previously written himself, gushed with praise for the young commissioner. Sinkevičius, it said, was one of the country’s most popular ministers, whose trademark was innovation. He is the “rising star” of the Lithuanian LVŽS party, which is part of the Greens/EFA in Brussels.
As minister in Lithuania, Sinkevičius focused on start-ups, crafting a package of laws that made it easier to start businesses, which led to 47 percent more start-ups within a year, according to Lithuania Tribune. “I am convinced that start-ups are one of the cornerstones for better and greener development,” he tells Europe.Table.
The reason: Well over 95 percent of European companies are small or medium-sized. That is why it is crucial that they “play an essential role in combating climate change and supporting the green transformation of our industry”.
Despite the war against Ukraine, climate change, loss of biodiversity, ecosystem collapse, and resource scarcity are among the biggest challenges for Sinkevičius in the coming decades. For food security, which is threatened by the Ukraine war in many countries outside the EU, a healthy environment is “fundamental” in his view. Here, his guiding principle is that “sustainability is fundamental to long-term food security, both in the EU and globally.”
The Lithuanian EU Commissioner, who is married to a Ukrainian woman, sees no reason to be “optimistic that Russia will scale back its imperial ambitions in the foreseeable future”. However, he is reassured that the Baltic states and Poland are NATO members. If Finland and Sweden still join the alliance, it would be a real game-changer that would turn the Baltic Sea into a “NATO sea”, which would “drastically change” the security situation in the region.
There will be no project to define joint marine protected areas with Russia in the foreseeable future, he said. “However, as far as China is concerned, we will continue to raise this matter bilaterally with our Chinese partners at the highest political level whenever possible.”
On Instagram, Sinkevičius presents himself as a politician as well as a family man with his wife and two children. And the further you scroll into the past, the more often you see him in a basketball jersey. Such images have become rarer as his duties increase, and Sinkevičius is still recovering from an injury – contracted while playing basketball. Even the youngest EU Commissioner is getting older. Gabriel Bub
In Brussels, the shutters are slowly being put up – the parliamentary summer recess has begun. But current developments do not allow for a real break as is evident by the fact that the EU Commission was in Nigeria this weekend to explore possibilities for additional gas supplies. Read more about this in the News.
Should Europe build up reserves for rare earths, magnesium, and cobalt in view of the current supply crises? With strategic raw material stocks, companies could bridge supply bottlenecks, cushion price risks, and thus reduce their dependence on suppliers. So far, this has been too expensive for the industry – but there could be political support soon: The instrument is being discussed by the BMWK and in the EU Commission as part of the raw materials strategy. Leonie Düngefeld has the details.
Cooperation between European and Chinese universities and research institutes is not uncommon and is actually also a sign of good cross-border cooperation. However, much of this joint research benefits the Chinese defense sector – especially in Germany and Austria. Forced technology transfers are the biggest risk here, as Matej Šimalčík of the think tank CEIAS points out in an interview with Amelie Richter. The think tank has studied the links between academic institutions and Chinese cooperation partners.
In today’s profile, you can read how Virginijus Sinkevičius, only 31 years old, made it from Minister of the Economy in Lithuania to the youngest EU Commissioner to date.
I wish you a good start to the new week.
When Peter Handley, Head of Energy-Intensive Industries and Raw Materials, DG GROW, presented the first building blocks for the EU’s raw materials package in mid-July (Europe.Table reported), he did not reveal whether strategic raw materials stocks would also be part of it. The industry has been calling for political support for this tool since the beginning of the pandemic. This is because higher stock levels provide a buffer that companies can use to bridge supply bottlenecks in the short to medium term, cushion price risks, and thus reduce their dependence on suppliers.
The EU Commission is at least currently examining “possible options for strategic stocks at EU level”, an EU official told Europe.Table. In the Versailles Declaration, EU leaders had given the Commission a mandate to explore strategic stockpiling of critical raw materials. The Parliament’s report, adopted in November 2021, also calls on the Commission to include “strategic stockpiling” in its action plan. This involves the most economically important raw materials with a high supply risk, which the Commission last put on a list in 2020.
“However, the responsibility for ensuring a steady supply for manufacturing processes lies primarily with industry,” the commission representative said. “They should pay attention to their security of supply, diversify their supplies and invest in resilient supply chains.”
This is also supported by Matthias Wachter, Head of Department for Raw Materials at the Federation of German Industries (BDI). “Companies know their raw material requirements and the procurement markets better than government institutions.” That’s why stockpiling under the responsibility of industry is the most efficient solution, he says. The problem: Until now, it has had a negative impact on the balance sheet when companies store raw materials – hence the just-in-time production that has been practiced for decades. “Warehousing is always associated with additional costs for companies,” explains Wachter. Stored material also means a significantly higher capital commitment. “There is thus no incentive to stockpile critical raw materials for a rainy day.”
In July 2020, the first year of the pandemic, the BDI surveyed its members about the impact of the pandemic on raw material supplies. More than half of the companies surveyed had increased their own stockpiling at that time. Most of them wanted greater political support for this, for example, through tax breaks for stockpiling. The BDI proposes a “raw material stockpiling reserve”. In balance sheet and tax terms, the storage should only take effect when the stock is liquidated again and the corresponding raw material is used.
In other countries, it is quite common to stockpile non-fossil raw materials as well. For example, the Chinese Food and Strategic Reserves Administration stores copper, aluminum, and zinc. Government loans allow imports during periods of low prices. When commodity prices rise, the authority then releases reserves to relieve the burden on companies.
Japan is also considered a successful example. There, companies participate in international mining projects. “This is an indirect way of stockpiling because there is a proportionate long-term availability through direct participation in a mine,” explains Peter Buchholz, head of the German Mineral Resources Agency (DERA). “With long-term supply contracts, you can organize just-in-time production well across the supply chain and secure stable prices in the long term.”
In addition, the state-owned Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) coordinates raw material requirements with companies for crisis situations, then purchases and stores them on world markets. JOGMEC also explores new raw material deposits and then sells the licenses to Japanese companies.
In Germany, too, state reserves beyond strategic oil and gas stocks could make sense, Buchholz explains. “If the state is responsible for a certain stockpile, it can better manage risk provisioning in terms of the national economy, for example, for strategically relevant industries and population protection.” One possibility, therefore, could be the US model: There, the Defense Logistics Agency, which is part of the Department of Defense, stocks certain raw materials relevant to defense. Currently, 42 metals – ranging from base metals such as zinc, cobalt, chromium, and manganese to precious metals such as iridium and platinum – with a market value of around $1.1 billion are stored at six different locations in the USA.
In Europe, France, Sweden, Slovakia, and Great Britain stockpiled strategically important metals from the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the Federal Republic also planned to build up a raw materials reserve for economic purposes. One option discussed at the time was tax incentives for the private sector, which would bear responsibility for the stockpiles. However, the government feared that stockpiling could thus be used as a means of private-sector speculation. The plan was therefore abandoned a short time later.
Today, they think about it again: The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology is considering “support measures that go beyond the measures adopted in the German government’s raw materials strategy in 2020”, a spokeswoman told Europe.Table. “This also includes various aspects of stockpiling.” The reviews of possible measures are still ongoing, and so far, there are no results, according to the BMWK.
The time frame for stockpiling by companies should be set by policymakers, believes Matthias Wachter of the BDI. He suggests: “If you have a few months’ buffer, you could continue to produce in the event of a supply disruption and secure alternative sources of supply in the meantime.” If inventories last for at least half a year, you can usually weather short- and medium-term crises well, according to DERA head Peter Buchholz.
In view of the high raw material prices, however, setting up storage facilities would currently only make sense to maintain production, Buchholz said. For strategic storage, one would have to wait until prices fall again. “Commodity markets are cyclical and very volatile,” he explains. “Countercyclical behavior would have to be much more ingrained in the industry.” China is in a better strategic position in this regard. Their import figures for copper show: China imports massively when prices are low.
According to a study commissioned by the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), three factors are crucial for the successful implementation and use of raw material storage facilities: constant demand and therefore, predictable sales, material specifications, and the relationship between raw material prices and available financial resources. Peter Buchholz suggests a planning horizon of about five years. During this period, it would be possible to purchase materials at low prices, store them and then produce them competitively when prices rise again. In strategically important sectors, it would also be possible to plan for ten years and replenish stocks again and again during favorable phases.
Which raw materials are suitable for storage at all is another question. Some metals are not weather-resistant and rust quickly. In addition, unprocessed raw materials are better suited for storage than processed materials – although processing currently takes place mainly in China. “It makes no sense to store raw materials here if you can’t process them further,” says Peter Buchholz.
Strategic raw material stocks must therefore be part of a larger package. Matthias Wachter speaks of the multi-pillar model: “We also need diversification of supply sources, more recycling and more extraction in Germany and Europe.”
Which universities and research institutes in Europe are cooperating with Chinese institutions? The “Academic Engagement Tracker” of the Central European think tank The Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS) has recorded more than 2,300 ties of academic institutions with Chinese cooperation partners and summarized details on their respective scientific cooperation.
Mr. Šimalčík, what areas of academic cooperation are you most concerned about?
There are some worrying trends that we have observed: First, we see a high share of collaboration with Chinese entities linked to the defense sector, such as the People’s Liberation Army, and military research and development. On average, over 40 percent of all connections are to military-linked entities. This share is highest in Austria and Germany, where it is around 55 percent. All but one of the top 10 most active Chinese universities are linked to the Chinese defense sector.
Are there other problematic connections?
Yes, we can observe that in the Central and Eastern European countries there is a very high level of dependence in China-focused education on Confucius Institutes which provide teachers, materials and finances to otherwise under-financed departments. That is a big problem. Future generations of China experts will be educated in an environment controlled by the Communist Party of China.
The third point of concern is that several European universities are cooperating with Chinese universities based in Xinjiang. These are mainly German and Polish institutions, but also from Bulgaria, Hungary and Georgia. What is worrying is the fact that many of these links were established after information about human rights abuses in Xinjiang became publicly available.
Is China focusing on specific academic fields for collaboration?
There is a predominant focus on STEM fields. Social sciences and humanities are only of secondary importance in the China-Europe academic engagement. Consequently, the direst risk European academia faces in collaborating with China is forced technology transfers. This risk is increasingly being highlighted by Western security agencies, including a joint statement by the directors of the FBI and MI5 intelligence agencies. Secret services in Central and Eastern Europe have also warned of the risks of technology theft.
In which country did you find the closest connection network?
The tracker focuses on eleven European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The most active were the German and Polish universities and research institutes. Looking at the top 10 most active academic institutions, all of them were either from Germany or Poland.
How did you collect all the data?
To map the interaction of European academic institutions and Chinese entities, we have relied on data collected from various open sources. The methodology constituted firstly of gathering data through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the public universities and research institutes. When that wasn’t possible, we used similar approaches. We have used this method to gather data on the scope and outcomes of cooperation with Chinese entities and evaluate the financial flows between them.
Filing the FOIA requests has also helped us assess the overall openness of public academic institutions regarding their dealings with China. Then we juxtaposed the collected data with media coverage of various academic interactions and other public sources to broaden the scope of the information where possible. In cases where it is allowed, such as Slovakia or Czechia, we also relied on publicly disclosed contracts to help supplement and check the transparency of agreements signed as a part of various interactions.
In the tracker, they also assessed the risk of individual cooperation. How did you go about it?
Where available, we have also cross-referenced the collected data with the China Defense University Tracker by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which has allowed us to note instances of cooperation with entities linked to the People’s Liberation Army and assign approximate risk levels. At this moment, the Tracker relies only on this cross-reference.
This is merely the first layer of risk assessment that should be conducted, as the actual risk assignment should consider more factors. For example, on the transfer of intellectual property or in which scientific area exactly the cooperation takes place. These factors can lead us to conclude that risk is higher or lower than the ASPI-assigned institutional risk level.
This is a task that universities should do themselves. In reality, however, they rarely do so. Conducting a rigorous risk assessment can help universities develop appropriate mitigation measures while continuing to collaborate academically with Chinese partners.
I studied sinology at the LMU in Munich. I spent my year abroad at Tongji in Shanghai, which was and is essential for my studies at the time and still is for my work today. Is every cooperation with Chinese universities equally “bad”?
No, obviously not all academic interaction with China is problematic. Mutual exchange can benefit European academics, provided that it is done sustainably and equitably. However, due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, which relies on a whole-of-society approach to achieve its interests – including academic institutions, civil society and corporations – engaging with Chinese entities carries specific risks.
What do you think European universities need to know or be better prepared for when it comes to cooperation with Chinese institutions?
Currently, universities are not prepared to deal with the challenges posed by academic cooperation with China. Only a few of the studies’ countries have specific guidelines and measures to prevent link abuse. As a result, there is a high level of variance among the countries in their awareness of potential risks. Response to these challenges should be three-pronged and focused on awareness raising, risk assessment and tailored risk mitigation measures, and transparency promotion.
When Virginijus Sinkevičius was born in Vilnius in November 1990, Lithuania had just regained its independence. 27 years later, he went on to become Lithuania’s Minister of the Economy. He is his country’s first minister born after the fall of the Iron Curtain. On December 1, 2019, he became the youngest EU commissioner to date. Since then, Sinkevičius has headed the Environment, Maritime Affairs, and Fisheries portfolio at the Brussels-based agency.
When the Lithuanian took office, the English-language news portal Lithuania Tribune, for which Sinkevičius had previously written himself, gushed with praise for the young commissioner. Sinkevičius, it said, was one of the country’s most popular ministers, whose trademark was innovation. He is the “rising star” of the Lithuanian LVŽS party, which is part of the Greens/EFA in Brussels.
As minister in Lithuania, Sinkevičius focused on start-ups, crafting a package of laws that made it easier to start businesses, which led to 47 percent more start-ups within a year, according to Lithuania Tribune. “I am convinced that start-ups are one of the cornerstones for better and greener development,” he tells Europe.Table.
The reason: Well over 95 percent of European companies are small or medium-sized. That is why it is crucial that they “play an essential role in combating climate change and supporting the green transformation of our industry”.
Despite the war against Ukraine, climate change, loss of biodiversity, ecosystem collapse, and resource scarcity are among the biggest challenges for Sinkevičius in the coming decades. For food security, which is threatened by the Ukraine war in many countries outside the EU, a healthy environment is “fundamental” in his view. Here, his guiding principle is that “sustainability is fundamental to long-term food security, both in the EU and globally.”
The Lithuanian EU Commissioner, who is married to a Ukrainian woman, sees no reason to be “optimistic that Russia will scale back its imperial ambitions in the foreseeable future”. However, he is reassured that the Baltic states and Poland are NATO members. If Finland and Sweden still join the alliance, it would be a real game-changer that would turn the Baltic Sea into a “NATO sea”, which would “drastically change” the security situation in the region.
There will be no project to define joint marine protected areas with Russia in the foreseeable future, he said. “However, as far as China is concerned, we will continue to raise this matter bilaterally with our Chinese partners at the highest political level whenever possible.”
On Instagram, Sinkevičius presents himself as a politician as well as a family man with his wife and two children. And the further you scroll into the past, the more often you see him in a basketball jersey. Such images have become rarer as his duties increase, and Sinkevičius is still recovering from an injury – contracted while playing basketball. Even the youngest EU Commissioner is getting older. Gabriel Bub
