It was a TV debate that really deserved the name. For almost three hours, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen fought a duel in front of millions of viewers, sometimes in a matter-of-fact and detailed manner, sometimes in an extremely heated manner. The incumbent Macron, who is leading in the polls, came across as extremely belligerent, at times even over-motivated: “Monsieur Macron, let her finish,” the moderator admonished him. Le Pen acted more reservedly, in an effort to appear presidential. A lesson learned from the 2017 debate, when a pinched performance on the big TV stage sealed her defeat in the runoff.
However, the leader of the Rassemblement National did not convince most viewers: in a snap poll conducted by the television station BFM TV, only 39 percent of viewers saw Le Pen as the winner, while 59 percent saw her opponent Macron as the winner. The race will remain open until the polls close on Sunday evening, but last night’s election probably did not bring Le Pen any closer to her big goal.
The first issue was right up her alley: she has made purchasing power the focus of her election campaign, and galloping inflation is playing into her hands. Macron had to concede: “People are angry, they can’t manage with their money.” Le Pen declared that she wanted to be “president of purchasing power,” the lawyer for the “suffering” citizens. However, her proposals – an exit from the European electricity market and a broad-based reduction in value-added tax – again offered Macron a target.
Macron then went on the offensive. He accused Le Pen of being a puppet of Vladimir Putin because of the loan from a Kremlin-affiliated bank in 2015 that has not yet been repaid: “You talk to your bankers when you talk to Russia.” Le Pen affirmed, “I am a completely free and independent woman.” She declared her “absolute solidarity” for Ukraine and also supported the imposed sanctions, only rejecting an oil and gas embargo – because this would mean “hara-kiri”.
Macron also took a hard line against his opponent on European policy. Le Pen affirmed that she did not want to leave the EU, only to change its organizational form. But her program, such as the primacy of French law over European law, would de facto mean a Frexit, Macron countered. The European Union functions as a community of owners in an apartment building: if one wants to renovate the facade, one can’t just say overnight, “we’ll do it this way or that way because my name is Madame Le Pen.” Macron, on the other hand, believes in Europe and in the Franco-German tandem “because it allows us to move forward.”
Le Pen is not the only far-right politician who, in light of the war in Ukraine, is trying to put her ties to Putin into perspective, at least for the public. She is in the company, for example, of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing Lega Nord in Italy. In view of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the far-right is now trying to conceal its close ties to the Kremlin, as Isabel Cuesta Camacho analyzes.
The negotiations on the Digital Services Act have not yet been concluded, and the suspense continues. In his guest article for Europe.Table, Alexander Rabe, Managing Director of the eco-Association, addressed important aspects of the DSA. He is particularly clear on one point: “Only the EU should set the rules,” he writes. The German NetzDG and other national regulations would have to make way for the EU to provide legal certainty with the DSA.
Ihr
Till Hoppe
Marine Le Pen would like to forget her admiration for Vladimir Putin. While her years of closeness to the Kremlin do not appear to be a disqualifying factor in the French presidential election – the race against Emmanuel Macron is still open immediately before Sunday’s runoff. But the far-right candidate has had to qualify her support for Russia’s president since the war in Ukraine began. Instead, she has preferred to focus on the issue of purchasing power in the election campaign – and incidentally blamed Western sanctions against Russia for galloping inflation.
The French presidential candidate is not the only European politician who has tried to hide her closeness to the Kremlin since the invasion of Ukraine. Whether it’s the Catalan separatist party of Carles Puigdemont, who fled justice, Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy, or the AfD, nationalist and far-right politicians are trying to cover up their support for Vladimir Putin. “Putin’s Russia has become toxic,” says author Anton Shekhovtsov, whose books have explored the link between European far-right groups and Russia.
Putin’s rhetoric was shared by nationalist and far-right parties in Europe: “They also saw Putin’s Russia as a conservative society that defends traditional values like the family. There was an ideological connection, and these politicians served Russian state propaganda with their statements.”
“The European far-right parties enjoyed media support from Russian propaganda channels, which they did not get from the mainstream media in their home countries,” Shekhovtsov says. Some parties have also received financial support from Russia. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) financed its campaign for the 2014 regional and local elections with a nine-million-euro loan from a Russian bank that has not yet been repaid.
Le Pen called Putin a “patriot” and defender of “traditional European values” and celebrated Putin’s measures to combat “LGBT propaganda.” While condemning the invasion of Ukraine, she has opposed sanctions against Russia, as she stated on her Twitter account in mid-March and in an interview with French medium BFMTV in mid-April.
Matteo Salvini’s Italian Lega Nord, known for its xenophobic policies, has also relied on funding and strategic political support from the Kremlin. As Italian magazine L’Espresso revealed in February, Salvini’s party conducted secret negotiations in Moscow with the intention of raising millions of euros in funding for the Lega ahead of the 2019 EU parliamentary elections. Salvini’s Lega has also consistently been the most active party in opposing economic sanctions against Moscow.
Since the attack on Ukraine, Salvini has been clumsily trying to cover up his ties to Putin. In early March, he traveled to the Polish city of Przemyśl, one of the main entry points for people from Ukraine. Przemyśl’s mayor, Wojciech Bakun, was not happy, however, that the Lega leader came to his city to make a case for supporting Ukrainian refugees. Bakun protested by holding a T-shirt with Putin’s likeness in front of Salvini’s face. The Italian politician had worn the T-shirt to the EU Parliament in 2015. At the time, he had said of his outfit honoring Putin, “I bought it in Moscow. It’s a response to the European fools who play war with Putin and Russia.”
In the AfD, which also has ties to the Kremlin, some politicians are not yet ready to condemn the war against Ukraine. For example, Eugen Schmidt, a member of the Bundestag, who likes to side with Moscow and claims in Russian media that there is no democracy in Germany, as a report by the program “Kontraste” shows.
“When you talk about pro-Russia far-right parties, it’s mainly about certain individuals within these factions who are pushing this agenda,” says expert Shekhovtsov. He cites Austria’s FPÖ as an example: “In 2019, the party’s entire pro-Russian faction was dissolved with the departure of Hans-Christian Strache after the Ibiza affair.”
In Europe, Russia interfered in the 2017 German elections as it did in the 2017 presidential elections in France. “In Germany, the Russians did all this anti-Merkel agitation,” Shekhovtsov said. Russia interferes in elections when it thinks it should – and can. In Hungary, for example, it wasn’t necessary because Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had already pushed through his agenda, which attacked several democratic principles.
As the New York Times revealed in September 2021, Carles Puigdemont’s Catalan separatist party sought help from Russia in its fight for independence from Spain. Puigdemont, who is on the run from Spanish justice on treason charges, denies any connection to the Kremlin.
In addition to far-right parties, there are also prominent European politicians who have maintained multi-million dollar business relationships with the Russian leader. The war has caused some to resign their leadership positions in companies with ties to Russia. Italian ex-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi resigned from the board of Delimobil, Russia’s largest car-sharing company, in late February. Former French political leader François Fillon also announced his swift resignation from his position at Sibur, the Russian petrochemical company. On the other hand, former German Chancellor and gas lobbyist Gerhard Schröder remained silent and retained his board positions at Gazprom and Rosnef.
“Putin has never considered Salvini, Le Pen, or Schröder as friends. He doesn’t respect them. The only country he respects or expects mutual respect from is the US,” Shekhovtsov says: “That comes from Putin’s experience as an intelligence officer: no respect for people who are willing to betray the national interests of their own societies.”
1.8 years – that’s the average lifespan of a smartphone. Often, repair is not even possible. And if it is, it is usually cheaper to buy a new device. As part of the Sustainable Products Initiative (SPI), the EU Commission now wants to strengthen the right to repair (Europe.Table reported).
The plans are likely to entail a considerable need for adjustment in the industry. Manufacturers are primarily concerned about the cost of implementation, says Claas Oehlmann, managing director of the BDI Circular Economy Initiative. If trade in spare parts or leasing models becomes increasingly important in the future, certain business models may no longer work.
Many companies realize that durability, repairability, and recyclability are central to a sustainable circular economy. “This has to start with product design, which is the key to sustainable products,” says Oehlmann. However, concrete calculations of the impact are still difficult at the moment: “The new Ecodesign Regulation only provides the framework for now,” Oehlmann says. “How individual measures will look is not yet clear.” However, the existing ecodesign specifications offer a certain orientation as to what the changeover will look like.
The Ecodesign Directive has so far only applied to certain categories such as washing machines, dishwashers, refrigerators, and televisions. The EU Commission wants to extend it to other products such as smartphones, computers, and vacuum cleaners and change it into a regulation. Warranties on products are to apply for longer, spare parts are to be available more quickly, and software updates are to be available for older devices as well.
According to a study by the consulting firm Oliver Wyman, this would reduce the revenues of European companies by around 20 percent. According to the study, the loss of revenue for manufacturers would result from new requirements for product design: for example, individual components of products would no longer have to be glued together in the future, but rather screwed together to make them repairable. According to industry estimates, the service life of electrical appliances could be extended by around a quarter, leading to fewer sales.
It is also unclear how the requirements can also apply to imported goods so that manufacturers within the EU are not at a competitive disadvantage. The Commission states that the regulation will “create a level playing field for companies wishing to sell their products on the EU market”.
However, the analysis by Oliver Wyman also states that the losses suffered by companies as a result of lower sales figures can be offset, at least in part, by new business models. For example, manufacturers could increase their revenue by around ten percent by selling spare parts, serving the second-hand market, and offering more services, such as subscription models for software updates or repairs.
For manufacturers, however, the spare parts business is a major challenge, says Werner Scholz, trade association managing director for household appliances at the ZVEI. “A spare part has to be managed, you don’t put it in storage somewhere and then forget about it. The requirements for components and spare parts are constantly changing, and plastics or certain metals are becoming banned.” Engines that manufacturers build today and put in storage as spare parts are already unlikely to meet current standards in a few years. “Regulation must not clash with other regulations there.”
The lifespan of electrical equipment is a key issue in the circular economy; after all, e-waste is the fastest-growing source of waste in the EU. In 2019, each EU citizen disposed of an average of ten kilograms of electrical equipment. For consumers, it is usually cheaper to buy a new appliance.
However, the willingness to repair is high, as shown by initiatives such as the repair bonus offered by the Thuringia Consumer Center. Since summer 2021, this has been reimbursing half of the repair costs for electrical appliances up to a value of €100 per person and year. “So many applications were received that the budget was exhausted after just six weeks and the Ministry of the Environment increased the funding volume once again,” says spokeswoman Katrin Braun.
Headquarters is currently planning a second edition of the program. The Austrian Ministry of the Environment is also offering such a repair subsidy on a national level starting April 26. Such a model would benefit local repair service providers, in particular, says Tobias Brönneke, head of the Center for Consumer Research and Sustainable Consumption (vunk) at Pforzheim University and chairman of the Baden-Württemberg Consumer Commission.
In addition, a reduction in VAT on repair services could help. Some member states, such as Sweden, already have good experience with this. However, according to Brönneke, the most important thing is an extension of the warranty against defects, which would prevent defects from being deliberately built into products.
The associations expect an actual impact on the market in four to five years. The circular economy in the EU is to be fully implemented by 2050 at the latest, with binding targets for the reuse of materials already in place by 2030.
The European Commission is considering whether the European Union could aim for a higher share of renewable energy by 2030 to accelerate the shift away from Russian fossil fuels. Last year, the commission proposed a 40 percent renewable energy target for 2030. Now it is looking at whether a 45 percent target would be possible.
“We are working at full speed to take into account especially the proposal to go from 40 percent to 45 percent – also against the background of higher energy prices,” Mechthild Wörsdörfer, deputy director-general of the commission’s energy department, told a meeting of EU lawmakers Wednesday.
Russia is the EU’s most important gas supplier. In 2020, the EU obtained 22 percent of its gross final energy consumption from renewables such as wind, solar, and biomass. The share varies widely among EU countries, ranging from more than 50 percent in Sweden to less than 10 percent in Luxembourg.
The new target depends on EU countries and the European Parliament. They are negotiating the proposal as part of the Fit for 55 package, which aims to cut EU emissions faster.
Markus Pieper, parliamentary director of the CDU/CSU group in the EU Parliament, said the new analysis was urgently needed so that it could be incorporated into the ongoing negotiations. He urged the Commission not to wait until after the summer. “Otherwise, we would be starting all over again.”
The commission will release a plan in May to phase out Russian fossil fuels by 2027. Wörsdörfer said that plan will include a legislative proposal to make it easier for renewable energy projects to get permits. rtr/sas
Even though the EU Parliament’s Industry and Energy Committee (ITRE) is not the lead committee for most of the dossiers in the Fit for 55 package, its members are authorized to issue an opinion in the form of their own report. Yesterday, ITRE voted on a large number of these so-called “opinions.” An overview:
ITRE’s rapporteur on CO2 fleet limits, Dominique Riquet (Renew, FR), wants to prevent the end of the internal combustion engine and calls for a technology-open approach to regulation. Instead of a 100 percent reduction in emissions from new vehicles from 2035, as proposed by the Commission, he wants only 95 percent. This would also make it possible to “retain a residual share for placing low-emission rechargeable hybrid vehicles on the market,” he writes in his report. Riquet also calls for emissions to no longer be measured only at the tailpipe, but throughout the entire life cycle. He also considers synthetic fuels and biofuels to be suitable for making the transition to low-emission mobility.
His report was adopted with 40 votes in favor, 17 against, and 19 abstentions.
The Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) is intended to accelerate the development of charging infrastructure for light and heavy vehicles. Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, DE) is a rapporteur in the ITRE Committee. He wants it to be possible to “cross the entire continent with an electric vehicle” as early as 2025. The Commission had proposed 2030 as a target. That means, for example, that every safe parking space should have “at least two charging stations for heavy-duty vehicles with a charging capacity of at least 100 kW installed.” In addition, there should be at least one fast-charging station (300kW) for passenger cars every five kilometers in urban areas and every 60 kilometers in rural areas.
The report was adopted with 59 votes in favor, 9 against, and 8 abstentions.
The ITRE compromise proposal on ETS reform focused in particular on the handling of free CO2 allowance allocations. The report by Mauri Pekkarinen (Renew, FI) stipulates that the free allocations for exports should be retained unchanged. Only after the end of the phase-in period of the CBAM, the Commission should present a detailed impact assessment of the “effects on EU exports of the CBAM sectors and the development of global emissions” (Europe.Table reported).
The report was adopted with 50 votes in favor, 24 against, and 2 abstentions.
The CBAM dossier is inextricably linked to the ETS. The ITRE compromise of rapporteur Izabela Kloc (ECR, PL) provides that the border adjustment mechanism will be tested under real conditions for one year. From 2023 to 2026, there would be a transition period for data collection, during which companies in the CBAM sectors would have to record what financial border adjustment they would theoretically have to pay, but would not pay it. In 2027, CBAM would be introduced, while in parallel free allocations would remain in full for the time being, but this may conflict with WTO rules (Europe.Table reported).
The report was adopted with 57 votes in favor, 16 against, and 3 abstentions.
Former Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło (ECR, PL) is rapporteur for the ITRE opinion on the Climate Social Fund. Although her draft was largely based on the Commission’s text, she wants special consideration to be given to “large families” in addition to single-parent families. It also calls for the fund to “support financially weaker households and micro-enterprises in particular by introducing measures related to natural gas-fired boilers and heating systems and distribution infrastructure.”
The report was adopted with 57 votes in favor, 9 against, and 10 abstentions.
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, DE) is responsible for the ITRE opinion for sustainable air transport (RefuelEU Aviation). Instead of a 63 percent share of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) by 2050, as proposed by the Commission, Paulus calls for a SAF share of 100 percent by 2040/2050. She also wants to end the tax exemption of jet fuel, the VAT exemption of airline tickets, and the free allocation of ETS allowances for aviation in order to reduce air traffic in general. While the commission wants to eliminate fossil fuels “in the coming decades” by using sustainable alternatives, Paul calls for emissions reductions from “advanced biofuels or synthetic fuels” as early as 2030.
The report was adopted with 42 votes in favor, 6 against, and 28 abstentions.
The European Commission is working to speed up the availability of alternative energy supplies to reduce the cost of a ban on Russian oil. This should convince Germany and other EU states to accept an oil embargo against Russia, an EU insider told Reuters on Wednesday.
In the debate over a sixth EU sanctions package against Russia, some EU countries also pushed for other new restrictions. These include excluding Russia’s top lenders Sberbank and Gazprom Neft from the international Swift payment system, halting imports of nuclear fuel from Russia, banning more Russian news channels, suspending visas for Russians, and blacklisting additional individuals and companies linked to the Kremlin. There is no understanding on this among the 27 EU governments.
Like some other EU states, the German government had stressed that it would take a few more months to become independent of Russian oil supplies. To this end, talks are being held with alternative suppliers. The EU Commission, for its part, now also wants to look at other supplier countries. The chairmen of the European, Foreign Affairs, and Defense Committees in the Bundestag had also called for an oil embargo “as quickly as possible.” rtr
European Council President Charles Michel pledged European solidarity with Ukraine during a surprise visit to Kyiv on Wednesday and said justice must be done for alleged Russian war crimes.
Michel, the head of the European Council, which represents the European Union’s 27 member states, visited the town of Borodianka northwest of Kyiv before holding talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in the capital. Ukraine suspects that Russian troops carried out atrocities in Borodianka and Bucha, another town near the capital. Moscow denies targeting civilians and has described the allegations as fabricated by Kyiv to justify more sanctions against it.
He said separately on Twitter: “History will not forget the war crimes that have been committed here. … There can be no peace without justice.”
Michel’s trip followed visits this month to Kyiv by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola.
“You are not alone,” Michel said, praising the courage of the Ukrainian people. “We are with you and will do everything which is possible to support you and to make sure that Ukraine will win the war.”
Michel said the EU had already provided Ukraine with 1.5 billion euros ($1.63 billion) of military equipment as well as imposing sanctions on Russia, but would look for more ways to respond to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion.
“I am convinced… that sooner or later we will target oil and gas,” he said, without giving details.
EU states have been divided over whether to impose an embargo on Russian oil or gas, with Germany among countries that are heavily dependent on energy imports from Russia.
Zelenskiy welcomed the “political signal” Michel had sent by visiting Borodianka, but urged Brussels to strengthen sanctions pressure on Russia and called for a “complete energy embargo including imports of oil and gas.”
He welcomed a sixth package of sanctions being prepared by the EU, but added: “Oil should be part of the sixth package. Without it this package will be empty, will not be powerful enough.”
The European Parliament has spoken out in favor of prescribing a uniform charging cable connection for numerous types of devices. The internal market committee voted yesterday to extend the planned regulation to smartwatches, fitness trackers, laptops, and printers, among others. The EU Commission had proposed only requiring manufacturers of cell phones, tablets, digital cameras, and portable speakers to install a standard charging cable connector in USB-C format.
Parliament’s goal is to establish a standard connection for as many devices as possible, said its rapporteur Alex Agius Saliba (S&D). This would benefit the environment, as fewer chargers of which would have to be disposed, and would make life easier for consumers. However, the specifications would also have to be practicable for manufacturers. For example, smartwatches and fitness wristbands should be exempt if they cannot be fitted with a USB-C port due to their small size.
By the end of 2026, the Commission is also to examine whether further device types can be included in the scope. By then, the authority is also to define a standard for wireless charging in order to achieve standardization here as well. This will make the regulation “future-proof,” according to Agius Saliba. Originally, the MEP from Malta had already wanted to specify the year 2025 here.
The new requirements for manufacturers are to take effect as early as nine months after the entry into force of the Radio Equipment Directive, which is currently being revised to address this issue. The companies are then to inform customers with clear labels whether the device comes with its own charging cable and what properties it has.
The positions were adopted by a large majority in the committee. He wants to use the strong mandate to push through the ambitious approach of the Parliament in the upcoming trialogue with the member states, said Agius Saliba. tho
Existing legislation in the transport sector should be better reflected in the law on artificial intelligence. That was the call made by Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN) rapporteur Josianne Cutajar (S&D) in her draft opinion on the AI law. She said it is important to ensure that the law does not overlap with sector-specific legislation and impose duplicative or conflicting obligations on transport stakeholders.
In the aviation, road, rail, and maritime sectors, measures are needed that are specifically tailored to each sector. This is the only way to ensure successful operations and service management while ensuring the highest level of safety. Harmonized legislation may not be sufficient to ensure safety in the sector, Cutajar warned. Therefore, sector-specific legislation must be maintained and, in some cases, take precedence over harmonized provisions of the AI Act.
The rapporteur also calls for better consideration of international norms and standards. Due to the international nature of transportation this is of particular importance. Finally, Cutajar argues in her draft for better promotion of research and innovation. New harmonized regulations should not hinder research if it is limited to controlled environments and the AI system is not brought to market. She proposes that small and medium-sized enterprises be given better access to the real laboratories provided for in the AI law.
In addition, the TRAN rapporteur makes some suggestions for defining AI systems and high-risk AI systems. Both are essential to transportation. Other minor changes include transparency of algorithms for transportation work, understanding human oversight in the context of transportation, and clarifying errors in data sets. Members of the Transportation and Tourism Committee now have until May 3 to submit their amendments to Cutajar’s statement. ank
With the Digital Services Act (DSA), the EU has created a successor to the E-Commerce Directive (EC-RL). The regulatory package is intended to complete the digital single market and define the future of the Internet in Europe. For 20 years, the EC-RL formed the legal foundation for online services. Considering the rapid development in the digital sector, this is already an impressively long time. The DSA offers the opportunity to adapt the horizontal legal framework to the technological leaps in development over the past 20 years.
Back then, it was hard to imagine what services would develop and in what form they would be used by citizens. Today, we can be reached online almost 24 hours a day via various devices, send and receive messages, use social media and video streaming, or have books, food, and other goods delivered to our homes.
There is no question that the EC-RL was not fully suitable for this purpose. Nevertheless, its rules provided the basic pillars that are still essential today: Limitation of liability based on notice and takedown, country of origin principle and the prohibition of general surveillance.
As an association of the Internet industry, we are pleased that the DSA retains these basic pillars or builds on them. We also expressly welcome the fact that the DSA expands the service providers, i.e., caching, hosting, and access providers, to include platforms and we actively called for this as part of eco’s discussions on the successor regulation to the EC Directive. In this way, it creates the opportunity to provide legal certainty in their activities for those who can do more, knows more, and also want to do more, without at the same time compromising the business basis for those who neither know the content nor have the financial or human resources.
Among the corresponding obstacles are rigid deadlines and proactive measures, which are particularly impossible for SMEs to afford. Every serious company already does everything it can to remove illegal content as quickly as possible.
It is regrettable that the political debate surrounding the DSA at the European level has focused very strongly on the large US platforms. It must be clear to the smaller and medium-sized providers that they will hardly be able to meet the requirements geared to platforms. This fact, which after all affects a large part of the market, is usually lost in the political debate.
One of the most important points is certainly to recognize that the Internet is a global medium and that corresponding regulations should also be coordinated at the highest possible political level. For Germany and Europe, this means that only the EU should set the rules.
The German NetzDG, just like other national regulations, are a thorn in the side not only of eco, but of the entire Internet industry, because they do not fit in with the strong desire for successful company startups in Europe. A company that has to adapt to 27 rules within Europe will think several times before deciding whether it would prefer to remain active only in individual countries or to try its luck entirely outside Europe in a large market such as the USA. Accordingly, it is important that the DSA also “supersedes” the NetzDG and does not allow nation states to apply stricter standards themselves in the form of minimum regulation.
This also goes hand in hand with the procedure for reporting and removing illegal content, i.e., notice and takedown, which is to be made much more uniform throughout Europe in the future. Allowing national deviations and special regulations here would call the DSA compromise into question.
Even though the DSA is certainly a milestone in European digital policy, it will not last for decades, as was the case with the EC Directive. Rather, it will require continuous adaptation and further development. This is regrettable insofar as the discussions between the Commission, Parliament and Council have made it clear how different the ideas are and how quickly some have lost sight of the actual goal of the DSA. In the end, a compact horizontal approach has turned into a regulation that is in part very fragmented.
From eco’s point of view, it is essential in this context that the European Union now seizes the opportunity to ensure legal certainty. However, to this end it is also necessary to enact a horizontal legal framework. The DSA must not become a youth or consumer protection law.
During the trilogue negotiations, the negotiators have not yet been able to reach a consensus on important points such as the general ban on surveillance or the abuse of reporting potentially illegal content. Accordingly, it remains exciting, because the negotiations on the DSA have not yet been concluded.
From a German perspective, the distribution of portfolios under the “traffic light” coalition has transferred responsibility for the DSA within the German government to the Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs and Transport. It would make sense for the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) to be located here as well. On the one hand, this would ensure that the necessary structures can be set up quickly, that technical expertise can be drawn upon, and that personnel and administrative resources can be used.
When the DSA is implemented and the DSC is then set up, it will in any case be a matter of uniform and consistent handling, both in Germany and in Europe.
It was a TV debate that really deserved the name. For almost three hours, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen fought a duel in front of millions of viewers, sometimes in a matter-of-fact and detailed manner, sometimes in an extremely heated manner. The incumbent Macron, who is leading in the polls, came across as extremely belligerent, at times even over-motivated: “Monsieur Macron, let her finish,” the moderator admonished him. Le Pen acted more reservedly, in an effort to appear presidential. A lesson learned from the 2017 debate, when a pinched performance on the big TV stage sealed her defeat in the runoff.
However, the leader of the Rassemblement National did not convince most viewers: in a snap poll conducted by the television station BFM TV, only 39 percent of viewers saw Le Pen as the winner, while 59 percent saw her opponent Macron as the winner. The race will remain open until the polls close on Sunday evening, but last night’s election probably did not bring Le Pen any closer to her big goal.
The first issue was right up her alley: she has made purchasing power the focus of her election campaign, and galloping inflation is playing into her hands. Macron had to concede: “People are angry, they can’t manage with their money.” Le Pen declared that she wanted to be “president of purchasing power,” the lawyer for the “suffering” citizens. However, her proposals – an exit from the European electricity market and a broad-based reduction in value-added tax – again offered Macron a target.
Macron then went on the offensive. He accused Le Pen of being a puppet of Vladimir Putin because of the loan from a Kremlin-affiliated bank in 2015 that has not yet been repaid: “You talk to your bankers when you talk to Russia.” Le Pen affirmed, “I am a completely free and independent woman.” She declared her “absolute solidarity” for Ukraine and also supported the imposed sanctions, only rejecting an oil and gas embargo – because this would mean “hara-kiri”.
Macron also took a hard line against his opponent on European policy. Le Pen affirmed that she did not want to leave the EU, only to change its organizational form. But her program, such as the primacy of French law over European law, would de facto mean a Frexit, Macron countered. The European Union functions as a community of owners in an apartment building: if one wants to renovate the facade, one can’t just say overnight, “we’ll do it this way or that way because my name is Madame Le Pen.” Macron, on the other hand, believes in Europe and in the Franco-German tandem “because it allows us to move forward.”
Le Pen is not the only far-right politician who, in light of the war in Ukraine, is trying to put her ties to Putin into perspective, at least for the public. She is in the company, for example, of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing Lega Nord in Italy. In view of the Russian attack on Ukraine, the far-right is now trying to conceal its close ties to the Kremlin, as Isabel Cuesta Camacho analyzes.
The negotiations on the Digital Services Act have not yet been concluded, and the suspense continues. In his guest article for Europe.Table, Alexander Rabe, Managing Director of the eco-Association, addressed important aspects of the DSA. He is particularly clear on one point: “Only the EU should set the rules,” he writes. The German NetzDG and other national regulations would have to make way for the EU to provide legal certainty with the DSA.
Ihr
Till Hoppe
Marine Le Pen would like to forget her admiration for Vladimir Putin. While her years of closeness to the Kremlin do not appear to be a disqualifying factor in the French presidential election – the race against Emmanuel Macron is still open immediately before Sunday’s runoff. But the far-right candidate has had to qualify her support for Russia’s president since the war in Ukraine began. Instead, she has preferred to focus on the issue of purchasing power in the election campaign – and incidentally blamed Western sanctions against Russia for galloping inflation.
The French presidential candidate is not the only European politician who has tried to hide her closeness to the Kremlin since the invasion of Ukraine. Whether it’s the Catalan separatist party of Carles Puigdemont, who fled justice, Matteo Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy, or the AfD, nationalist and far-right politicians are trying to cover up their support for Vladimir Putin. “Putin’s Russia has become toxic,” says author Anton Shekhovtsov, whose books have explored the link between European far-right groups and Russia.
Putin’s rhetoric was shared by nationalist and far-right parties in Europe: “They also saw Putin’s Russia as a conservative society that defends traditional values like the family. There was an ideological connection, and these politicians served Russian state propaganda with their statements.”
“The European far-right parties enjoyed media support from Russian propaganda channels, which they did not get from the mainstream media in their home countries,” Shekhovtsov says. Some parties have also received financial support from Russia. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) financed its campaign for the 2014 regional and local elections with a nine-million-euro loan from a Russian bank that has not yet been repaid.
Le Pen called Putin a “patriot” and defender of “traditional European values” and celebrated Putin’s measures to combat “LGBT propaganda.” While condemning the invasion of Ukraine, she has opposed sanctions against Russia, as she stated on her Twitter account in mid-March and in an interview with French medium BFMTV in mid-April.
Matteo Salvini’s Italian Lega Nord, known for its xenophobic policies, has also relied on funding and strategic political support from the Kremlin. As Italian magazine L’Espresso revealed in February, Salvini’s party conducted secret negotiations in Moscow with the intention of raising millions of euros in funding for the Lega ahead of the 2019 EU parliamentary elections. Salvini’s Lega has also consistently been the most active party in opposing economic sanctions against Moscow.
Since the attack on Ukraine, Salvini has been clumsily trying to cover up his ties to Putin. In early March, he traveled to the Polish city of Przemyśl, one of the main entry points for people from Ukraine. Przemyśl’s mayor, Wojciech Bakun, was not happy, however, that the Lega leader came to his city to make a case for supporting Ukrainian refugees. Bakun protested by holding a T-shirt with Putin’s likeness in front of Salvini’s face. The Italian politician had worn the T-shirt to the EU Parliament in 2015. At the time, he had said of his outfit honoring Putin, “I bought it in Moscow. It’s a response to the European fools who play war with Putin and Russia.”
In the AfD, which also has ties to the Kremlin, some politicians are not yet ready to condemn the war against Ukraine. For example, Eugen Schmidt, a member of the Bundestag, who likes to side with Moscow and claims in Russian media that there is no democracy in Germany, as a report by the program “Kontraste” shows.
“When you talk about pro-Russia far-right parties, it’s mainly about certain individuals within these factions who are pushing this agenda,” says expert Shekhovtsov. He cites Austria’s FPÖ as an example: “In 2019, the party’s entire pro-Russian faction was dissolved with the departure of Hans-Christian Strache after the Ibiza affair.”
In Europe, Russia interfered in the 2017 German elections as it did in the 2017 presidential elections in France. “In Germany, the Russians did all this anti-Merkel agitation,” Shekhovtsov said. Russia interferes in elections when it thinks it should – and can. In Hungary, for example, it wasn’t necessary because Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had already pushed through his agenda, which attacked several democratic principles.
As the New York Times revealed in September 2021, Carles Puigdemont’s Catalan separatist party sought help from Russia in its fight for independence from Spain. Puigdemont, who is on the run from Spanish justice on treason charges, denies any connection to the Kremlin.
In addition to far-right parties, there are also prominent European politicians who have maintained multi-million dollar business relationships with the Russian leader. The war has caused some to resign their leadership positions in companies with ties to Russia. Italian ex-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi resigned from the board of Delimobil, Russia’s largest car-sharing company, in late February. Former French political leader François Fillon also announced his swift resignation from his position at Sibur, the Russian petrochemical company. On the other hand, former German Chancellor and gas lobbyist Gerhard Schröder remained silent and retained his board positions at Gazprom and Rosnef.
“Putin has never considered Salvini, Le Pen, or Schröder as friends. He doesn’t respect them. The only country he respects or expects mutual respect from is the US,” Shekhovtsov says: “That comes from Putin’s experience as an intelligence officer: no respect for people who are willing to betray the national interests of their own societies.”
1.8 years – that’s the average lifespan of a smartphone. Often, repair is not even possible. And if it is, it is usually cheaper to buy a new device. As part of the Sustainable Products Initiative (SPI), the EU Commission now wants to strengthen the right to repair (Europe.Table reported).
The plans are likely to entail a considerable need for adjustment in the industry. Manufacturers are primarily concerned about the cost of implementation, says Claas Oehlmann, managing director of the BDI Circular Economy Initiative. If trade in spare parts or leasing models becomes increasingly important in the future, certain business models may no longer work.
Many companies realize that durability, repairability, and recyclability are central to a sustainable circular economy. “This has to start with product design, which is the key to sustainable products,” says Oehlmann. However, concrete calculations of the impact are still difficult at the moment: “The new Ecodesign Regulation only provides the framework for now,” Oehlmann says. “How individual measures will look is not yet clear.” However, the existing ecodesign specifications offer a certain orientation as to what the changeover will look like.
The Ecodesign Directive has so far only applied to certain categories such as washing machines, dishwashers, refrigerators, and televisions. The EU Commission wants to extend it to other products such as smartphones, computers, and vacuum cleaners and change it into a regulation. Warranties on products are to apply for longer, spare parts are to be available more quickly, and software updates are to be available for older devices as well.
According to a study by the consulting firm Oliver Wyman, this would reduce the revenues of European companies by around 20 percent. According to the study, the loss of revenue for manufacturers would result from new requirements for product design: for example, individual components of products would no longer have to be glued together in the future, but rather screwed together to make them repairable. According to industry estimates, the service life of electrical appliances could be extended by around a quarter, leading to fewer sales.
It is also unclear how the requirements can also apply to imported goods so that manufacturers within the EU are not at a competitive disadvantage. The Commission states that the regulation will “create a level playing field for companies wishing to sell their products on the EU market”.
However, the analysis by Oliver Wyman also states that the losses suffered by companies as a result of lower sales figures can be offset, at least in part, by new business models. For example, manufacturers could increase their revenue by around ten percent by selling spare parts, serving the second-hand market, and offering more services, such as subscription models for software updates or repairs.
For manufacturers, however, the spare parts business is a major challenge, says Werner Scholz, trade association managing director for household appliances at the ZVEI. “A spare part has to be managed, you don’t put it in storage somewhere and then forget about it. The requirements for components and spare parts are constantly changing, and plastics or certain metals are becoming banned.” Engines that manufacturers build today and put in storage as spare parts are already unlikely to meet current standards in a few years. “Regulation must not clash with other regulations there.”
The lifespan of electrical equipment is a key issue in the circular economy; after all, e-waste is the fastest-growing source of waste in the EU. In 2019, each EU citizen disposed of an average of ten kilograms of electrical equipment. For consumers, it is usually cheaper to buy a new appliance.
However, the willingness to repair is high, as shown by initiatives such as the repair bonus offered by the Thuringia Consumer Center. Since summer 2021, this has been reimbursing half of the repair costs for electrical appliances up to a value of €100 per person and year. “So many applications were received that the budget was exhausted after just six weeks and the Ministry of the Environment increased the funding volume once again,” says spokeswoman Katrin Braun.
Headquarters is currently planning a second edition of the program. The Austrian Ministry of the Environment is also offering such a repair subsidy on a national level starting April 26. Such a model would benefit local repair service providers, in particular, says Tobias Brönneke, head of the Center for Consumer Research and Sustainable Consumption (vunk) at Pforzheim University and chairman of the Baden-Württemberg Consumer Commission.
In addition, a reduction in VAT on repair services could help. Some member states, such as Sweden, already have good experience with this. However, according to Brönneke, the most important thing is an extension of the warranty against defects, which would prevent defects from being deliberately built into products.
The associations expect an actual impact on the market in four to five years. The circular economy in the EU is to be fully implemented by 2050 at the latest, with binding targets for the reuse of materials already in place by 2030.
The European Commission is considering whether the European Union could aim for a higher share of renewable energy by 2030 to accelerate the shift away from Russian fossil fuels. Last year, the commission proposed a 40 percent renewable energy target for 2030. Now it is looking at whether a 45 percent target would be possible.
“We are working at full speed to take into account especially the proposal to go from 40 percent to 45 percent – also against the background of higher energy prices,” Mechthild Wörsdörfer, deputy director-general of the commission’s energy department, told a meeting of EU lawmakers Wednesday.
Russia is the EU’s most important gas supplier. In 2020, the EU obtained 22 percent of its gross final energy consumption from renewables such as wind, solar, and biomass. The share varies widely among EU countries, ranging from more than 50 percent in Sweden to less than 10 percent in Luxembourg.
The new target depends on EU countries and the European Parliament. They are negotiating the proposal as part of the Fit for 55 package, which aims to cut EU emissions faster.
Markus Pieper, parliamentary director of the CDU/CSU group in the EU Parliament, said the new analysis was urgently needed so that it could be incorporated into the ongoing negotiations. He urged the Commission not to wait until after the summer. “Otherwise, we would be starting all over again.”
The commission will release a plan in May to phase out Russian fossil fuels by 2027. Wörsdörfer said that plan will include a legislative proposal to make it easier for renewable energy projects to get permits. rtr/sas
Even though the EU Parliament’s Industry and Energy Committee (ITRE) is not the lead committee for most of the dossiers in the Fit for 55 package, its members are authorized to issue an opinion in the form of their own report. Yesterday, ITRE voted on a large number of these so-called “opinions.” An overview:
ITRE’s rapporteur on CO2 fleet limits, Dominique Riquet (Renew, FR), wants to prevent the end of the internal combustion engine and calls for a technology-open approach to regulation. Instead of a 100 percent reduction in emissions from new vehicles from 2035, as proposed by the Commission, he wants only 95 percent. This would also make it possible to “retain a residual share for placing low-emission rechargeable hybrid vehicles on the market,” he writes in his report. Riquet also calls for emissions to no longer be measured only at the tailpipe, but throughout the entire life cycle. He also considers synthetic fuels and biofuels to be suitable for making the transition to low-emission mobility.
His report was adopted with 40 votes in favor, 17 against, and 19 abstentions.
The Alternative Fuel Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) is intended to accelerate the development of charging infrastructure for light and heavy vehicles. Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, DE) is a rapporteur in the ITRE Committee. He wants it to be possible to “cross the entire continent with an electric vehicle” as early as 2025. The Commission had proposed 2030 as a target. That means, for example, that every safe parking space should have “at least two charging stations for heavy-duty vehicles with a charging capacity of at least 100 kW installed.” In addition, there should be at least one fast-charging station (300kW) for passenger cars every five kilometers in urban areas and every 60 kilometers in rural areas.
The report was adopted with 59 votes in favor, 9 against, and 8 abstentions.
The ITRE compromise proposal on ETS reform focused in particular on the handling of free CO2 allowance allocations. The report by Mauri Pekkarinen (Renew, FI) stipulates that the free allocations for exports should be retained unchanged. Only after the end of the phase-in period of the CBAM, the Commission should present a detailed impact assessment of the “effects on EU exports of the CBAM sectors and the development of global emissions” (Europe.Table reported).
The report was adopted with 50 votes in favor, 24 against, and 2 abstentions.
The CBAM dossier is inextricably linked to the ETS. The ITRE compromise of rapporteur Izabela Kloc (ECR, PL) provides that the border adjustment mechanism will be tested under real conditions for one year. From 2023 to 2026, there would be a transition period for data collection, during which companies in the CBAM sectors would have to record what financial border adjustment they would theoretically have to pay, but would not pay it. In 2027, CBAM would be introduced, while in parallel free allocations would remain in full for the time being, but this may conflict with WTO rules (Europe.Table reported).
The report was adopted with 57 votes in favor, 16 against, and 3 abstentions.
Former Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło (ECR, PL) is rapporteur for the ITRE opinion on the Climate Social Fund. Although her draft was largely based on the Commission’s text, she wants special consideration to be given to “large families” in addition to single-parent families. It also calls for the fund to “support financially weaker households and micro-enterprises in particular by introducing measures related to natural gas-fired boilers and heating systems and distribution infrastructure.”
The report was adopted with 57 votes in favor, 9 against, and 10 abstentions.
Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, DE) is responsible for the ITRE opinion for sustainable air transport (RefuelEU Aviation). Instead of a 63 percent share of sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) by 2050, as proposed by the Commission, Paulus calls for a SAF share of 100 percent by 2040/2050. She also wants to end the tax exemption of jet fuel, the VAT exemption of airline tickets, and the free allocation of ETS allowances for aviation in order to reduce air traffic in general. While the commission wants to eliminate fossil fuels “in the coming decades” by using sustainable alternatives, Paul calls for emissions reductions from “advanced biofuels or synthetic fuels” as early as 2030.
The report was adopted with 42 votes in favor, 6 against, and 28 abstentions.
The European Commission is working to speed up the availability of alternative energy supplies to reduce the cost of a ban on Russian oil. This should convince Germany and other EU states to accept an oil embargo against Russia, an EU insider told Reuters on Wednesday.
In the debate over a sixth EU sanctions package against Russia, some EU countries also pushed for other new restrictions. These include excluding Russia’s top lenders Sberbank and Gazprom Neft from the international Swift payment system, halting imports of nuclear fuel from Russia, banning more Russian news channels, suspending visas for Russians, and blacklisting additional individuals and companies linked to the Kremlin. There is no understanding on this among the 27 EU governments.
Like some other EU states, the German government had stressed that it would take a few more months to become independent of Russian oil supplies. To this end, talks are being held with alternative suppliers. The EU Commission, for its part, now also wants to look at other supplier countries. The chairmen of the European, Foreign Affairs, and Defense Committees in the Bundestag had also called for an oil embargo “as quickly as possible.” rtr
European Council President Charles Michel pledged European solidarity with Ukraine during a surprise visit to Kyiv on Wednesday and said justice must be done for alleged Russian war crimes.
Michel, the head of the European Council, which represents the European Union’s 27 member states, visited the town of Borodianka northwest of Kyiv before holding talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in the capital. Ukraine suspects that Russian troops carried out atrocities in Borodianka and Bucha, another town near the capital. Moscow denies targeting civilians and has described the allegations as fabricated by Kyiv to justify more sanctions against it.
He said separately on Twitter: “History will not forget the war crimes that have been committed here. … There can be no peace without justice.”
Michel’s trip followed visits this month to Kyiv by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola.
“You are not alone,” Michel said, praising the courage of the Ukrainian people. “We are with you and will do everything which is possible to support you and to make sure that Ukraine will win the war.”
Michel said the EU had already provided Ukraine with 1.5 billion euros ($1.63 billion) of military equipment as well as imposing sanctions on Russia, but would look for more ways to respond to Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion.
“I am convinced… that sooner or later we will target oil and gas,” he said, without giving details.
EU states have been divided over whether to impose an embargo on Russian oil or gas, with Germany among countries that are heavily dependent on energy imports from Russia.
Zelenskiy welcomed the “political signal” Michel had sent by visiting Borodianka, but urged Brussels to strengthen sanctions pressure on Russia and called for a “complete energy embargo including imports of oil and gas.”
He welcomed a sixth package of sanctions being prepared by the EU, but added: “Oil should be part of the sixth package. Without it this package will be empty, will not be powerful enough.”
The European Parliament has spoken out in favor of prescribing a uniform charging cable connection for numerous types of devices. The internal market committee voted yesterday to extend the planned regulation to smartwatches, fitness trackers, laptops, and printers, among others. The EU Commission had proposed only requiring manufacturers of cell phones, tablets, digital cameras, and portable speakers to install a standard charging cable connector in USB-C format.
Parliament’s goal is to establish a standard connection for as many devices as possible, said its rapporteur Alex Agius Saliba (S&D). This would benefit the environment, as fewer chargers of which would have to be disposed, and would make life easier for consumers. However, the specifications would also have to be practicable for manufacturers. For example, smartwatches and fitness wristbands should be exempt if they cannot be fitted with a USB-C port due to their small size.
By the end of 2026, the Commission is also to examine whether further device types can be included in the scope. By then, the authority is also to define a standard for wireless charging in order to achieve standardization here as well. This will make the regulation “future-proof,” according to Agius Saliba. Originally, the MEP from Malta had already wanted to specify the year 2025 here.
The new requirements for manufacturers are to take effect as early as nine months after the entry into force of the Radio Equipment Directive, which is currently being revised to address this issue. The companies are then to inform customers with clear labels whether the device comes with its own charging cable and what properties it has.
The positions were adopted by a large majority in the committee. He wants to use the strong mandate to push through the ambitious approach of the Parliament in the upcoming trialogue with the member states, said Agius Saliba. tho
Existing legislation in the transport sector should be better reflected in the law on artificial intelligence. That was the call made by Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN) rapporteur Josianne Cutajar (S&D) in her draft opinion on the AI law. She said it is important to ensure that the law does not overlap with sector-specific legislation and impose duplicative or conflicting obligations on transport stakeholders.
In the aviation, road, rail, and maritime sectors, measures are needed that are specifically tailored to each sector. This is the only way to ensure successful operations and service management while ensuring the highest level of safety. Harmonized legislation may not be sufficient to ensure safety in the sector, Cutajar warned. Therefore, sector-specific legislation must be maintained and, in some cases, take precedence over harmonized provisions of the AI Act.
The rapporteur also calls for better consideration of international norms and standards. Due to the international nature of transportation this is of particular importance. Finally, Cutajar argues in her draft for better promotion of research and innovation. New harmonized regulations should not hinder research if it is limited to controlled environments and the AI system is not brought to market. She proposes that small and medium-sized enterprises be given better access to the real laboratories provided for in the AI law.
In addition, the TRAN rapporteur makes some suggestions for defining AI systems and high-risk AI systems. Both are essential to transportation. Other minor changes include transparency of algorithms for transportation work, understanding human oversight in the context of transportation, and clarifying errors in data sets. Members of the Transportation and Tourism Committee now have until May 3 to submit their amendments to Cutajar’s statement. ank
With the Digital Services Act (DSA), the EU has created a successor to the E-Commerce Directive (EC-RL). The regulatory package is intended to complete the digital single market and define the future of the Internet in Europe. For 20 years, the EC-RL formed the legal foundation for online services. Considering the rapid development in the digital sector, this is already an impressively long time. The DSA offers the opportunity to adapt the horizontal legal framework to the technological leaps in development over the past 20 years.
Back then, it was hard to imagine what services would develop and in what form they would be used by citizens. Today, we can be reached online almost 24 hours a day via various devices, send and receive messages, use social media and video streaming, or have books, food, and other goods delivered to our homes.
There is no question that the EC-RL was not fully suitable for this purpose. Nevertheless, its rules provided the basic pillars that are still essential today: Limitation of liability based on notice and takedown, country of origin principle and the prohibition of general surveillance.
As an association of the Internet industry, we are pleased that the DSA retains these basic pillars or builds on them. We also expressly welcome the fact that the DSA expands the service providers, i.e., caching, hosting, and access providers, to include platforms and we actively called for this as part of eco’s discussions on the successor regulation to the EC Directive. In this way, it creates the opportunity to provide legal certainty in their activities for those who can do more, knows more, and also want to do more, without at the same time compromising the business basis for those who neither know the content nor have the financial or human resources.
Among the corresponding obstacles are rigid deadlines and proactive measures, which are particularly impossible for SMEs to afford. Every serious company already does everything it can to remove illegal content as quickly as possible.
It is regrettable that the political debate surrounding the DSA at the European level has focused very strongly on the large US platforms. It must be clear to the smaller and medium-sized providers that they will hardly be able to meet the requirements geared to platforms. This fact, which after all affects a large part of the market, is usually lost in the political debate.
One of the most important points is certainly to recognize that the Internet is a global medium and that corresponding regulations should also be coordinated at the highest possible political level. For Germany and Europe, this means that only the EU should set the rules.
The German NetzDG, just like other national regulations, are a thorn in the side not only of eco, but of the entire Internet industry, because they do not fit in with the strong desire for successful company startups in Europe. A company that has to adapt to 27 rules within Europe will think several times before deciding whether it would prefer to remain active only in individual countries or to try its luck entirely outside Europe in a large market such as the USA. Accordingly, it is important that the DSA also “supersedes” the NetzDG and does not allow nation states to apply stricter standards themselves in the form of minimum regulation.
This also goes hand in hand with the procedure for reporting and removing illegal content, i.e., notice and takedown, which is to be made much more uniform throughout Europe in the future. Allowing national deviations and special regulations here would call the DSA compromise into question.
Even though the DSA is certainly a milestone in European digital policy, it will not last for decades, as was the case with the EC Directive. Rather, it will require continuous adaptation and further development. This is regrettable insofar as the discussions between the Commission, Parliament and Council have made it clear how different the ideas are and how quickly some have lost sight of the actual goal of the DSA. In the end, a compact horizontal approach has turned into a regulation that is in part very fragmented.
From eco’s point of view, it is essential in this context that the European Union now seizes the opportunity to ensure legal certainty. However, to this end it is also necessary to enact a horizontal legal framework. The DSA must not become a youth or consumer protection law.
During the trilogue negotiations, the negotiators have not yet been able to reach a consensus on important points such as the general ban on surveillance or the abuse of reporting potentially illegal content. Accordingly, it remains exciting, because the negotiations on the DSA have not yet been concluded.
From a German perspective, the distribution of portfolios under the “traffic light” coalition has transferred responsibility for the DSA within the German government to the Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs and Transport. It would make sense for the Digital Services Coordinator (DSC) to be located here as well. On the one hand, this would ensure that the necessary structures can be set up quickly, that technical expertise can be drawn upon, and that personnel and administrative resources can be used.
When the DSA is implemented and the DSC is then set up, it will in any case be a matter of uniform and consistent handling, both in Germany and in Europe.