Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D) sees an opportunity in the corruption scandal that is rocking the European Parliament: For the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Interference, the right moment has come to ensure more transparency in the EP. In an interview with Claire Stam, he argues in favor of a European anti-corruption authority based on the French model.
Today’s Spanish-French summit between Pedro Sánchez and Emmanuel Macron is expected to focus on the H2Med Corridor agreements. Spain is expected to export almost ten percent of the hydrogen consumed in the EU by 2030 as a result of the construction of the hydrogen pipeline. In addition, the Spanish government is launching numerous other hydrogen projects, as Isabel Cuesta reports.
As is well known, the MidCat pipeline, of which Chancellor Olaf Scholz had shown himself to be a fan, came to nothing due to the French blockade. The pipeline was one of the issues last year that highlighted the differences between France and Germany. The two countries are basically strong partners in Europe, Sébastien Treyer and Nicolas Berghmans of the Paris-based think tank IDDRI write in the Opinion. But in order to avoid jeopardizing the EU’s cohesion, they would have to cooperate more closely on climate and energy policy.
Mr. Glucksmann, there has been discussion for years about improving transparency in the European Parliament. Is anything moving forward now?
The moment is now here for everyone to seize, especially everyone who has been pushing for expanded transparency rules for years. All those who want to better protect the institution against conflicts of interest and foreign influence must act now. We must seize this moment, now that the attention of the media and also of pressure groups is there, and implement the reforms that are due.
What makes this new dynamic so special?
The Christian Democrats and conservatives in Parliament have long blocked reforms for more transparency and disclosure of conflicts of interest. I am observing a clear change in the Christian Democrat EPP family of parties. This change was co-initiated by the President of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She has understood that this is also a momentum for her as a politician. She makes the transparency reform rules of the institution she presides over her own business. And that opens a new window of opportunity.
Does that mean there will be a decisive impulse coming from Parliament President Roberta Metsola (EPP)?
She will push for something to be done. And since Roberta Metsola comes from the Christian Democratic party family EPP, her commitment is helping to ensure that the balance of power in the European Parliament is set in motion on this issue. She has understood that she must take the political lead, that she must take the initiative, and that she must also defend the institution that she embodies.
How do you explain this political offensive by the President of the European Parliament?
Roberta Metsola has understood that she can play an almost historic role here. I recall that she was the first European politician to meet Ukrainian President Selensky. In doing so, she demonstrated her ability to respond politically. My impression is, she wants to advance her role as the President of the Parliament with a clear and very political understanding of office. In this case, it is a good thing.
Will the EPP support her on the transparency issue?
She definitely has the support of the majority of the parliament behind her. That is important.
In order to push back foreign influence, you propose the creation of a new anti-corruption authority. The “Haute Autorité” (Supreme Authority) in France is to serve as a model. Can you explain this in more detail?
The Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique, HATVP) is an independent French administrative authority created in 2013. Its mission is to receive, examine together with the tax administration, and publish the declarations of assets and interests of public officials. It may also be consulted by them on matters of professional ethics and conflicts of interest in the performance of their duties and make recommendations at the request of the prime minister or on its own initiative.
Why does the EU need such an authority?
Actually, such an institution should have existed long ago. We need an independent European institution that controls, checks and regulates public life. In France, this authority, made up of judges and prosecutors, helps to reaffirm the role of the state. And such an institution at the European level would affirm the role and the activity of the European Parliament. We must not forget: There were certain forces willing to use large sums of money to corrupt the decisions of the Parliament.
At the bilateral summit between Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez, which will take place today in Barcelona, the agreements on the H2Med corridor will be elaborated. The H2Med hydrogen pipeline is the result of France’s refusal to participate in the MidCat project, which envisaged a link between Spain and France across the Pyrenees for the transport of natural gas and later hydrogen.
Instead, Paris, Madrid and Lisbon agreed on a new project called BarMar. The name BarMar was changed to H2Med because Portugal felt excluded from the name with reference to Barcelona and Marseille.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz campaigned for MidCat last summer at the height of the gas crisis because Spain has 30 percent of Europe’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification capacity. He had specially invited Sánchez to a cabinet meeting in Meseberg. Later, Spain and France held out the prospect of using H2Med to transport natural gas for a transitional period – but they later rescinded this. So German hopes now also rest on the export of green hydrogen from the Iberian peninsula.
As a result of the development of the H2Med corridor, Spain is expected to export almost ten percent – around two million tons per year – of the hydrogen consumed in the EU by 2030. This will strengthen the position of Spain and Portugal as the leading regions in renewable energy production in the EU.
In parallel to the summit between Sánchez and Macron, the grid operator ENAGAS is organizing a conference on green hydrogen today, which will also be attended by Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action.
The H2Med project includes two cross-border infrastructures, one between Celorico da Beira (Portugal) and Zamora (Spain) and another underwater between Barcelona and Marseille. Teresa Ribera, Spain’s Minister of Ecological Transition, said in an interview this week that the pipeline could be operational by 2028 or 2029.
She pleaded for financing with European funds, as it was a project of common interest and not only relevant for the three states directly involved. Ribera announced that the EU Commission would decide on the matter later this year: “If so, European funding will take place in 2024 and work will begin immediately thereafter.”
With plenty of sun, wind and space, Spain offers the best conditions for the production of green hydrogen. In the so-called Hoja de Ruta del Hidrógeno (Hydrogen Roadmap), the government has approved a budget of more than €1.5 billion for green hydrogen. According to the Ministry of Ecological Transition, it is estimated that the plan will mobilize up to €8.9 billion in private capital.
This month, the government of Pedro Sánchez approved a decree to promote the green hydrogen industry, allocating €74 million to the four Spanish IPCEI green hydrogen projects selected by Brussels. The initiatives will mobilize investments of more than €245 million.
Companies H2B2, based in Seville, and Nordex, with plants in Asturias and Navarre, are focusing on electrolyzers; Sener, in the Basque Country, is promoting the construction of an electrolyzer factory; and Iveco, with plants in Madrid, Valladolid and Barcelona, plans to produce hydrogen-powered heavy-duty vehicles. Minister Ribera said Spain currently attracts 20 percent of all global investment in green hydrogen.
The region of Extremadura wants to become the most competitive in the field of green hydrogen. This week, the President of Extremadura, Guillermo Fernández Vara, and Arturo Gonzalo Aizpiri, CEO of ENAGAS, signed a protocol to promote hydrogen infrastructures in the region. By 2030, Extremadura aims to produce 20 percent of the green hydrogen produced in Spain and build up to three gigawatts (GW) of electrolysis capacity. Plans also call for 420 kilometers of hydrogen pipelines in the region, essentially replicating the current gas infrastructure.
One funding instrument in Spain is the so-called PERTE strategic projects for economic recovery and transformation, through which funds from NextGenerationEU are made available. Relevant for hydrogen is the PERTE for Renewable Energy, Renewable Hydrogen and Storage (ERHA). The investments foreseen in the Renewable Hydrogen Roadmap are divided into four areas, ranging from research and development to commercial use: the industrial value chain, pilot projects, large-scale sectoral integration and European market integration.
Germany and France’s support for the implementation of the European Green Deal is essential – and unequivocal. It is particularly evident in the fact that the climate component of the pact was adopted at the end of 2022. This is intended to bring it into line with the target of reducing emissions by 55 percent by 2030.
But is that enough? The energy crisis is putting pressure on all EU countries. A lot of money was spent to deal with the Covid pandemic. Now governments have to keep their spending under control – and at the same time find solutions to the current economic, social and environmental crises.
The European project and the cohesion of the EU are threatened by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. True, the pandemic has strengthened European solidarity, and Germany and France are working together to revive the economy. But the risks of divergence remain numerous. Going it alone cannot be an option.
The EU quickly adopted emergency measures after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and developed a strategy to weather the winter, adjust its energy mix, and skim off excess profits. Member states provided support to businesses and households. But many measures were aimed in different directions.
Of course, each country is sovereign in finding solutions to the social problems posed by this crisis. The French energy shield was particularly massive, protecting households from the sharpest price increases. But it was not targeted enough at the poorest households, it was not accompanied by accelerated support for investment in energy-saving equipment, and it protected businesses more than households.
Germany, for its part, is accused of using its own aid program to organize a kind of competitive devaluation by lowering domestic energy prices to support its industry. There seems to be no coordination between the two countries.
The race for economic crisis aid, which could soon become a race for new green investments, is worrying for other member states. Their public coffers are not well filled. There is a great danger that this kind of crisis management will lead to growing economic egoism on the continent. It is currently only partially averted by solidarity mechanisms around shared debt such as NextGenerationEU.
Under these damaging political conditions, the EU cannot refrain from thinking about new forms of joint debt. France is making proposals on this, while Germany is seen as more reluctant. Both should deepen their dialogue on this – in transparency toward the other member states, especially during the Franco-German Council of Ministers, which will celebrate 60 years of friendship and pragmatic compromises around the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty next Sunday.
Should we return to the earlier, macroeconomic orthodoxy? Given the amounts that the US or China put on the table, it is reasonable that European players are not the last to allow state aid as well. Even more so if they appear necessary to support the green transformation of industry.
What is not sufficiently discussed, however, is the distribution of state aid paid by the member states to the companies. Statistics from the EU Commission on contributions within the temporary crisis framework speak a clear language: More than half is paid by Germany to its companies. 24 percent by France to its own economic operators. And the rest is shared by the other 25 member states!
This is something that needs to be talked about. The players and member states that are more reticent about state aid and committed to free competition must be heard. The European response to the American and Chinese plans must be built together with them. Otherwise, there is a risk of exacerbating economic imbalances within the single market. A joint approach is needed to develop and support the green industry.
What about trade policy? Germany and France have finally agreed on how climate protection should be integrated into trade policy. But for the EU’s trading partners in the Global South, especially in Africa, there are also risks. In the race for state aid between the major economic powers of Asia, Europe and the USA, they could be squeezed out of the markets.
It is true that they are promised that their interests will be taken into account if green gas or hydrogen is purchased from them. But this does a poor job of hiding the individual strategies being pursued by member states, and Germany in particular. European actors are not showing African partners that they would have recognized the damaging effects of other large, uncoordinated economic decisions on their potential to develop economically. This will also be very dangerous for the European project.
Whether in joint debt policy, government support for climate-friendly transformation or energy-related trade policy, if Germany and France, the EU’s two economic heavyweights, do not want to jeopardize its cohesion, they must coordinate better.
Sébastian Treyer is the Executive Director of the Paris-based sustainability think tank IDDRI. Nicolas Berghmans is IDDRI’s leading expert on European affairs, energy and climate.
Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D) sees an opportunity in the corruption scandal that is rocking the European Parliament: For the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Interference, the right moment has come to ensure more transparency in the EP. In an interview with Claire Stam, he argues in favor of a European anti-corruption authority based on the French model.
Today’s Spanish-French summit between Pedro Sánchez and Emmanuel Macron is expected to focus on the H2Med Corridor agreements. Spain is expected to export almost ten percent of the hydrogen consumed in the EU by 2030 as a result of the construction of the hydrogen pipeline. In addition, the Spanish government is launching numerous other hydrogen projects, as Isabel Cuesta reports.
As is well known, the MidCat pipeline, of which Chancellor Olaf Scholz had shown himself to be a fan, came to nothing due to the French blockade. The pipeline was one of the issues last year that highlighted the differences between France and Germany. The two countries are basically strong partners in Europe, Sébastien Treyer and Nicolas Berghmans of the Paris-based think tank IDDRI write in the Opinion. But in order to avoid jeopardizing the EU’s cohesion, they would have to cooperate more closely on climate and energy policy.
Mr. Glucksmann, there has been discussion for years about improving transparency in the European Parliament. Is anything moving forward now?
The moment is now here for everyone to seize, especially everyone who has been pushing for expanded transparency rules for years. All those who want to better protect the institution against conflicts of interest and foreign influence must act now. We must seize this moment, now that the attention of the media and also of pressure groups is there, and implement the reforms that are due.
What makes this new dynamic so special?
The Christian Democrats and conservatives in Parliament have long blocked reforms for more transparency and disclosure of conflicts of interest. I am observing a clear change in the Christian Democrat EPP family of parties. This change was co-initiated by the President of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola. She has understood that this is also a momentum for her as a politician. She makes the transparency reform rules of the institution she presides over her own business. And that opens a new window of opportunity.
Does that mean there will be a decisive impulse coming from Parliament President Roberta Metsola (EPP)?
She will push for something to be done. And since Roberta Metsola comes from the Christian Democratic party family EPP, her commitment is helping to ensure that the balance of power in the European Parliament is set in motion on this issue. She has understood that she must take the political lead, that she must take the initiative, and that she must also defend the institution that she embodies.
How do you explain this political offensive by the President of the European Parliament?
Roberta Metsola has understood that she can play an almost historic role here. I recall that she was the first European politician to meet Ukrainian President Selensky. In doing so, she demonstrated her ability to respond politically. My impression is, she wants to advance her role as the President of the Parliament with a clear and very political understanding of office. In this case, it is a good thing.
Will the EPP support her on the transparency issue?
She definitely has the support of the majority of the parliament behind her. That is important.
In order to push back foreign influence, you propose the creation of a new anti-corruption authority. The “Haute Autorité” (Supreme Authority) in France is to serve as a model. Can you explain this in more detail?
The Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la transparence de la vie publique, HATVP) is an independent French administrative authority created in 2013. Its mission is to receive, examine together with the tax administration, and publish the declarations of assets and interests of public officials. It may also be consulted by them on matters of professional ethics and conflicts of interest in the performance of their duties and make recommendations at the request of the prime minister or on its own initiative.
Why does the EU need such an authority?
Actually, such an institution should have existed long ago. We need an independent European institution that controls, checks and regulates public life. In France, this authority, made up of judges and prosecutors, helps to reaffirm the role of the state. And such an institution at the European level would affirm the role and the activity of the European Parliament. We must not forget: There were certain forces willing to use large sums of money to corrupt the decisions of the Parliament.
At the bilateral summit between Emmanuel Macron and Pedro Sánchez, which will take place today in Barcelona, the agreements on the H2Med corridor will be elaborated. The H2Med hydrogen pipeline is the result of France’s refusal to participate in the MidCat project, which envisaged a link between Spain and France across the Pyrenees for the transport of natural gas and later hydrogen.
Instead, Paris, Madrid and Lisbon agreed on a new project called BarMar. The name BarMar was changed to H2Med because Portugal felt excluded from the name with reference to Barcelona and Marseille.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz campaigned for MidCat last summer at the height of the gas crisis because Spain has 30 percent of Europe’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) regasification capacity. He had specially invited Sánchez to a cabinet meeting in Meseberg. Later, Spain and France held out the prospect of using H2Med to transport natural gas for a transitional period – but they later rescinded this. So German hopes now also rest on the export of green hydrogen from the Iberian peninsula.
As a result of the development of the H2Med corridor, Spain is expected to export almost ten percent – around two million tons per year – of the hydrogen consumed in the EU by 2030. This will strengthen the position of Spain and Portugal as the leading regions in renewable energy production in the EU.
In parallel to the summit between Sánchez and Macron, the grid operator ENAGAS is organizing a conference on green hydrogen today, which will also be attended by Franziska Brantner, Parliamentary State Secretary at the German Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action.
The H2Med project includes two cross-border infrastructures, one between Celorico da Beira (Portugal) and Zamora (Spain) and another underwater between Barcelona and Marseille. Teresa Ribera, Spain’s Minister of Ecological Transition, said in an interview this week that the pipeline could be operational by 2028 or 2029.
She pleaded for financing with European funds, as it was a project of common interest and not only relevant for the three states directly involved. Ribera announced that the EU Commission would decide on the matter later this year: “If so, European funding will take place in 2024 and work will begin immediately thereafter.”
With plenty of sun, wind and space, Spain offers the best conditions for the production of green hydrogen. In the so-called Hoja de Ruta del Hidrógeno (Hydrogen Roadmap), the government has approved a budget of more than €1.5 billion for green hydrogen. According to the Ministry of Ecological Transition, it is estimated that the plan will mobilize up to €8.9 billion in private capital.
This month, the government of Pedro Sánchez approved a decree to promote the green hydrogen industry, allocating €74 million to the four Spanish IPCEI green hydrogen projects selected by Brussels. The initiatives will mobilize investments of more than €245 million.
Companies H2B2, based in Seville, and Nordex, with plants in Asturias and Navarre, are focusing on electrolyzers; Sener, in the Basque Country, is promoting the construction of an electrolyzer factory; and Iveco, with plants in Madrid, Valladolid and Barcelona, plans to produce hydrogen-powered heavy-duty vehicles. Minister Ribera said Spain currently attracts 20 percent of all global investment in green hydrogen.
The region of Extremadura wants to become the most competitive in the field of green hydrogen. This week, the President of Extremadura, Guillermo Fernández Vara, and Arturo Gonzalo Aizpiri, CEO of ENAGAS, signed a protocol to promote hydrogen infrastructures in the region. By 2030, Extremadura aims to produce 20 percent of the green hydrogen produced in Spain and build up to three gigawatts (GW) of electrolysis capacity. Plans also call for 420 kilometers of hydrogen pipelines in the region, essentially replicating the current gas infrastructure.
One funding instrument in Spain is the so-called PERTE strategic projects for economic recovery and transformation, through which funds from NextGenerationEU are made available. Relevant for hydrogen is the PERTE for Renewable Energy, Renewable Hydrogen and Storage (ERHA). The investments foreseen in the Renewable Hydrogen Roadmap are divided into four areas, ranging from research and development to commercial use: the industrial value chain, pilot projects, large-scale sectoral integration and European market integration.
Germany and France’s support for the implementation of the European Green Deal is essential – and unequivocal. It is particularly evident in the fact that the climate component of the pact was adopted at the end of 2022. This is intended to bring it into line with the target of reducing emissions by 55 percent by 2030.
But is that enough? The energy crisis is putting pressure on all EU countries. A lot of money was spent to deal with the Covid pandemic. Now governments have to keep their spending under control – and at the same time find solutions to the current economic, social and environmental crises.
The European project and the cohesion of the EU are threatened by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. True, the pandemic has strengthened European solidarity, and Germany and France are working together to revive the economy. But the risks of divergence remain numerous. Going it alone cannot be an option.
The EU quickly adopted emergency measures after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and developed a strategy to weather the winter, adjust its energy mix, and skim off excess profits. Member states provided support to businesses and households. But many measures were aimed in different directions.
Of course, each country is sovereign in finding solutions to the social problems posed by this crisis. The French energy shield was particularly massive, protecting households from the sharpest price increases. But it was not targeted enough at the poorest households, it was not accompanied by accelerated support for investment in energy-saving equipment, and it protected businesses more than households.
Germany, for its part, is accused of using its own aid program to organize a kind of competitive devaluation by lowering domestic energy prices to support its industry. There seems to be no coordination between the two countries.
The race for economic crisis aid, which could soon become a race for new green investments, is worrying for other member states. Their public coffers are not well filled. There is a great danger that this kind of crisis management will lead to growing economic egoism on the continent. It is currently only partially averted by solidarity mechanisms around shared debt such as NextGenerationEU.
Under these damaging political conditions, the EU cannot refrain from thinking about new forms of joint debt. France is making proposals on this, while Germany is seen as more reluctant. Both should deepen their dialogue on this – in transparency toward the other member states, especially during the Franco-German Council of Ministers, which will celebrate 60 years of friendship and pragmatic compromises around the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty next Sunday.
Should we return to the earlier, macroeconomic orthodoxy? Given the amounts that the US or China put on the table, it is reasonable that European players are not the last to allow state aid as well. Even more so if they appear necessary to support the green transformation of industry.
What is not sufficiently discussed, however, is the distribution of state aid paid by the member states to the companies. Statistics from the EU Commission on contributions within the temporary crisis framework speak a clear language: More than half is paid by Germany to its companies. 24 percent by France to its own economic operators. And the rest is shared by the other 25 member states!
This is something that needs to be talked about. The players and member states that are more reticent about state aid and committed to free competition must be heard. The European response to the American and Chinese plans must be built together with them. Otherwise, there is a risk of exacerbating economic imbalances within the single market. A joint approach is needed to develop and support the green industry.
What about trade policy? Germany and France have finally agreed on how climate protection should be integrated into trade policy. But for the EU’s trading partners in the Global South, especially in Africa, there are also risks. In the race for state aid between the major economic powers of Asia, Europe and the USA, they could be squeezed out of the markets.
It is true that they are promised that their interests will be taken into account if green gas or hydrogen is purchased from them. But this does a poor job of hiding the individual strategies being pursued by member states, and Germany in particular. European actors are not showing African partners that they would have recognized the damaging effects of other large, uncoordinated economic decisions on their potential to develop economically. This will also be very dangerous for the European project.
Whether in joint debt policy, government support for climate-friendly transformation or energy-related trade policy, if Germany and France, the EU’s two economic heavyweights, do not want to jeopardize its cohesion, they must coordinate better.
Sébastian Treyer is the Executive Director of the Paris-based sustainability think tank IDDRI. Nicolas Berghmans is IDDRI’s leading expert on European affairs, energy and climate.
