Solar energy is making a comeback in Europe – not least because of the threat of a gas supply freeze. In the future, the EU Commission wants to make greater use of solar energy for industrial heating. Most recently, photovoltaic technology has been on the rise, especially in the building sector. Manuel Berkel analyzed which obstacles still need to be cleared for the solar sector to expand in Europe.
Friday is the day: After several failed attempts, the meeting between the representatives of the European Union and China will take place, albeit it virtually and with little hope for real results. But in the current situation, defined by Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the meeting taking place is a success in itself, according to Tim Rühlig, research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). The summit is also very important because of the tensions between China and Lithuania, as Amelie Richter reports.
MEP Reinhard Bütikofer also commented on the upcoming summit. He thinks the summit will set the course for future EU-China relations. As you can read in today’s Profile, Bütikofer is a proven China expert – and is therefore on the list of undesirable persons on Chinese soil.
In the planned update of the Industrial Emissions Directive, the EU Commission wants to stipulate that member states must make the permit conditions for industrial plants publicly available in the future, including applicable emission limits. Read more about this in the News.
The EU Commission is focusing on greater use of heat generation from solar energy. “Now is the moment to focus more on solar thermal – also in industrial processes,” said Hans van Steen, Acting Director on Renewables, Research, Innovation, and Energy Efficiency in the Directorate General for Energy, at an event on the planned solar strategy.
With dramatically lower prices for competing photovoltaics, solar thermal energy has fallen further and further behind in recent years. For cost reasons, many building owners now rely on solar power for space heating. With the threat of a gas supply freeze, a new business case now beckons for solar thermal energy as process heat in industry.
Solar thermal could replace some gas consumption in industry, also said Catharina Sikow-Magny, director of Green Transition and Energy System Integration at DG Energy. Another advantage is that solar heat can be stored seasonally. But Sikow-Magny also sees opportunities for photovoltaic electricity to replace natural gas in heat generation – in combination with electric heat pumps or as an energy source for the electrolysis of hydrogen.
The Commission wants to triple the installed photovoltaic capacity by 2030 compared to 2020. The industrial policy goal for this is the reconstruction and massive expansion of European production of modules and components. Europe currently imports the lion’s share from China. After Russia’s war of aggression dramatically demonstrated Europe’s dependencies in energy supply, awareness of dependencies in renewable energies is also growing.
While the European solar industry has no difficulty accessing polysilicon, the CEO of manufacturer Meyer Burger, Gunter Erfurt, said. “But we need other materials, and we need to ensure we have access to sufficient quantities,” he said. According to Burger, it would already mean relief to eliminate tariffs on precursors or to establish equal treatment with module imports from Asia. Burger also mentioned financial aid and purchase guarantees from energy suppliers for modules produced in Europe.
The Commission is already initiating another requirement, transparent labeling of sustainability standards along the supply chain. Solar modules are to be included in the label obligations of the Ecodesign Directive, indicated Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson. Today, Wednesday, the Commission will present a first package on the circular economy.
On financial aid, it was said that the US is currently pushing billions in subsidies for domestic manufacturers, reported Walburga Hemetsberger, CEO of Solar Power Europe. She described plans of some member states to tax extra profits of power producers as harmful. In view of increased gas prices, electricity prices had also risen, which has given producers with low costs – including solar parks – high profits for several months.
With a solar roof initiative, photovoltaic systems should become mandatory on all new buildings and in all renovations, Hemetsberger demanded. In Germany, the federal government is currently still debating a mandatory requirement for new buildings. Solar Power Europe is working on a qualification platform to train sufficient craftsmen that will bring job seekers and training companies together.
Several participants in the discussion saw great potential in the multiple use of land, for example, in agriculture, and facades. If only one percent of agricultural land were used for photovoltaics and agriculture at the same time (agrivoltaics), a potential of 900 gigawatts of power would be created, Hemetsberger calculated. If ten percent of the water surfaces in the EU were used for floating solar power plants, 200 gigawatts would be added. Hemetsberger, therefore, called on the Commission to present a framework for the dual use of land.
In the future, photovoltaics must be considered as infrastructure within and around cities, said Daniel Mugnier, Chairman of the IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme, a research initiative of the International Energy Agency. He sees room, for example, on noise barriers and fences in agriculture. On facades of new buildings, building-integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) will grow strongly, says Mugnier. In cities, vertical systems are also interesting because roof installation is more difficult than for single-family homes in rural areas, Hemetsberger added.
Local energy communities for solar energy received broad support. Since the Russian crisis, they have been seen as insurance for consumers against high energy prices, similar to Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for wind farms for large industrial companies. After some energy suppliers had to file for bankruptcy because of skyrocketing prices, there was a run on his energy cooperative, reported Dirk Vansintjan, President of REScoop.eu, the European Federation of Citizen Energy Cooperatives.
IEA expert Mugnier also called for strengthening energy communities and solar self-consumption. He highlighted “energy communities” in the USA as a model. Wealthy households that can afford to invest in photovoltaic systems share their solar power with lower-income households.
The idea has support from the left-wingers in the EU Parliament. “Energy communities can be a structural solution in the fight against energy poverty, given the extremely high energy prices,” German MEP Cornelia Ernst told Europe.Table. Concepts such as tenant electricity and virtual meters should also be considered.
Ownership must be defined as security-relevant, Vansintjan asked the Commission to present a framework for local photovoltaic projects, as well as a procurement guide for utilities and municipalities.
It has been almost two years since representatives of the European Union and China gathered for a summit meeting. In 2021, the meeting, which was actually scheduled annually, was canceled, and possible dates were repeatedly postponed. The online conference on Friday, however, now comes at an inopportune time for both sides. The 27 EU member states are “reconsidering” their relations with Beijing in a “new global context”. The reason is China’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine war will thus dominate the meeting.
Participants on the EU side are Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Council President Charles Michel and Foreign Affairs Commissioner Josep Borrell. The Chinese side will be represented by Head of State Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang.
The focus will be on Ukraine, the commitment of the international community to support Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis caused by Russian aggression and the global impact of the crisis, the EU Commission announced on Tuesday. Also on the agenda: climate change, biodiversity, health – which refers to the Covid pandemic in most cases – and “ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.”
The last, rather vaguely worded topic may include talks on the stalled CAI investment agreement. Of equal importance here are reciprocal sanctions. Then there are the EU’s two requests to the World Trade Organization against China. One of them concerns the unprecedented trade embargo against an EU state, namely Lithuania. Brussels also wants to encourage a resumption of the human rights dialogue between the EU and China.
According to the agenda of the 23rd EU-China Summit, the three EU representatives will first meet Premier Li in the morning, and President Xi in the afternoon. It is expected that EU-China trade issues will rather be discussed with Premier Li, so that the discussion time with President Xi can be fully dedicated to the Ukraine crisis. Brussels wants to keep up the pressure on Beijing to engage in concrete mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Borrell already discussed the chances of a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors on Tuesday. They had “agreed on the urgency of returning to peace in the European continent as quickly as possible,” an EU statement released after the talks read.
Last week, the heads of state and government of the EU, NATO, and the G7 had already sent a clear message to China at a marathon summit: side with the West and take action. Beijing, however, was not swayed by this.
Accordingly, expectations that the EU-China summit will move the People’s Republic to act are modest. So far, China has been very reserved and passive, says Tim Rühlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). “I don’t see any signs that this will change now for the summit.” Especially since the meeting will be only held virtual, the crucial element of interpersonal dynamics that sometimes sparks decisive change will be missing.
Rühlig also sees a solution to the Ukraine conflict through negotiations as Beijing’s preferred route. So why doesn’t China step up to the plate and finally get involved? “What is considered an acceptable outcome differs greatly in Europe and China,” Rühlig explains. How Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges from the negotiations is also very important to Beijing and Xi, according to the DGAP researcher. And here, uncertainties are still too great at the moment. Another problem for the People’s Republic is that peace negotiations are currently somewhat deadlocked.
Lithuania, WTO, sanctions, CAI – all other issues are complex and will hardly be able to make much headway in just one summit. Rühlig has low expectations: “Basically, there will be no results. But the mere fact that this summit meeting is finally taking place is already a success,” says Rühlig.
MEP Reinhard Bütikofer believes that Friday’s summit – even in the absence of much progress, if any – will set the tone for future EU-China relations. “I hope EU representatives will work hard to make China understand that the EU expects them to refrain from supporting Russia,” Bütikofer said on Tuesday.
However, he believes that the chance to detach China from Russia has already been lost and calls for a completely new political approach toward the People’s Republic. At the summit, Brussels should make it clear that the People’s Republic is now and in the future dealing with a more united European Union than in the past, Bütikofer said.
And the Chinese side? It could enter the meeting with completely different intentions than the EU. There is an “asymmetry of expectations and priorities,” says Mathieu Duchâtel, Director of the Asia Program at French think tank Institut Montaigne. He assumes that China has no particular expectations – except for the main “hurdles” that have to be overcome from the Chinese perspective and that have been known for some time anyway.
One of them, he believes, is the “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius. “They need a win against Lithuania when it comes to its designation,” Duchâtel cites as an example. Vilnius and Beijing have been fighting over the name of the “Taiwan Office” in the Lithuanian capital since last year. Ratification of the CAI and a reversal of sanctions are also priorities for the Chinese. “But this is clearly not on the agenda,” Duchâtel said.
Change of name in Vilnius in exchange for pressure on Moscow? Beijing is well aware that there is a high interest on the European part to get a “certain diplomatic message” on the Ukraine war out of Beijing, says Duchâtel. However, Duchâtel does not believe that China could now use the power it has been granted in the Ukraine war to comply with, or at least come close to, the wishes of others. Surely it is impossible to predict what kind of deals will be proposed. But this approach would not look good for China and the EU and is more likely to be fruitless. If Beijing changes its position and tone, it will be for different reasons, Duchâtel is certain.
China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, said last weekend that Beijing does not have high expectations for breakthroughs in relations with Europe. “We had very high hopes for the development of China-EU relations when France took over the EU presidency early this year. But sometimes, hopes cannot keep up with changes,” Chinese state media quoted Lu as saying.
In early April, the Commission will present a proposal for updating the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED). From a preliminary draft published by Contexte on Tuesday, it is clear that affected plants will have to be much more transparent in the future about the impact their industrial processes have on people and nature.
The IED, introduced in 2010, was designed to prevent industrial pollution by, among other things, strengthening the polluter pays principle and introducing rules for the approval of facilities. The IED particularly affects power generation plants, refineries, waste processing and incineration plants, metal, cement, paper and glass production, the chemical industry, and parts of the food industry.
According to the Commission, a review of the 2020 directive did show that the IED reduced pollutant emissions to air, water, and soil. But the IED’s targets were not being implemented uniformly across member states, hindering the instrument’s ability to achieve its goals. That’s why the Commission now wants to require countries to make permit conditions for facilities covered by the IED publicly available – including applicable emission limits.
In addition, there will no longer be exemptions for meeting energy efficiency targets or emission limits for certain installations. Until now, member states have been able to grant exemptions at the time of permitting, allowing different requirements to be placed on plants in different countries. Plant operators will also be required to develop a plan by June 2030 to transition to “clean, closed-loop and carbon-neutral operations”. However, chemical plants are already expected to use “less toxic chemicals” during the transition and contribute to improved resource efficiency with energy, water, and waste reduction, as well as a greater circular economy.
IED plant operators who do not comply with the rules and thereby cause damage to people or nature are to be obliged to pay compensation, according to the draft. Until now, it has been up to member states to set penalties for non-compliance. However, the limits for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and dust emissions set out in the IED have not been revised by the Commission.
On April 5, the Brussels-based authority plans to officially present the proposed amendment to the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. luk
Intra-European and international emissions from aviation and shipping are not included in the German emissions budget for transport from the Climate Protection Act. According to a study by the environmental umbrella organization Transport & Environment (T&E), these unaccounted emissions account for over 90 percent of total emissions from the two sectors. If they were included, total emissions from the transport sector in Germany would be almost 20 percent higher in 2021.
T&E writes that only domestic flights and domestic shipping routes, which account for only 8 percent of aviation and shipping emissions, have been included. The association concludes that the Climate Protection Act “cannot ensure true climate neutrality for Germany” in 2045 and calls for emissions from aviation and shipping on international routes to be included in the national climate budget. “The United Kingdom has already shown that this is possible,” explains Silke Bölts, aviation policy officer at T&E.
Even in national emission reduction targets (NDCs), countries are not required to list international and transnational transport emissions. This creates invisible emissions that do not show up on any balance sheet and are likely to be difficult to find investments to avoid. The EU has a common NDC of 55 percent emissions reduction by 2030 compared to 1990.
T&E calls for the German government to advocate for the EU to include international shipping and aviation in its NDC to advance the decarbonization of the transport sector. This can be done by increasing the scope of the two Fit for 55 dossiers, ReFuelEU Aviation and FuelEU Maritime. luk
By Thursday, President Vladimir Putin wants to make practical arrangements to force foreign companies to pay their gas bills in rubles instead of euros or dollars, as they have to date. The G7 countries had rejected Moscow’s demands this week. Now supply disruptions could loom.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Tuesday, “No one will supply gas for free, it is simply impossible, and you can pay for it only in rubles.” The move has drawn strong criticism from European countries, which pay for Russian gas mostly in euros and say Russia is not entitled to redraw contracts. The ruble had fallen to an all-time low after Western sanctions against Russia but has since recovered.
US and German government officials will meet in Berlin this week with energy industry executives to discuss ways to boost Germany’s energy supplies, as Russia’s war in Ukraine ratchets up pressure on Europe to find alternate sources of energy. The roundtable, to be led by the US Commerce Department, will include executives from liquefied natural gas suppliers and hydrogen energy firms, a US official familiar with the plans said.
Already yesterday, Tuesday, the energy company E.ON and its Australian partner FFI have concluded an energy partnership. The stated goal is to create ways to realize the delivery of up to five million tons of green hydrogen per year to Europe by 2030. “We are shipping our sunshine to Germany,” said FFI CEO Andrew Forrest. A memorandum of understanding to that effect has been signed.
The first shipments of the green hydrogen should reach Germany as early as 2024, announced E.ON board member Patrick Lammers. E.ON has the networks and the customers for the green energy carrier, FFI could produce it from renewable energies and then ship it to Europe.
“The race to produce and transport green hydrogen on a large scale has picked up speed,” said Economics Minister Robert Habeck. The agreement between E.ON and FFI is an important step. Both companies are now in the “pole position” to supply German industry with green hydrogen. rtr
A halt to Russian energy imports could trigger an economic crisis in Germany similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to a study. An embargo due to the invasion of Ukraine would lead to a long-lasting recession that would peak after six quarters with a minus of about three percent, according to the study published on Tuesday by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW).
“The severity of the recession is thus comparable to the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and can accordingly be significantly limited with targeted macroeconomic policies,” say authors Christian Bayer, Alexander Kriwoluzky, and Fabian Seyrich. At the same time, an import freeze would lead to an increase in inflation of up to 2.3 percentage points.
An embargo would result in high costs to compensate for the loss of Russian energy sources. However, this would also include investments that were necessary anyway for the energy turnaround, which would now be brought forward. “A stimulating fiscal policy that sets investment incentives here can therefore mitigate the short- and long-term costs,” it said. But it was also important for policymakers to prepare the economy for a supply freeze to mitigate the severity of the potential shock.
Meanwhile, the Polish government has adopted draft legislation that will allow a ban on imports of Russian coal, a cabinet spokesperson said on Tuesday. “We don’t want these imports to be possible any longer, although we realize that there’s a risk related to the fact that the European Union has not approved such actions to date,” Piotr Muller told reporters in Warsaw.
Sanctions in the EU as a rule have to be agreed by the whole trading bloc, and Brussels could potentially punish countries acting unilaterally. Since the start of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Warsaw has been calling on the European Union to include Russian fossil fuels in sanctions the bloc imposed on Moscow.
Russia dominates Polish coal imports, accounting for about 20 percent of domestic use. Some 9.4 million tons of Russian coal was imported to Poland in 2020 and used mostly to heat individual households. The nation also imports some 50 percent of its gas and over 60 percent of the oil it refines from Russia.
Muller said Premier Mateusz Morawiecki would announce detailed plans to eliminate Russian energy supplies later this week. rtr
Eleven EU countries that have so far borne the brunt of the wave of refugees from Ukraine called for a separate EU fund to support their health systems at yesterday’s meeting of EU health ministers in Brussels.
The influx of people from Ukraine is increasing pressure on the health systems of countries already strained by the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the statement, which was signed by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic states, among others. Polish Health Minister Adam Niedzielski estimated that expenses per million refugees ranged from €50 million to €70 million per month. So far, more than two million Ukrainians have arrived in Poland.
The signing member states also called on the European Commission to propose the activation of emergency aid under Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 to cover the costs of health care for refugees. In addition, the Commission should identify which funding mechanisms could still be used by member states.
The call for financial support for the particularly affected EU countries met with fundamental understanding among the health ministers present. However, the proposal for a separate fund at the EU level was greeted with caution by some member states. There is no question that adequate financial support is necessary, according to Belgian Health Minister Magnus Heunicke. However, several questions would have to be answered during the review, for example, about the conditions associated with such support.
The health ministers of Denmark and Austria argued instead for the financial aid to be provided from the existing EU budget. “Our conviction is that support should be provided through existing funding mechanisms,” said Austrian Health Minister Johannes Rauch. “These are in place, are working, are well established, and should be used.” Germany still wants to examine the declaration in detail. “In spirit and in word, however, it is what we need,” said German Health Minister Karl Lauterbach.
EU Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides appealed to the member states to first make use of all existing financing options. She announced an emergency aid package of €500 million. In addition, €420 million are to be made available from the Internal Affairs Fund. In addition, money from the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund React-EU could be used to finance health care for refugees. Other options will be examined, she promised.
To assist member states, the European Union, in cooperation with WHO, is setting up triage centers at borders with Ukraine to receive refugees in need of medical care, Kyriakides reported. They would then be transported to the member states best able to treat them.
The European Health Emergency Response Authority (HERA) has secured about 200,000 diphtheria and tetanus vaccines for Ukraine, according to the health commissioner. Another 70,000 doses were also to go to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the non-EU country of Moldova through the EU’s civil protection mechanism. In addition, vaccines against measles, polio, tuberculosis, and COVID-19 would be purchased and distributed to immunize Ukrainian refugees, especially children. ank
Reinhard Bütikofer is a passionate chess player. 50 years ago, he won a city youth championship. When he competed simultaneously against an international grandmaster back then, or so he tells it, the game ended in a draw. He conducts his conversations just as he plays chess. Sometimes he confronts someone with something, then takes his time and waits to see in which direction his counterpart moves. Meanwhile, he watches attentively and patiently. Of course, he competes against fellow party members more often, he says. “But most of them only played me once.”
The Green MEP grew up in Speyer in the Palatinate region of Germany. His father was a postal worker, his mother a housewife. Bütikofer was the first in his family to graduate from high school with a degree in an ancient language. In 1971, he enrolled in Heidelberg, some 25 kilometers away, and began studying philosophy, history, ancient history, and, at times, sinology. It was the time of the student movement, and Bütikofer later became a member of the Maoist Communist University Group (KHG) and the Communist League of West Germany (KBW). During the day, he discusses, debates, and agitates. In the evening, he goes to the pub – and plays chess.
Two years later, he runs for student representative in the philosophy department conference – his first political office. He then looks into local politics. In Heidelberg, he initiates a local political debate forum in which leftists, far-leftists, greens, liberals, social democrats, and young unionists participate. In 1984, the 31-year-old “Büti” swaps the lecture hall for the city hall and is elected to the city council for the Green Alternative List. “At the time, I made a point of not hiding the fact that I had been a long-term student and a member of KBW,” he recalls.
A long-term student who was later to make a career at state and federal level and then in European politics. The fact that he never graduated from university does not bother even the University of Heidelberg. There is even a biography of him on their site. During his studies, he also became interested in China. The story he tells about it goes like this: In 1970, he cycles through Great Britain with a friend. In London, it is raining terribly. Bütikofer takes refuge in a bookstore.
“After an hour, the saleswoman came up to me and asked if I hadn’t noticed that the rain was over.” He was particularly taken with two books: “Teach yourself Swahili” and “Teach yourself Chinese“. Bütikofer buys the latter and starts scribbling Chinese characters while still on the bike ride. He had no idea that his China expertise would land him on the Chinese Communist Party’s sanctions list 50 years later.
At the end of the 1980s, he was elected to the Baden-Württemberg state parliament and became budgetary and financial policy spokesman for the Green parliamentary group. He also climbed the party ladder: In 2002, Bütikofer became federal chairman of the Greens and tried to mend the rifts within the party between the realists and the leftists. When he relinquished the post six years later to the current Minister of Agriculture, Cem Özdemir, a journalist wrote of Bütikofer’s time in office that he had been a gifted mediator. This was evidenced not least by his high telephone bills, which were legendary among the Greens.
Bütikofer, meanwhile, is taking a different path: He wants to get involved in European politics. There are two reasons for this. Even today, he says, “Speyer, the Haardt, the Rhine plain, that’s my home.” This German-French border region, which had long been contested, would particularly appreciate the project of European unification. “That shapes someone who grows up in these contexts.” The other formative experience for him was German unification. Bütikofer wants to work for a European Germany. After all, attempts to create a German Europe have ended badly twice.
In Strasbourg and Brussels, he also experiences a different kind of politics, one that has to seek consensus across party and state lines – unlike in the Stuttgart state parliament. “Mayer-Vorfelder, the finance minister of Baden-Württemberg, once asked me why I was so committed to presenting my proposals because I knew very well that everything would be voted down.” And indeed: In eight years, he wins exactly one vote in the state parliament. He has only experienced such exclusion from two sides in his work in the European Parliament: from the right-wing radicals and from Xi Jinping’s CCP, he says and laughs.
Last year, the Chinese party banned him from visiting the mainland, Hong Kong or Macao. In response, Bütikofer tweets, “But there’s still Taiwan.” And adds a smiley.
In the meantime, he is not only known as a proven China expert. Bütikofer tweets about Nord Stream 2, EU taxonomy, and the ban on the human rights organization Memorial International in Russia. On the USA, on climate and trade policy, and on German foreign policy. In the China-Lithuania conflict, he thinks, the German chancellor could take a stronger stance for Lithuania – similar to what the EU has already done. He considers the traffic light idea of a federal Europe, including treaty reform, to be quite realistic, but not in this legislative period.
When asked how he would breathe life into the “values-based” and “feminist” foreign policy enshrined in the coalition agreement, he says that he does not carry these concepts around in front of him like a Tibetan prayer wheel, but he does cite practical examples, such as the fight against rising nationalism. He views this with great concern.
In the long run, Germany alone does not have a spoon long enough to eat from a soup bowl together with the major powers. “Either we help ourselves to the European spoon, or we don’t get much of the soup.” A European policy on China, is the most important thing about the agreement the coalition has reached on the issue. And maybe it doesn’t need any new terms. Pauline Schinkels
Solar energy is making a comeback in Europe – not least because of the threat of a gas supply freeze. In the future, the EU Commission wants to make greater use of solar energy for industrial heating. Most recently, photovoltaic technology has been on the rise, especially in the building sector. Manuel Berkel analyzed which obstacles still need to be cleared for the solar sector to expand in Europe.
Friday is the day: After several failed attempts, the meeting between the representatives of the European Union and China will take place, albeit it virtually and with little hope for real results. But in the current situation, defined by Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine, the meeting taking place is a success in itself, according to Tim Rühlig, research fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). The summit is also very important because of the tensions between China and Lithuania, as Amelie Richter reports.
MEP Reinhard Bütikofer also commented on the upcoming summit. He thinks the summit will set the course for future EU-China relations. As you can read in today’s Profile, Bütikofer is a proven China expert – and is therefore on the list of undesirable persons on Chinese soil.
In the planned update of the Industrial Emissions Directive, the EU Commission wants to stipulate that member states must make the permit conditions for industrial plants publicly available in the future, including applicable emission limits. Read more about this in the News.
The EU Commission is focusing on greater use of heat generation from solar energy. “Now is the moment to focus more on solar thermal – also in industrial processes,” said Hans van Steen, Acting Director on Renewables, Research, Innovation, and Energy Efficiency in the Directorate General for Energy, at an event on the planned solar strategy.
With dramatically lower prices for competing photovoltaics, solar thermal energy has fallen further and further behind in recent years. For cost reasons, many building owners now rely on solar power for space heating. With the threat of a gas supply freeze, a new business case now beckons for solar thermal energy as process heat in industry.
Solar thermal could replace some gas consumption in industry, also said Catharina Sikow-Magny, director of Green Transition and Energy System Integration at DG Energy. Another advantage is that solar heat can be stored seasonally. But Sikow-Magny also sees opportunities for photovoltaic electricity to replace natural gas in heat generation – in combination with electric heat pumps or as an energy source for the electrolysis of hydrogen.
The Commission wants to triple the installed photovoltaic capacity by 2030 compared to 2020. The industrial policy goal for this is the reconstruction and massive expansion of European production of modules and components. Europe currently imports the lion’s share from China. After Russia’s war of aggression dramatically demonstrated Europe’s dependencies in energy supply, awareness of dependencies in renewable energies is also growing.
While the European solar industry has no difficulty accessing polysilicon, the CEO of manufacturer Meyer Burger, Gunter Erfurt, said. “But we need other materials, and we need to ensure we have access to sufficient quantities,” he said. According to Burger, it would already mean relief to eliminate tariffs on precursors or to establish equal treatment with module imports from Asia. Burger also mentioned financial aid and purchase guarantees from energy suppliers for modules produced in Europe.
The Commission is already initiating another requirement, transparent labeling of sustainability standards along the supply chain. Solar modules are to be included in the label obligations of the Ecodesign Directive, indicated Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson. Today, Wednesday, the Commission will present a first package on the circular economy.
On financial aid, it was said that the US is currently pushing billions in subsidies for domestic manufacturers, reported Walburga Hemetsberger, CEO of Solar Power Europe. She described plans of some member states to tax extra profits of power producers as harmful. In view of increased gas prices, electricity prices had also risen, which has given producers with low costs – including solar parks – high profits for several months.
With a solar roof initiative, photovoltaic systems should become mandatory on all new buildings and in all renovations, Hemetsberger demanded. In Germany, the federal government is currently still debating a mandatory requirement for new buildings. Solar Power Europe is working on a qualification platform to train sufficient craftsmen that will bring job seekers and training companies together.
Several participants in the discussion saw great potential in the multiple use of land, for example, in agriculture, and facades. If only one percent of agricultural land were used for photovoltaics and agriculture at the same time (agrivoltaics), a potential of 900 gigawatts of power would be created, Hemetsberger calculated. If ten percent of the water surfaces in the EU were used for floating solar power plants, 200 gigawatts would be added. Hemetsberger, therefore, called on the Commission to present a framework for the dual use of land.
In the future, photovoltaics must be considered as infrastructure within and around cities, said Daniel Mugnier, Chairman of the IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme, a research initiative of the International Energy Agency. He sees room, for example, on noise barriers and fences in agriculture. On facades of new buildings, building-integrated photovoltaics (BIPV) will grow strongly, says Mugnier. In cities, vertical systems are also interesting because roof installation is more difficult than for single-family homes in rural areas, Hemetsberger added.
Local energy communities for solar energy received broad support. Since the Russian crisis, they have been seen as insurance for consumers against high energy prices, similar to Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) for wind farms for large industrial companies. After some energy suppliers had to file for bankruptcy because of skyrocketing prices, there was a run on his energy cooperative, reported Dirk Vansintjan, President of REScoop.eu, the European Federation of Citizen Energy Cooperatives.
IEA expert Mugnier also called for strengthening energy communities and solar self-consumption. He highlighted “energy communities” in the USA as a model. Wealthy households that can afford to invest in photovoltaic systems share their solar power with lower-income households.
The idea has support from the left-wingers in the EU Parliament. “Energy communities can be a structural solution in the fight against energy poverty, given the extremely high energy prices,” German MEP Cornelia Ernst told Europe.Table. Concepts such as tenant electricity and virtual meters should also be considered.
Ownership must be defined as security-relevant, Vansintjan asked the Commission to present a framework for local photovoltaic projects, as well as a procurement guide for utilities and municipalities.
It has been almost two years since representatives of the European Union and China gathered for a summit meeting. In 2021, the meeting, which was actually scheduled annually, was canceled, and possible dates were repeatedly postponed. The online conference on Friday, however, now comes at an inopportune time for both sides. The 27 EU member states are “reconsidering” their relations with Beijing in a “new global context”. The reason is China’s reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Ukraine war will thus dominate the meeting.
Participants on the EU side are Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Council President Charles Michel and Foreign Affairs Commissioner Josep Borrell. The Chinese side will be represented by Head of State Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang.
The focus will be on Ukraine, the commitment of the international community to support Ukraine, the humanitarian crisis caused by Russian aggression and the global impact of the crisis, the EU Commission announced on Tuesday. Also on the agenda: climate change, biodiversity, health – which refers to the Covid pandemic in most cases – and “ways to ensure a more balanced and reciprocal trade relationship.”
The last, rather vaguely worded topic may include talks on the stalled CAI investment agreement. Of equal importance here are reciprocal sanctions. Then there are the EU’s two requests to the World Trade Organization against China. One of them concerns the unprecedented trade embargo against an EU state, namely Lithuania. Brussels also wants to encourage a resumption of the human rights dialogue between the EU and China.
According to the agenda of the 23rd EU-China Summit, the three EU representatives will first meet Premier Li in the morning, and President Xi in the afternoon. It is expected that EU-China trade issues will rather be discussed with Premier Li, so that the discussion time with President Xi can be fully dedicated to the Ukraine crisis. Brussels wants to keep up the pressure on Beijing to engage in concrete mediation between Russia and Ukraine.
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Borrell already discussed the chances of a ceasefire and humanitarian corridors on Tuesday. They had “agreed on the urgency of returning to peace in the European continent as quickly as possible,” an EU statement released after the talks read.
Last week, the heads of state and government of the EU, NATO, and the G7 had already sent a clear message to China at a marathon summit: side with the West and take action. Beijing, however, was not swayed by this.
Accordingly, expectations that the EU-China summit will move the People’s Republic to act are modest. So far, China has been very reserved and passive, says Tim Rühlig, Research Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). “I don’t see any signs that this will change now for the summit.” Especially since the meeting will be only held virtual, the crucial element of interpersonal dynamics that sometimes sparks decisive change will be missing.
Rühlig also sees a solution to the Ukraine conflict through negotiations as Beijing’s preferred route. So why doesn’t China step up to the plate and finally get involved? “What is considered an acceptable outcome differs greatly in Europe and China,” Rühlig explains. How Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges from the negotiations is also very important to Beijing and Xi, according to the DGAP researcher. And here, uncertainties are still too great at the moment. Another problem for the People’s Republic is that peace negotiations are currently somewhat deadlocked.
Lithuania, WTO, sanctions, CAI – all other issues are complex and will hardly be able to make much headway in just one summit. Rühlig has low expectations: “Basically, there will be no results. But the mere fact that this summit meeting is finally taking place is already a success,” says Rühlig.
MEP Reinhard Bütikofer believes that Friday’s summit – even in the absence of much progress, if any – will set the tone for future EU-China relations. “I hope EU representatives will work hard to make China understand that the EU expects them to refrain from supporting Russia,” Bütikofer said on Tuesday.
However, he believes that the chance to detach China from Russia has already been lost and calls for a completely new political approach toward the People’s Republic. At the summit, Brussels should make it clear that the People’s Republic is now and in the future dealing with a more united European Union than in the past, Bütikofer said.
And the Chinese side? It could enter the meeting with completely different intentions than the EU. There is an “asymmetry of expectations and priorities,” says Mathieu Duchâtel, Director of the Asia Program at French think tank Institut Montaigne. He assumes that China has no particular expectations – except for the main “hurdles” that have to be overcome from the Chinese perspective and that have been known for some time anyway.
One of them, he believes, is the “Taiwan Office” in Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius. “They need a win against Lithuania when it comes to its designation,” Duchâtel cites as an example. Vilnius and Beijing have been fighting over the name of the “Taiwan Office” in the Lithuanian capital since last year. Ratification of the CAI and a reversal of sanctions are also priorities for the Chinese. “But this is clearly not on the agenda,” Duchâtel said.
Change of name in Vilnius in exchange for pressure on Moscow? Beijing is well aware that there is a high interest on the European part to get a “certain diplomatic message” on the Ukraine war out of Beijing, says Duchâtel. However, Duchâtel does not believe that China could now use the power it has been granted in the Ukraine war to comply with, or at least come close to, the wishes of others. Surely it is impossible to predict what kind of deals will be proposed. But this approach would not look good for China and the EU and is more likely to be fruitless. If Beijing changes its position and tone, it will be for different reasons, Duchâtel is certain.
China’s ambassador to France, Lu Shaye, said last weekend that Beijing does not have high expectations for breakthroughs in relations with Europe. “We had very high hopes for the development of China-EU relations when France took over the EU presidency early this year. But sometimes, hopes cannot keep up with changes,” Chinese state media quoted Lu as saying.
In early April, the Commission will present a proposal for updating the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED). From a preliminary draft published by Contexte on Tuesday, it is clear that affected plants will have to be much more transparent in the future about the impact their industrial processes have on people and nature.
The IED, introduced in 2010, was designed to prevent industrial pollution by, among other things, strengthening the polluter pays principle and introducing rules for the approval of facilities. The IED particularly affects power generation plants, refineries, waste processing and incineration plants, metal, cement, paper and glass production, the chemical industry, and parts of the food industry.
According to the Commission, a review of the 2020 directive did show that the IED reduced pollutant emissions to air, water, and soil. But the IED’s targets were not being implemented uniformly across member states, hindering the instrument’s ability to achieve its goals. That’s why the Commission now wants to require countries to make permit conditions for facilities covered by the IED publicly available – including applicable emission limits.
In addition, there will no longer be exemptions for meeting energy efficiency targets or emission limits for certain installations. Until now, member states have been able to grant exemptions at the time of permitting, allowing different requirements to be placed on plants in different countries. Plant operators will also be required to develop a plan by June 2030 to transition to “clean, closed-loop and carbon-neutral operations”. However, chemical plants are already expected to use “less toxic chemicals” during the transition and contribute to improved resource efficiency with energy, water, and waste reduction, as well as a greater circular economy.
IED plant operators who do not comply with the rules and thereby cause damage to people or nature are to be obliged to pay compensation, according to the draft. Until now, it has been up to member states to set penalties for non-compliance. However, the limits for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and dust emissions set out in the IED have not been revised by the Commission.
On April 5, the Brussels-based authority plans to officially present the proposed amendment to the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. luk
Intra-European and international emissions from aviation and shipping are not included in the German emissions budget for transport from the Climate Protection Act. According to a study by the environmental umbrella organization Transport & Environment (T&E), these unaccounted emissions account for over 90 percent of total emissions from the two sectors. If they were included, total emissions from the transport sector in Germany would be almost 20 percent higher in 2021.
T&E writes that only domestic flights and domestic shipping routes, which account for only 8 percent of aviation and shipping emissions, have been included. The association concludes that the Climate Protection Act “cannot ensure true climate neutrality for Germany” in 2045 and calls for emissions from aviation and shipping on international routes to be included in the national climate budget. “The United Kingdom has already shown that this is possible,” explains Silke Bölts, aviation policy officer at T&E.
Even in national emission reduction targets (NDCs), countries are not required to list international and transnational transport emissions. This creates invisible emissions that do not show up on any balance sheet and are likely to be difficult to find investments to avoid. The EU has a common NDC of 55 percent emissions reduction by 2030 compared to 1990.
T&E calls for the German government to advocate for the EU to include international shipping and aviation in its NDC to advance the decarbonization of the transport sector. This can be done by increasing the scope of the two Fit for 55 dossiers, ReFuelEU Aviation and FuelEU Maritime. luk
By Thursday, President Vladimir Putin wants to make practical arrangements to force foreign companies to pay their gas bills in rubles instead of euros or dollars, as they have to date. The G7 countries had rejected Moscow’s demands this week. Now supply disruptions could loom.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Tuesday, “No one will supply gas for free, it is simply impossible, and you can pay for it only in rubles.” The move has drawn strong criticism from European countries, which pay for Russian gas mostly in euros and say Russia is not entitled to redraw contracts. The ruble had fallen to an all-time low after Western sanctions against Russia but has since recovered.
US and German government officials will meet in Berlin this week with energy industry executives to discuss ways to boost Germany’s energy supplies, as Russia’s war in Ukraine ratchets up pressure on Europe to find alternate sources of energy. The roundtable, to be led by the US Commerce Department, will include executives from liquefied natural gas suppliers and hydrogen energy firms, a US official familiar with the plans said.
Already yesterday, Tuesday, the energy company E.ON and its Australian partner FFI have concluded an energy partnership. The stated goal is to create ways to realize the delivery of up to five million tons of green hydrogen per year to Europe by 2030. “We are shipping our sunshine to Germany,” said FFI CEO Andrew Forrest. A memorandum of understanding to that effect has been signed.
The first shipments of the green hydrogen should reach Germany as early as 2024, announced E.ON board member Patrick Lammers. E.ON has the networks and the customers for the green energy carrier, FFI could produce it from renewable energies and then ship it to Europe.
“The race to produce and transport green hydrogen on a large scale has picked up speed,” said Economics Minister Robert Habeck. The agreement between E.ON and FFI is an important step. Both companies are now in the “pole position” to supply German industry with green hydrogen. rtr
A halt to Russian energy imports could trigger an economic crisis in Germany similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, according to a study. An embargo due to the invasion of Ukraine would lead to a long-lasting recession that would peak after six quarters with a minus of about three percent, according to the study published on Tuesday by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW).
“The severity of the recession is thus comparable to the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and can accordingly be significantly limited with targeted macroeconomic policies,” say authors Christian Bayer, Alexander Kriwoluzky, and Fabian Seyrich. At the same time, an import freeze would lead to an increase in inflation of up to 2.3 percentage points.
An embargo would result in high costs to compensate for the loss of Russian energy sources. However, this would also include investments that were necessary anyway for the energy turnaround, which would now be brought forward. “A stimulating fiscal policy that sets investment incentives here can therefore mitigate the short- and long-term costs,” it said. But it was also important for policymakers to prepare the economy for a supply freeze to mitigate the severity of the potential shock.
Meanwhile, the Polish government has adopted draft legislation that will allow a ban on imports of Russian coal, a cabinet spokesperson said on Tuesday. “We don’t want these imports to be possible any longer, although we realize that there’s a risk related to the fact that the European Union has not approved such actions to date,” Piotr Muller told reporters in Warsaw.
Sanctions in the EU as a rule have to be agreed by the whole trading bloc, and Brussels could potentially punish countries acting unilaterally. Since the start of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Warsaw has been calling on the European Union to include Russian fossil fuels in sanctions the bloc imposed on Moscow.
Russia dominates Polish coal imports, accounting for about 20 percent of domestic use. Some 9.4 million tons of Russian coal was imported to Poland in 2020 and used mostly to heat individual households. The nation also imports some 50 percent of its gas and over 60 percent of the oil it refines from Russia.
Muller said Premier Mateusz Morawiecki would announce detailed plans to eliminate Russian energy supplies later this week. rtr
Eleven EU countries that have so far borne the brunt of the wave of refugees from Ukraine called for a separate EU fund to support their health systems at yesterday’s meeting of EU health ministers in Brussels.
The influx of people from Ukraine is increasing pressure on the health systems of countries already strained by the COVID-19 pandemic, according to the statement, which was signed by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic states, among others. Polish Health Minister Adam Niedzielski estimated that expenses per million refugees ranged from €50 million to €70 million per month. So far, more than two million Ukrainians have arrived in Poland.
The signing member states also called on the European Commission to propose the activation of emergency aid under Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 to cover the costs of health care for refugees. In addition, the Commission should identify which funding mechanisms could still be used by member states.
The call for financial support for the particularly affected EU countries met with fundamental understanding among the health ministers present. However, the proposal for a separate fund at the EU level was greeted with caution by some member states. There is no question that adequate financial support is necessary, according to Belgian Health Minister Magnus Heunicke. However, several questions would have to be answered during the review, for example, about the conditions associated with such support.
The health ministers of Denmark and Austria argued instead for the financial aid to be provided from the existing EU budget. “Our conviction is that support should be provided through existing funding mechanisms,” said Austrian Health Minister Johannes Rauch. “These are in place, are working, are well established, and should be used.” Germany still wants to examine the declaration in detail. “In spirit and in word, however, it is what we need,” said German Health Minister Karl Lauterbach.
EU Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides appealed to the member states to first make use of all existing financing options. She announced an emergency aid package of €500 million. In addition, €420 million are to be made available from the Internal Affairs Fund. In addition, money from the Cohesion Fund and the European Social Fund React-EU could be used to finance health care for refugees. Other options will be examined, she promised.
To assist member states, the European Union, in cooperation with WHO, is setting up triage centers at borders with Ukraine to receive refugees in need of medical care, Kyriakides reported. They would then be transported to the member states best able to treat them.
The European Health Emergency Response Authority (HERA) has secured about 200,000 diphtheria and tetanus vaccines for Ukraine, according to the health commissioner. Another 70,000 doses were also to go to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the non-EU country of Moldova through the EU’s civil protection mechanism. In addition, vaccines against measles, polio, tuberculosis, and COVID-19 would be purchased and distributed to immunize Ukrainian refugees, especially children. ank
Reinhard Bütikofer is a passionate chess player. 50 years ago, he won a city youth championship. When he competed simultaneously against an international grandmaster back then, or so he tells it, the game ended in a draw. He conducts his conversations just as he plays chess. Sometimes he confronts someone with something, then takes his time and waits to see in which direction his counterpart moves. Meanwhile, he watches attentively and patiently. Of course, he competes against fellow party members more often, he says. “But most of them only played me once.”
The Green MEP grew up in Speyer in the Palatinate region of Germany. His father was a postal worker, his mother a housewife. Bütikofer was the first in his family to graduate from high school with a degree in an ancient language. In 1971, he enrolled in Heidelberg, some 25 kilometers away, and began studying philosophy, history, ancient history, and, at times, sinology. It was the time of the student movement, and Bütikofer later became a member of the Maoist Communist University Group (KHG) and the Communist League of West Germany (KBW). During the day, he discusses, debates, and agitates. In the evening, he goes to the pub – and plays chess.
Two years later, he runs for student representative in the philosophy department conference – his first political office. He then looks into local politics. In Heidelberg, he initiates a local political debate forum in which leftists, far-leftists, greens, liberals, social democrats, and young unionists participate. In 1984, the 31-year-old “Büti” swaps the lecture hall for the city hall and is elected to the city council for the Green Alternative List. “At the time, I made a point of not hiding the fact that I had been a long-term student and a member of KBW,” he recalls.
A long-term student who was later to make a career at state and federal level and then in European politics. The fact that he never graduated from university does not bother even the University of Heidelberg. There is even a biography of him on their site. During his studies, he also became interested in China. The story he tells about it goes like this: In 1970, he cycles through Great Britain with a friend. In London, it is raining terribly. Bütikofer takes refuge in a bookstore.
“After an hour, the saleswoman came up to me and asked if I hadn’t noticed that the rain was over.” He was particularly taken with two books: “Teach yourself Swahili” and “Teach yourself Chinese“. Bütikofer buys the latter and starts scribbling Chinese characters while still on the bike ride. He had no idea that his China expertise would land him on the Chinese Communist Party’s sanctions list 50 years later.
At the end of the 1980s, he was elected to the Baden-Württemberg state parliament and became budgetary and financial policy spokesman for the Green parliamentary group. He also climbed the party ladder: In 2002, Bütikofer became federal chairman of the Greens and tried to mend the rifts within the party between the realists and the leftists. When he relinquished the post six years later to the current Minister of Agriculture, Cem Özdemir, a journalist wrote of Bütikofer’s time in office that he had been a gifted mediator. This was evidenced not least by his high telephone bills, which were legendary among the Greens.
Bütikofer, meanwhile, is taking a different path: He wants to get involved in European politics. There are two reasons for this. Even today, he says, “Speyer, the Haardt, the Rhine plain, that’s my home.” This German-French border region, which had long been contested, would particularly appreciate the project of European unification. “That shapes someone who grows up in these contexts.” The other formative experience for him was German unification. Bütikofer wants to work for a European Germany. After all, attempts to create a German Europe have ended badly twice.
In Strasbourg and Brussels, he also experiences a different kind of politics, one that has to seek consensus across party and state lines – unlike in the Stuttgart state parliament. “Mayer-Vorfelder, the finance minister of Baden-Württemberg, once asked me why I was so committed to presenting my proposals because I knew very well that everything would be voted down.” And indeed: In eight years, he wins exactly one vote in the state parliament. He has only experienced such exclusion from two sides in his work in the European Parliament: from the right-wing radicals and from Xi Jinping’s CCP, he says and laughs.
Last year, the Chinese party banned him from visiting the mainland, Hong Kong or Macao. In response, Bütikofer tweets, “But there’s still Taiwan.” And adds a smiley.
In the meantime, he is not only known as a proven China expert. Bütikofer tweets about Nord Stream 2, EU taxonomy, and the ban on the human rights organization Memorial International in Russia. On the USA, on climate and trade policy, and on German foreign policy. In the China-Lithuania conflict, he thinks, the German chancellor could take a stronger stance for Lithuania – similar to what the EU has already done. He considers the traffic light idea of a federal Europe, including treaty reform, to be quite realistic, but not in this legislative period.
When asked how he would breathe life into the “values-based” and “feminist” foreign policy enshrined in the coalition agreement, he says that he does not carry these concepts around in front of him like a Tibetan prayer wheel, but he does cite practical examples, such as the fight against rising nationalism. He views this with great concern.
In the long run, Germany alone does not have a spoon long enough to eat from a soup bowl together with the major powers. “Either we help ourselves to the European spoon, or we don’t get much of the soup.” A European policy on China, is the most important thing about the agreement the coalition has reached on the issue. And maybe it doesn’t need any new terms. Pauline Schinkels