The liberal Renew Europe Parliamentary group is currently meeting in Vienna: The meeting of the Members of Parliament after the summer break also marks the start of the upcoming election campaign – as is well known, the European Parliament will be re-elected at the beginning of June 2024. The liberals will make it clear who they do not want to cooperate with after the elections: “We reject cooperation with anti-European parties now and after the 2024 elections,” reads the “Vienna Declaration”, which is to be adopted today and is available in draft form to Table.Media.
The group around its chairman, Stéphane Séjourné, has thus clearly rejected the idea of seeking right-wing majorities in the European Parliament after the election. EPP leader Manfred Weber had already sought contact with Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in order to open up new power options. In addition, the Christian Democrats recently went on a collision course with their previous alliance partners, for example, on the Renaturation Act. The Renew deputies are now blatantly calling on the EPP to “take responsibility and adhere to our coalition agreement again“.
The political landscape is becoming increasingly polarized, with some conservative parties succumbing to the temptations of illiberalism and the political left indulging in economic populism. Renew, on the other hand, sees itself as a bulwark of the political center.
The Liberals want to stand up for media freedom and rights for the LGBTQ community and also pass the pending Green Deal bills. They support the migration pact and call for Bulgaria and Romania to be admitted to the Schengen area. On economic policy, they are pushing for stricter enforcement of rules, less bureaucracy, and larger investment budgets for sectors such as AI, semiconductors, and critical raw materials. Will they get through to voters with these messages?
In Poland, the election campaign ahead of the parliamentary elections on Oct. 15 is slowly getting underway. All participating parties have presented their lists of candidates – most recently Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. There was at least one big surprise: Kaczynski will compete in Kielce, the capital of the rural conservative Holy Cross Voivodeship (Swietokrzyskie) – although he is at home in Warsaw. He probably wants to avoid defeat by Donald Tusk, who is expected to win in the Polish capital.
This election campaign, it can already be said, will be the most brutal and dirty in the history of Poland’s young democracy. The PiS and its splinter groups, which have ruled the country as the United Right for eight years, are using the methods of populists like Donald Trump or Viktor Orban to stay in power. The national-conservative government camp does not shy away from outright lies to discredit opponents. The government-controlled media have been running smear campaigns against the opposition for months.
But the party leadership also uses rhetoric never heard before in the EU. At a party event in July, Kaczynski lashed out against the opposition leader: “Donald Tusk is the true enemy of our people. He must never come to power in Poland again. Let him go to his Germany and do damage there!” Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki also calls the head of the liberal Civic Coalition “Judas”, “traitor to the fatherland” or at least “fraud” at every opportunity. The Sejm’s Ethics Committee has already reprimanded Kaczynski for his remarks – but it has no legal consequences.
In order to stay in power, PiS relies on tried and tested tactics. It stokes fears of Germany and the sellout of the country; of migrants and of the Russian Wagner mercenaries who could allegedly invade Poland at any moment. On the 84th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Piotr Glinski, the minister of culture and PiS candidate in Warsaw, once again raised the demand for German reparations.
In order to be able to play out all these issues in the election campaign, the PiS majority in parliament has decided on a referendum that will take place at the same time as the parliamentary elections. The four suggestively worded questions make a mockery of the idea of a referendum.
Anyone who wants to save Poland must answer “no” to all questions – and vote for PiS as the guarantor of sovereignty. The opposition leader has called for a boycott of the referendum. “PiS is making an illegal election campaign with our tax money,” Tusk said. While each party has 40 million zlotys (about €9 million) at its disposal for the election campaign, there is no spending limit for the referendum.
The latest polls see the PiS bloc far ahead with 33 to 38 percent. The results of the other parties vary greatly depending on the polling institute: Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition is polling between 21 and 30 percent, the post-communist Left between four and nine percent, and the “Third Way” (a coalition of the peasant party PSL and the liberal Polska 2050) between five and ten percent. The two groups, which together with the Civic Coalition could form a government, are in danger of failing to clear the eight-percent hurdle that a coalition must win to enter the Sejm.
The ultra-right Konfederacja party is not yet certain to win a seat in the Sejm. Between six and twelve percent of Poles want to vote for the party, which positions itself as a protest party against the political establishment. “Konfederacja,” which populistically includes the abolition of taxes in its program, does not want to form a coalition with either PiS or KO. But will they change their mind?
If the right wins the election again, Europe will have to prepare itself for a permanent conflict. Because a new PiS government will be even more radical than before. It will want to take definitive control of the courts and crush the independent media. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is already publicly flirting with the term “soft authoritarianism“. Andrzej Rybak
The initial skepticism seems to have been overcome. After the informal meetings of defense and foreign ministers in Toledo, Spain, at the end of August, Josep Borrell was able to report broad consensus on his plan to put the financing of military aid to Ukraine on a stable footing – and thus to increase the so-called European Peace Facility by €20 billion for this purpose.
Specifically, the EUSR envisions €5 billion annually for the period 2024 to 2027, which could be used to co-finance defense equipment for Ukraine.
The Spaniard has been pushing ahead every now and then since the start of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and then gets his way in the end. Chances are good that the member states will agree to the increase in funding in time for the end of the year. It sounds like a lot of money, but it is roughly in line with previous disbursements. The advantage of Borrell’s plan is that the Peace Facility pot would no longer have to be replenished every few months. So far, this has provided Hungary in particular with an opportunity for ever-new blackmail maneuvers. Viktor Orbán’s government is currently blocking an eighth tranche of 500 million euros.
The EU foreign affairs representative has the danger of public fatigue in mind and wants to make aid predictable. It is important to set up support for Ukraine for the long term, Annalena Baerbock also said in Toledo. After all, she said, it is an investment in the “peace of Europe”.
The German Foreign Minister in particular had sounded much more skeptical before the summer break. The debate was complicated by the fact that the Commission is planning a supplement of €66 billion for the financial period from 2021 to 2027, irrespective of military aid to Ukraine.
Germany and other net contributors now want to press for already planned economic and budgetary aid for Ukraine to be made possible by reallocations in the EU budget. The Peace Facility, on the other hand, is a pot outside the budget because the EU is not allowed to finance armaments from the common budget. But Germany, as the largest economy, must also contribute 25 percent to the Peace Facility. Member states can then submit invoices to Brussels for armaments they have supplied to Ukraine. The reimbursement rate is around 50 percent.
Those who, like Germany, have recently been supplying a lot can at times be reimbursed more than they have paid in. Eastern European countries, in turn, use the fund to modernize stocks from Soviet times. This, too, has already caused discussion in Brussels. To make matters worse, there is no overview of the disbursements. Not all member states are interested in disclosing deliveries and disbursements. The EU Parliament has no say in the fund outside the budget.
The lack of transparency could yet become a political problem for the Peace Facility. And the pot was not actually intended to finance armaments on a large scale. The funds were to be used to support armed forces in third countries, particularly in Africa, in their modernization efforts. The German side therefore questioned whether the Peace Facility was the right instrument for aid to Ukraine. Now, after all, there is to be a separate pot.
Will the 20 billion euros be enough? If Donald Trump manages a comeback next year and scales back US support, probably not. If, contrary to expectations, a cease-fire is reached soon, the funds could be used for the security guarantees that the West has promised Ukraine. The €20 billion are an upper limit, Josep Borrell appeased in Toledo. The Spaniard wanted to counter the impression that the peace facility is becoming a bottomless pit.
A major point of contention is the current Article 17 of the EMFA. After the Digital Services Act established moderation obligations for all content on platforms and search engines, and an exception for professional media subject to their own sets of rules failed, the exception to the DSA moderation rules is now to come via the EMFA.
For example, the recitals now state: “In order to minimize the impact of blocking or restrictions on users’ freedom of information, Very Large Online Platforms should endeavor to provide a statement of reasons giving the media service provider the opportunity to respond to the statement of reasons within 24 hours before the blocking or suspension takes effect.” This would make professional media content at least temporarily sacrosanct for the affected providers.
The digital association DotEurope argues against this in clear terms. In a letter that the association has made public, it argues that dispute resolution mechanisms are already provided for in the DSA. Moreover, the proposed “must-carry” provision would diametrically contradict the DSA. The EMFA could require dangerous content to remain online for 24 hours. On top of that, there would be no reason for preferential treatment of these media, according to the platform operators.
European parliamentarians consider this to be an extremely weak justification: Media freedom also includes self-control mechanisms, such as the Press Council in Germany. Why the provider’s terms of use should take precedence over media freedom is inexplicable. At the same time, the platforms have recently come in for considerable criticism: Their measures against disinformation were not sufficient. In addition, non-EU providers would not be covered by the EMFA regulations unless they adhered to comparable rules, the parliamentarians suggested.
The EMFA is watched with a wary eye from the federal states. In Germany, the state chancelleries and state parliaments have sovereignty over public broadcasting. Time and again, there have been disputes in Germany about the extent to which public broadcasting is allowed to be active in new forms of media. The EU parliamentarians tend to give a clear affirmative answer: New offers as new content, formats and technical developments would have to be possible so that public providers could maintain their competitive position in the internal market.
Elsewhere, German observers will also be looking very closely: “The persons or bodies who have the highest decision-making power in public service media providers should be appointed and, if necessary, dismissed according to predictable, transparent, non-discriminatory, balanced and objective criteria, and the qualifications of the persons filling these positions must be guaranteed.”
This proposal is aimed not least at intendances, administrative and program directors, and radio, television and administrative boards. Whether the German system would meet these requirements is the subject of debate within Germany. Not least of all, the events surrounding the RBB board of directors have caused intense debate here. Nevertheless, Germany is only one of many European countries concerned. Others would have to change their current practices in filling top broadcasting positions in any case.
On the question of direct or indirect state funding of the media, the Culture Committee now wants to include the EU institutions themselves and their sub-authorities. The EU Commission had not envisaged this in its proposal. At the same time, the committee envisages a comprehensive definition of the actors that would act in the state’s interest and thus be regulated. However, state actors or those close to the state should have the option of purchasing advertising budgets, for example, in the event of a crisis. However, the criteria according to which this is done must be transparent and set out in advance in national laws.
The parliamentarians also attach importance to more EU self-restraint in another area: the planned enforcement and supervisory body. Compromise proposal 40 states that “the work of the committee should be carried out independently of the Commission and any political or economic influence,” and that an independent committee secretariat should ensure this. Among other things, this is intended to cushion the problem of the EU Commission suddenly assuming the role of media regulator – in the name of media freedom.
Early in the summer, according to media reports, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Resnikov hinted during many private conversations that the commitment in principle to deliver F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv could be his last major project in office. Now, on Sunday, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy actually proposed a change at the head of the Ministry of Defense.
The experienced lawyer Resnikov, who will probably become ambassador to Great Britain, is to give way to 41-year-old Rustem Umerov. Umerov is currently head of the State Property Fund. The parliament in Kyiv could vote on Resnikov’s dismissal as early as today, Tuesday, and Umerov is to be confirmed in his new position on Wednesday. Both processes are considered formalities.
Resnikov, a 57-year-old native of Lviv, leaves the Ministry of Defense in a better state than before he took office a few months before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. His predecessor was still engaged in a public conflict with the General Staff, which caused plenty of chaos. Resnikov’s greatest merits lie primarily in his successful cooperation with international partners.
With his good English and communication skills, he developed a good connection to Washington, London, Berlin and Paris. And there was also more order in the Ministry than before, despite the Russian war of aggression.
However, Resnikov never made a secret of the fact that he originally became defense minister rather unwillingly and, above all, at Zelenskiy’s explicit request. He is likely to feel more comfortable in the new position of ambassador in London.
But some corruption scandals, such as the procurement of food for soldiers at inflated prices, also played their part. Resnikov was not personally involved in these, but public communication was not perfect despite several dismissals and some improvements in the purchasing system.
The appointment of Rustem Umerov as Resnikov’s successor is also symbolic. Umerov is Crimean Tatar. Especially now, when the Ukrainian army has scored some successes in its counteroffensive in the south on the way to the important Tokmak junction and has as its goal the land bridge to the annexed Crimea, Umerov’s appointment is also a clear message to Moscow: Crimea is indispensable for Ukraine. But the decisive factor in this appointment was certainly not symbolism.
Zelenskiy’s team was basically looking for a person who met two criteria: On the one hand, the government in Kyiv needed someone who could ensure greater transparency in procurement at the Ministry of Defense. In this regard, Umerov has so far attracted positive attention as head of the State Property Fund. The agency has traditionally been considered highly susceptible to corruption. Under Umerov’s one-year leadership, there were no scandals at all.
On the other hand, it was important to Zelenskiy that the international track, which was very successful under Resnikov, should not slacken. Umerov, who speaks good English and Turkish, also seems to be a good candidate for this. He shines, for example, with quite good connections in the US, but unlike Resnikov, he also has excellent contacts in the East. “He is one of the three people in Ukraine who maintain direct contact with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” leading Kyiv political scientist Volodymyr Fessenko says of him, for example. Umerov is also said to be on good terms with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
No wonder, then, that the 41-year-old not only accompanied Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his wife Olena on trips to the Arab world, for example, but also plays an important background role in the grain agreement, as well as in the prisoner exchange. That Umerov has good negotiating skills is also demonstrated by the fact that he was a member of the Ukrainian delegation at Russian-Ukrainian negotiations last year. His upcoming appointment is therefore a well-thought-out move by Zelenskiy, which should ensure positive votes among both his supporters and the opposition.
Especially since Umerov originally comes from the opposition: in 2019, he was elected as a member of parliament for the national-liberal Voice faction. At the same time, he has good relations with Andriy Yermak, the powerful head of Zelenskiy’s presidential office, on whom many personnel decisions depend. Only time will tell whether Umerov’s diplomatic skills qualify him for the defense ministry as well. Denis Trobetskoy
The liberal Renew Europe Parliamentary group is currently meeting in Vienna: The meeting of the Members of Parliament after the summer break also marks the start of the upcoming election campaign – as is well known, the European Parliament will be re-elected at the beginning of June 2024. The liberals will make it clear who they do not want to cooperate with after the elections: “We reject cooperation with anti-European parties now and after the 2024 elections,” reads the “Vienna Declaration”, which is to be adopted today and is available in draft form to Table.Media.
The group around its chairman, Stéphane Séjourné, has thus clearly rejected the idea of seeking right-wing majorities in the European Parliament after the election. EPP leader Manfred Weber had already sought contact with Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in order to open up new power options. In addition, the Christian Democrats recently went on a collision course with their previous alliance partners, for example, on the Renaturation Act. The Renew deputies are now blatantly calling on the EPP to “take responsibility and adhere to our coalition agreement again“.
The political landscape is becoming increasingly polarized, with some conservative parties succumbing to the temptations of illiberalism and the political left indulging in economic populism. Renew, on the other hand, sees itself as a bulwark of the political center.
The Liberals want to stand up for media freedom and rights for the LGBTQ community and also pass the pending Green Deal bills. They support the migration pact and call for Bulgaria and Romania to be admitted to the Schengen area. On economic policy, they are pushing for stricter enforcement of rules, less bureaucracy, and larger investment budgets for sectors such as AI, semiconductors, and critical raw materials. Will they get through to voters with these messages?
In Poland, the election campaign ahead of the parliamentary elections on Oct. 15 is slowly getting underway. All participating parties have presented their lists of candidates – most recently Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party. There was at least one big surprise: Kaczynski will compete in Kielce, the capital of the rural conservative Holy Cross Voivodeship (Swietokrzyskie) – although he is at home in Warsaw. He probably wants to avoid defeat by Donald Tusk, who is expected to win in the Polish capital.
This election campaign, it can already be said, will be the most brutal and dirty in the history of Poland’s young democracy. The PiS and its splinter groups, which have ruled the country as the United Right for eight years, are using the methods of populists like Donald Trump or Viktor Orban to stay in power. The national-conservative government camp does not shy away from outright lies to discredit opponents. The government-controlled media have been running smear campaigns against the opposition for months.
But the party leadership also uses rhetoric never heard before in the EU. At a party event in July, Kaczynski lashed out against the opposition leader: “Donald Tusk is the true enemy of our people. He must never come to power in Poland again. Let him go to his Germany and do damage there!” Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki also calls the head of the liberal Civic Coalition “Judas”, “traitor to the fatherland” or at least “fraud” at every opportunity. The Sejm’s Ethics Committee has already reprimanded Kaczynski for his remarks – but it has no legal consequences.
In order to stay in power, PiS relies on tried and tested tactics. It stokes fears of Germany and the sellout of the country; of migrants and of the Russian Wagner mercenaries who could allegedly invade Poland at any moment. On the 84th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Piotr Glinski, the minister of culture and PiS candidate in Warsaw, once again raised the demand for German reparations.
In order to be able to play out all these issues in the election campaign, the PiS majority in parliament has decided on a referendum that will take place at the same time as the parliamentary elections. The four suggestively worded questions make a mockery of the idea of a referendum.
Anyone who wants to save Poland must answer “no” to all questions – and vote for PiS as the guarantor of sovereignty. The opposition leader has called for a boycott of the referendum. “PiS is making an illegal election campaign with our tax money,” Tusk said. While each party has 40 million zlotys (about €9 million) at its disposal for the election campaign, there is no spending limit for the referendum.
The latest polls see the PiS bloc far ahead with 33 to 38 percent. The results of the other parties vary greatly depending on the polling institute: Donald Tusk’s Civic Coalition is polling between 21 and 30 percent, the post-communist Left between four and nine percent, and the “Third Way” (a coalition of the peasant party PSL and the liberal Polska 2050) between five and ten percent. The two groups, which together with the Civic Coalition could form a government, are in danger of failing to clear the eight-percent hurdle that a coalition must win to enter the Sejm.
The ultra-right Konfederacja party is not yet certain to win a seat in the Sejm. Between six and twelve percent of Poles want to vote for the party, which positions itself as a protest party against the political establishment. “Konfederacja,” which populistically includes the abolition of taxes in its program, does not want to form a coalition with either PiS or KO. But will they change their mind?
If the right wins the election again, Europe will have to prepare itself for a permanent conflict. Because a new PiS government will be even more radical than before. It will want to take definitive control of the courts and crush the independent media. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is already publicly flirting with the term “soft authoritarianism“. Andrzej Rybak
The initial skepticism seems to have been overcome. After the informal meetings of defense and foreign ministers in Toledo, Spain, at the end of August, Josep Borrell was able to report broad consensus on his plan to put the financing of military aid to Ukraine on a stable footing – and thus to increase the so-called European Peace Facility by €20 billion for this purpose.
Specifically, the EUSR envisions €5 billion annually for the period 2024 to 2027, which could be used to co-finance defense equipment for Ukraine.
The Spaniard has been pushing ahead every now and then since the start of the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine and then gets his way in the end. Chances are good that the member states will agree to the increase in funding in time for the end of the year. It sounds like a lot of money, but it is roughly in line with previous disbursements. The advantage of Borrell’s plan is that the Peace Facility pot would no longer have to be replenished every few months. So far, this has provided Hungary in particular with an opportunity for ever-new blackmail maneuvers. Viktor Orbán’s government is currently blocking an eighth tranche of 500 million euros.
The EU foreign affairs representative has the danger of public fatigue in mind and wants to make aid predictable. It is important to set up support for Ukraine for the long term, Annalena Baerbock also said in Toledo. After all, she said, it is an investment in the “peace of Europe”.
The German Foreign Minister in particular had sounded much more skeptical before the summer break. The debate was complicated by the fact that the Commission is planning a supplement of €66 billion for the financial period from 2021 to 2027, irrespective of military aid to Ukraine.
Germany and other net contributors now want to press for already planned economic and budgetary aid for Ukraine to be made possible by reallocations in the EU budget. The Peace Facility, on the other hand, is a pot outside the budget because the EU is not allowed to finance armaments from the common budget. But Germany, as the largest economy, must also contribute 25 percent to the Peace Facility. Member states can then submit invoices to Brussels for armaments they have supplied to Ukraine. The reimbursement rate is around 50 percent.
Those who, like Germany, have recently been supplying a lot can at times be reimbursed more than they have paid in. Eastern European countries, in turn, use the fund to modernize stocks from Soviet times. This, too, has already caused discussion in Brussels. To make matters worse, there is no overview of the disbursements. Not all member states are interested in disclosing deliveries and disbursements. The EU Parliament has no say in the fund outside the budget.
The lack of transparency could yet become a political problem for the Peace Facility. And the pot was not actually intended to finance armaments on a large scale. The funds were to be used to support armed forces in third countries, particularly in Africa, in their modernization efforts. The German side therefore questioned whether the Peace Facility was the right instrument for aid to Ukraine. Now, after all, there is to be a separate pot.
Will the 20 billion euros be enough? If Donald Trump manages a comeback next year and scales back US support, probably not. If, contrary to expectations, a cease-fire is reached soon, the funds could be used for the security guarantees that the West has promised Ukraine. The €20 billion are an upper limit, Josep Borrell appeased in Toledo. The Spaniard wanted to counter the impression that the peace facility is becoming a bottomless pit.
A major point of contention is the current Article 17 of the EMFA. After the Digital Services Act established moderation obligations for all content on platforms and search engines, and an exception for professional media subject to their own sets of rules failed, the exception to the DSA moderation rules is now to come via the EMFA.
For example, the recitals now state: “In order to minimize the impact of blocking or restrictions on users’ freedom of information, Very Large Online Platforms should endeavor to provide a statement of reasons giving the media service provider the opportunity to respond to the statement of reasons within 24 hours before the blocking or suspension takes effect.” This would make professional media content at least temporarily sacrosanct for the affected providers.
The digital association DotEurope argues against this in clear terms. In a letter that the association has made public, it argues that dispute resolution mechanisms are already provided for in the DSA. Moreover, the proposed “must-carry” provision would diametrically contradict the DSA. The EMFA could require dangerous content to remain online for 24 hours. On top of that, there would be no reason for preferential treatment of these media, according to the platform operators.
European parliamentarians consider this to be an extremely weak justification: Media freedom also includes self-control mechanisms, such as the Press Council in Germany. Why the provider’s terms of use should take precedence over media freedom is inexplicable. At the same time, the platforms have recently come in for considerable criticism: Their measures against disinformation were not sufficient. In addition, non-EU providers would not be covered by the EMFA regulations unless they adhered to comparable rules, the parliamentarians suggested.
The EMFA is watched with a wary eye from the federal states. In Germany, the state chancelleries and state parliaments have sovereignty over public broadcasting. Time and again, there have been disputes in Germany about the extent to which public broadcasting is allowed to be active in new forms of media. The EU parliamentarians tend to give a clear affirmative answer: New offers as new content, formats and technical developments would have to be possible so that public providers could maintain their competitive position in the internal market.
Elsewhere, German observers will also be looking very closely: “The persons or bodies who have the highest decision-making power in public service media providers should be appointed and, if necessary, dismissed according to predictable, transparent, non-discriminatory, balanced and objective criteria, and the qualifications of the persons filling these positions must be guaranteed.”
This proposal is aimed not least at intendances, administrative and program directors, and radio, television and administrative boards. Whether the German system would meet these requirements is the subject of debate within Germany. Not least of all, the events surrounding the RBB board of directors have caused intense debate here. Nevertheless, Germany is only one of many European countries concerned. Others would have to change their current practices in filling top broadcasting positions in any case.
On the question of direct or indirect state funding of the media, the Culture Committee now wants to include the EU institutions themselves and their sub-authorities. The EU Commission had not envisaged this in its proposal. At the same time, the committee envisages a comprehensive definition of the actors that would act in the state’s interest and thus be regulated. However, state actors or those close to the state should have the option of purchasing advertising budgets, for example, in the event of a crisis. However, the criteria according to which this is done must be transparent and set out in advance in national laws.
The parliamentarians also attach importance to more EU self-restraint in another area: the planned enforcement and supervisory body. Compromise proposal 40 states that “the work of the committee should be carried out independently of the Commission and any political or economic influence,” and that an independent committee secretariat should ensure this. Among other things, this is intended to cushion the problem of the EU Commission suddenly assuming the role of media regulator – in the name of media freedom.
Early in the summer, according to media reports, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Resnikov hinted during many private conversations that the commitment in principle to deliver F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv could be his last major project in office. Now, on Sunday, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy actually proposed a change at the head of the Ministry of Defense.
The experienced lawyer Resnikov, who will probably become ambassador to Great Britain, is to give way to 41-year-old Rustem Umerov. Umerov is currently head of the State Property Fund. The parliament in Kyiv could vote on Resnikov’s dismissal as early as today, Tuesday, and Umerov is to be confirmed in his new position on Wednesday. Both processes are considered formalities.
Resnikov, a 57-year-old native of Lviv, leaves the Ministry of Defense in a better state than before he took office a few months before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. His predecessor was still engaged in a public conflict with the General Staff, which caused plenty of chaos. Resnikov’s greatest merits lie primarily in his successful cooperation with international partners.
With his good English and communication skills, he developed a good connection to Washington, London, Berlin and Paris. And there was also more order in the Ministry than before, despite the Russian war of aggression.
However, Resnikov never made a secret of the fact that he originally became defense minister rather unwillingly and, above all, at Zelenskiy’s explicit request. He is likely to feel more comfortable in the new position of ambassador in London.
But some corruption scandals, such as the procurement of food for soldiers at inflated prices, also played their part. Resnikov was not personally involved in these, but public communication was not perfect despite several dismissals and some improvements in the purchasing system.
The appointment of Rustem Umerov as Resnikov’s successor is also symbolic. Umerov is Crimean Tatar. Especially now, when the Ukrainian army has scored some successes in its counteroffensive in the south on the way to the important Tokmak junction and has as its goal the land bridge to the annexed Crimea, Umerov’s appointment is also a clear message to Moscow: Crimea is indispensable for Ukraine. But the decisive factor in this appointment was certainly not symbolism.
Zelenskiy’s team was basically looking for a person who met two criteria: On the one hand, the government in Kyiv needed someone who could ensure greater transparency in procurement at the Ministry of Defense. In this regard, Umerov has so far attracted positive attention as head of the State Property Fund. The agency has traditionally been considered highly susceptible to corruption. Under Umerov’s one-year leadership, there were no scandals at all.
On the other hand, it was important to Zelenskiy that the international track, which was very successful under Resnikov, should not slacken. Umerov, who speaks good English and Turkish, also seems to be a good candidate for this. He shines, for example, with quite good connections in the US, but unlike Resnikov, he also has excellent contacts in the East. “He is one of the three people in Ukraine who maintain direct contact with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan,” leading Kyiv political scientist Volodymyr Fessenko says of him, for example. Umerov is also said to be on good terms with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
No wonder, then, that the 41-year-old not only accompanied Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his wife Olena on trips to the Arab world, for example, but also plays an important background role in the grain agreement, as well as in the prisoner exchange. That Umerov has good negotiating skills is also demonstrated by the fact that he was a member of the Ukrainian delegation at Russian-Ukrainian negotiations last year. His upcoming appointment is therefore a well-thought-out move by Zelenskiy, which should ensure positive votes among both his supporters and the opposition.
Especially since Umerov originally comes from the opposition: in 2019, he was elected as a member of parliament for the national-liberal Voice faction. At the same time, he has good relations with Andriy Yermak, the powerful head of Zelenskiy’s presidential office, on whom many personnel decisions depend. Only time will tell whether Umerov’s diplomatic skills qualify him for the defense ministry as well. Denis Trobetskoy
