Today, the AI Act takes its penultimate hurdle. After the member states voted unanimously in favor of the political compromise from December through their Permanent Representatives, it is now Parliament’s turn. Today, the lead committees IMCO and LIBE must first confirm the result, before the plenary is expected to take a final vote in March or April.
The vote will be exciting for two reasons: Firstly because the agreement was only reached verbally and there were disagreements afterwards about what was actually agreed and some things still had to be clarified at a technical level. Secondly, because basically nobody is really happy with the law.
The most controversial issues continue to be remote biometric identification in public spaces and the regulation of generative artificial intelligence. In practically every parliamentary group, there are MEPs who see red lines being crossed on one issue or fear competitive disadvantages due to excessive regulation on the other. It is therefore to be expected that there will be dissenters from the EPP, S&D, the Greens and Renew. The ECR, the Left and ID will probably reject the proposal.
This is a normal democratic process. But this time there are other factors at play. For example, the embarrassment of the EU losing its much-vaunted leadership role in the regulation of AI if the law is not passed. A gift.
The question is far more important: what would happen to the proposed legislation with regard to citizens’ rights in a future EU Parliament that has moved further to the right and under the Hungarian Council Presidency? In this respect, some argue that it is better to agree now than to reject it. The situation is also much better with the AI Act than without any legal regulation at all.
In any case, there is still a bad aftertaste. Such an important law deserves a better democratic process and a better result that does not leave so many questions unanswered.
We wish you a wonderful day!
Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and after twelve packages of sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries, Moscow is still able to fill its state budget and finance the war. Oil and gas sales play a central role in this. Although revenues are below the government’s plans, they still show that Russia is successfully circumventing the $60 price cap that was introduced for Russian oil in December 2022.
“Overall, 2022 has helped Russia to prepare and make a huge profit in energy trading,” explains Alexandra Prokopenko in an interview with Table.Media. The former employee of the Russian Central Bank left Moscow immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today, she conducts research at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. The fact that Russia continues to generate solid revenues from the export of oil is due to the fact that “there is obviously a major problem in enforcing sanctions, both by the EU and the USA. You can see this particularly well in the oil trade,” says Prokopenko.
The war itself is a guarantee for Russia that the world market price for oil will remain comparatively high. Since January 2022 – shortly before the full-scale invasion – until today, the oil price has been above the pre-war level. The average annual price of Brent crude was $70.86 in 2021; it rose to $100.93 in 2022 and fell to $82.49 in 2023.
Moscow has so far been able to break through the price cap of $60 for Russian oil introduced on Dec. 5, 2022. India and China, the largest buyers of Russian oil, but also Gulf states, are apparently buying it at higher prices, which are still below the global market price – a win-win for sellers and buyers. If Indian refineries process Russian oil into diesel and export it, it is considered an Indian product. Turkey also plays an important and dubious role in the transshipment of Russian oil. According to the Financial Times, the oil even reaches the EU: Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium.
Every dollar over $60 is an advantage for Russia. Thanks to direct pipelines to China and the shadow fleet, this business is so successful that Russia has publicly set its budget plans for the coming years at $70.
Oil revenues are the Achilles heel of war financing. “For it to really hurt, the price has to be significantly lower, below $60. At $70 a barrel, Russia will get through the year just fine,” says analyst Prokopenko.
The EU member states had already failed to prevent the sale of tankers to Russia, which are used to circumvent the oil price limit, when the 12th sanctions package was drawn up. On the second anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion, the EU is preparing the 13th package. It will affect individuals and diplomats in Russia rather than industries. There is not much left for the EU and the USA, except perhaps Russian uranium – but imports to the EU actually increased in 2022 and 2023.
Enforcing sanctions – that will be the West’s next big task. David O’Sullivan is diplomatically responsible for this in the EU. The 70-year-old travels a lot in Central Asia, where he is urgently campaigning to restrict re-exports to Russia. According to EU circles in Brussels, some states such as Armenia, Georgia and Serbia are cooperating and are now severely restricting re-exports to Russia.
However, he is less satisfied with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although awareness is growing there, “they have still taken few concrete steps overall”. The verdict on Ankara is even clearer: “Turkey has listened to our demands and also shown a certain willingness to cooperate, but the flow of goods [to Russia] remains a cause for concern.” Why the issue of enforcement is only now coming to the fore, even though it has been clear since 2014 that Russia is circumventing the sanctions and how, would certainly be worth a political discussion.
The EU is trying to entice the former Soviet republics in particular with investments, promises of investment and the prospect of closer trade relations. Thus ensnared by Russia, the EU – and also China – the situation offers the states opportunities to gain something for themselves that they did not have before the war. Punishments or sanctions against them would possibly be damaging, and Russia is of course aware of this. The states in Central Asia are therefore not only benefiting economically at the moment but are also increasing their diplomatic weight.
Several factors will determine whether Russia comes under greater or lesser economic pressure:
“Enforcing the sanctions is a game of cat and mouse. From the outside, it may seem pointless to keep finding new ways to circumvent them, only for Russian companies to look for new ones. But it is important to play this game and to keep putting new obstacles in the way of circumvention,” emphasizes Janis Kluge from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). “To this end, legislation will have to be constantly adapted, there needs to be constant dialogue with and pressure on circumventing states, and the authorities need to be better equipped to detect and punish circumvention.”
However, Alexandra Prokopenko is certain that no significant consequences are to be expected in the short term, as Russia is too well prepared for this: “There is no reason for optimism for the West. On the contrary, I would say that this year will be very difficult. From an economic point of view, no crisis is to be expected in Russia this year. If something happens, it will be something else.”
The deadline has expired: The European Parliament and member states had until Feb. 9, i.e. last Friday, to conclude their political negotiations on individual legislative proposals. Anything that has not been agreed in trilogue by this deadline can no longer be formally adopted before the end of the legislative period.
But as is so often the case in Brussels, there is always a back door. Some delayed dossiers can still be adopted in an emergency procedure. In this so-called corrigendum procedure, the Council and Parliament have time to reach a political agreement by the week of the session from March 11 to 14. Unlike the regular process, only the English-language version of the legislative text is used here. This saves time during translation and final editing by the language lawyers in both chambers.
To be adopted in time, the legislative texts must be adopted by the last week of the Parliament’s session before the European elections from April 22 to 25. In Parliament, the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) will now decide which legislative procedures will be given priority. The list has not yet been finalized. However, the hot candidates include the import ban on products from forced labor, the right to repair and the Clean Air Directive.
Here is an overview of the timetables for the remaining dossiers:
Certification of CO2 withdrawals: The final trilogue meeting is scheduled for next Monday at 7 p.m. It will be an open-ended session. If an agreement is reached, the law could probably be passed in the last plenary week in April. And that’s what it looks like. The certification of CO2 removals is not considered very controversial anyway, but the relevance for the industry and the repercussions for future legislative proposals are enormous. It remains to be seen whether certain methods such as direct emission reductions will take precedence over CO2 removal, as demanded by Parliament.
CO2 fleet regulation for heavy commercial vehicles: Now that the Liberals have given up their blockade in the Council at the last minute, there are many indications that the CO2 fleet limits for heavy commercial vehicles can still come into force in this legislature. The EU ambassadors already adopted the text on Friday, and any Council of Ministers can now formally approve the trilogue result. The Parliament’s Environment Committee will vote on the legislative proposal on Wednesday, followed by the plenary session in Strasbourg in the last week of February.
Political agreement on the Clean Air Directive is to be reached next Tuesday (Feb. 20). In mid-January, the Belgian Council Presidency presented a compromise proposal on pollutant threshold values. If the trilogue is completed on Tuesday, the way would be clear for a vote on the result in the April plenary session at the latest, so that the dossier can be brought over the finishing line before the end of the legislative period.
Restoring nature: The plenary session in Strasbourg will vote on the controversial legislative proposal in the week of Feb. 26. The Environment Council is due to give its final approval on March 25. The regulation will come into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal of the EU.
Methane emissions: During the parliamentary session in March, methane emissions will be voted on, but only those emitted by the energy sector, not methane emissions from agriculture. During the same parliamentary session, MEPs will also vote on industrial emissions.
The directive on soil monitoring will be voted on by the ENVI Committee on March 11 and then by Parliament during the April session.
On Feb. 7, Parliament voted in favor of relaxing the legal framework on new breeding techniques (NGTs). MEPs called for stricter labeling requirements for genetically modified products than provided for in the Commission’s proposal. There is still no sign of a compromise on the part of the Member States. The Belgian Council Presidency was unable to reach an agreement and talks are now continuing at working level, according to negotiating circles.
The trilogue negotiations on the most important energy dossiers were concluded before Christmas under the Spanish Council Presidency. The EPBD buildings directive is now due to be adopted in plenary in March. The new electricity market design is on the agenda for the first plenary session in April, while the two elements of the gas package will be discussed in the second session in April.
Net Zero Industry Act: Parliament and Council reached a trilogue agreement last Tuesday, in time for the Feb. 9 deadline. The act is now set to be adopted in plenary in the last week of the April session. The financial instrument of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), which is linked to the NZIA, is to be adopted next week as part of the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework.
SMEI/IMERA: At the beginning of February, the co-legislators agreed on the Single Market Emergency Instrument, which will be renamed the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) once implemented. It is now to be voted on in the first week of April.
Economic governance: Council and Parliament reached an agreement in the trilogue negotiations on Saturday night. The package is expected to be finally adopted by Parliament in the second session of April. However, the Commission will start work before then. In spring, it will make a proposal to the member states for their net expenditure paths, after which they will have to submit their multi-year plans for the years 2025 to 2028 or 2025 to 2031 to the Commission in September.
Supply Chain Act: After the Belgian Council Presidency took the vote in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) off the agenda last Friday and then again this week, no new date has yet been announced. The intention is to continue working on the law with the Member States and to schedule the vote in Coreper as soon as “the time is right”, it was said. The vote in Parliament is currently scheduled for April.
Import ban on products from forced labor: The regulation related to the Supply Chain Act is currently still being negotiated by the Council and Parliament. The second (and probably last) political trilogue will take place on March 4. The law could then still be passed in the corrigendum procedure.
Green Claims Directive: On Feb. 14, the Internal Market and Environment Committees will vote on their report. It must then be formally adopted by the plenary, which is scheduled for March. The adoption of the directive will therefore slip into the coming legislative period. The trilogue negotiations are scheduled to begin in the fall at the earliest.
Ecodesign Regulation: Following the trilogue agreement at the beginning of December, the Council and Parliament still have to adopt the result in plenary. Coreper and the Environment Committee in Parliament have already approved the agreement.
Right to repair: The Council and Parliament reached a trilogue agreement at the beginning of February. On Feb. 14, Coreper will vote on the result in the Council, and on Feb. 22, the lead Internal Market Committee is expected to vote. The plenary is then expected to formally adopt the law at the end of April.
Packaging Regulation: Following the first trilogue on Feb. 6, the Council and Parliament want to reach a political agreement on March 4 and 5 and have therefore scheduled a “very long” trilogue meeting. It is said that some technical negotiations will then be necessary, but the law is to be adopted in the corrigendum procedure before the end of this legislative period.
AI Act: The member states have cleared the way for the world’s first comprehensive AI law. Now Parliament has to give its approval – today in the lead committees and then in plenary. The outcome is open. If Parliament gives its approval, adoption in one of the Council formations should be a mere formality. By contrast, Parliament has not yet dealt with the AI Liability Directive. It is an issue for the next legislature.
Product Liability Directive: In contrast to AI liability, Parliament and the Council have already reached an agreement on the revision of product liability law. The PLD aims to adapt liability law to the digital age. It includes networked products, software for the first time and also applies to AI – until there is a specific law. The date for the vote in plenary is March 11.
Gigabit Infrastructure Act: The Council and Parliament reached a political agreement at the beginning of February. The Act is intended to make network expansion in the member states faster and more cost-effective. The GIA is also intended to abolish extra charges for international calls within the EU. The legislative proposal will be put to the vote in the plenary session of Parliament on April 22.
European Digital Identity Framework: Members of the European Parliament plan to vote on the framework for a Europe-wide digital identity as early as Feb. 26. With the EUid wallet, citizens will be able to prove their identity throughout the EU and make use of public or private services.
European Media Freedom Act: In December, the Council and Parliament reached an agreement on the European Media Freedom Act, which is intended to safeguard the freedom and independence of the media in the EU. It is expected to be passed by the European Parliament in March.
Cyber Resilience Act: Following the agreement in the trilogue, the lead ITRE committee gave its positive vote. This means that the law, which aims to make networked devices from home appliances to industrial applications more secure, can be passed in plenary in April.
Migration pact: The EU ambassadors have already confirmed the results of the trilogue negotiations, now it’s Parliament’s turn: the Committee on Home Affairs is due to vote on Wednesday, followed by the plenary session in the first week of April. By János Allenbach-Ammann, Leonie Düngefeld, Till Hoppe, Lukas Scheid, Claire Stam, Falk Steiner and Corinna Visser
EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski has submitted proposals to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as to how the bureaucratic relief she has announced for farmers could look. Von der Leyen intends to present a draft before the next Agriculture Council at the end of the month, as she announced at the beginning of February in response to the farmers’ protests. Wojciechowski’s proposals go a long way – and the legal basis is partly questionable, as a legal expert confirmed to Table.Media.
Wojciechowski is in favor of suspending sanctions within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This emerges from an internal note from Wojciechowski to von der Leyen, which the French portal Contexte published last week. According to the note, Brussels should “signal” to the member states that they can temporarily suspend sanctions for breaches of GAEC standards. Wojciechowski refers to the Regulation on the financing and implementation of the CAP as the legal basis, which allows for exceptions “in cases of force ma jeure and exceptional circumstances“. Such an exceptional situation exists due to the market distortions caused by the war in Ukraine, he argues.
However, whether high production costs as a result of the war in Ukraine actually constitute an “exceptional circumstance” “must be doubted”, says agricultural law professor José Martinez from the University of Göttingen. This is because the costs were foreseeable. In addition, the expert believes that the exemption provided for in the regulation relates to individual cases, i.e. the situation of individual farms. Sanctions could therefore not be suspended across the board on this basis, as Wojciechowski suggests.
Martinez also believes that another of the Agriculture Commissioner’s proposals could run into legal difficulties. In the case of direct payments, Wojciechowski wants farms to no longer have to provide evidence – such as geo-referenced photos – that, for example, organic regulations have actually been implemented. Instead, a simple declaration would suffice. This would reverse the burden of proof: the company would not have to prove that it is providing a service, but the responsible authorities would have to prove that it is not doing so in case of doubt. However, Martinez believes that such a step would require an explicit amendment to the relevant regulation, including the approval of the member states and Parliament. The Commission will probably want to avoid this shortly before the end of the legislative period.
Wojciechowski proposes a third point: The member states should finance an inflation adjustment for the CAP direct payments from their own budgets. The note mentions an increase in payments of up to ten percent. The fact that the Commission has temporarily raised the ceilings for national aid in the wake of the war in Ukraine means that this is permissible.
It is rather unlikely that von der Leyen will adopt the proposals one-to-one. The Polish Commissioner for Agriculture had already been publicly deviating from the Commission’s line for some time, and the Commission President is unlikely to want to get herself into legal difficulties. Even farmers’ representatives in Brussels were surprised by the unorthodox proposals. Nevertheless, the paper could form an initial working basis for what the Commission ultimately presents.
Feb. 14, 2024; 2-3:15 p.m., online
FSR, Seminar Maritime transport decarbonization – what to expect from the new regulatory frameworks?
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) addresses the question whether the IMO and EU regulatory frameworks for decarbonisation are complementary or contradictory. INFO & REGISTRATION
Feb. 15, 2024; 6-7 p.m., online
GMF, Presentation The Global Dimension of Ukraine’s Cyber Defense
The German Marshall Fund (GMF) discusses global efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to detect and defend itself from Russian cyberattacks. INFO & REGISTRATION
The European Commission’s latest proposal for a temporary relaxation of the GAEC-8 standard on brownfield sites did not receive the necessary qualified majority of Member States in a vote in the relevant Council committee on Friday. The German government also abstained, which effectively counts as a vote against in the voting procedure. The Commission already proposed a derogation for 2024 at the end of January as a concession to the protesting farmers, but recently extended this significantly once again – according to a Commission spokesperson at the request of some member states.
According to the proposal, farms should also be able to meet GAEC 8 by growing legumes or catch crops instead of four percent fallow land. In the original draft, however, seven percent of the arable land was required for this, in the latest draft only four percent. Despite the changes, several countries voted against the new proposal or abstained because it did not go far enough for them, according to the Commission spokesperson. The opposite is true for Germany, as the federal government apparently abstained not despite, but because of the additional relaxation.
With the latest proposal, the Commission has missed “a balanced middle way that combines the competitiveness of our agriculture with the efficient protection of biodiversity”, said Minister Cem Özdemir after the vote, explaining the German government’s abstention. In the view of the Green politician, such a balanced solution would have been the original proposal, which he had expressly supported. Özdemir also criticized the “zigzag course” of the Commission, which had changed its mind on the fallow land issue several times within a few weeks.
Despite the failed vote, the Commission would now have the option of implementing its proposal on its own authority. Alternatively, it could submit a new draft or appeal to an appeal committee. Further steps are being examined, but which option the Commission ultimately chooses is still open, said the spokesperson. jd
In the debate about the future status of Ukrainian refugees in the European Union, Margaritis Schinas, the EU Commission Vice-President responsible for migration, does not expect a quick decision. “I think it is normal that a decision for a further extension would have to be made by a new team,” said Schinas when asked by Table.Media in Berlin.
A solution would therefore only be possible well after the European elections in June and the appointment of a new Commission, less than six months before the current regulation expires. Schinas is thus dampening expectations raised by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson in January – that a possible follow-up regulation may still be possible in the coming months if the member states reach an agreement.
The application of the mass influx directive, which was once created in the wake of the Yugoslavian wars, had already been extended twice by the member states and thus, according to the legal text, exhaustively. It forms the basis for the simplified protection procedure for Ukrainian war refugees. They do not have to undergo a regular asylum procedure until March 2025. Instead, they can receive protection status under the simplified procedure, which entitles them to attend nursery and school in Germany and receive transfer payments, among other things.
The German Association of Counties had vehemently pushed for a change in the rules, but also warned that a change of track to the regular asylum system for Ukrainians living in Germany would overburden the authorities in Germany without further adjustments. The CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s domestic policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, Alexander Throm, had called on Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) to find a quick solution.
Overall, the application of the Temporary Protection Directive has been one of the few positive things in European migration policy in recent years, says Schinas in Berlin. fst
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has sharply criticized Donald Trump’s comments on NATO: “Any relativization of the guarantee of mutual assistance is irresponsible and dangerous,” he said during the inaugural visit of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. “Nobody should play or deal with Europe’s security.”
The former president had previously said during an election campaign appearance that, in the event of an attack by Russia, he would not stand by those states that do not spend two percent of their economic output on defense, as agreed in NATO. Tusk emphasized that it was in the common interest of all European NATO states to increase their defense spending accordingly. Trump’s words should therefore “act like a cold shower in Europe” – especially for those countries that do not feel the threat from Russia so directly.
Scholz also expressed the expectation “that all NATO member states will meet these criteria“. Germany will achieve the two percent value this year “and for all time” and thus have the highest defense spending in Europe. And it is fully committed to the guarantee of assistance, said the Chancellor: “Poland’s security is also our security.”
Before he visited Berlin, Tusk had traveled to Paris for a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. To mobilize the EU partners, the three want to revive the Weimar Triangle. The aim is to strengthen joint air defenses and ramp up the production of ammunition within months, said Tusk. There are “no reasons why the European Union cannot have the same military power as Russia”. tho
Latvia’s security authorities have launched an investigation into MEP Tatjana Ždanoka. According to a report on Latvian television last week, the security police summoned the 73-year-old because of possible contacts with the Russian secret service FSB. Ždanoka confirmed a corresponding conversation, the content of which she had pledged to keep confidential, she said according to the program published on Sunday evening.
Ždanoka, who has been a member of the European Parliament since 2004 and is not currently a member of any political group, also rejected the accusations. Another leading member of Ždanoka’s party, the Russian Union of Latvia, was also summoned to an interview by the authorities.
According to the report, Ždanoka is said to have been commissioned by the Russian secret service to promote pro-Kremlin sentiment in the Baltic states. To this end, the politician, who has repeatedly openly advocated Russian positions, was supported by two different agents from at least 2004 to 2017, according to leaked emails citing corresponding correspondence.
The security authorities’ hands are partly tied in the investigation, as most of the published correspondence dates back to before 2016. At that time, supporting a foreign state was not punishable under criminal law in Latvia. A corresponding amendment to the law only came into force in 2016.
The European Parliament has launched an investigation into MEPs. In a resolution adopted on Thursday, the European representatives expressed their “utter indignation and deep concern about Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine democracy in the EU”. dpa
One month after the first announcements of the government reshuffle in France, Gabriel Attal’s government is now complete. It has 35 ministers and state secretaries. However, Attal has not succeeded in attracting new faces from the right or left.
Agnès Pannier-Runacher, who was Minister for the Energy Transition until the beginning of January, was surprisingly appointed Deputy Minister to Marc Fesneau, Minister for Agriculture and Food Sovereignty.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Pannier-Runacher will be responsible for:
Her expertise in the areas of energy, climate and industry will be “invaluable”. Pannier-Runacher will also support her boss Fesneau in other areas, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, in strengthening food sovereignty and the competitiveness of the agricultural and food sectors, as well as supporting farmers and foresters in the fight against climate change.
The ministry of Christophe Béchu, Minister for Ecological Transformation, has been joined by two deputy ministers: one is responsible for housing construction and thus for the climate component of thermal building refurbishment, the other for transport. A new state secretary has also been added to his team, who is responsible for oceans and biodiversity. Béchu has also taken over the international climate negotiations previously led by Pannier-Runnacher.
The energy portfolio has been assigned to the Ministry of the Economy, which is headed by the influential Bruno Le Maire. This reorganization could cause tensions between the ministers Béchu and Le Maire. The Official Journal states that Béchu is to take care of the thermal renovation of buildings and the electrification of road transport “with the involvement of the Minister for the Economy”. A very administrative way of explaining that the policy pursued will depend above all on the weight of the ministers in office and the will of President Emmanuel Macron.
The Europe portfolio is also getting a new face. Jean-Noël Barrot has been appointed Minister Delegate for Europe to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and former MEP Stéphane Séjourné. He succeeds Laurence Boone. Barrot was previously Deputy Minister for Digital Affairs.
However, he will retain his mandate as a member of parliament for the centrist Mouvement démocrate party in the Yveline department and as a regional councilor for the Île-de-France region. Former MEP Chrysoula Zacharopoulou will remain as Secretary of State for Development and International Partnerships. cst
After lengthy negotiations in the trilogue, Germany has called into question the consensus reached in December for a European supply chain law. However, many companies in Germany – including many small and medium-sized enterprises – have long since embarked on the path to a sustainable economy and are implementing comprehensive due diligence obligations. They support regulations that would create clarity for everyone in Europe. We also advocate a strong European supply chain law, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).
Ever since the Covid pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, it has been clear that Europe needs strategic autonomy, including in the economy. A central building block for this is the diversification of relationships in various sectors. For this to succeed, the member states urgently need to coordinate their requirements. European regulation ensures the standardization of different laws and creates orientation for partner countries.
In recent years, pressure on governments and businesses in third countries to implement sustainability and human rights standards has also increased. The USA, with its strict legislation against forced labor, is very important for many companies. Australia and New Zealand have laws against modern slavery. The Japanese government has issued guidelines for companies, India and Thailand have national action plans for business and human rights, and South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia are also addressing the issue.
The Mexican government is using the trend towards compliance with social standards as an argument to entice companies away from China. There is a draft law in Colombia and a law is also being discussed in Brazil. Even the Chinese government is now holding its companies to account: They are supposed to follow the OECD guidelines for multinational companies abroad.
The EU is one of the major global economic players. The CSDDD now offers the EU the opportunity to influence global standard-setting on environmental and social issues in its favor. This gives European companies a clear orientation and gives them a competitive advantage.
Critics argue that European regulation stands in the way of current efforts to ensure security of supply because companies are confronted with bureaucratic requirements. However, the opposite is true: the implementation of due diligence obligations helps companies to get to know their supply chains better. They not only look at which countries their products come from, but also which actors are involved and under what conditions they are manufactured. This applies in particular to sectors in which supply chains are not transparent, suppliers change frequently and relationships are very non-binding.
The debate also leads to more cooperation with suppliers and partners. We can already see how transparency is being increased through data collection and data pooling. Because the EU is a very important market for many third countries, many companies are already adapting to EU regulations. In practice, this does not lead to less cooperation, but to more exchange and reliability between trading partners. “Supplier shopping” in the pure search for the lowest price – this is proving to be an outdated model. More direct contact with producers is being sought and agencies are increasingly being bypassed.
Around half of German exports, especially from SMEs, go to the European domestic market. This makes it the most important export market for German companies. This success of our SMEs is largely due to the fact that laws in the European single market have been standardized. If the CSDDD does not come about, German SMEs will continue to be confronted with a patchwork of regulations.
With the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Initiative (CSRD), there is already a uniform reporting obligation in the EU without the underlying processes being regulated. The EU taxonomy is also already having an impact. More and more investors are demanding high environmental and social standards when investing in companies. There are also other EU regulations, such as those on conflict minerals, which companies have to comply with.
The CSDDD would regulate the many underlying due diligence processes and create a uniform standard for sustainability processes. This would significantly reduce the burden on companies. An EU-wide regulation would therefore make sense, particularly in order to keep the bureaucratic burden low and to support German companies in implementing due diligence obligations in a targeted manner.
The CSDDD can even provide economic impetus because it will bring a further standardization push for risk management data and tools. In 2023, investors will have invested hundreds of millions in start-ups that develop digital solutions for supply chain management. This standardization will make risk management much simpler and cheaper in the long term. This will help SMEs and create new market opportunities.
Markus Löning has been a member of the Bundestag for the FDP and, as the Federal Government’s Human Rights Commissioner, has dealt with international relations and human rights. He has been supporting companies in establishing human rights due diligence processes for ten years.
Melanie Müller is a researcher in the Africa and Middle East research group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). She heads the SWP component of the Sustainable Supply Chains Research Network and focuses on the supply chains of metallic raw materials.
Today, the AI Act takes its penultimate hurdle. After the member states voted unanimously in favor of the political compromise from December through their Permanent Representatives, it is now Parliament’s turn. Today, the lead committees IMCO and LIBE must first confirm the result, before the plenary is expected to take a final vote in March or April.
The vote will be exciting for two reasons: Firstly because the agreement was only reached verbally and there were disagreements afterwards about what was actually agreed and some things still had to be clarified at a technical level. Secondly, because basically nobody is really happy with the law.
The most controversial issues continue to be remote biometric identification in public spaces and the regulation of generative artificial intelligence. In practically every parliamentary group, there are MEPs who see red lines being crossed on one issue or fear competitive disadvantages due to excessive regulation on the other. It is therefore to be expected that there will be dissenters from the EPP, S&D, the Greens and Renew. The ECR, the Left and ID will probably reject the proposal.
This is a normal democratic process. But this time there are other factors at play. For example, the embarrassment of the EU losing its much-vaunted leadership role in the regulation of AI if the law is not passed. A gift.
The question is far more important: what would happen to the proposed legislation with regard to citizens’ rights in a future EU Parliament that has moved further to the right and under the Hungarian Council Presidency? In this respect, some argue that it is better to agree now than to reject it. The situation is also much better with the AI Act than without any legal regulation at all.
In any case, there is still a bad aftertaste. Such an important law deserves a better democratic process and a better result that does not leave so many questions unanswered.
We wish you a wonderful day!
Two years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and after twelve packages of sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries, Moscow is still able to fill its state budget and finance the war. Oil and gas sales play a central role in this. Although revenues are below the government’s plans, they still show that Russia is successfully circumventing the $60 price cap that was introduced for Russian oil in December 2022.
“Overall, 2022 has helped Russia to prepare and make a huge profit in energy trading,” explains Alexandra Prokopenko in an interview with Table.Media. The former employee of the Russian Central Bank left Moscow immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today, she conducts research at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. The fact that Russia continues to generate solid revenues from the export of oil is due to the fact that “there is obviously a major problem in enforcing sanctions, both by the EU and the USA. You can see this particularly well in the oil trade,” says Prokopenko.
The war itself is a guarantee for Russia that the world market price for oil will remain comparatively high. Since January 2022 – shortly before the full-scale invasion – until today, the oil price has been above the pre-war level. The average annual price of Brent crude was $70.86 in 2021; it rose to $100.93 in 2022 and fell to $82.49 in 2023.
Moscow has so far been able to break through the price cap of $60 for Russian oil introduced on Dec. 5, 2022. India and China, the largest buyers of Russian oil, but also Gulf states, are apparently buying it at higher prices, which are still below the global market price – a win-win for sellers and buyers. If Indian refineries process Russian oil into diesel and export it, it is considered an Indian product. Turkey also plays an important and dubious role in the transshipment of Russian oil. According to the Financial Times, the oil even reaches the EU: Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium.
Every dollar over $60 is an advantage for Russia. Thanks to direct pipelines to China and the shadow fleet, this business is so successful that Russia has publicly set its budget plans for the coming years at $70.
Oil revenues are the Achilles heel of war financing. “For it to really hurt, the price has to be significantly lower, below $60. At $70 a barrel, Russia will get through the year just fine,” says analyst Prokopenko.
The EU member states had already failed to prevent the sale of tankers to Russia, which are used to circumvent the oil price limit, when the 12th sanctions package was drawn up. On the second anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion, the EU is preparing the 13th package. It will affect individuals and diplomats in Russia rather than industries. There is not much left for the EU and the USA, except perhaps Russian uranium – but imports to the EU actually increased in 2022 and 2023.
Enforcing sanctions – that will be the West’s next big task. David O’Sullivan is diplomatically responsible for this in the EU. The 70-year-old travels a lot in Central Asia, where he is urgently campaigning to restrict re-exports to Russia. According to EU circles in Brussels, some states such as Armenia, Georgia and Serbia are cooperating and are now severely restricting re-exports to Russia.
However, he is less satisfied with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although awareness is growing there, “they have still taken few concrete steps overall”. The verdict on Ankara is even clearer: “Turkey has listened to our demands and also shown a certain willingness to cooperate, but the flow of goods [to Russia] remains a cause for concern.” Why the issue of enforcement is only now coming to the fore, even though it has been clear since 2014 that Russia is circumventing the sanctions and how, would certainly be worth a political discussion.
The EU is trying to entice the former Soviet republics in particular with investments, promises of investment and the prospect of closer trade relations. Thus ensnared by Russia, the EU – and also China – the situation offers the states opportunities to gain something for themselves that they did not have before the war. Punishments or sanctions against them would possibly be damaging, and Russia is of course aware of this. The states in Central Asia are therefore not only benefiting economically at the moment but are also increasing their diplomatic weight.
Several factors will determine whether Russia comes under greater or lesser economic pressure:
“Enforcing the sanctions is a game of cat and mouse. From the outside, it may seem pointless to keep finding new ways to circumvent them, only for Russian companies to look for new ones. But it is important to play this game and to keep putting new obstacles in the way of circumvention,” emphasizes Janis Kluge from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). “To this end, legislation will have to be constantly adapted, there needs to be constant dialogue with and pressure on circumventing states, and the authorities need to be better equipped to detect and punish circumvention.”
However, Alexandra Prokopenko is certain that no significant consequences are to be expected in the short term, as Russia is too well prepared for this: “There is no reason for optimism for the West. On the contrary, I would say that this year will be very difficult. From an economic point of view, no crisis is to be expected in Russia this year. If something happens, it will be something else.”
The deadline has expired: The European Parliament and member states had until Feb. 9, i.e. last Friday, to conclude their political negotiations on individual legislative proposals. Anything that has not been agreed in trilogue by this deadline can no longer be formally adopted before the end of the legislative period.
But as is so often the case in Brussels, there is always a back door. Some delayed dossiers can still be adopted in an emergency procedure. In this so-called corrigendum procedure, the Council and Parliament have time to reach a political agreement by the week of the session from March 11 to 14. Unlike the regular process, only the English-language version of the legislative text is used here. This saves time during translation and final editing by the language lawyers in both chambers.
To be adopted in time, the legislative texts must be adopted by the last week of the Parliament’s session before the European elections from April 22 to 25. In Parliament, the Conference of Committee Chairs (CCC) will now decide which legislative procedures will be given priority. The list has not yet been finalized. However, the hot candidates include the import ban on products from forced labor, the right to repair and the Clean Air Directive.
Here is an overview of the timetables for the remaining dossiers:
Certification of CO2 withdrawals: The final trilogue meeting is scheduled for next Monday at 7 p.m. It will be an open-ended session. If an agreement is reached, the law could probably be passed in the last plenary week in April. And that’s what it looks like. The certification of CO2 removals is not considered very controversial anyway, but the relevance for the industry and the repercussions for future legislative proposals are enormous. It remains to be seen whether certain methods such as direct emission reductions will take precedence over CO2 removal, as demanded by Parliament.
CO2 fleet regulation for heavy commercial vehicles: Now that the Liberals have given up their blockade in the Council at the last minute, there are many indications that the CO2 fleet limits for heavy commercial vehicles can still come into force in this legislature. The EU ambassadors already adopted the text on Friday, and any Council of Ministers can now formally approve the trilogue result. The Parliament’s Environment Committee will vote on the legislative proposal on Wednesday, followed by the plenary session in Strasbourg in the last week of February.
Political agreement on the Clean Air Directive is to be reached next Tuesday (Feb. 20). In mid-January, the Belgian Council Presidency presented a compromise proposal on pollutant threshold values. If the trilogue is completed on Tuesday, the way would be clear for a vote on the result in the April plenary session at the latest, so that the dossier can be brought over the finishing line before the end of the legislative period.
Restoring nature: The plenary session in Strasbourg will vote on the controversial legislative proposal in the week of Feb. 26. The Environment Council is due to give its final approval on March 25. The regulation will come into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal of the EU.
Methane emissions: During the parliamentary session in March, methane emissions will be voted on, but only those emitted by the energy sector, not methane emissions from agriculture. During the same parliamentary session, MEPs will also vote on industrial emissions.
The directive on soil monitoring will be voted on by the ENVI Committee on March 11 and then by Parliament during the April session.
On Feb. 7, Parliament voted in favor of relaxing the legal framework on new breeding techniques (NGTs). MEPs called for stricter labeling requirements for genetically modified products than provided for in the Commission’s proposal. There is still no sign of a compromise on the part of the Member States. The Belgian Council Presidency was unable to reach an agreement and talks are now continuing at working level, according to negotiating circles.
The trilogue negotiations on the most important energy dossiers were concluded before Christmas under the Spanish Council Presidency. The EPBD buildings directive is now due to be adopted in plenary in March. The new electricity market design is on the agenda for the first plenary session in April, while the two elements of the gas package will be discussed in the second session in April.
Net Zero Industry Act: Parliament and Council reached a trilogue agreement last Tuesday, in time for the Feb. 9 deadline. The act is now set to be adopted in plenary in the last week of the April session. The financial instrument of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), which is linked to the NZIA, is to be adopted next week as part of the revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework.
SMEI/IMERA: At the beginning of February, the co-legislators agreed on the Single Market Emergency Instrument, which will be renamed the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA) once implemented. It is now to be voted on in the first week of April.
Economic governance: Council and Parliament reached an agreement in the trilogue negotiations on Saturday night. The package is expected to be finally adopted by Parliament in the second session of April. However, the Commission will start work before then. In spring, it will make a proposal to the member states for their net expenditure paths, after which they will have to submit their multi-year plans for the years 2025 to 2028 or 2025 to 2031 to the Commission in September.
Supply Chain Act: After the Belgian Council Presidency took the vote in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) off the agenda last Friday and then again this week, no new date has yet been announced. The intention is to continue working on the law with the Member States and to schedule the vote in Coreper as soon as “the time is right”, it was said. The vote in Parliament is currently scheduled for April.
Import ban on products from forced labor: The regulation related to the Supply Chain Act is currently still being negotiated by the Council and Parliament. The second (and probably last) political trilogue will take place on March 4. The law could then still be passed in the corrigendum procedure.
Green Claims Directive: On Feb. 14, the Internal Market and Environment Committees will vote on their report. It must then be formally adopted by the plenary, which is scheduled for March. The adoption of the directive will therefore slip into the coming legislative period. The trilogue negotiations are scheduled to begin in the fall at the earliest.
Ecodesign Regulation: Following the trilogue agreement at the beginning of December, the Council and Parliament still have to adopt the result in plenary. Coreper and the Environment Committee in Parliament have already approved the agreement.
Right to repair: The Council and Parliament reached a trilogue agreement at the beginning of February. On Feb. 14, Coreper will vote on the result in the Council, and on Feb. 22, the lead Internal Market Committee is expected to vote. The plenary is then expected to formally adopt the law at the end of April.
Packaging Regulation: Following the first trilogue on Feb. 6, the Council and Parliament want to reach a political agreement on March 4 and 5 and have therefore scheduled a “very long” trilogue meeting. It is said that some technical negotiations will then be necessary, but the law is to be adopted in the corrigendum procedure before the end of this legislative period.
AI Act: The member states have cleared the way for the world’s first comprehensive AI law. Now Parliament has to give its approval – today in the lead committees and then in plenary. The outcome is open. If Parliament gives its approval, adoption in one of the Council formations should be a mere formality. By contrast, Parliament has not yet dealt with the AI Liability Directive. It is an issue for the next legislature.
Product Liability Directive: In contrast to AI liability, Parliament and the Council have already reached an agreement on the revision of product liability law. The PLD aims to adapt liability law to the digital age. It includes networked products, software for the first time and also applies to AI – until there is a specific law. The date for the vote in plenary is March 11.
Gigabit Infrastructure Act: The Council and Parliament reached a political agreement at the beginning of February. The Act is intended to make network expansion in the member states faster and more cost-effective. The GIA is also intended to abolish extra charges for international calls within the EU. The legislative proposal will be put to the vote in the plenary session of Parliament on April 22.
European Digital Identity Framework: Members of the European Parliament plan to vote on the framework for a Europe-wide digital identity as early as Feb. 26. With the EUid wallet, citizens will be able to prove their identity throughout the EU and make use of public or private services.
European Media Freedom Act: In December, the Council and Parliament reached an agreement on the European Media Freedom Act, which is intended to safeguard the freedom and independence of the media in the EU. It is expected to be passed by the European Parliament in March.
Cyber Resilience Act: Following the agreement in the trilogue, the lead ITRE committee gave its positive vote. This means that the law, which aims to make networked devices from home appliances to industrial applications more secure, can be passed in plenary in April.
Migration pact: The EU ambassadors have already confirmed the results of the trilogue negotiations, now it’s Parliament’s turn: the Committee on Home Affairs is due to vote on Wednesday, followed by the plenary session in the first week of April. By János Allenbach-Ammann, Leonie Düngefeld, Till Hoppe, Lukas Scheid, Claire Stam, Falk Steiner and Corinna Visser
EU Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski has submitted proposals to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as to how the bureaucratic relief she has announced for farmers could look. Von der Leyen intends to present a draft before the next Agriculture Council at the end of the month, as she announced at the beginning of February in response to the farmers’ protests. Wojciechowski’s proposals go a long way – and the legal basis is partly questionable, as a legal expert confirmed to Table.Media.
Wojciechowski is in favor of suspending sanctions within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This emerges from an internal note from Wojciechowski to von der Leyen, which the French portal Contexte published last week. According to the note, Brussels should “signal” to the member states that they can temporarily suspend sanctions for breaches of GAEC standards. Wojciechowski refers to the Regulation on the financing and implementation of the CAP as the legal basis, which allows for exceptions “in cases of force ma jeure and exceptional circumstances“. Such an exceptional situation exists due to the market distortions caused by the war in Ukraine, he argues.
However, whether high production costs as a result of the war in Ukraine actually constitute an “exceptional circumstance” “must be doubted”, says agricultural law professor José Martinez from the University of Göttingen. This is because the costs were foreseeable. In addition, the expert believes that the exemption provided for in the regulation relates to individual cases, i.e. the situation of individual farms. Sanctions could therefore not be suspended across the board on this basis, as Wojciechowski suggests.
Martinez also believes that another of the Agriculture Commissioner’s proposals could run into legal difficulties. In the case of direct payments, Wojciechowski wants farms to no longer have to provide evidence – such as geo-referenced photos – that, for example, organic regulations have actually been implemented. Instead, a simple declaration would suffice. This would reverse the burden of proof: the company would not have to prove that it is providing a service, but the responsible authorities would have to prove that it is not doing so in case of doubt. However, Martinez believes that such a step would require an explicit amendment to the relevant regulation, including the approval of the member states and Parliament. The Commission will probably want to avoid this shortly before the end of the legislative period.
Wojciechowski proposes a third point: The member states should finance an inflation adjustment for the CAP direct payments from their own budgets. The note mentions an increase in payments of up to ten percent. The fact that the Commission has temporarily raised the ceilings for national aid in the wake of the war in Ukraine means that this is permissible.
It is rather unlikely that von der Leyen will adopt the proposals one-to-one. The Polish Commissioner for Agriculture had already been publicly deviating from the Commission’s line for some time, and the Commission President is unlikely to want to get herself into legal difficulties. Even farmers’ representatives in Brussels were surprised by the unorthodox proposals. Nevertheless, the paper could form an initial working basis for what the Commission ultimately presents.
Feb. 14, 2024; 2-3:15 p.m., online
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The European Commission’s latest proposal for a temporary relaxation of the GAEC-8 standard on brownfield sites did not receive the necessary qualified majority of Member States in a vote in the relevant Council committee on Friday. The German government also abstained, which effectively counts as a vote against in the voting procedure. The Commission already proposed a derogation for 2024 at the end of January as a concession to the protesting farmers, but recently extended this significantly once again – according to a Commission spokesperson at the request of some member states.
According to the proposal, farms should also be able to meet GAEC 8 by growing legumes or catch crops instead of four percent fallow land. In the original draft, however, seven percent of the arable land was required for this, in the latest draft only four percent. Despite the changes, several countries voted against the new proposal or abstained because it did not go far enough for them, according to the Commission spokesperson. The opposite is true for Germany, as the federal government apparently abstained not despite, but because of the additional relaxation.
With the latest proposal, the Commission has missed “a balanced middle way that combines the competitiveness of our agriculture with the efficient protection of biodiversity”, said Minister Cem Özdemir after the vote, explaining the German government’s abstention. In the view of the Green politician, such a balanced solution would have been the original proposal, which he had expressly supported. Özdemir also criticized the “zigzag course” of the Commission, which had changed its mind on the fallow land issue several times within a few weeks.
Despite the failed vote, the Commission would now have the option of implementing its proposal on its own authority. Alternatively, it could submit a new draft or appeal to an appeal committee. Further steps are being examined, but which option the Commission ultimately chooses is still open, said the spokesperson. jd
In the debate about the future status of Ukrainian refugees in the European Union, Margaritis Schinas, the EU Commission Vice-President responsible for migration, does not expect a quick decision. “I think it is normal that a decision for a further extension would have to be made by a new team,” said Schinas when asked by Table.Media in Berlin.
A solution would therefore only be possible well after the European elections in June and the appointment of a new Commission, less than six months before the current regulation expires. Schinas is thus dampening expectations raised by EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson in January – that a possible follow-up regulation may still be possible in the coming months if the member states reach an agreement.
The application of the mass influx directive, which was once created in the wake of the Yugoslavian wars, had already been extended twice by the member states and thus, according to the legal text, exhaustively. It forms the basis for the simplified protection procedure for Ukrainian war refugees. They do not have to undergo a regular asylum procedure until March 2025. Instead, they can receive protection status under the simplified procedure, which entitles them to attend nursery and school in Germany and receive transfer payments, among other things.
The German Association of Counties had vehemently pushed for a change in the rules, but also warned that a change of track to the regular asylum system for Ukrainians living in Germany would overburden the authorities in Germany without further adjustments. The CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s domestic policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, Alexander Throm, had called on Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (SPD) to find a quick solution.
Overall, the application of the Temporary Protection Directive has been one of the few positive things in European migration policy in recent years, says Schinas in Berlin. fst
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has sharply criticized Donald Trump’s comments on NATO: “Any relativization of the guarantee of mutual assistance is irresponsible and dangerous,” he said during the inaugural visit of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. “Nobody should play or deal with Europe’s security.”
The former president had previously said during an election campaign appearance that, in the event of an attack by Russia, he would not stand by those states that do not spend two percent of their economic output on defense, as agreed in NATO. Tusk emphasized that it was in the common interest of all European NATO states to increase their defense spending accordingly. Trump’s words should therefore “act like a cold shower in Europe” – especially for those countries that do not feel the threat from Russia so directly.
Scholz also expressed the expectation “that all NATO member states will meet these criteria“. Germany will achieve the two percent value this year “and for all time” and thus have the highest defense spending in Europe. And it is fully committed to the guarantee of assistance, said the Chancellor: “Poland’s security is also our security.”
Before he visited Berlin, Tusk had traveled to Paris for a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron. To mobilize the EU partners, the three want to revive the Weimar Triangle. The aim is to strengthen joint air defenses and ramp up the production of ammunition within months, said Tusk. There are “no reasons why the European Union cannot have the same military power as Russia”. tho
Latvia’s security authorities have launched an investigation into MEP Tatjana Ždanoka. According to a report on Latvian television last week, the security police summoned the 73-year-old because of possible contacts with the Russian secret service FSB. Ždanoka confirmed a corresponding conversation, the content of which she had pledged to keep confidential, she said according to the program published on Sunday evening.
Ždanoka, who has been a member of the European Parliament since 2004 and is not currently a member of any political group, also rejected the accusations. Another leading member of Ždanoka’s party, the Russian Union of Latvia, was also summoned to an interview by the authorities.
According to the report, Ždanoka is said to have been commissioned by the Russian secret service to promote pro-Kremlin sentiment in the Baltic states. To this end, the politician, who has repeatedly openly advocated Russian positions, was supported by two different agents from at least 2004 to 2017, according to leaked emails citing corresponding correspondence.
The security authorities’ hands are partly tied in the investigation, as most of the published correspondence dates back to before 2016. At that time, supporting a foreign state was not punishable under criminal law in Latvia. A corresponding amendment to the law only came into force in 2016.
The European Parliament has launched an investigation into MEPs. In a resolution adopted on Thursday, the European representatives expressed their “utter indignation and deep concern about Russia’s ongoing efforts to undermine democracy in the EU”. dpa
One month after the first announcements of the government reshuffle in France, Gabriel Attal’s government is now complete. It has 35 ministers and state secretaries. However, Attal has not succeeded in attracting new faces from the right or left.
Agnès Pannier-Runacher, who was Minister for the Energy Transition until the beginning of January, was surprisingly appointed Deputy Minister to Marc Fesneau, Minister for Agriculture and Food Sovereignty.
According to the Ministry of Agriculture, Pannier-Runacher will be responsible for:
Her expertise in the areas of energy, climate and industry will be “invaluable”. Pannier-Runacher will also support her boss Fesneau in other areas, according to the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, in strengthening food sovereignty and the competitiveness of the agricultural and food sectors, as well as supporting farmers and foresters in the fight against climate change.
The ministry of Christophe Béchu, Minister for Ecological Transformation, has been joined by two deputy ministers: one is responsible for housing construction and thus for the climate component of thermal building refurbishment, the other for transport. A new state secretary has also been added to his team, who is responsible for oceans and biodiversity. Béchu has also taken over the international climate negotiations previously led by Pannier-Runnacher.
The energy portfolio has been assigned to the Ministry of the Economy, which is headed by the influential Bruno Le Maire. This reorganization could cause tensions between the ministers Béchu and Le Maire. The Official Journal states that Béchu is to take care of the thermal renovation of buildings and the electrification of road transport “with the involvement of the Minister for the Economy”. A very administrative way of explaining that the policy pursued will depend above all on the weight of the ministers in office and the will of President Emmanuel Macron.
The Europe portfolio is also getting a new face. Jean-Noël Barrot has been appointed Minister Delegate for Europe to the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs and former MEP Stéphane Séjourné. He succeeds Laurence Boone. Barrot was previously Deputy Minister for Digital Affairs.
However, he will retain his mandate as a member of parliament for the centrist Mouvement démocrate party in the Yveline department and as a regional councilor for the Île-de-France region. Former MEP Chrysoula Zacharopoulou will remain as Secretary of State for Development and International Partnerships. cst
After lengthy negotiations in the trilogue, Germany has called into question the consensus reached in December for a European supply chain law. However, many companies in Germany – including many small and medium-sized enterprises – have long since embarked on the path to a sustainable economy and are implementing comprehensive due diligence obligations. They support regulations that would create clarity for everyone in Europe. We also advocate a strong European supply chain law, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).
Ever since the Covid pandemic and the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, it has been clear that Europe needs strategic autonomy, including in the economy. A central building block for this is the diversification of relationships in various sectors. For this to succeed, the member states urgently need to coordinate their requirements. European regulation ensures the standardization of different laws and creates orientation for partner countries.
In recent years, pressure on governments and businesses in third countries to implement sustainability and human rights standards has also increased. The USA, with its strict legislation against forced labor, is very important for many companies. Australia and New Zealand have laws against modern slavery. The Japanese government has issued guidelines for companies, India and Thailand have national action plans for business and human rights, and South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia are also addressing the issue.
The Mexican government is using the trend towards compliance with social standards as an argument to entice companies away from China. There is a draft law in Colombia and a law is also being discussed in Brazil. Even the Chinese government is now holding its companies to account: They are supposed to follow the OECD guidelines for multinational companies abroad.
The EU is one of the major global economic players. The CSDDD now offers the EU the opportunity to influence global standard-setting on environmental and social issues in its favor. This gives European companies a clear orientation and gives them a competitive advantage.
Critics argue that European regulation stands in the way of current efforts to ensure security of supply because companies are confronted with bureaucratic requirements. However, the opposite is true: the implementation of due diligence obligations helps companies to get to know their supply chains better. They not only look at which countries their products come from, but also which actors are involved and under what conditions they are manufactured. This applies in particular to sectors in which supply chains are not transparent, suppliers change frequently and relationships are very non-binding.
The debate also leads to more cooperation with suppliers and partners. We can already see how transparency is being increased through data collection and data pooling. Because the EU is a very important market for many third countries, many companies are already adapting to EU regulations. In practice, this does not lead to less cooperation, but to more exchange and reliability between trading partners. “Supplier shopping” in the pure search for the lowest price – this is proving to be an outdated model. More direct contact with producers is being sought and agencies are increasingly being bypassed.
Around half of German exports, especially from SMEs, go to the European domestic market. This makes it the most important export market for German companies. This success of our SMEs is largely due to the fact that laws in the European single market have been standardized. If the CSDDD does not come about, German SMEs will continue to be confronted with a patchwork of regulations.
With the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Initiative (CSRD), there is already a uniform reporting obligation in the EU without the underlying processes being regulated. The EU taxonomy is also already having an impact. More and more investors are demanding high environmental and social standards when investing in companies. There are also other EU regulations, such as those on conflict minerals, which companies have to comply with.
The CSDDD would regulate the many underlying due diligence processes and create a uniform standard for sustainability processes. This would significantly reduce the burden on companies. An EU-wide regulation would therefore make sense, particularly in order to keep the bureaucratic burden low and to support German companies in implementing due diligence obligations in a targeted manner.
The CSDDD can even provide economic impetus because it will bring a further standardization push for risk management data and tools. In 2023, investors will have invested hundreds of millions in start-ups that develop digital solutions for supply chain management. This standardization will make risk management much simpler and cheaper in the long term. This will help SMEs and create new market opportunities.
Markus Löning has been a member of the Bundestag for the FDP and, as the Federal Government’s Human Rights Commissioner, has dealt with international relations and human rights. He has been supporting companies in establishing human rights due diligence processes for ten years.
Melanie Müller is a researcher in the Africa and Middle East research group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). She heads the SWP component of the Sustainable Supply Chains Research Network and focuses on the supply chains of metallic raw materials.