The energy ministers have packed their program for today’s Council ever more tightly over the past few days. The focus should be on the conclusions on grid expansion. The Belgian Council Presidency has been working on this for months; as things stand at present, the completion of the internal electricity market will probably be the dominant energy policy topic of the next legislature.
However, France, supported by the German government and the Netherlands, has put biofuel fraud on the agenda at short notice – although it is now difficult to keep track of all the gateways for fraudsters in this area. China has been flooding the European market for months with fuel that is supposedly produced from waste and residues in a climate-friendly way.
“We propose that the certification of the sustainability of the biofuels produced in these plants be refused if the inspectors of the competent authorities of the Member States are denied access to the plants”, the states write in a paper addressed to the Commission, which is available to Table.Briefings.
In contrast, the Commission’s paper on progress with capacity markets is likely to have caused disappointment. Several member states such as Germany and Italy had pushed for simpler approval procedures for the remuneration of new gas-fired power plants. However, in one and a half pages, the Commission merely repeats the familiar timetable for its forthcoming proposals.
In contrast, the discussions surrounding the German gas storage levy are likely to become more lively. In a joint paper, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are now criticizing the fact that they will have to pay even more from July. They are appealing to the Commission to find a solution so that “energy security throughout Central Europe is not further jeopardized”.
For Bernd Lange (SPD), MEP for many years, the trade policy of the next EU Commission should be based on three priorities:
However, the success of EU trade policy will depend heavily on the international environment, particularly the outcome of the US presidential election on November 4. In an interview with Table.Briefings, Lange discussed how the EU should pursue the priorities he has called for and how it can react to the results of the US elections.
Joe Biden doesn’t seem to think much of the WTO. If he is re-elected: How realistic is a WTO reform in the coming years?
US presidents are generally a little more relaxed in their second term of office. However, the majority situation in the House of Representatives is also a factor. The Biden administration has made it clear that the issue of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be addressed after Nov. 4. We will also certainly be discussing the issue of the definition of national security very intensively with our American friends once again. The confrontation has recently come to a head. I assume that the situation will ease somewhat with a re-elected Biden administration.
It is also possible that the other scenario will come to pass and Trump will win the presidential election. He has spoken of a ten percent tariff that he wants to build around the American market like a wall. How can the EU react if he implements this?
Yes, he wants ten percent on everything, he wants to introduce quotas in certain sectors, he wants to become independent of China within four years, and much more. These are all things that are not WTO-compatible. We are already preparing for possible WTO cases. And then, of course, we have our defensive instruments, particularly in public procurement, where we could also restrict the activities of American companies.
What other instruments does the EU have?
For example, the anti-restraint instrument, which was also created because Trump threatened to impose tariffs on European cars. We now have countermeasures in our toolbox. We are looking very closely at which measures we can introduce very quickly and under what conditions. We will not allow another situation like this, in which we are surprised by hostile action from a friend.
Does the Union now have enough trade defense instruments at its disposal or are there still gaps?
At the moment, the toolbox is well stocked. We also have the enforcement regulation to enforce WTO law and the screening of foreign direct investments. We will certainly also sharpen up the instrument against foreign subsidies. But if we realize that we need something else, we can quickly establish something else.
The expansion of the bilateral trade network has been slow in this legislature. Where can agreements be concluded in the coming years?
Mercosur, Australia and Indonesia are the three agreements that will be particularly important soon. The Mercosur states are still interested in an agreement. I hope that this time the situation in our country will not cause it to fail. That’s why we need to talk intensively with our French friends.
But how is that supposed to work? Without France, there will probably be no Mercosur agreement.
We need to look at how agricultural policy is shaped in France and then once again at the value chain in agriculture as a whole. A few years ago, we introduced legislation against unfair trading practices because the major users and traders of agricultural products were putting thumbscrews on farmers. These were completely unfair practices. Some of this has been abolished, but we need to tackle it again. Ultimately, the value chain from milk to cheese to sale must be fair. And if that is the case, then the skepticism towards free trade agreements is no longer so great.
What is the timeline for the Mercosur agreement?
We have to wait for the European elections, then something has to happen and next year the lid has to be put on it.
You also argue that the EU should carefully implement unilateral EU trade-related regulations such as the Deforestation Regulation. What do you have in mind?
The approach must be more flexible and cooperative. In the deforestation regulation, for example, there are three different risk classifications. But you can’t really do that for countries. Indonesia has a distance of 4,000 kilometers between its islands and the production conditions are very different. Can you classify a country just like that? And how can we integrate our partners’ instruments more strongly into the implementation? For example, many countries have already drawn up maps on their own initiative to track deforestation. I think we can really cooperate more in this area.
Horizon Europe, the EU’s current ninth framework program for research and innovation, which has a budget of €95 billion, will run until 2027. The new EU Commission will propose the name of its successor and the size of its budget. “The most important prerequisite for this is that the entire EU budget is fixed, the multi-annual financial framework for 2028 to 2034. The EU Commission’s proposal should be available by mid-2025”, says Victoria Reichl, Head of the Brussels office of the EU Cooperation Office of the Science Organizations (KoWi), a service platform for the major German science organizations.
At the same time, the Commission proposal for the tenth Framework Program for Research and Innovation (FP10), which also runs from 2028 to 2034, is expected next summer. Members of the EU Parliament and many European stakeholder associations have already positioned themselves concerning the FP10 budget: they consider a significant increase to be necessary – to €200 billion. However, Reichl considers this doubling compared to Horizon Europe difficult to achieve. In their previous positions on FP10, the member states have deliberately not yet mentioned any figures or made any concrete budgetary demands, as the political decision on the design of the next EU financial framework is ultimately in the hands of the European heads of state and government.
In terms of content, however, the countries are already positioning themselves on FP10. Denmark and Latvia did this quite early on and, among other things, initiated a debate on the dissolution of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), which is also part of the research framework program and has content overlaps with the European Innovation Council (EIC).
Germany is one of the countries that took an early position on FP10 with the BMBF’s discussion paper published last Thursday. Among other things, it calls for a strengthening of European security, for example through complementary funding and synergies between civil and military research. Yesterday, Wednesday, the DFG also published a position paper on FP10.
Dealing with the dual-use potential of research will continue to be an important topic in the next legislative period, says Reichl. At the beginning of 2024, the EU Commission presented the White Paper “Options for increased support for research and development on potentially dual-use technologies”. It outlines three ways in which EU funding programs can be adapted to changing geopolitical conditions.
One of these would be to move away from the exclusively civilian character of the framework program. “This would of course have an impact on the European Defense Fund, which is currently a separate, specific program in Horizon Europe”, says Reichl.
The Commission also brought new instruments into play. Victor Warhem, economist at the Centres for European Policy Network (CEP), suggests following the example of the US defense research agency DARPA. This agency was involved in pioneering inventions such as the internet and GPS on a manageable budget.
Warhem is therefore proposing a new EU agency for leap innovations in dual-use research, which could be attached to the European Defense Agency, for example. This agency should be equipped with a budget corresponding to 0.02 percent of the EU’s economic output. This would correspond to around €3.3 billion this year.
Fundamental changes to the structure of the framework program have not yet emerged, rather a fundamental continuity of the programs within the three pillars. “However, a debate about greater permeability between the pillars is foreseeable”, says Reichl.
Above all, the funding of excellent basic research by the European Research Council (ERC) in the first pillar is, in her view, certain, as it is generally recognized and highly valued. In terms of personnel, it will be interesting when the first four-year term of office of ERC President Maria Leptin ends in the fall of 2025, although a second term of office would be possible.
Beyond FP10, the head of the KoWi office in Brussels sees several other research policy issues and decisions on the agenda of the next EU Commission:
The structure and responsibilities within the EU Commission will also be important for EU research policy. Following the last European elections in 2019, Mariya Gabriel headed two Directorates-General as EU Research Commissioner for the first time: Research and Innovation and Education. Both Gabriel and her successor Iliana Ivanova were or are responsible for a total of five areas: Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth.
Because research-relevant EU program lines such as the EIT and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions were also previously the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Education, there were certainly arguments for this merger, says Reichl. Overall, it was hoped that there would be more synergy effects between the EU education and research programs. However, she also hears criticism of the current combination. Reichl: “Ultimately, this is a political decision that the next EU Commission will have to make.” The new College of Commissioners is to be presented in December. It will then also be clear who will take care of research matters at EU level and what else will be part of this portfolio. With Till Hoppe
Belgium has been leading the EU through crises, wars and geopolitical turmoil for five months – so far with success. From the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to the controversial supply chain law, the Belgian Presidency has pulled some hot potatoes out of the fire and kept the 27 EU states together.
But now Belgium itself is threatening to slide into crisis. New elections at the regional and federal level are due on June 9, the day of the European elections of all days. They could divide the Belgian kingdom even further and bring it to the brink of ungovernability. The latest polls paint a picture of a deeply divided country.
In Flanders, the largest region, the separatists of Vlaams Belang are in the lead with 26.8% of voting intentions, according to figures from the IPSOS Institute. The equally nationalist N-VA party follows in second place with 20.6%. Together, they account for almost 50 percent – more than enough to blockade Belgium.
In French-speaking Wallonia, the socialists and liberals from the Mouvement Réformateur (MR) are in a tense neck-and-neck race with 22.6% each. After years of socialist dominance, a stalemate is emerging here, which could also have a paralyzing effect – far beyond the region.
In the capital Brussels, the seat of the EU institutions, the MR is ahead with 23.3%. The radical left-wing “Parti des Travailleurs Belges” (PTB) follows in second place with 19.8 percent – and the trend is rising. The Greens have slumped from 21.6 to 12.5 percent; the Belgian broadcaster BRF speaks of a “debacle”.
It is unclear how a viable federal government for the whole country can be formed from this motley patchwork. In any case, the current ruling Vivaldi coalition led by Liberal Prime Minister Alexander De Croo no longer has a majority.
Instead of the current seven, eight or more parties could be needed to form a government in the future. One possibility would be for the Walloon opposition party “Les Engagés” (formerly Christian Democrats, CDH) to join the governing coalition after the election – and thus help Vivaldi to a second term in office after all.
However, the nationalists in Flanders are trying to prevent precisely this. N-VA leader Bart De Wever is mobilizing his supporters with the warning of a Vivaldi 2.0 government, which could continue the current liberal policy under the motto “Tous ensemble contre l’extrême droite” (Together against the far right).
The leader of Vlaams Belang, Tom Van Grieken, is even more radical. “It’s time to settle accounts with the system parties”, he demands. At the same time, Van Grieken is putting pressure on the N-VA: They have it in their hands to break up the “cordon sanitaire”. Together, the separatist Flemish parties could also play a role at the federal level.
Does this mean that the country is at risk of being divided? On paper yes, in practice no. Because a radical reform of the state would be necessary for Flanders to break away from the federation. Corresponding constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of the 150 seats in parliament. This is currently not in sight.
“There is no majority for the division of Belgium and no two-thirds majority for state reform”, said the renowned German constitutional law expert Christian Behrendt to the German-language portal Belgieninfo. Even minor reforms – such as the regionalization of the healthcare system – would have little chance of success.
Most experts rule out the worst-case scenario. However, forming a government is likely to be very difficult. After all, it is not just the future of Belgium that is causing controversy.
The election campaign also revolves around Middle East policy, in which Belgium is increasingly distancing itself from Israel (and Germany), the high cost of living and the austerity policy that the highly indebted country is facing with the new EU debt rules.
The radical left-wing PTB in particular knows how to score points with these issues – not only in Brussels, by the way, but nationwide, as it is the only party that operates centrally and federally. Nevertheless, the election is likely to be dominated by the right-wing and far-right parties in Flanders – because they are also ahead nationwide.
Most observers are convinced that this election will be decided in Flanders. The Flemish NV-A and its leader De Wever have a key role to play, according to a study by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
If the NV-A joins forces with the Vlaams Belang, there is a threat of a blockade – because all other parties reject cooperation with the extreme right-wing Flemish. If, on the other hand, it moves towards the Vivaldi parties, the cards would be reshuffled. It will then depend on what demands De Wever makes – and whether they are acceptable to the moderate parties.
Either way, Brussels is bracing itself for lengthy negotiations. After the last parliamentary elections in 2019, it took almost 500 days for the incumbent Vivaldi government to finally stand. This time, the negative record of 541 days set after the 2010 elections could even be broken. However, this is unlikely to paralyze the Belgian EU Presidency. No matter what happens, Prime Minister De Croo and his team will remain in office as caretaker leaders. The last three weeks until the end of the Council Presidency are therefore secure. It will be difficult after that – because on July 1, of all days, the presidency will pass to Hungary.
The choice comes as a surprise: if Geert Wilders likes to grumble about anything, it’s unelected bureaucrats. Dick Schoof, the future head of government and successor to Mark Rutte, is exactly that, a top civil servant who is also described as a doer with a thirst for recognition. Over the past 20 years, Schoof has played a key role in shaping the Netherlands’ security and asylum policy. He is therefore actually a representative of this “deep state”, which the far-right election winner otherwise likes to denounce.
He wants to be head of government “for all Dutch people”, Schoof emphasized during his first appearance in his new role. And no, he could not identify at all with the image that he would be “on Wilders’ leash” as Prime Minister. Geert Wilders with his freedom party PVV, the right-wing liberal VVD, Pieter Omtzigt’s conservative NSC and the populist farmers’ movement BBB only agreed on the senior civil servant at the second attempt.
The 67-year-old was most recently the top civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, where he was the right-hand man of Justice Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz, who is also the leader of the right-wing liberal VVD party. Schoof previously headed the Dutch secret service, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Before that, he was National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security (NCTV). After all, Dick Schoof is used to driving around in heavily armored vehicles and being escorted by police, according to NRC Handelsblad. Unlike outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who prefers to cycle to work.
Schoof knows more about Wilders than the other way around, which could be tricky, NRC Handelsblad continues. In his role at NCTV, Schoof was also responsible for the security arrangements of the Islam opponent, who is regularly threatened with death. Previous positions include leading positions in the police and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). Dick Schoof is described in the Dutch media as a doer who did the heavy lifting for his political superiors and was happy to push the boundaries. And while other civil servants shied away from the public eye, Dick Schoof loved the camera.
In a recent in-depth interview with “De Groene Amsterdammer”, the top civil servant made nuanced comments on the potential dangers to the rule of law should a government dominated by Geert Wilders PVV come to power. He had no clear yardstick with which he could say when a country was not a democratic constitutional state. The rule of law and democracy are always subject to change. The rule of law can also deal with politicians like Geert Wilders who have unconstitutional demands in their party manifesto: “Don’t underestimate the rule of law in our country.”
It is as if Dick Schoof had suspected that he would soon become Prime Minister by Geert Wilders’ grace. His long career in the civil service and democratic constitutional state will serve him as a common thread, he said after the nomination. The 67-year-old could have retired, but Dick Schoof recently asked for an extension.
The future head of government is not completely colorless. He was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Labor (PvdA) until 2021. After 30 years, he no longer felt at home there. He was asked at the presentation on Wednesday whether he could identify with the ideology of Geert Wilders’ PVV. Schoof said that he had been approached for the position by all four parliamentary group leaders. And reiterated that he wanted to be Prime Minister “of all Dutch people”. Stephan Israel
The energy ministers have packed their program for today’s Council ever more tightly over the past few days. The focus should be on the conclusions on grid expansion. The Belgian Council Presidency has been working on this for months; as things stand at present, the completion of the internal electricity market will probably be the dominant energy policy topic of the next legislature.
However, France, supported by the German government and the Netherlands, has put biofuel fraud on the agenda at short notice – although it is now difficult to keep track of all the gateways for fraudsters in this area. China has been flooding the European market for months with fuel that is supposedly produced from waste and residues in a climate-friendly way.
“We propose that the certification of the sustainability of the biofuels produced in these plants be refused if the inspectors of the competent authorities of the Member States are denied access to the plants”, the states write in a paper addressed to the Commission, which is available to Table.Briefings.
In contrast, the Commission’s paper on progress with capacity markets is likely to have caused disappointment. Several member states such as Germany and Italy had pushed for simpler approval procedures for the remuneration of new gas-fired power plants. However, in one and a half pages, the Commission merely repeats the familiar timetable for its forthcoming proposals.
In contrast, the discussions surrounding the German gas storage levy are likely to become more lively. In a joint paper, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary are now criticizing the fact that they will have to pay even more from July. They are appealing to the Commission to find a solution so that “energy security throughout Central Europe is not further jeopardized”.
For Bernd Lange (SPD), MEP for many years, the trade policy of the next EU Commission should be based on three priorities:
However, the success of EU trade policy will depend heavily on the international environment, particularly the outcome of the US presidential election on November 4. In an interview with Table.Briefings, Lange discussed how the EU should pursue the priorities he has called for and how it can react to the results of the US elections.
Joe Biden doesn’t seem to think much of the WTO. If he is re-elected: How realistic is a WTO reform in the coming years?
US presidents are generally a little more relaxed in their second term of office. However, the majority situation in the House of Representatives is also a factor. The Biden administration has made it clear that the issue of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be addressed after Nov. 4. We will also certainly be discussing the issue of the definition of national security very intensively with our American friends once again. The confrontation has recently come to a head. I assume that the situation will ease somewhat with a re-elected Biden administration.
It is also possible that the other scenario will come to pass and Trump will win the presidential election. He has spoken of a ten percent tariff that he wants to build around the American market like a wall. How can the EU react if he implements this?
Yes, he wants ten percent on everything, he wants to introduce quotas in certain sectors, he wants to become independent of China within four years, and much more. These are all things that are not WTO-compatible. We are already preparing for possible WTO cases. And then, of course, we have our defensive instruments, particularly in public procurement, where we could also restrict the activities of American companies.
What other instruments does the EU have?
For example, the anti-restraint instrument, which was also created because Trump threatened to impose tariffs on European cars. We now have countermeasures in our toolbox. We are looking very closely at which measures we can introduce very quickly and under what conditions. We will not allow another situation like this, in which we are surprised by hostile action from a friend.
Does the Union now have enough trade defense instruments at its disposal or are there still gaps?
At the moment, the toolbox is well stocked. We also have the enforcement regulation to enforce WTO law and the screening of foreign direct investments. We will certainly also sharpen up the instrument against foreign subsidies. But if we realize that we need something else, we can quickly establish something else.
The expansion of the bilateral trade network has been slow in this legislature. Where can agreements be concluded in the coming years?
Mercosur, Australia and Indonesia are the three agreements that will be particularly important soon. The Mercosur states are still interested in an agreement. I hope that this time the situation in our country will not cause it to fail. That’s why we need to talk intensively with our French friends.
But how is that supposed to work? Without France, there will probably be no Mercosur agreement.
We need to look at how agricultural policy is shaped in France and then once again at the value chain in agriculture as a whole. A few years ago, we introduced legislation against unfair trading practices because the major users and traders of agricultural products were putting thumbscrews on farmers. These were completely unfair practices. Some of this has been abolished, but we need to tackle it again. Ultimately, the value chain from milk to cheese to sale must be fair. And if that is the case, then the skepticism towards free trade agreements is no longer so great.
What is the timeline for the Mercosur agreement?
We have to wait for the European elections, then something has to happen and next year the lid has to be put on it.
You also argue that the EU should carefully implement unilateral EU trade-related regulations such as the Deforestation Regulation. What do you have in mind?
The approach must be more flexible and cooperative. In the deforestation regulation, for example, there are three different risk classifications. But you can’t really do that for countries. Indonesia has a distance of 4,000 kilometers between its islands and the production conditions are very different. Can you classify a country just like that? And how can we integrate our partners’ instruments more strongly into the implementation? For example, many countries have already drawn up maps on their own initiative to track deforestation. I think we can really cooperate more in this area.
Horizon Europe, the EU’s current ninth framework program for research and innovation, which has a budget of €95 billion, will run until 2027. The new EU Commission will propose the name of its successor and the size of its budget. “The most important prerequisite for this is that the entire EU budget is fixed, the multi-annual financial framework for 2028 to 2034. The EU Commission’s proposal should be available by mid-2025”, says Victoria Reichl, Head of the Brussels office of the EU Cooperation Office of the Science Organizations (KoWi), a service platform for the major German science organizations.
At the same time, the Commission proposal for the tenth Framework Program for Research and Innovation (FP10), which also runs from 2028 to 2034, is expected next summer. Members of the EU Parliament and many European stakeholder associations have already positioned themselves concerning the FP10 budget: they consider a significant increase to be necessary – to €200 billion. However, Reichl considers this doubling compared to Horizon Europe difficult to achieve. In their previous positions on FP10, the member states have deliberately not yet mentioned any figures or made any concrete budgetary demands, as the political decision on the design of the next EU financial framework is ultimately in the hands of the European heads of state and government.
In terms of content, however, the countries are already positioning themselves on FP10. Denmark and Latvia did this quite early on and, among other things, initiated a debate on the dissolution of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), which is also part of the research framework program and has content overlaps with the European Innovation Council (EIC).
Germany is one of the countries that took an early position on FP10 with the BMBF’s discussion paper published last Thursday. Among other things, it calls for a strengthening of European security, for example through complementary funding and synergies between civil and military research. Yesterday, Wednesday, the DFG also published a position paper on FP10.
Dealing with the dual-use potential of research will continue to be an important topic in the next legislative period, says Reichl. At the beginning of 2024, the EU Commission presented the White Paper “Options for increased support for research and development on potentially dual-use technologies”. It outlines three ways in which EU funding programs can be adapted to changing geopolitical conditions.
One of these would be to move away from the exclusively civilian character of the framework program. “This would of course have an impact on the European Defense Fund, which is currently a separate, specific program in Horizon Europe”, says Reichl.
The Commission also brought new instruments into play. Victor Warhem, economist at the Centres for European Policy Network (CEP), suggests following the example of the US defense research agency DARPA. This agency was involved in pioneering inventions such as the internet and GPS on a manageable budget.
Warhem is therefore proposing a new EU agency for leap innovations in dual-use research, which could be attached to the European Defense Agency, for example. This agency should be equipped with a budget corresponding to 0.02 percent of the EU’s economic output. This would correspond to around €3.3 billion this year.
Fundamental changes to the structure of the framework program have not yet emerged, rather a fundamental continuity of the programs within the three pillars. “However, a debate about greater permeability between the pillars is foreseeable”, says Reichl.
Above all, the funding of excellent basic research by the European Research Council (ERC) in the first pillar is, in her view, certain, as it is generally recognized and highly valued. In terms of personnel, it will be interesting when the first four-year term of office of ERC President Maria Leptin ends in the fall of 2025, although a second term of office would be possible.
Beyond FP10, the head of the KoWi office in Brussels sees several other research policy issues and decisions on the agenda of the next EU Commission:
The structure and responsibilities within the EU Commission will also be important for EU research policy. Following the last European elections in 2019, Mariya Gabriel headed two Directorates-General as EU Research Commissioner for the first time: Research and Innovation and Education. Both Gabriel and her successor Iliana Ivanova were or are responsible for a total of five areas: Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth.
Because research-relevant EU program lines such as the EIT and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions were also previously the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Education, there were certainly arguments for this merger, says Reichl. Overall, it was hoped that there would be more synergy effects between the EU education and research programs. However, she also hears criticism of the current combination. Reichl: “Ultimately, this is a political decision that the next EU Commission will have to make.” The new College of Commissioners is to be presented in December. It will then also be clear who will take care of research matters at EU level and what else will be part of this portfolio. With Till Hoppe
Belgium has been leading the EU through crises, wars and geopolitical turmoil for five months – so far with success. From the reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to the controversial supply chain law, the Belgian Presidency has pulled some hot potatoes out of the fire and kept the 27 EU states together.
But now Belgium itself is threatening to slide into crisis. New elections at the regional and federal level are due on June 9, the day of the European elections of all days. They could divide the Belgian kingdom even further and bring it to the brink of ungovernability. The latest polls paint a picture of a deeply divided country.
In Flanders, the largest region, the separatists of Vlaams Belang are in the lead with 26.8% of voting intentions, according to figures from the IPSOS Institute. The equally nationalist N-VA party follows in second place with 20.6%. Together, they account for almost 50 percent – more than enough to blockade Belgium.
In French-speaking Wallonia, the socialists and liberals from the Mouvement Réformateur (MR) are in a tense neck-and-neck race with 22.6% each. After years of socialist dominance, a stalemate is emerging here, which could also have a paralyzing effect – far beyond the region.
In the capital Brussels, the seat of the EU institutions, the MR is ahead with 23.3%. The radical left-wing “Parti des Travailleurs Belges” (PTB) follows in second place with 19.8 percent – and the trend is rising. The Greens have slumped from 21.6 to 12.5 percent; the Belgian broadcaster BRF speaks of a “debacle”.
It is unclear how a viable federal government for the whole country can be formed from this motley patchwork. In any case, the current ruling Vivaldi coalition led by Liberal Prime Minister Alexander De Croo no longer has a majority.
Instead of the current seven, eight or more parties could be needed to form a government in the future. One possibility would be for the Walloon opposition party “Les Engagés” (formerly Christian Democrats, CDH) to join the governing coalition after the election – and thus help Vivaldi to a second term in office after all.
However, the nationalists in Flanders are trying to prevent precisely this. N-VA leader Bart De Wever is mobilizing his supporters with the warning of a Vivaldi 2.0 government, which could continue the current liberal policy under the motto “Tous ensemble contre l’extrême droite” (Together against the far right).
The leader of Vlaams Belang, Tom Van Grieken, is even more radical. “It’s time to settle accounts with the system parties”, he demands. At the same time, Van Grieken is putting pressure on the N-VA: They have it in their hands to break up the “cordon sanitaire”. Together, the separatist Flemish parties could also play a role at the federal level.
Does this mean that the country is at risk of being divided? On paper yes, in practice no. Because a radical reform of the state would be necessary for Flanders to break away from the federation. Corresponding constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of the 150 seats in parliament. This is currently not in sight.
“There is no majority for the division of Belgium and no two-thirds majority for state reform”, said the renowned German constitutional law expert Christian Behrendt to the German-language portal Belgieninfo. Even minor reforms – such as the regionalization of the healthcare system – would have little chance of success.
Most experts rule out the worst-case scenario. However, forming a government is likely to be very difficult. After all, it is not just the future of Belgium that is causing controversy.
The election campaign also revolves around Middle East policy, in which Belgium is increasingly distancing itself from Israel (and Germany), the high cost of living and the austerity policy that the highly indebted country is facing with the new EU debt rules.
The radical left-wing PTB in particular knows how to score points with these issues – not only in Brussels, by the way, but nationwide, as it is the only party that operates centrally and federally. Nevertheless, the election is likely to be dominated by the right-wing and far-right parties in Flanders – because they are also ahead nationwide.
Most observers are convinced that this election will be decided in Flanders. The Flemish NV-A and its leader De Wever have a key role to play, according to a study by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
If the NV-A joins forces with the Vlaams Belang, there is a threat of a blockade – because all other parties reject cooperation with the extreme right-wing Flemish. If, on the other hand, it moves towards the Vivaldi parties, the cards would be reshuffled. It will then depend on what demands De Wever makes – and whether they are acceptable to the moderate parties.
Either way, Brussels is bracing itself for lengthy negotiations. After the last parliamentary elections in 2019, it took almost 500 days for the incumbent Vivaldi government to finally stand. This time, the negative record of 541 days set after the 2010 elections could even be broken. However, this is unlikely to paralyze the Belgian EU Presidency. No matter what happens, Prime Minister De Croo and his team will remain in office as caretaker leaders. The last three weeks until the end of the Council Presidency are therefore secure. It will be difficult after that – because on July 1, of all days, the presidency will pass to Hungary.
The choice comes as a surprise: if Geert Wilders likes to grumble about anything, it’s unelected bureaucrats. Dick Schoof, the future head of government and successor to Mark Rutte, is exactly that, a top civil servant who is also described as a doer with a thirst for recognition. Over the past 20 years, Schoof has played a key role in shaping the Netherlands’ security and asylum policy. He is therefore actually a representative of this “deep state”, which the far-right election winner otherwise likes to denounce.
He wants to be head of government “for all Dutch people”, Schoof emphasized during his first appearance in his new role. And no, he could not identify at all with the image that he would be “on Wilders’ leash” as Prime Minister. Geert Wilders with his freedom party PVV, the right-wing liberal VVD, Pieter Omtzigt’s conservative NSC and the populist farmers’ movement BBB only agreed on the senior civil servant at the second attempt.
The 67-year-old was most recently the top civil servant in the Ministry of Justice, where he was the right-hand man of Justice Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz, who is also the leader of the right-wing liberal VVD party. Schoof previously headed the Dutch secret service, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Before that, he was National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security (NCTV). After all, Dick Schoof is used to driving around in heavily armored vehicles and being escorted by police, according to NRC Handelsblad. Unlike outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who prefers to cycle to work.
Schoof knows more about Wilders than the other way around, which could be tricky, NRC Handelsblad continues. In his role at NCTV, Schoof was also responsible for the security arrangements of the Islam opponent, who is regularly threatened with death. Previous positions include leading positions in the police and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND). Dick Schoof is described in the Dutch media as a doer who did the heavy lifting for his political superiors and was happy to push the boundaries. And while other civil servants shied away from the public eye, Dick Schoof loved the camera.
In a recent in-depth interview with “De Groene Amsterdammer”, the top civil servant made nuanced comments on the potential dangers to the rule of law should a government dominated by Geert Wilders PVV come to power. He had no clear yardstick with which he could say when a country was not a democratic constitutional state. The rule of law and democracy are always subject to change. The rule of law can also deal with politicians like Geert Wilders who have unconstitutional demands in their party manifesto: “Don’t underestimate the rule of law in our country.”
It is as if Dick Schoof had suspected that he would soon become Prime Minister by Geert Wilders’ grace. His long career in the civil service and democratic constitutional state will serve him as a common thread, he said after the nomination. The 67-year-old could have retired, but Dick Schoof recently asked for an extension.
The future head of government is not completely colorless. He was a member of the Social Democratic Party of Labor (PvdA) until 2021. After 30 years, he no longer felt at home there. He was asked at the presentation on Wednesday whether he could identify with the ideology of Geert Wilders’ PVV. Schoof said that he had been approached for the position by all four parliamentary group leaders. And reiterated that he wanted to be Prime Minister “of all Dutch people”. Stephan Israel
