“Mutual dependencies” in energy supply – that is not a bad starting position for Christoph Bals, political director of Germanwatch. On the contrary: He does not think much of “energy autarky”; close cooperation is one way to create stability. But in contrast to past experiences with the purchase of oil and gas, there must be cooperation on equal footing in the future. The energy partnership recently concluded with South Africa could serve as a model here. In an interview with Timo Landenberger and Lukas Scheid, Bals talks about how he views the climate policy challenges of the year and his position in the current taxonomy debate.
If the government in Spain has its way, the country should become the center of electromobility in Europe. Meanwhile, the EU is advocating for local metal extractions, which are crucial for implementing the Green Deal. It seems to work out perfectly that there are large lithium deposits in the Extremadura region. The Valdeflores mine, for example, is estimated to hold 1.6 million tons of lithium carbonate – enough to produce ten million batteries for EVs. But citizens’ initiatives and local politicians oppose the mine. Isabel Cuesta analyzes the conflict.
The EU has passed the Climate Change Act and also backed it up with measures in the form of the Fit for 55 package. In Glasgow, there were promising announcements on climate neutrality. In Germany, a new government was sworn in that is committed to climate protection. Nevertheless, we are still a long way from the 1.5 degree target. What is your bottom line?
I don’t usually think in these categories. Fundamentally transforming Germany, the EU, and global society within a few years is no walk in the park. But the fact that, driven on the one hand by the Paris Agreement and on the other by civil society that has taken to the streets, we have agreed on greenhouse gas neutrality for 2050 and also serious targets for 2030, and that the implementation packages are increasingly on the table, that is, first of all, a huge success.
At the same time, it is clear that this is not yet enough for a 1.5-degree strategy. That is why we need immediate programs to reduce emissions as quickly as possible. Only if we succeed quickly will we have a chance of starting to prepare the tightening of targets at EU level from 2022. By the next climate summit in autumn, the EU needs a strategy to close the remaining gap to the 1.5 degree limit, which I assume will be closed, through international cooperation with partners from the Global South.
The implementation packages that you have mentioned are already very controversial. On many dossiers of the Fit for 55 package, the EU states are far from a common position. How can the Green Deal succeed at all?
Now that the objectives have essentially been set, we are entering the implementation phase at all levels. In the EU, at least, most of the proposals are now on the table. The next few months will be a struggle to reach an agreement. That requires governments that really want to get things done. I hope that the new German government will really support the Commission’s proposals as one, as stated in the coalition agreement. And not, as in the past, abstain with a split vote in the end. There will hopefully be a much more proactive role from Germany. Also central will be how the upcoming election in France turns out and how the country will then position itself. Hopefully, some progress will be made in the next few weeks by the current government in the French Presidency.
Basically, the ability to act internally and externally must be linked to solidarity. What the EU has set in motion with the Better Recovery program has significantly increased the willingness to take transformative action in some of the EU states. In Italy, for example, the discussion is different now than it was before the package. I hope that the new German government is in a better position than the old one and that it can, for example, revitalize the Weimar Triangle in terms of climate policy and develop new momentum with partners such as Poland.
At the same time, the positions are highly divergent. Especially between Germany, France, and Poland, if you look at emissions trading and the possible extension to buildings and transport, for example.
I believe that in France, too, there is a willingness to extend the ETS to other sectors if, in return, there is support for border adjustment. In Germany, on the other hand, there is acceptance for this instrument if it is embedded in the concept of climate clubs. However, these must not be exclusive but must create options for partners in the Global South.
Poland has brought the discussion about financial speculation, which is responsible for the CO2 price increase, to the table. This alone has already put a damper on the speculative bubble. Poland should be approached here so that the problem can be tackled together. Speculative bubbles cannot be in anyone’s interest. In addition, Poland has the specific problem that very many of its buildings are based on district heating. This has to be dealt with, also with the necessary financial support. Some Polish municipal utilities are developing very interesting concepts.
Poland also has an argument in the transport sector: Many people there buy used cars from Germany. This is then to be punished by emissions trading, without there really being any alternative for the people. So we have to look at the individual problems very specifically, and the countries that want to promote the ETS should get involved through solidarity-based cooperation. This is difficult but not impossible to solve.
Can Germany live up to its new role as a climate carthorse?
The litmus test will be how the crash program is implemented and enshrined in law in Germany over the next few months. Germany is so far on a structural path of non-achievement of its targets for the 65 percent reduction. To achieve this, the course must be changed in 2022. This goes hand in hand with supporting the Fit for 55 proposals and entering into active negotiations with those partners who are struggling to do so. I see a willingness on the part of the key players in the ministries of economics, foreign affairs, and the environment. However, politics is not measured by promises but by implementations.
In Germany, we are also in a special situation in the EU. We are the only country that wants to phase out coal and nuclear energy at the same time. But the expansion of renewable energies is going slowly. Where is all the electricity supposed to come from?
Various scientific institutes and the German Environment Agency have already shown how the expansion of onshore and offshore wind power, as well as photovoltaics and the intelligent networking of these sources of electricity, can make it quite possible for at least 80 percent of electricity demand to be covered by renewable energies by 2030.
On the other hand, the current political framework conditions do not allow for this, which is why the crash program must be in the law gazette this year. This applies to the acceleration of the planning process, to the definition of how much land area may be used for this purpose and to the parallel support of biodiversity. Physically and technically, it is possible. Now it needs to be implemented politically. The majority of the population supports it, so the chances are not bad.
In addition to electrification, the production of green hydrogen will also lead to a significant increase in electricity demand, which we will not be able to meet in the EU alone. In all likelihood, then, we will continue to be dependent on energy imports. Will this not create new dependencies?
A major difference compared to existing dependencies on oil and gas imports is that we will have a choice. Hydrogen can be produced in many countries. We will no longer be dependent on oil or gas deposits that are only concentrated in certain regions. This potential for blackmail will not exist to the same extent.
Moreover, I am generally not a proponent of energy autarky. That would be much more problematic in terms of peace policy than the mutual dependencies and cooperation that can now be established. Depending on how we shape such energy partnerships, they can become strong anchors of stability. But this must take place on an equal footing so that we can get away from the neo-colonial patterns that have often existed in the past with regard to the purchase of oil and gas. This also means paying attention to how much of the value-added remains in the regions and how they can, for example, use hydrogen for their own needs.
The energy partnership concluded last year with South Africa can be a paradigm of how transformation can be implemented cooperatively with developing and emerging countries. This offers enormous cooperation potential for our economy as well. If we still want to have a chance of achieving the 1.5-degree path, such partnerships are very important, more important than the overly petty debates within the EU.
Speaking of which: Another rift at EU level is the issue of taxonomy, which is currently causing a lot of excitement. The meaning of the sustainability label is already controversial.
The taxonomy is one of the necessary building blocks for redirecting investment flows in the financial markets in line with the Paris climate goal so that they are compatible with climate protection. So that’s a very important marker in terms of which direction the private and public money should go. In that, we’re in a situation where we can’t just flip the switch in many sectors, we need a transformative phase. And the big argument is about whether this transformative phase should be given a green cloak or whether other very narrowly defined opportunities for investment should be created for it.
The latter would be much better for us because gas is a fossil fuel and highly problematic from a climate point of view. You can’t call that sustainable, even if you’re phasing out coal and nuclear power at the same time and temporarily relying on gas infrastructure to a certain extent. And with nuclear, there is hardly any sustainability index in the world, even in Russia, that declares it sustainable. To even try to use that as a transition makes no sense to me ecologically or economically. It is up to the sovereign decision of the member states how they want to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. But they should not force others to give this the guise of sustainability.
As mentioned, Germany is counting on the expansion of the gas infrastructure for the transition, which should then be H2-ready. On the other hand, it is not yet clear what this actually means and how it works. Won’t these end up being stranded assets?
According to the coalition agreement, Germany wants to phase out fossil gas by 2045 – I hope it will even succeed about ten years earlier. This is being driven forward year by year by the Climate Protection Act. We need to change the depreciation rules accordingly, and we need to anchor this rule for all new buildings in the gas sector.
Especially if this is not done stringently, there may be stranded assets. But in the course of the next 15 years, it may well be that better flexibility options such as storage options or demand-time management will also make parts of the gas infrastructure now expected obsolete. After all, the gas-fired power plants are not intended to run permanently but to kick in when there is too little renewable energy in the grid. Especially when we have longer-term fluctuations, so-called dark lulls. And this gap can possibly be closed by other instruments, which may even be considerably cheaper.
Fabian Zuleeg keeps an eye on the entire EU. And actually the whole world as well. As chief executive of the Brussels-based think tank European Policy Centre (EPC), he and his staff of around fifty are tasked with providing advice on important issues. These include foreign policy, economic policy, inflation, COVID-19, health policy, the Green Deal, climate protection, environmental protection, digital issues, and relations with the US and China. The list is long.
So is the list of institutions, organizations, and groups for which the EPC provides consultancy services: These include European institutions, non-profit foundations, companies, advocacy groups, NGOs, and governments.
For a long time, Fabian Zuleeg was busy with the Brexit. “We worked a lot with both sides. Even if that didn’t prevent the Brexit. The task of a think tank is not to change the big direction, but to look at how everyone can work together constructively in the future.” This currently applies to climate protection, where the UK and the EU must continue to work together, he thinks. He does not believe that more countries will leave the EU. “The UK has been a cautionary tale for everyone.”
Zuleeg is convinced that the EU must take stronger action against populists in the political sphere. The EPC and he himself are strongly pro-European. “We need to strengthen cohesion in the EU and reduce, and hopefully eventually eliminate, the imbalances between countries and within countries.”
Zuleeg’s focus on business, politics, and Europe was clear from an early age. At the age of 15, the now almost 50-year-old leaves Germany and goes to Australia. He attends a European school in Luxembourg and studies at various universities in Scotland, culminating in a doctorate in political economy. He works in academia, in the Scottish government, and in the private sector. Then the opportunity arises to join the EPC in Brussels.
The next stage of his life follows: one third in Germany, one third in Scotland, one third in Belgium. As international as his CV is, the Cologne native feels international. “Sometimes I ask myself, how German am I anymore? My wife is Scottish and my son is both Scottish and Belgian as well as German. I feel the same way. For me, it’s not a contradiction. I feel European.”
An overarching identity that is important to him and that he embraces when he travels in his spare time. In his own country in Belgium, exploring the local beer. Visiting family in Scotland. Or spending a weekend in Paris or London. The spirit of Europe won’t let him go. Sarah Tekath
“Mutual dependencies” in energy supply – that is not a bad starting position for Christoph Bals, political director of Germanwatch. On the contrary: He does not think much of “energy autarky”; close cooperation is one way to create stability. But in contrast to past experiences with the purchase of oil and gas, there must be cooperation on equal footing in the future. The energy partnership recently concluded with South Africa could serve as a model here. In an interview with Timo Landenberger and Lukas Scheid, Bals talks about how he views the climate policy challenges of the year and his position in the current taxonomy debate.
If the government in Spain has its way, the country should become the center of electromobility in Europe. Meanwhile, the EU is advocating for local metal extractions, which are crucial for implementing the Green Deal. It seems to work out perfectly that there are large lithium deposits in the Extremadura region. The Valdeflores mine, for example, is estimated to hold 1.6 million tons of lithium carbonate – enough to produce ten million batteries for EVs. But citizens’ initiatives and local politicians oppose the mine. Isabel Cuesta analyzes the conflict.
The EU has passed the Climate Change Act and also backed it up with measures in the form of the Fit for 55 package. In Glasgow, there were promising announcements on climate neutrality. In Germany, a new government was sworn in that is committed to climate protection. Nevertheless, we are still a long way from the 1.5 degree target. What is your bottom line?
I don’t usually think in these categories. Fundamentally transforming Germany, the EU, and global society within a few years is no walk in the park. But the fact that, driven on the one hand by the Paris Agreement and on the other by civil society that has taken to the streets, we have agreed on greenhouse gas neutrality for 2050 and also serious targets for 2030, and that the implementation packages are increasingly on the table, that is, first of all, a huge success.
At the same time, it is clear that this is not yet enough for a 1.5-degree strategy. That is why we need immediate programs to reduce emissions as quickly as possible. Only if we succeed quickly will we have a chance of starting to prepare the tightening of targets at EU level from 2022. By the next climate summit in autumn, the EU needs a strategy to close the remaining gap to the 1.5 degree limit, which I assume will be closed, through international cooperation with partners from the Global South.
The implementation packages that you have mentioned are already very controversial. On many dossiers of the Fit for 55 package, the EU states are far from a common position. How can the Green Deal succeed at all?
Now that the objectives have essentially been set, we are entering the implementation phase at all levels. In the EU, at least, most of the proposals are now on the table. The next few months will be a struggle to reach an agreement. That requires governments that really want to get things done. I hope that the new German government will really support the Commission’s proposals as one, as stated in the coalition agreement. And not, as in the past, abstain with a split vote in the end. There will hopefully be a much more proactive role from Germany. Also central will be how the upcoming election in France turns out and how the country will then position itself. Hopefully, some progress will be made in the next few weeks by the current government in the French Presidency.
Basically, the ability to act internally and externally must be linked to solidarity. What the EU has set in motion with the Better Recovery program has significantly increased the willingness to take transformative action in some of the EU states. In Italy, for example, the discussion is different now than it was before the package. I hope that the new German government is in a better position than the old one and that it can, for example, revitalize the Weimar Triangle in terms of climate policy and develop new momentum with partners such as Poland.
At the same time, the positions are highly divergent. Especially between Germany, France, and Poland, if you look at emissions trading and the possible extension to buildings and transport, for example.
I believe that in France, too, there is a willingness to extend the ETS to other sectors if, in return, there is support for border adjustment. In Germany, on the other hand, there is acceptance for this instrument if it is embedded in the concept of climate clubs. However, these must not be exclusive but must create options for partners in the Global South.
Poland has brought the discussion about financial speculation, which is responsible for the CO2 price increase, to the table. This alone has already put a damper on the speculative bubble. Poland should be approached here so that the problem can be tackled together. Speculative bubbles cannot be in anyone’s interest. In addition, Poland has the specific problem that very many of its buildings are based on district heating. This has to be dealt with, also with the necessary financial support. Some Polish municipal utilities are developing very interesting concepts.
Poland also has an argument in the transport sector: Many people there buy used cars from Germany. This is then to be punished by emissions trading, without there really being any alternative for the people. So we have to look at the individual problems very specifically, and the countries that want to promote the ETS should get involved through solidarity-based cooperation. This is difficult but not impossible to solve.
Can Germany live up to its new role as a climate carthorse?
The litmus test will be how the crash program is implemented and enshrined in law in Germany over the next few months. Germany is so far on a structural path of non-achievement of its targets for the 65 percent reduction. To achieve this, the course must be changed in 2022. This goes hand in hand with supporting the Fit for 55 proposals and entering into active negotiations with those partners who are struggling to do so. I see a willingness on the part of the key players in the ministries of economics, foreign affairs, and the environment. However, politics is not measured by promises but by implementations.
In Germany, we are also in a special situation in the EU. We are the only country that wants to phase out coal and nuclear energy at the same time. But the expansion of renewable energies is going slowly. Where is all the electricity supposed to come from?
Various scientific institutes and the German Environment Agency have already shown how the expansion of onshore and offshore wind power, as well as photovoltaics and the intelligent networking of these sources of electricity, can make it quite possible for at least 80 percent of electricity demand to be covered by renewable energies by 2030.
On the other hand, the current political framework conditions do not allow for this, which is why the crash program must be in the law gazette this year. This applies to the acceleration of the planning process, to the definition of how much land area may be used for this purpose and to the parallel support of biodiversity. Physically and technically, it is possible. Now it needs to be implemented politically. The majority of the population supports it, so the chances are not bad.
In addition to electrification, the production of green hydrogen will also lead to a significant increase in electricity demand, which we will not be able to meet in the EU alone. In all likelihood, then, we will continue to be dependent on energy imports. Will this not create new dependencies?
A major difference compared to existing dependencies on oil and gas imports is that we will have a choice. Hydrogen can be produced in many countries. We will no longer be dependent on oil or gas deposits that are only concentrated in certain regions. This potential for blackmail will not exist to the same extent.
Moreover, I am generally not a proponent of energy autarky. That would be much more problematic in terms of peace policy than the mutual dependencies and cooperation that can now be established. Depending on how we shape such energy partnerships, they can become strong anchors of stability. But this must take place on an equal footing so that we can get away from the neo-colonial patterns that have often existed in the past with regard to the purchase of oil and gas. This also means paying attention to how much of the value-added remains in the regions and how they can, for example, use hydrogen for their own needs.
The energy partnership concluded last year with South Africa can be a paradigm of how transformation can be implemented cooperatively with developing and emerging countries. This offers enormous cooperation potential for our economy as well. If we still want to have a chance of achieving the 1.5-degree path, such partnerships are very important, more important than the overly petty debates within the EU.
Speaking of which: Another rift at EU level is the issue of taxonomy, which is currently causing a lot of excitement. The meaning of the sustainability label is already controversial.
The taxonomy is one of the necessary building blocks for redirecting investment flows in the financial markets in line with the Paris climate goal so that they are compatible with climate protection. So that’s a very important marker in terms of which direction the private and public money should go. In that, we’re in a situation where we can’t just flip the switch in many sectors, we need a transformative phase. And the big argument is about whether this transformative phase should be given a green cloak or whether other very narrowly defined opportunities for investment should be created for it.
The latter would be much better for us because gas is a fossil fuel and highly problematic from a climate point of view. You can’t call that sustainable, even if you’re phasing out coal and nuclear power at the same time and temporarily relying on gas infrastructure to a certain extent. And with nuclear, there is hardly any sustainability index in the world, even in Russia, that declares it sustainable. To even try to use that as a transition makes no sense to me ecologically or economically. It is up to the sovereign decision of the member states how they want to achieve greenhouse gas neutrality. But they should not force others to give this the guise of sustainability.
As mentioned, Germany is counting on the expansion of the gas infrastructure for the transition, which should then be H2-ready. On the other hand, it is not yet clear what this actually means and how it works. Won’t these end up being stranded assets?
According to the coalition agreement, Germany wants to phase out fossil gas by 2045 – I hope it will even succeed about ten years earlier. This is being driven forward year by year by the Climate Protection Act. We need to change the depreciation rules accordingly, and we need to anchor this rule for all new buildings in the gas sector.
Especially if this is not done stringently, there may be stranded assets. But in the course of the next 15 years, it may well be that better flexibility options such as storage options or demand-time management will also make parts of the gas infrastructure now expected obsolete. After all, the gas-fired power plants are not intended to run permanently but to kick in when there is too little renewable energy in the grid. Especially when we have longer-term fluctuations, so-called dark lulls. And this gap can possibly be closed by other instruments, which may even be considerably cheaper.
Fabian Zuleeg keeps an eye on the entire EU. And actually the whole world as well. As chief executive of the Brussels-based think tank European Policy Centre (EPC), he and his staff of around fifty are tasked with providing advice on important issues. These include foreign policy, economic policy, inflation, COVID-19, health policy, the Green Deal, climate protection, environmental protection, digital issues, and relations with the US and China. The list is long.
So is the list of institutions, organizations, and groups for which the EPC provides consultancy services: These include European institutions, non-profit foundations, companies, advocacy groups, NGOs, and governments.
For a long time, Fabian Zuleeg was busy with the Brexit. “We worked a lot with both sides. Even if that didn’t prevent the Brexit. The task of a think tank is not to change the big direction, but to look at how everyone can work together constructively in the future.” This currently applies to climate protection, where the UK and the EU must continue to work together, he thinks. He does not believe that more countries will leave the EU. “The UK has been a cautionary tale for everyone.”
Zuleeg is convinced that the EU must take stronger action against populists in the political sphere. The EPC and he himself are strongly pro-European. “We need to strengthen cohesion in the EU and reduce, and hopefully eventually eliminate, the imbalances between countries and within countries.”
Zuleeg’s focus on business, politics, and Europe was clear from an early age. At the age of 15, the now almost 50-year-old leaves Germany and goes to Australia. He attends a European school in Luxembourg and studies at various universities in Scotland, culminating in a doctorate in political economy. He works in academia, in the Scottish government, and in the private sector. Then the opportunity arises to join the EPC in Brussels.
The next stage of his life follows: one third in Germany, one third in Scotland, one third in Belgium. As international as his CV is, the Cologne native feels international. “Sometimes I ask myself, how German am I anymore? My wife is Scottish and my son is both Scottish and Belgian as well as German. I feel the same way. For me, it’s not a contradiction. I feel European.”
An overarching identity that is important to him and that he embraces when he travels in his spare time. In his own country in Belgium, exploring the local beer. Visiting family in Scotland. Or spending a weekend in Paris or London. The spirit of Europe won’t let him go. Sarah Tekath
