A cooling-off period for ex-deputies and the end of unlimited access to Parliament with alumni cards: With these and other proposals, Parliament President Roberta Metsola wants to make the EP more transparent. It is an attempt to improve the image of the institution, which has suffered greatly in the wake of the corruption scandal surrounding Eva Kaili. Charlotte Wirth took a closer look at the proposals and discovered some loopholes.
Who will succeed Eva Kaili? According to the agreements between the groups, the vacant vice-president post belongs to the S&D group. By now, it is clear who the Socialists will nominate for the election. Read more in the News.
At the turn of the year, the new Supply Chain Act came into force in Germany. It places greater obligations on large companies to comply with human rights and environmental requirements. So far, the German business community has reacted quite calmly to the changes. Felix Lee and Charlotte Wirth analyze the law’s implementation to date as quite tame, while the corresponding EU proposal goes much further in some respects.
The reform proposal that Roberta Metsola will present today comprises 14 points. Less than a month after the corruption scandal surrounding Vice President Eva Kaili came to light, the speaker of Parliament is working to improve the image of her institution. Organizations such as Transparency International have accused Parliament of having insufficient transparency rules, which allowed such a scandal to occur in the first place.
Metsola’s proposals include the following:
Transparency International has already reacted to the leaked proposal by Roberto Metsola. The proposed changes are “long overdue” and would make it much more difficult for third countries to exert undue influence on the work of EU parliamentarians.
In some respects, however, the proposal does not go far enough. For example, members of Parliament would still only be required to declare travel paid for by third parties. However, members of Parliament have their own travel allowance, which they do not have to account for – provided that they are invited by the respective country in writing “in their function as members of Parliament.”
In particular, the new access rules for former MEPs are likely to be bitterly resented by some ex-parliamentarians. Using parliamentary access for lobbying purposes is a fairly common practice in the European Parliament. The best example: former EPP MEP and former Italian defense minister Mario Mauro. Mauro sat in Parliament until 2013, but since at least 2011 he has been running his own lobbying firm, Meseuro, which has been registered in the parliamentary lobby register since 2020. Since 2018, Mauro has also worked for the consulting firm Sec Newgate.
Among his clients is, for example, the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), as Sec Newgate confirms. In 2020, Mauro made his case in the European press in his capacity as a former minister, particularly for Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Until yesterday, Mario Mauro did not have lobbying accreditation for any of the companies, as required by transparency rules, but used his alumni access to, for example, meet with Commission President von der Leyen on behalf of consultancy Sec Newgate. Such mixing of interests is likely to complicate Metsola’s 14 points in the future.
However, the Speaker’s proposals are not tied to stronger sanctions. MEPs still do not risk much by ignoring the code of conduct. UKIP and the Front National, for example, only had to repay the Parliament the sum of the embezzled funds in the last legislature for embezzling their expense allowances and employing bogus staff.
As a rule, the EU Parliament’s sanctions do not go beyond the suspension of daily allowances for a period of up to 30 days. This is hardly likely to serve as a deterrent. The best example: Luxembourg MEP Monica Semedo (Renew) was suspended for 15 days as recently as 2021 for bullying her staff. Barely a year later, she faces sanctions once more, again for bullying.
Sanctions like these are extremely rare. In the last legislative period, Parliament examined only 24 possible violations of the rules. In no case were sanctions imposed. Moreover, the decision on sanctions and their scope rests solely with the Speaker of Parliament.
However, Roberta Metsola herself has some catching up to do when it comes to upholding the Code of Conduct. The President of Parliament has been a member of the steering committee of the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF)*, an interest group that brings together leading players and lobby organizations in the financial industry (including the European Banking Federation, Allianz, JPMorgan and Blackrock) and MEPs and regularly invites them to policy briefs. Metsola has not noted this membership in her financial statement, although the Code of Conduct (Article 4 d) obliges her to do so. For representatives of the financial industry, membership costs €8,000 a year.
The secretariat of the interest group, which is registered as a non-profit association in Belgium, is provided by the consulting firm Kreab, which also represents the interests of the financial industry. Other members of the steering committee include Markus Ferber (CSU) and Stefan Berger (CDU). Ferber, who regularly takes the lead on reports that affect the financial industry, has indicated his membership in the EPFSF eventually.
There are a number of interest groups in Brussels, such as the EPFSF. They grant companies and associations formalized, privileged access to parliamentarians, even when they are working on dossiers that directly affect the industry. Since these meetings rarely take place in Parliament itself, they do not need to be recorded as lobby meetings under either the current rules or Metsola’s reform proposals.
It remains unclear how quickly the implementation of Metsola’s reform plans will proceed. Some proposals, such as the rules for former parliamentarians, are anchored in Parliament’s rules of procedure. In order to adapt them, the proposals must first be approved by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) and later by the plenum. Other proposals, such as advanced training on financial rules, are easier to push through. A task force comprising members of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee, the Secretariat and Metsola herself is to further elaborate the proposals.
*An earlier version of the article, citing the EPFSF website, had stated that Roberta Metsola was still a member of the Forum’s Steering Committee. Metsola’s spokesperson has since clarified that the Speaker of the Parliament has had no relations with the EPFSF during the current legislature. She had also not received any financial benefits from the organization. The EPFSF homepage has since been updated accordingly.
So far, the anger about the new Supply Chain Act has been limited and only one person in the German public is upset about the law: Wu Ken, the Chinese ambassador. China will not interfere in Germany’s legislation, he said in an interview with Handelsblatt. “But politicizing economic and trade issues distorts the principles of the market economy.”
The ambassador of the People’s Republic apparently sees the new law, which obliges companies in Germany to comply with human rights standards and requirements against environmental pollution in their supply chains, as a targeted attack on China. Some countries would use such a law “to make a fuss about the internal affairs of other states,” the ambassador raged. His country would take all necessary measures “to consistently protect the legitimate rights and interests of its companies,” the ambassador said, without, however, providing details.
There is probably a reason why the excitement – apart from that of the Chinese ambassador – has so far been limited: The Supply Chain Act is quite tame in its implementation.
In essence, German companies, but also foreign companies with branches or subsidiaries in Germany, must take a closer look at their supply chains and document them using an electronic procedure. Those who accept child labor, immoral wages or environmental disasters at suppliers must expect fines in the millions. It could therefore make sense for large companies to hire a human rights officer. Volkswagen has already done so.
But there is only an obligation to make an effort, not an obligation to succeed. In the case of indirect suppliers, companies are also only required to take action if there is evidence of human rights violations such as poverty wages or child labor in the region where the supplier’s factory is located. If violations are proven, the companies in question are not punished immediately, but only if they do nothing about it.
While the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), which is responsible for ensuring compliance with the new law, emphasizes that it can
However, the turnover-based fine framework only applies to companies with annual sales of more than €400 million. In addition, the new law will only come into force in stages. Starting this year, it will initially apply only to large companies with more than 3,000 employees – that’s around 600, and from 2024 to just under 3,000 companies with more than 1,000 employees.
Trade unions and non-governmental organizations have the possibility to sue in the event of indications of human rights violations if the victims also specifically agree to this. However, there is no corporate liability under civil law. This means that the victims have no prospect of compensation from the companies. However, BAFA can intervene with its demands for fines.
Most German companies do not yet see a problem for business in the current version of the Supply Chain Act. “For us, not so much has changed,” says Jan Philippi, who runs a design manufactory near Hamburg and sources many of the goods he offers from China. His company, he says, had already previously negotiated a code of conduct from its Chinese partners. He has also personally verified their statements during factory visits.
The situation could be different if the European law is voted for. This is because the EU proposal goes much further than German law in some respects. For example, companies with 500 or more employees and annual net sales of €150 million are already affected. In high-risk sectors, companies with 250 or more employees and sales of €40 million must also perform due diligence. The proposal applies to the entire value chain and not just to the first stage of the supply chain.
Furthermore, in contrast to German law, the Commission’s draft provides for civil liability and simplifies access to justice for victims of human rights violations and environmental damage. Liability also applies to damage caused outside the EU. However, companies are only liable if those affected can prove that they failed to meet their obligations.
The law is expected to enter the trilogue in the second half of the legislative session. Parliament will vote on its position in the JURI Committee in March and in plenary in May at the earliest. The Social Democrat Lara Wolters is in charge, and in her report she has considerably tightened up the Commission’s proposal. The Council, for its part, presented its General Approach in December. This is weaker than the Commission’s proposal and exempts the financial sector, in particular, almost entirely from the due diligence obligation.
The German Chamber of Commerce in China generally views the Supply Chain Act as an “opportunity to improve the social and environmental situation worldwide.” Jens Hildebrandt, Executive Board Member in Beijing, does admit that the law “also poses challenges” for German companies in China. According to their latest business climate survey, only just under a third of companies have problems fully meeting the requirements of the Supply Chain Act.
In some cases, there are difficulties in communicating with suppliers on site or in inspecting production facilities, according to Hildebrandt. Despite these hurdles, however, few companies would consider reorganizing their suppliers. A full 86 percent of companies do not need to take any further action to restructure their supply chains, Hildebrandt emphasizes.
For large German companies that produce in Xinjiang, however, things are likely to become much more difficult. The United Nations Human Rights Office accuses the leadership in Beijing of arbitrarily detaining Uyghurs and other members of Muslim minorities in detention camps. For years, there have been accusations of forced labor in the factories, and the US government has even spoken of genocide. German companies that operate factories in Xinjiang, such as Volkswagen or BASF, have not been able to prove that forced labor takes place in their supply chains. But they are likely to come under greater scrutiny from non-governmental organizations and auditing authorities with the Supply Chain Act.
The BAFA, which is responsible for such cases, intends to significantly increase its staffing levels. At the turn of the year, around 50 people were already hired at the authority’s new branch office in Borna near Leipzig for the Supply Chain Act. By summer 2023, it is planned to double their number to around 100.
When things grate between German and French politicians, few people are better placed than Sabine Thillaye to explain why. Thillaye is a Remscheid-born French member of the National Assembly. She is a member of the Defense Committee, the European Affairs Committee and part of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly.
She discusses Franco-German misunderstandings, explains why problems arise when French and Germans talk about “concept” and mean different things, and why Germans feel differently about debt than the French. “I feel like the French see more of the future potential and the Germans more of the risk potential.”
Thillaye can lecture on how language affects systems of thought. “A French person is less likely to clearly say ‘no’ in a conversation than a German, whose statement is already more precise, simply because the French language strings a lot of words together.”
At first, she didn’t want to go to France at all, preferring to go to Brussels and get involved in European politics, then she married a Frenchman. But she never let go of Europe as a project. She has lived in France for more than 30 years and acquired French citizenship in 2015. Macron’s emphasis on European issues was a reason for her, who was previously an entrepreneur, to enter politics. She started out in Macron’s En Marche movement and now sits in the National Assembly for the Democrats after a dispute with party colleagues.
After the Franco-German Council of Ministers was canceled in October, a delegation from the French defense committee came to Berlin in December. Thillaye told a small group of journalists that German politicians sometimes had the feeling that they were talking to lobbyists because they mainly represented the interests of their constituencies. However, the meetings with her colleagues from the German defense committee were “very positive.”
Afterwards, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht took an hour and a half to meet Thillaye. Not a matter of course for such a meeting. Lambrecht, as Thillaye describes it, asked for understanding for the purchase of the F-35 aircraft, saying that Germany had a responsibility to NATO for nuclear sharing. The fact that Germany has bought the American aircraft does not mean that it wants to abandon the Franco-German armament project FCAS.
The matter of the F-35s again has to do with cultural differences, Thillaye says. “In Germany, there is heavy short-term thinking, because they say: we want to show efficiency now, we need an immediate answer. There is a state of war at our borders, how do we get ahead in terms of capacity?” In France, people tend to think longer-term and say, “Yes, my God, we need our own aircraft or defense system.”
Thillaye does not believe that FCAS could fail. At the end of the year, industry representatives signed the contract for Phase 1B, but politicians had to put pressure on them to do so. The ministers will meet again on Jan. 22. The governments will then be able to join in celebrating 60 years of the Élysée Treaty. A delegation from the German defense committee is also to come to France.
For the deputies who have “appropriate language skills,” a telegram or signal group is to be set up “so that it is possible to exchange information and react quickly and on short notice when such irritations arise.” If Thillaye is right with her problem diagnosis, that should help. Gabriel Bub
A cooling-off period for ex-deputies and the end of unlimited access to Parliament with alumni cards: With these and other proposals, Parliament President Roberta Metsola wants to make the EP more transparent. It is an attempt to improve the image of the institution, which has suffered greatly in the wake of the corruption scandal surrounding Eva Kaili. Charlotte Wirth took a closer look at the proposals and discovered some loopholes.
Who will succeed Eva Kaili? According to the agreements between the groups, the vacant vice-president post belongs to the S&D group. By now, it is clear who the Socialists will nominate for the election. Read more in the News.
At the turn of the year, the new Supply Chain Act came into force in Germany. It places greater obligations on large companies to comply with human rights and environmental requirements. So far, the German business community has reacted quite calmly to the changes. Felix Lee and Charlotte Wirth analyze the law’s implementation to date as quite tame, while the corresponding EU proposal goes much further in some respects.
The reform proposal that Roberta Metsola will present today comprises 14 points. Less than a month after the corruption scandal surrounding Vice President Eva Kaili came to light, the speaker of Parliament is working to improve the image of her institution. Organizations such as Transparency International have accused Parliament of having insufficient transparency rules, which allowed such a scandal to occur in the first place.
Metsola’s proposals include the following:
Transparency International has already reacted to the leaked proposal by Roberto Metsola. The proposed changes are “long overdue” and would make it much more difficult for third countries to exert undue influence on the work of EU parliamentarians.
In some respects, however, the proposal does not go far enough. For example, members of Parliament would still only be required to declare travel paid for by third parties. However, members of Parliament have their own travel allowance, which they do not have to account for – provided that they are invited by the respective country in writing “in their function as members of Parliament.”
In particular, the new access rules for former MEPs are likely to be bitterly resented by some ex-parliamentarians. Using parliamentary access for lobbying purposes is a fairly common practice in the European Parliament. The best example: former EPP MEP and former Italian defense minister Mario Mauro. Mauro sat in Parliament until 2013, but since at least 2011 he has been running his own lobbying firm, Meseuro, which has been registered in the parliamentary lobby register since 2020. Since 2018, Mauro has also worked for the consulting firm Sec Newgate.
Among his clients is, for example, the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM), as Sec Newgate confirms. In 2020, Mauro made his case in the European press in his capacity as a former minister, particularly for Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Until yesterday, Mario Mauro did not have lobbying accreditation for any of the companies, as required by transparency rules, but used his alumni access to, for example, meet with Commission President von der Leyen on behalf of consultancy Sec Newgate. Such mixing of interests is likely to complicate Metsola’s 14 points in the future.
However, the Speaker’s proposals are not tied to stronger sanctions. MEPs still do not risk much by ignoring the code of conduct. UKIP and the Front National, for example, only had to repay the Parliament the sum of the embezzled funds in the last legislature for embezzling their expense allowances and employing bogus staff.
As a rule, the EU Parliament’s sanctions do not go beyond the suspension of daily allowances for a period of up to 30 days. This is hardly likely to serve as a deterrent. The best example: Luxembourg MEP Monica Semedo (Renew) was suspended for 15 days as recently as 2021 for bullying her staff. Barely a year later, she faces sanctions once more, again for bullying.
Sanctions like these are extremely rare. In the last legislative period, Parliament examined only 24 possible violations of the rules. In no case were sanctions imposed. Moreover, the decision on sanctions and their scope rests solely with the Speaker of Parliament.
However, Roberta Metsola herself has some catching up to do when it comes to upholding the Code of Conduct. The President of Parliament has been a member of the steering committee of the European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum (EPFSF)*, an interest group that brings together leading players and lobby organizations in the financial industry (including the European Banking Federation, Allianz, JPMorgan and Blackrock) and MEPs and regularly invites them to policy briefs. Metsola has not noted this membership in her financial statement, although the Code of Conduct (Article 4 d) obliges her to do so. For representatives of the financial industry, membership costs €8,000 a year.
The secretariat of the interest group, which is registered as a non-profit association in Belgium, is provided by the consulting firm Kreab, which also represents the interests of the financial industry. Other members of the steering committee include Markus Ferber (CSU) and Stefan Berger (CDU). Ferber, who regularly takes the lead on reports that affect the financial industry, has indicated his membership in the EPFSF eventually.
There are a number of interest groups in Brussels, such as the EPFSF. They grant companies and associations formalized, privileged access to parliamentarians, even when they are working on dossiers that directly affect the industry. Since these meetings rarely take place in Parliament itself, they do not need to be recorded as lobby meetings under either the current rules or Metsola’s reform proposals.
It remains unclear how quickly the implementation of Metsola’s reform plans will proceed. Some proposals, such as the rules for former parliamentarians, are anchored in Parliament’s rules of procedure. In order to adapt them, the proposals must first be approved by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) and later by the plenum. Other proposals, such as advanced training on financial rules, are easier to push through. A task force comprising members of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee, the Secretariat and Metsola herself is to further elaborate the proposals.
*An earlier version of the article, citing the EPFSF website, had stated that Roberta Metsola was still a member of the Forum’s Steering Committee. Metsola’s spokesperson has since clarified that the Speaker of the Parliament has had no relations with the EPFSF during the current legislature. She had also not received any financial benefits from the organization. The EPFSF homepage has since been updated accordingly.
So far, the anger about the new Supply Chain Act has been limited and only one person in the German public is upset about the law: Wu Ken, the Chinese ambassador. China will not interfere in Germany’s legislation, he said in an interview with Handelsblatt. “But politicizing economic and trade issues distorts the principles of the market economy.”
The ambassador of the People’s Republic apparently sees the new law, which obliges companies in Germany to comply with human rights standards and requirements against environmental pollution in their supply chains, as a targeted attack on China. Some countries would use such a law “to make a fuss about the internal affairs of other states,” the ambassador raged. His country would take all necessary measures “to consistently protect the legitimate rights and interests of its companies,” the ambassador said, without, however, providing details.
There is probably a reason why the excitement – apart from that of the Chinese ambassador – has so far been limited: The Supply Chain Act is quite tame in its implementation.
In essence, German companies, but also foreign companies with branches or subsidiaries in Germany, must take a closer look at their supply chains and document them using an electronic procedure. Those who accept child labor, immoral wages or environmental disasters at suppliers must expect fines in the millions. It could therefore make sense for large companies to hire a human rights officer. Volkswagen has already done so.
But there is only an obligation to make an effort, not an obligation to succeed. In the case of indirect suppliers, companies are also only required to take action if there is evidence of human rights violations such as poverty wages or child labor in the region where the supplier’s factory is located. If violations are proven, the companies in question are not punished immediately, but only if they do nothing about it.
While the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), which is responsible for ensuring compliance with the new law, emphasizes that it can
However, the turnover-based fine framework only applies to companies with annual sales of more than €400 million. In addition, the new law will only come into force in stages. Starting this year, it will initially apply only to large companies with more than 3,000 employees – that’s around 600, and from 2024 to just under 3,000 companies with more than 1,000 employees.
Trade unions and non-governmental organizations have the possibility to sue in the event of indications of human rights violations if the victims also specifically agree to this. However, there is no corporate liability under civil law. This means that the victims have no prospect of compensation from the companies. However, BAFA can intervene with its demands for fines.
Most German companies do not yet see a problem for business in the current version of the Supply Chain Act. “For us, not so much has changed,” says Jan Philippi, who runs a design manufactory near Hamburg and sources many of the goods he offers from China. His company, he says, had already previously negotiated a code of conduct from its Chinese partners. He has also personally verified their statements during factory visits.
The situation could be different if the European law is voted for. This is because the EU proposal goes much further than German law in some respects. For example, companies with 500 or more employees and annual net sales of €150 million are already affected. In high-risk sectors, companies with 250 or more employees and sales of €40 million must also perform due diligence. The proposal applies to the entire value chain and not just to the first stage of the supply chain.
Furthermore, in contrast to German law, the Commission’s draft provides for civil liability and simplifies access to justice for victims of human rights violations and environmental damage. Liability also applies to damage caused outside the EU. However, companies are only liable if those affected can prove that they failed to meet their obligations.
The law is expected to enter the trilogue in the second half of the legislative session. Parliament will vote on its position in the JURI Committee in March and in plenary in May at the earliest. The Social Democrat Lara Wolters is in charge, and in her report she has considerably tightened up the Commission’s proposal. The Council, for its part, presented its General Approach in December. This is weaker than the Commission’s proposal and exempts the financial sector, in particular, almost entirely from the due diligence obligation.
The German Chamber of Commerce in China generally views the Supply Chain Act as an “opportunity to improve the social and environmental situation worldwide.” Jens Hildebrandt, Executive Board Member in Beijing, does admit that the law “also poses challenges” for German companies in China. According to their latest business climate survey, only just under a third of companies have problems fully meeting the requirements of the Supply Chain Act.
In some cases, there are difficulties in communicating with suppliers on site or in inspecting production facilities, according to Hildebrandt. Despite these hurdles, however, few companies would consider reorganizing their suppliers. A full 86 percent of companies do not need to take any further action to restructure their supply chains, Hildebrandt emphasizes.
For large German companies that produce in Xinjiang, however, things are likely to become much more difficult. The United Nations Human Rights Office accuses the leadership in Beijing of arbitrarily detaining Uyghurs and other members of Muslim minorities in detention camps. For years, there have been accusations of forced labor in the factories, and the US government has even spoken of genocide. German companies that operate factories in Xinjiang, such as Volkswagen or BASF, have not been able to prove that forced labor takes place in their supply chains. But they are likely to come under greater scrutiny from non-governmental organizations and auditing authorities with the Supply Chain Act.
The BAFA, which is responsible for such cases, intends to significantly increase its staffing levels. At the turn of the year, around 50 people were already hired at the authority’s new branch office in Borna near Leipzig for the Supply Chain Act. By summer 2023, it is planned to double their number to around 100.
When things grate between German and French politicians, few people are better placed than Sabine Thillaye to explain why. Thillaye is a Remscheid-born French member of the National Assembly. She is a member of the Defense Committee, the European Affairs Committee and part of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly.
She discusses Franco-German misunderstandings, explains why problems arise when French and Germans talk about “concept” and mean different things, and why Germans feel differently about debt than the French. “I feel like the French see more of the future potential and the Germans more of the risk potential.”
Thillaye can lecture on how language affects systems of thought. “A French person is less likely to clearly say ‘no’ in a conversation than a German, whose statement is already more precise, simply because the French language strings a lot of words together.”
At first, she didn’t want to go to France at all, preferring to go to Brussels and get involved in European politics, then she married a Frenchman. But she never let go of Europe as a project. She has lived in France for more than 30 years and acquired French citizenship in 2015. Macron’s emphasis on European issues was a reason for her, who was previously an entrepreneur, to enter politics. She started out in Macron’s En Marche movement and now sits in the National Assembly for the Democrats after a dispute with party colleagues.
After the Franco-German Council of Ministers was canceled in October, a delegation from the French defense committee came to Berlin in December. Thillaye told a small group of journalists that German politicians sometimes had the feeling that they were talking to lobbyists because they mainly represented the interests of their constituencies. However, the meetings with her colleagues from the German defense committee were “very positive.”
Afterwards, Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht took an hour and a half to meet Thillaye. Not a matter of course for such a meeting. Lambrecht, as Thillaye describes it, asked for understanding for the purchase of the F-35 aircraft, saying that Germany had a responsibility to NATO for nuclear sharing. The fact that Germany has bought the American aircraft does not mean that it wants to abandon the Franco-German armament project FCAS.
The matter of the F-35s again has to do with cultural differences, Thillaye says. “In Germany, there is heavy short-term thinking, because they say: we want to show efficiency now, we need an immediate answer. There is a state of war at our borders, how do we get ahead in terms of capacity?” In France, people tend to think longer-term and say, “Yes, my God, we need our own aircraft or defense system.”
Thillaye does not believe that FCAS could fail. At the end of the year, industry representatives signed the contract for Phase 1B, but politicians had to put pressure on them to do so. The ministers will meet again on Jan. 22. The governments will then be able to join in celebrating 60 years of the Élysée Treaty. A delegation from the German defense committee is also to come to France.
For the deputies who have “appropriate language skills,” a telegram or signal group is to be set up “so that it is possible to exchange information and react quickly and on short notice when such irritations arise.” If Thillaye is right with her problem diagnosis, that should help. Gabriel Bub
