The European Green Party (EGP) is embarking on a challenging endeavor starting today in Lyon. At their party conference, they aim to finalize their program for the European elections on June 9. While it should be straightforward, as the party in Europe continues to stand for ambitious climate action policies and strict regulations for industries to reduce emissions, amendments proposed by the German Greens to the election program suddenly raise questions.
Instead of increasing ambitions in climate action, the coalition party wants to water down the targeted goals. Rather than aiming for a climate-neutral Europe by 2040, the German Greens apparently propose 2045. They also want to eliminate the gas phase-out by 2035 and the oil phase-out by 2040. Negotiations and discussions in Lyon are expected to be tough and emotional.
Furthermore, the Greens also plan to nominate their top candidates for the election on Saturday. The German Green frontrunner Terry Reintke and the Dutch Bas Eickhout, both of whom are already members of the EU Parliament, have the best chances for the top spots. However, Elīna Pinto from Latvia and Benedetta Scuderi from Italy are certainly not without chances.
You can read about the outcomes of the party conference on Monday in Europe.Table. Until then, have a relaxing weekend and enjoy your Friday reading,
The EU Commission is grappling with the question of what to do next with Ukrainian refugees starting March 2025. “There is currently a discussion, and we are exploring the possibilities,” says a spokesperson for the EU Commission. The cause of uncertainty is the EU’s mass influx directive concerning temporary protection.
Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the mechanism was activated on March 4, 2022. All member states found it a good idea to avoid chaos. The regulation, as stated in Article 4 of the directive, can be extended twice, each time for a maximum of one year. About five million Ukrainians arrived in the EU under this regulation, with approximately one million in Germany alone, 80 percent of whom were women.
Had the Council not made the corresponding decision, the fleeing Ukrainians would have had to go through the regular procedure: They would have had to apply for asylum and, with high probability, would then have received refugee status under the Geneva Refugee Convention, known as subsidiary protection. The sheer volume would have overwhelmed the EU member states, particularly Germany’s administration. That’s why the federal government, as well as states and municipalities, wanted to apply this directive.
However, with the second extension until March 2025, decided in October 2023, the instrument is fully utilized if one takes Article 4 literally. It’s a problem because there’s little indication that Ukrainians could return to a peaceful country by 2025. Already last summer, a special envoy of the EU Commission warned in a report that a solution must be found promptly. It requires a long-term perspective, demanded by the former Belgian Minister of Labor, Lodewijk Asscher.
However, the controversial EU asylum package did not include negotiations on the directive for temporary protection. This makes a difference, especially for Germany, where the question has been looming for months whether the unequal treatment of Ukrainian and other refugees is justified.
In January, the EU Commission presented potential solutions at the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers. Belgian State Secretary for Migration Nicole de Moor described the exchange as “initial reflection exercises”. One of them: A creative interpretation of the directive applied so far, allowing for an extension beyond 2025. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson presented this option to the member states, according to Brussels sources. However, among legal scholars, the finite nature of the measure has been the unanimous legal opinion so far. When asked, the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs cannot provide details.
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior remains reserved amid the debates: “The BMI welcomes approaches that continue to enable coherent action by all member states to protect those who have fled from Ukraine to the EU due to the Russian war of aggression.” Regarding the specific considerations of the EU Commission, Nancy Faeser’s ministry declines to comment and refers to the Commission and ongoing discussions among member states.
However, time is running out for a new regulation: The EU Commission has not yet put forward a formal proposal to amend the directive. Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson even announced that she would not submit any regulatory proposals until there was agreement on the target corridor. In April, the current European Parliament will meet for the last time, and elections will be held in June. After that, the new EU Commission must be appointed. Therefore, the EU legislative machinery will be at a standstill until at least September, possibly longer.
Moreover, in the second half of the year, it will be Hungary, of all countries, that will hold the Council Presidency, deciding on negotiation dates for projects. Thus, the remaining good year realistically only consists of a few weeks.
If the special status for the refugees from Ukraine were to be removed in Germany, significant administrative problems would arise. Primarily for the already overstretched immigration authorities and employment agencies: They would have to manage a million “clients” much more intensively than before, scrutinizing claims more closely. Ukrainian residents already living here could potentially fall under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act without a new regulation.
“However, this would not be the preferred option for us, as it would confront the immigration authorities with a flood of applications,” explains a spokesperson for the German Association of Counties. “Therefore, as an alternative to an EU solution, only a general residence regulation in Germany seems to be possible, rendering individual applications obsolete.” For newcomers, a regulation similar to that for asylum seekers should be considered, emphasizes the Association of Counties.
It’s no wonder that the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs primarily wants one thing: to remove Ukrainians from the special protection status. “Such a change is desirable from the perspective of the BMAS, also because it enables refugees and employers to have a secure perspective beyond the duration of the directive for temporary protection,” a spokesperson told Table.Media.
However, from the refugees’ perspective, this is not automatically attractive: a change from the current protection system also means that they would initially have no entitlement to basic security or citizen’s income. At least not if they do not participate in labor market integration measures. However, this would entail considerable additional effort. The employment agencies and job centers could handle this, according to the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. “The Federal Employment Agency has demonstrated in the past that it can handle unexpected needs,” the ministry of Hubertus Heil said.
Whether this would work smoothly, though? One way could be to add a corresponding amendment to the asylum package at the last minute. However, the problem does not arise equally in every EU country. Germany’s approach to uncomplicated reception based on social law might meet with little understanding from other member states and require further concessions in asylum law.
Thus, not only for those affected but also for a year before the likely expiration date, a problem looms that has been announced since the beginning of the regulation. Yet many stakeholders still hope for a European solution. Because even in the event of a swift peace in Ukraine, a rapid return for all refugees would hardly be realistic within a short time.
Within the traffic light coalition, there are differing views on how the EU Supply Chain Directive (CSDDD) will affect businesses in Germany and how the government should vote in the Council. Protagonists include Federal Minister of Labor Hubertus Heil (SPD), who leads on the European directive, and FDP ministers Christian Lindner and Marco Buschmann.
The finance and justice ministries led by them do not want to support the trilogue result on the draft EU Supply Chain Directive. They stated this in a letter yesterday. In the EU Council, this would result in Germany abstaining, “which effectively amounts to a no vote”, they wrote.
According to Federal Minister of Labor Hubertus Heil, the CSDDD is “in Germany’s interest”. He is strongly advocating for approval. He has made a proposal, now under discussion within the government, which includes reducing bureaucratic burdens and no additional reporting requirements.
“We can and should trust ourselves in Europe to embark on the path toward fair global supply chains,” said Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Svenja Schulze in support of the directive. “I offer companies to further expand our support services for implementing the new rules in Germany and abroad,” she told Table.Media. However, there is great skepticism within the FDP. “I must acknowledge that there is no consensus in the government,” summarized Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the EU Summit in Brussels.
There are also different assessments of what consequences German abstention in the Council would have. On the FDP side and among their supporters, especially the major associations, there is hope that this could prevent the CSDDD from being adopted at the European level. In contrast, supporters in the government camp of the SPD and Greens are convinced that the directive will be adopted even if Germany abstains.
The actual majority situation in the Council is still difficult to predict. According to information from Table.Media, so far only Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Malta have announced their intention to approve the text. Six other member states, including Ireland, Poland and Greece, expressed positive views during a meeting of the Council working group.
However, Sweden is expected to reject the law; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia are likely to “not approve”. All others stated that they are currently reviewing the trilogue result. At the start of discussions on the CSDDD under the German EU Council Presidency, all states unanimously spoke in favor of such regulation.
Although, according to government sources, “every half-sentence” of the CSDDD has been coordinated between the involved ministries, there are currently very different assessments on crucial points.
Example liability: Lindner and Buschmann admit that the German side achieved some success in the trilogue negotiations regarding liability. Liability will be “limited using established principles of German liability law, such as the necessity for the violated norm to protect third parties”, they write.
Additionally, companies could share audits and fulfill due diligence obligations jointly in industry initiatives. This was advocated, for example, by the Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI). “Nevertheless, the liability provision represents a greater burden compared to the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG). Unlike the LkSG, the CSDDD is intended to include civil liability.” The SPD in the grand coalition with the CDU/CSU could not enforce this.
Government sources do not deny that liability under the CSDDD is somewhat more comprehensive than under the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG). However, the German side prevented the French from asserting their much more far-reaching ideas of liability, as anchored in the French Due Diligence Act.
Furthermore, according to the CSDDD, companies are only “liable in case of their own fault and avoidable damages”. Companies that have made efforts “are not liable”. Such a duty to make efforts corresponds to the regulation of the LkSG. Incidentally, the Ministry of Justice significantly contributed to the liability rules of the CSDDD. However, Minister of Justice Buschmann already expressed concerns about the CSDDD last summer.
Victims of human rights violations in the supply chains of European companies should be facilitated access to justice. So far, this access has been so complicated that de facto, hardly any proceedings take place. Facilitating access to European courts for these victims has been a concern of most EU governments from the outset.
Example scope of application: Lindner and Buschmann criticize the further application to companies with 500 employees and, in high-risk sectors, to companies with more than 250 employees. However, according to government sources, Buschmann, Habeck and Heil previously supported this regulation together. Additionally, a turnover threshold is introduced at the European level, which does not exist in German law. Overall, several hundred more companies in Germany are likely to be covered by the CSDDD due to the new regulation. The EU Commission estimates 13,000 companies across Europe. German law covers 5,200 companies.
Example environment: According to the two FDP ministers, the trilogue result also includes “a covert environmentally friendly general clause”. This leads to “far-reaching corporate responsibility for environmental damage, regardless of a specific impact on people”. Other government circles, however, explain: There is “no open or covert general clause for the environment”. The German government rejected such attempts during the trilogue negotiations. In the human rights context, there is only the suggestion that serious environmental damage also has a human rights relevance. However, a similar provision is also found in the German LkSG.
Example reporting obligations: The two FDP ministries foresee significant financial, personnel and “bureaucratic additional burdens” on German companies. For example, larger companies should “draw up a plan to ensure the compatibility of their corporate strategy with the Paris Agreement, including specific reduction targets”. However, companies already have to do this as part of their reporting obligations, according to other government circles. The CSDDD does not impose additional burdens here.
Reactions to the disagreement within the traffic light coalition regarding the CSDDD vary. “The FDP’s U-turn is a slap in the face to all those who suffer forced labor and starvation wages in the supply chains of European companies,” said Michelle Trimborn, spokesperson for the Supply Chain Act initiative. The stance of the two FDP ministers is an affront to all companies that have been advocating for sustainable business practices for years.
If the CSDDD does not come to fruition, this would send a disastrous signal to German companies that professional supply chain management is unnecessary,” said Antje von Dewitz, CEO of Vaude. “In favor of short-term relief, the establishment of entrepreneurial sustainability is actively hindered.”
The Gesamtmetall Employers’ Association welcomed the FDP’s decision. “In its current form, this directive would go far beyond the German regulation and make legally secure foreign trade almost impossible.” It is good that the FDP has come to its senses and “pulls the plug on the European Supply Chain Act,” said Angelika Niebler, Chair of the CSU European Group.
However, it is considered unlikely that the CSDDD could be renegotiated during the current legislative period. Supporters of the directive also fear that there may no longer be majorities for the CSDDD after the European elections. With Till Hoppe and Leonie Düngefeld
For seven weeks, Viktor Orbán had kept the other 26 heads of state and government and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy waiting. At Thursday’s special summit, things moved quickly: The Hungarian Prime Minister paved the way for the financial package, which includes assistance for Ukraine amounting to €50 billion until 2027, already in the pre-talks with a small group.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that there had been no promises to Orbán in return for releasing frozen EU funds for Hungary. “The answer to that is a clear no,” von der Leyen said. Orbán also failed to secure his demand for an annual veto right for the disbursement of Ukraine funds. The final statement only provides for annual discussions among heads of state and government on the topic.
Nevertheless, Orbán spoke of having “fulfilled his mission“, mentioning a control mechanism by the end of the year. At the summit in mid-December, the Hungarian Prime Minister had blocked negotiations on the increase of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) related to Ukraine aid, much to the dismay of the other 26.
Subsequently, President Charles Michel called for the special summit yesterday. Diplomats interpreted Orbán’s veto as an attempt to secure additional EU funds. The Commission and Council still withhold around €20 billion for Hungary because the government in Budapest has not implemented the agreed reforms to combat corruption and ensure judicial independence.
The conclusions of the special summit refer to the formulations adopted by heads of state and government in December 2020 regarding the new rule-of-law conditionality mechanism. It was stipulated that the application of the new rule-of-law instrument should be proportional to the impact of the shortcomings on the EU budget. Orbán doubts whether this is the case in practice. However, diplomats from other member states emphasized that the reference in yesterday’s final statement did not represent a new development.
With the decision, the EU establishes a new Ukraine Facility, through which €50 billion will flow to Kyiv until 2027. Of this, €33 billion will be provided as low-interest loans, with the remainder as grants for the first time. The funds are crucial to stabilize Ukraine’s economy and finances in the long term, said President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
The decision of the Europeans is also “a signal to American taxpayers,” said Michel. He hoped this would make it easier for US President Joe Biden to get his financial assistance through Congress. There, Republicans are mainly blocking billions in payments to the government in Kyiv for tactical reasons.
The agreement also paves the way for an increase of €64.6 billion in the Multiannual Financial Framework until 2027. Von der Leyen expressed being “very satisfied” with the outcome – the Commission will receive 80 percent of the additional funds it requested last June. This will enable the EU to fulfill its tasks in combating illegal migration (with an additional €2 billion) or supporting neighboring states such as those in the Western Balkans.
However, beyond the main block of the Ukraine Facility, von der Leyen had to significantly reduce her wish list. In particular, Scholz had insisted on raising a significant portion of the needed funds through savings and reallocations in the EU budget. For example, €2.1 billion from the Horizon Europe research program will be reallocated.
But in the negotiations, the new investment platform STEP suffered the most: Instead of €10 billion additional funds for funds like InvestEU, member states only agreed to provide €1.5 billion for the European Defense Fund.
“We are not meeting our responsibilities in this way,” criticized Rasmus Andresen, the Green Party budgetary negotiator in the European Parliament. MEPs see STEP as a trial run for a European Sovereignty Fund and want to go beyond the Commission’s proposal. However, they have little leverage in the upcoming trilogue negotiations with the Council, which are to be concluded at lightning speed.
Chancellor Scholz also urged other heads of state and government in Brussels once again to deliver more weapons to Kyiv. “Are all member states doing enough? My personal assessment is that this is not the case,” he said. Germany has earmarked more than €7 billion for arms supplies to Ukraine this year alone – more than half of all other EU member states combined.
The figures provided by the High Representative Josep Borrell were “difficult to understand”, said Scholz. The Spaniard had spoken the day before at the informal meeting of defense ministers about commitments from other member states totaling more than €20 billion for this year and presented the breakdown at the summit as well. Borrell probably included contributions for several years, Scholz said. However, he was not particularly surprised by this. The goal of his inquiry had been to trigger processes in other member states anyway.
Scholz pushes for bilateral contributions from individual member states to be given greater consideration in the European Peace Facility, which finances jointly military equipment for Ukraine. The discussion on the increase of the Peace Facility was postponed; the Council is now expected to reach an agreement by early March.
The desired amount of €5 billion for this year is missing from the final statement, unlike in previous drafts. Von der Leyen announced that contracts with arms companies would be signed within a few weeks to deliver the promised ammunition to Ukraine.
“All Catalan pro-independence supporters will be granted amnesty. Because they are not terrorists,” said Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez on Thursday following the special summit in Brussels. This statement comes amid controversy between the ruling Socialists of the PSOE and the Spanish judiciary.
The PSOE views decisions such as that of Judge Manuel García-Castellón, to investigate former Catalan regional president Carles Puigdemont and ERC leader Marta Rovira on suspicion of terrorism, as “interference” in the amnesty process. Sánchez made this statement in Brussels before the judge had completed his work. “As everyone knows, Catalan independence is not terrorism,” Sánchez reiterated.
Carles Puigdemont’s party, Junts per Catalunya, voted against the amnesty law in Parliament on Tuesday. As a result, the bill cannot be forwarded to the Senate, at least temporarily. Junts does not consider the law in its current form sufficient to protect all those accused in connection with the Catalan “process”.
The separatists especially want to guarantee amnesty for Puigdemont. The investigations conducted by Judge Manuel García-Castellón into the Tsunami Democràtic protest group directly concern Puigdemont due to possible terrorist offenses. Puigdemont is also under investigation by Judge Joaquín Aguirre in Barcelona for treason. The judge is examining the “Russian connection”.
Junts and the Socialists now have an initial deadline until Feb. 21 to reach a new agreement. This deadline can be extended for a maximum of another 15 days until March 7.
On Thursday, Sánchez instructed to maintain the amnesty law in its current form and without further concessions to Junts. The Socialist believes that further changes to the bill would jeopardize its review before the Constitutional Court. Sánchez’s statement in Brussels is a message to Junts, but also to the investigating judges.
The Socialists had originally refused to grant comprehensive amnesty to all persons accused of terrorism in connection with the separatist process. The constitutionality of the law could be challenged both in Spain and before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Last week, the PSOE had already promised the separatist parties Junts and ERC amendments to the amnesty law regarding terrorist offenses. Socialists and separatists agreed that persons accused of terrorism in the context of the separatist process would not be granted amnesty “if they have obviously and with direct intent caused serious human rights violations“. This refers, in particular, to those mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and international humanitarian law.
The Socialists also granted the separatists another amendment regarding the application of precautionary measures. These are intended to ensure that Puigdemont can return to Spain without precautionary measures, even if the future amnesty law is appealed against.
After PSOE, Junts, and ERC agreed to protect the cases of the CDR (Committees for the Defense of the Republic) and Tsunami Democràtic through amendments to the amnesty law, National Court Judge Manuel García Castellón questioned their arguments. García-Castellón deemed the serious injuries suffered by police officers during the violent riots in Catalonia in October 2019 as “incompatible with the right to life and physical integrity“.
The CDR had coordinated the violent demonstrations. In 2019, the National Court found that the CDR communicated their strategy and key steps directly to Puigdemont.
At the special summit in Brussels, French President Emmanuel Macron advocated for mirror clauses and argued against the trade agreement with Mercosur. “I am not fundamentally against free trade agreements,” Macron said in a press briefing. He is simply against free trade when the “law of the jungle” applies. “We cannot demand that European producers respect more and more rules while negotiating free trade agreements, as was done in the 90s,” Macron said.
The summit in Brussels was accompanied by massive farmers’ protests, which were also a topic of discussion among the heads of state and government. According to Macron, opening up markets without demanding respect for European rules from trading partners threatens the existence of European farmers. If we follow this principle, we will end up with a “continent that makes rules for producers that no longer exist”, Macron said.
With this extreme example, Macron warned that Europe risks losing control over food production and subsequently consuming inferior goods from third countries due to excessive regulation coupled with market opening. Macron believes this threatens Europe’s sovereignty.
As a positive example, the French president cited recent trade agreements with Chile and New Zealand, in which trading partners agreed to sustainability criteria. However, the much more commercially significant Mercosur trading bloc is unwilling to accept these criteria. Similar to Macron, the South American countries are concerned about their sovereignty. jaa
After his removal as Mayor of Düsseldorf in 2020, Thomas Geisel had been relatively quiet. In 2024, the 60-year-old made a significant move. He wants to embark on a new chapter, in a new party and at a higher political level. He aims for Brussels.
At the press conference for the founding of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – Reason and Justice on Jan. 8, the BSW surprisingly presented Geisel as one of two lead candidates for the European elections. He had recently announced his departure from the SPD and his switch to the BSW.
What prompted Thomas Geisel to leave the SPD after more than 40 years? He cited concerns about Germany’s state as a “rehabilitation case”, seeing the economic location and social cohesion as threatened, he said at the press conference. Foreign and migration policy are also concerns for him. He is riding the wave of discontent in the country.
He was convinced by the “left, reasonable economic policy with an order-political compass” of the BSW, which limits economic power but avoids overregulation of the economy. Despite leaving the SPD, he still identifies as a social democrat, saying to WDR, “Social democracy is an attitude, not a party membership.”
As the son of SPD politician Alfred Geisel, the native Swabian from Ellwangen experienced politics up close from a young age. “Politics has always been part of my life. One of my earliest childhood memories is distributing my father’s election ballots.” He joined the party at 18.
He studied law and political science in Freiburg, Geneva and Washington. He also worked in former East Germany. In 1990, he worked as a consultant for the SPD faction in the People’s Chamber, the parliament of the GDR. He said, “It was a great time, literally making history.”
He held various positions within the SPD and a leading role at the Federal Agency for Special Tasks Arising from Unification until he switched to the business sector in 1998. From 2000 to 2013, he was responsible for natural gas procurement at Eon Ruhrgas. He said he was a “cardboard cutout” in the party during that time.
In 2014, he returned to active politics, well-prepared by his management experiences in the energy sector. He ran for mayor of Düsseldorf for the SPD and won the election. Looking back, it was “an extremely strenuous” but also the “most fulfilling task” of his career. In 2020, came the “great disappointment”: Geisel was not re-elected and initially withdrew from politics.
A European political connection is not immediately obvious from Geisel’s resume, unlike his co-lead candidate Fabio De Masi. However, he emphasizes that “Europe also plays a role in everyday local politics.” Geisel, invoking the principle of subsidiarity, finds the EU often “intrusive,” engaging in “micromanagement”.
For Geisel, the European Union is primarily an economic project that should aim to establish fair competition and enable international trade. In his vision, a strong Europe would focus on “its core competencies”, acting “where the state power of the member states is no longer sufficient”. This includes limiting the market power of multinational corporations.
Almost two years ago, when he was still an SPD politician, his publication of the blog post “Enough is enough, Mr. Melnyk!” caused some fierce criticism within the party. His ideas on foreign and security policy seem to be better suited to the BSW. He says: “I am of the opinion that our current approach to the war in Ukraine has not been thought through. It is not a responsible policy.”
Geisel criticized arms deliveries that prolong the war. He advocated suspending deliveries and offering Putin a “face-saving negotiation offer”. “Europe should be aware that we have a lever in our hands that promotes negotiations and thus offers a chance to end this war.”
In terms of EU accession, Ukraine probably shouldn’t expect support from potential MEP Thomas Geisel. “I find it fundamentally wrong that we see the issue of EU accession from a geostrategic perspective. That’s instrumentalizing Europe for me.”
He fundamentally believes, “Europe does not become stronger by gaining more expertise, nor by becoming larger; the larger Europe becomes, the more diverse the opinions.” Finding a “balance of size” is important to “speak with an independent voice in a multipolar world,” which Geisel finds “very desirable”.
At the first party congress on Jan. 27, the BSW finally adopted a European election program under the motto “less is more“. Geisel is still working on familiarizing himself with the content. He describes the current mood at the BSW as “a bit like a start-up”.
He talks about motivation and enthusiasm, as well as the need for improvisation. He compares his candidacy for the European Parliament to “jumping into the deep end“. But he sees himself as up to the challenge as a “committed European”. Clara Baldus
The European Green Party (EGP) is embarking on a challenging endeavor starting today in Lyon. At their party conference, they aim to finalize their program for the European elections on June 9. While it should be straightforward, as the party in Europe continues to stand for ambitious climate action policies and strict regulations for industries to reduce emissions, amendments proposed by the German Greens to the election program suddenly raise questions.
Instead of increasing ambitions in climate action, the coalition party wants to water down the targeted goals. Rather than aiming for a climate-neutral Europe by 2040, the German Greens apparently propose 2045. They also want to eliminate the gas phase-out by 2035 and the oil phase-out by 2040. Negotiations and discussions in Lyon are expected to be tough and emotional.
Furthermore, the Greens also plan to nominate their top candidates for the election on Saturday. The German Green frontrunner Terry Reintke and the Dutch Bas Eickhout, both of whom are already members of the EU Parliament, have the best chances for the top spots. However, Elīna Pinto from Latvia and Benedetta Scuderi from Italy are certainly not without chances.
You can read about the outcomes of the party conference on Monday in Europe.Table. Until then, have a relaxing weekend and enjoy your Friday reading,
The EU Commission is grappling with the question of what to do next with Ukrainian refugees starting March 2025. “There is currently a discussion, and we are exploring the possibilities,” says a spokesperson for the EU Commission. The cause of uncertainty is the EU’s mass influx directive concerning temporary protection.
Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the mechanism was activated on March 4, 2022. All member states found it a good idea to avoid chaos. The regulation, as stated in Article 4 of the directive, can be extended twice, each time for a maximum of one year. About five million Ukrainians arrived in the EU under this regulation, with approximately one million in Germany alone, 80 percent of whom were women.
Had the Council not made the corresponding decision, the fleeing Ukrainians would have had to go through the regular procedure: They would have had to apply for asylum and, with high probability, would then have received refugee status under the Geneva Refugee Convention, known as subsidiary protection. The sheer volume would have overwhelmed the EU member states, particularly Germany’s administration. That’s why the federal government, as well as states and municipalities, wanted to apply this directive.
However, with the second extension until March 2025, decided in October 2023, the instrument is fully utilized if one takes Article 4 literally. It’s a problem because there’s little indication that Ukrainians could return to a peaceful country by 2025. Already last summer, a special envoy of the EU Commission warned in a report that a solution must be found promptly. It requires a long-term perspective, demanded by the former Belgian Minister of Labor, Lodewijk Asscher.
However, the controversial EU asylum package did not include negotiations on the directive for temporary protection. This makes a difference, especially for Germany, where the question has been looming for months whether the unequal treatment of Ukrainian and other refugees is justified.
In January, the EU Commission presented potential solutions at the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers. Belgian State Secretary for Migration Nicole de Moor described the exchange as “initial reflection exercises”. One of them: A creative interpretation of the directive applied so far, allowing for an extension beyond 2025. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson presented this option to the member states, according to Brussels sources. However, among legal scholars, the finite nature of the measure has been the unanimous legal opinion so far. When asked, the EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs cannot provide details.
The German Federal Ministry of the Interior remains reserved amid the debates: “The BMI welcomes approaches that continue to enable coherent action by all member states to protect those who have fled from Ukraine to the EU due to the Russian war of aggression.” Regarding the specific considerations of the EU Commission, Nancy Faeser’s ministry declines to comment and refers to the Commission and ongoing discussions among member states.
However, time is running out for a new regulation: The EU Commission has not yet put forward a formal proposal to amend the directive. Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson even announced that she would not submit any regulatory proposals until there was agreement on the target corridor. In April, the current European Parliament will meet for the last time, and elections will be held in June. After that, the new EU Commission must be appointed. Therefore, the EU legislative machinery will be at a standstill until at least September, possibly longer.
Moreover, in the second half of the year, it will be Hungary, of all countries, that will hold the Council Presidency, deciding on negotiation dates for projects. Thus, the remaining good year realistically only consists of a few weeks.
If the special status for the refugees from Ukraine were to be removed in Germany, significant administrative problems would arise. Primarily for the already overstretched immigration authorities and employment agencies: They would have to manage a million “clients” much more intensively than before, scrutinizing claims more closely. Ukrainian residents already living here could potentially fall under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act without a new regulation.
“However, this would not be the preferred option for us, as it would confront the immigration authorities with a flood of applications,” explains a spokesperson for the German Association of Counties. “Therefore, as an alternative to an EU solution, only a general residence regulation in Germany seems to be possible, rendering individual applications obsolete.” For newcomers, a regulation similar to that for asylum seekers should be considered, emphasizes the Association of Counties.
It’s no wonder that the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs primarily wants one thing: to remove Ukrainians from the special protection status. “Such a change is desirable from the perspective of the BMAS, also because it enables refugees and employers to have a secure perspective beyond the duration of the directive for temporary protection,” a spokesperson told Table.Media.
However, from the refugees’ perspective, this is not automatically attractive: a change from the current protection system also means that they would initially have no entitlement to basic security or citizen’s income. At least not if they do not participate in labor market integration measures. However, this would entail considerable additional effort. The employment agencies and job centers could handle this, according to the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. “The Federal Employment Agency has demonstrated in the past that it can handle unexpected needs,” the ministry of Hubertus Heil said.
Whether this would work smoothly, though? One way could be to add a corresponding amendment to the asylum package at the last minute. However, the problem does not arise equally in every EU country. Germany’s approach to uncomplicated reception based on social law might meet with little understanding from other member states and require further concessions in asylum law.
Thus, not only for those affected but also for a year before the likely expiration date, a problem looms that has been announced since the beginning of the regulation. Yet many stakeholders still hope for a European solution. Because even in the event of a swift peace in Ukraine, a rapid return for all refugees would hardly be realistic within a short time.
Within the traffic light coalition, there are differing views on how the EU Supply Chain Directive (CSDDD) will affect businesses in Germany and how the government should vote in the Council. Protagonists include Federal Minister of Labor Hubertus Heil (SPD), who leads on the European directive, and FDP ministers Christian Lindner and Marco Buschmann.
The finance and justice ministries led by them do not want to support the trilogue result on the draft EU Supply Chain Directive. They stated this in a letter yesterday. In the EU Council, this would result in Germany abstaining, “which effectively amounts to a no vote”, they wrote.
According to Federal Minister of Labor Hubertus Heil, the CSDDD is “in Germany’s interest”. He is strongly advocating for approval. He has made a proposal, now under discussion within the government, which includes reducing bureaucratic burdens and no additional reporting requirements.
“We can and should trust ourselves in Europe to embark on the path toward fair global supply chains,” said Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Svenja Schulze in support of the directive. “I offer companies to further expand our support services for implementing the new rules in Germany and abroad,” she told Table.Media. However, there is great skepticism within the FDP. “I must acknowledge that there is no consensus in the government,” summarized Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the EU Summit in Brussels.
There are also different assessments of what consequences German abstention in the Council would have. On the FDP side and among their supporters, especially the major associations, there is hope that this could prevent the CSDDD from being adopted at the European level. In contrast, supporters in the government camp of the SPD and Greens are convinced that the directive will be adopted even if Germany abstains.
The actual majority situation in the Council is still difficult to predict. According to information from Table.Media, so far only Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Malta have announced their intention to approve the text. Six other member states, including Ireland, Poland and Greece, expressed positive views during a meeting of the Council working group.
However, Sweden is expected to reject the law; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia are likely to “not approve”. All others stated that they are currently reviewing the trilogue result. At the start of discussions on the CSDDD under the German EU Council Presidency, all states unanimously spoke in favor of such regulation.
Although, according to government sources, “every half-sentence” of the CSDDD has been coordinated between the involved ministries, there are currently very different assessments on crucial points.
Example liability: Lindner and Buschmann admit that the German side achieved some success in the trilogue negotiations regarding liability. Liability will be “limited using established principles of German liability law, such as the necessity for the violated norm to protect third parties”, they write.
Additionally, companies could share audits and fulfill due diligence obligations jointly in industry initiatives. This was advocated, for example, by the Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI). “Nevertheless, the liability provision represents a greater burden compared to the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG). Unlike the LkSG, the CSDDD is intended to include civil liability.” The SPD in the grand coalition with the CDU/CSU could not enforce this.
Government sources do not deny that liability under the CSDDD is somewhat more comprehensive than under the German Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG). However, the German side prevented the French from asserting their much more far-reaching ideas of liability, as anchored in the French Due Diligence Act.
Furthermore, according to the CSDDD, companies are only “liable in case of their own fault and avoidable damages”. Companies that have made efforts “are not liable”. Such a duty to make efforts corresponds to the regulation of the LkSG. Incidentally, the Ministry of Justice significantly contributed to the liability rules of the CSDDD. However, Minister of Justice Buschmann already expressed concerns about the CSDDD last summer.
Victims of human rights violations in the supply chains of European companies should be facilitated access to justice. So far, this access has been so complicated that de facto, hardly any proceedings take place. Facilitating access to European courts for these victims has been a concern of most EU governments from the outset.
Example scope of application: Lindner and Buschmann criticize the further application to companies with 500 employees and, in high-risk sectors, to companies with more than 250 employees. However, according to government sources, Buschmann, Habeck and Heil previously supported this regulation together. Additionally, a turnover threshold is introduced at the European level, which does not exist in German law. Overall, several hundred more companies in Germany are likely to be covered by the CSDDD due to the new regulation. The EU Commission estimates 13,000 companies across Europe. German law covers 5,200 companies.
Example environment: According to the two FDP ministers, the trilogue result also includes “a covert environmentally friendly general clause”. This leads to “far-reaching corporate responsibility for environmental damage, regardless of a specific impact on people”. Other government circles, however, explain: There is “no open or covert general clause for the environment”. The German government rejected such attempts during the trilogue negotiations. In the human rights context, there is only the suggestion that serious environmental damage also has a human rights relevance. However, a similar provision is also found in the German LkSG.
Example reporting obligations: The two FDP ministries foresee significant financial, personnel and “bureaucratic additional burdens” on German companies. For example, larger companies should “draw up a plan to ensure the compatibility of their corporate strategy with the Paris Agreement, including specific reduction targets”. However, companies already have to do this as part of their reporting obligations, according to other government circles. The CSDDD does not impose additional burdens here.
Reactions to the disagreement within the traffic light coalition regarding the CSDDD vary. “The FDP’s U-turn is a slap in the face to all those who suffer forced labor and starvation wages in the supply chains of European companies,” said Michelle Trimborn, spokesperson for the Supply Chain Act initiative. The stance of the two FDP ministers is an affront to all companies that have been advocating for sustainable business practices for years.
If the CSDDD does not come to fruition, this would send a disastrous signal to German companies that professional supply chain management is unnecessary,” said Antje von Dewitz, CEO of Vaude. “In favor of short-term relief, the establishment of entrepreneurial sustainability is actively hindered.”
The Gesamtmetall Employers’ Association welcomed the FDP’s decision. “In its current form, this directive would go far beyond the German regulation and make legally secure foreign trade almost impossible.” It is good that the FDP has come to its senses and “pulls the plug on the European Supply Chain Act,” said Angelika Niebler, Chair of the CSU European Group.
However, it is considered unlikely that the CSDDD could be renegotiated during the current legislative period. Supporters of the directive also fear that there may no longer be majorities for the CSDDD after the European elections. With Till Hoppe and Leonie Düngefeld
For seven weeks, Viktor Orbán had kept the other 26 heads of state and government and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy waiting. At Thursday’s special summit, things moved quickly: The Hungarian Prime Minister paved the way for the financial package, which includes assistance for Ukraine amounting to €50 billion until 2027, already in the pre-talks with a small group.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized that there had been no promises to Orbán in return for releasing frozen EU funds for Hungary. “The answer to that is a clear no,” von der Leyen said. Orbán also failed to secure his demand for an annual veto right for the disbursement of Ukraine funds. The final statement only provides for annual discussions among heads of state and government on the topic.
Nevertheless, Orbán spoke of having “fulfilled his mission“, mentioning a control mechanism by the end of the year. At the summit in mid-December, the Hungarian Prime Minister had blocked negotiations on the increase of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) related to Ukraine aid, much to the dismay of the other 26.
Subsequently, President Charles Michel called for the special summit yesterday. Diplomats interpreted Orbán’s veto as an attempt to secure additional EU funds. The Commission and Council still withhold around €20 billion for Hungary because the government in Budapest has not implemented the agreed reforms to combat corruption and ensure judicial independence.
The conclusions of the special summit refer to the formulations adopted by heads of state and government in December 2020 regarding the new rule-of-law conditionality mechanism. It was stipulated that the application of the new rule-of-law instrument should be proportional to the impact of the shortcomings on the EU budget. Orbán doubts whether this is the case in practice. However, diplomats from other member states emphasized that the reference in yesterday’s final statement did not represent a new development.
With the decision, the EU establishes a new Ukraine Facility, through which €50 billion will flow to Kyiv until 2027. Of this, €33 billion will be provided as low-interest loans, with the remainder as grants for the first time. The funds are crucial to stabilize Ukraine’s economy and finances in the long term, said President Volodymyr Zelenskiy.
The decision of the Europeans is also “a signal to American taxpayers,” said Michel. He hoped this would make it easier for US President Joe Biden to get his financial assistance through Congress. There, Republicans are mainly blocking billions in payments to the government in Kyiv for tactical reasons.
The agreement also paves the way for an increase of €64.6 billion in the Multiannual Financial Framework until 2027. Von der Leyen expressed being “very satisfied” with the outcome – the Commission will receive 80 percent of the additional funds it requested last June. This will enable the EU to fulfill its tasks in combating illegal migration (with an additional €2 billion) or supporting neighboring states such as those in the Western Balkans.
However, beyond the main block of the Ukraine Facility, von der Leyen had to significantly reduce her wish list. In particular, Scholz had insisted on raising a significant portion of the needed funds through savings and reallocations in the EU budget. For example, €2.1 billion from the Horizon Europe research program will be reallocated.
But in the negotiations, the new investment platform STEP suffered the most: Instead of €10 billion additional funds for funds like InvestEU, member states only agreed to provide €1.5 billion for the European Defense Fund.
“We are not meeting our responsibilities in this way,” criticized Rasmus Andresen, the Green Party budgetary negotiator in the European Parliament. MEPs see STEP as a trial run for a European Sovereignty Fund and want to go beyond the Commission’s proposal. However, they have little leverage in the upcoming trilogue negotiations with the Council, which are to be concluded at lightning speed.
Chancellor Scholz also urged other heads of state and government in Brussels once again to deliver more weapons to Kyiv. “Are all member states doing enough? My personal assessment is that this is not the case,” he said. Germany has earmarked more than €7 billion for arms supplies to Ukraine this year alone – more than half of all other EU member states combined.
The figures provided by the High Representative Josep Borrell were “difficult to understand”, said Scholz. The Spaniard had spoken the day before at the informal meeting of defense ministers about commitments from other member states totaling more than €20 billion for this year and presented the breakdown at the summit as well. Borrell probably included contributions for several years, Scholz said. However, he was not particularly surprised by this. The goal of his inquiry had been to trigger processes in other member states anyway.
Scholz pushes for bilateral contributions from individual member states to be given greater consideration in the European Peace Facility, which finances jointly military equipment for Ukraine. The discussion on the increase of the Peace Facility was postponed; the Council is now expected to reach an agreement by early March.
The desired amount of €5 billion for this year is missing from the final statement, unlike in previous drafts. Von der Leyen announced that contracts with arms companies would be signed within a few weeks to deliver the promised ammunition to Ukraine.
“All Catalan pro-independence supporters will be granted amnesty. Because they are not terrorists,” said Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez on Thursday following the special summit in Brussels. This statement comes amid controversy between the ruling Socialists of the PSOE and the Spanish judiciary.
The PSOE views decisions such as that of Judge Manuel García-Castellón, to investigate former Catalan regional president Carles Puigdemont and ERC leader Marta Rovira on suspicion of terrorism, as “interference” in the amnesty process. Sánchez made this statement in Brussels before the judge had completed his work. “As everyone knows, Catalan independence is not terrorism,” Sánchez reiterated.
Carles Puigdemont’s party, Junts per Catalunya, voted against the amnesty law in Parliament on Tuesday. As a result, the bill cannot be forwarded to the Senate, at least temporarily. Junts does not consider the law in its current form sufficient to protect all those accused in connection with the Catalan “process”.
The separatists especially want to guarantee amnesty for Puigdemont. The investigations conducted by Judge Manuel García-Castellón into the Tsunami Democràtic protest group directly concern Puigdemont due to possible terrorist offenses. Puigdemont is also under investigation by Judge Joaquín Aguirre in Barcelona for treason. The judge is examining the “Russian connection”.
Junts and the Socialists now have an initial deadline until Feb. 21 to reach a new agreement. This deadline can be extended for a maximum of another 15 days until March 7.
On Thursday, Sánchez instructed to maintain the amnesty law in its current form and without further concessions to Junts. The Socialist believes that further changes to the bill would jeopardize its review before the Constitutional Court. Sánchez’s statement in Brussels is a message to Junts, but also to the investigating judges.
The Socialists had originally refused to grant comprehensive amnesty to all persons accused of terrorism in connection with the separatist process. The constitutionality of the law could be challenged both in Spain and before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Last week, the PSOE had already promised the separatist parties Junts and ERC amendments to the amnesty law regarding terrorist offenses. Socialists and separatists agreed that persons accused of terrorism in the context of the separatist process would not be granted amnesty “if they have obviously and with direct intent caused serious human rights violations“. This refers, in particular, to those mentioned in Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and international humanitarian law.
The Socialists also granted the separatists another amendment regarding the application of precautionary measures. These are intended to ensure that Puigdemont can return to Spain without precautionary measures, even if the future amnesty law is appealed against.
After PSOE, Junts, and ERC agreed to protect the cases of the CDR (Committees for the Defense of the Republic) and Tsunami Democràtic through amendments to the amnesty law, National Court Judge Manuel García Castellón questioned their arguments. García-Castellón deemed the serious injuries suffered by police officers during the violent riots in Catalonia in October 2019 as “incompatible with the right to life and physical integrity“.
The CDR had coordinated the violent demonstrations. In 2019, the National Court found that the CDR communicated their strategy and key steps directly to Puigdemont.
At the special summit in Brussels, French President Emmanuel Macron advocated for mirror clauses and argued against the trade agreement with Mercosur. “I am not fundamentally against free trade agreements,” Macron said in a press briefing. He is simply against free trade when the “law of the jungle” applies. “We cannot demand that European producers respect more and more rules while negotiating free trade agreements, as was done in the 90s,” Macron said.
The summit in Brussels was accompanied by massive farmers’ protests, which were also a topic of discussion among the heads of state and government. According to Macron, opening up markets without demanding respect for European rules from trading partners threatens the existence of European farmers. If we follow this principle, we will end up with a “continent that makes rules for producers that no longer exist”, Macron said.
With this extreme example, Macron warned that Europe risks losing control over food production and subsequently consuming inferior goods from third countries due to excessive regulation coupled with market opening. Macron believes this threatens Europe’s sovereignty.
As a positive example, the French president cited recent trade agreements with Chile and New Zealand, in which trading partners agreed to sustainability criteria. However, the much more commercially significant Mercosur trading bloc is unwilling to accept these criteria. Similar to Macron, the South American countries are concerned about their sovereignty. jaa
After his removal as Mayor of Düsseldorf in 2020, Thomas Geisel had been relatively quiet. In 2024, the 60-year-old made a significant move. He wants to embark on a new chapter, in a new party and at a higher political level. He aims for Brussels.
At the press conference for the founding of the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance – Reason and Justice on Jan. 8, the BSW surprisingly presented Geisel as one of two lead candidates for the European elections. He had recently announced his departure from the SPD and his switch to the BSW.
What prompted Thomas Geisel to leave the SPD after more than 40 years? He cited concerns about Germany’s state as a “rehabilitation case”, seeing the economic location and social cohesion as threatened, he said at the press conference. Foreign and migration policy are also concerns for him. He is riding the wave of discontent in the country.
He was convinced by the “left, reasonable economic policy with an order-political compass” of the BSW, which limits economic power but avoids overregulation of the economy. Despite leaving the SPD, he still identifies as a social democrat, saying to WDR, “Social democracy is an attitude, not a party membership.”
As the son of SPD politician Alfred Geisel, the native Swabian from Ellwangen experienced politics up close from a young age. “Politics has always been part of my life. One of my earliest childhood memories is distributing my father’s election ballots.” He joined the party at 18.
He studied law and political science in Freiburg, Geneva and Washington. He also worked in former East Germany. In 1990, he worked as a consultant for the SPD faction in the People’s Chamber, the parliament of the GDR. He said, “It was a great time, literally making history.”
He held various positions within the SPD and a leading role at the Federal Agency for Special Tasks Arising from Unification until he switched to the business sector in 1998. From 2000 to 2013, he was responsible for natural gas procurement at Eon Ruhrgas. He said he was a “cardboard cutout” in the party during that time.
In 2014, he returned to active politics, well-prepared by his management experiences in the energy sector. He ran for mayor of Düsseldorf for the SPD and won the election. Looking back, it was “an extremely strenuous” but also the “most fulfilling task” of his career. In 2020, came the “great disappointment”: Geisel was not re-elected and initially withdrew from politics.
A European political connection is not immediately obvious from Geisel’s resume, unlike his co-lead candidate Fabio De Masi. However, he emphasizes that “Europe also plays a role in everyday local politics.” Geisel, invoking the principle of subsidiarity, finds the EU often “intrusive,” engaging in “micromanagement”.
For Geisel, the European Union is primarily an economic project that should aim to establish fair competition and enable international trade. In his vision, a strong Europe would focus on “its core competencies”, acting “where the state power of the member states is no longer sufficient”. This includes limiting the market power of multinational corporations.
Almost two years ago, when he was still an SPD politician, his publication of the blog post “Enough is enough, Mr. Melnyk!” caused some fierce criticism within the party. His ideas on foreign and security policy seem to be better suited to the BSW. He says: “I am of the opinion that our current approach to the war in Ukraine has not been thought through. It is not a responsible policy.”
Geisel criticized arms deliveries that prolong the war. He advocated suspending deliveries and offering Putin a “face-saving negotiation offer”. “Europe should be aware that we have a lever in our hands that promotes negotiations and thus offers a chance to end this war.”
In terms of EU accession, Ukraine probably shouldn’t expect support from potential MEP Thomas Geisel. “I find it fundamentally wrong that we see the issue of EU accession from a geostrategic perspective. That’s instrumentalizing Europe for me.”
He fundamentally believes, “Europe does not become stronger by gaining more expertise, nor by becoming larger; the larger Europe becomes, the more diverse the opinions.” Finding a “balance of size” is important to “speak with an independent voice in a multipolar world,” which Geisel finds “very desirable”.
At the first party congress on Jan. 27, the BSW finally adopted a European election program under the motto “less is more“. Geisel is still working on familiarizing himself with the content. He describes the current mood at the BSW as “a bit like a start-up”.
He talks about motivation and enthusiasm, as well as the need for improvisation. He compares his candidacy for the European Parliament to “jumping into the deep end“. But he sees himself as up to the challenge as a “committed European”. Clara Baldus
