The upcoming state elections on Sunday in Hesse and Bavaria don’t hold high expectations for the traffic light coalition parties. According to recent polls, the Free Democrats (FDP) face the risk of not making it into the state parliaments in both Bavaria and Hesse. The Social Democrats (SPD) could potentially achieve single-digit results in Bavaria, placing them fourth behind the CSU, Greens, Free Voters and AfD.
In Hesse, it has long been apparent that the SPD will not be able to reach its goal of becoming the strongest force. They are lagging far behind the Greens and a strengthened AfD, competing for second place. The Greens are also expected to perform worse in both states compared to the last state elections and might achieve only slightly better results than their meager nationwide poll numbers.
This will have consequences for the cooperation within the traffic light coalition and Germany’s European policy. The traffic light coalition parties will aim to strengthen their individual profiles. It is foreseeable that it will become even more challenging for the three governing parties to forge compromises.
In the past, the traffic light coalition parties repeatedly reached agreements on legislation crucial for the German industry, such as the Euro 7 emission standard, so late that the federal government could hardly influence the council’s position. If conflicts within the coalition intensify now, the traffic light coalition may appear even less united in Brussels.
For the most important pending issues, this does not bode well: In asylum policy, the Nature Renaturation Law, CO2 fleet limits for heavy-duty vehicles and Air Quality Directive, the federal government may not be able to adequately leverage Germany’s political weight in Brussels. We will, of course, keep you informed as usual.
Originally intended to be a relaxed format for informal high-level exchanges, perhaps a large event with nearly 50 heads of state and government is not the right framework for discussing war and peace. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev did not even attend the third meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Granada. Therefore, the planned bilateral discussion on steps toward normalization with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan could not take place.
Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo’s Vjosa Osmani both arrived on time but avoided each other. Osmani stated that as long as Serbia is not held accountable for the “act of aggression” in northern Kosovo, a dialogue is not possible, and they cannot simply return to business as usual. Currently, there is no basis for discussion. The Kosovar President presented the heads of state and government with new information, according to her, suggesting that Vučić was behind the bloody attack by Serbian paramilitaries on a police patrol in northern Kosovo. However, despite fairly clear facts, there is still no appetite among EU states to impose sanctions on Serbia.
The European Political Community was originally Macron’s idea, partly to keep potential accession candidates at arm’s length. Now, the new format may be reaching its limits. The semi-annual meetings, which are supposed to take place alternately in an EU state and outside the EU, worked quite well twice before. The first EPC meetings in Prague and Chisinau were more or less official anti-Putin summits against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression.
In Spain, however, unlike in the Czech Republic and Moldova, the war seemed far away. Moreover, the Russian war of annihilation in Ukraine may not be a sufficient unifying factor in the long run. Macron’s European Political Community, lacking structure, binding values, and a clear agenda, appears as an empty shell.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was again present in Granada but, for the first time, played a more supporting role than a star in the circle of heads of state and government. There is a certain fatigue in the air. In Granada, Zelenskiy warned that Putin planned a long war over several years. Europeans should be prepared to provide long-term support to Ukraine.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and then Nagorno-Karabakh and northern Kosovo. In the face of war and crises, Europeans appeared powerless in Granada. Azerbaijan’s president seemed to deliberately snub the high-profile rendezvous: Even beforehand, it was said that President Ilham Aliyev would not fly to Granada due to the “anti-Azerbaijani sentiment” of some summit participants.
France, in particular, whose Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna had just been in Yerevan condemning the expulsion of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, does not position itself as ambiguously as some other EU states. France wants to support beleaguered Armenia with weapons.
The accusation from Baku is that France cannot be a neutral mediator and is spreading resentment. Not all EU countries take as clear a position as France, as Azerbaijan has become more important as an energy supplier. Another prominent absentee was Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who officially canceled due to a cold. Turkey sees itself as the protector of Azerbaijan.
EU Chief Diplomat Josep Borrell lamented that it was a shame that Azerbaijan and Turkey, as important supporters, were not in Granada. He said, “That’s why we can’t discuss something as serious as the displacement of more than 100,000 people from their homes due to military violence.”
The European Parliament, on the other hand, took a clear position, condemning Azerbaijan for its “unjustified military attack on Nagorno-Karabakh”. The attack is a gross violation of international law. The Parliament called on EU states to impose sanctions on Azerbaijani government members responsible for multiple human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On the sidelines of the summit, EU Council President Charles Michel, France’s Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In a statement, Scholz, Macron and Charles Michel emphasized their “unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Armenia’s borders“. Armenia is also promised further humanitarian aid. Displaced persons have the right to return to their homes without conditions and under international supervision. Efforts toward normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue to be supported.
While the first official German institutions, including the Bundestag, the Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, have already joined Bluesky, there is still little sign of Brussels institutions. “We are observing how Bluesky develops,” wrote the spokesperson for the Commission Representation in Germany, Birgit Schmeitzner – naturally on her Bluesky profile.
While the social media migration trucks of Berlin’s political scene are rolling, few Brussels policymakers have made their presence felt on the platform. However, the trend is rapidly growing: European Parliament Vice President Katarina Barley (SPD), MEPs Andreas Schwab (CDU), Michael Bloss (Greens), Tiemo Wölken (SPD), Terry Reintke (Greens), Delara Burkhardt (SPD), Austrian Thomas Waitz (Greens) and Dutchwoman Sophie in’t Veld (Volt/D66) are already present on the platform. Renew and the Greens are also making their first steps on Bluesky.
What stands out is that many actors from the academic field surrounding EU affairs have already joined Bluesky – from Nicolai von Ondarza (SWP) to Georgina Wright (Institut Montaigne), Anna Grzymala-Busse (Stanford), or Thu Nguyen (Hertie School).
So, could Bluesky actually become the better Twitter? Technically, it has a significant advantage over other alternatives: At first glance, it functions almost exactly like the former political communication powerhouse. There’s hardly any need to adapt. And the so-called critical mass, at which discussions develop spontaneously on platforms, creating lasting added value for participants, seems to have been reached, at least in Berlin. The presence of many European media representatives on the platform, including Table.Media, could further increase its attractiveness for the political scene in Brussels.
The platform is not yet publicly accessible. Users can invite interested parties to the platform to a limited extent. Those invited can then receive invitation codes themselves: A referral system used by other social media providers, most recently by the social audio platform Clubhouse, which seems to have been forgotten after a short-lived high. Alternatively, interested parties can join a waiting list on Bluesky.
However, the new platform is not without its pitfalls. Bluesky was launched as a project at Twitter in 2019 and spun off into its own company just a few days before Musk’s takeover bid. Jack Dorsey, one of Twitter’s founders, initiated Bluesky with the stated goal of not establishing algorithms that reward controversy and rage.
How the platform develops will be interesting for regulators in Brussels. Although Bluesky is far from achieving VLOP status according to the DSA, it still has a long way to go. Bluesky currently does not meet some of the essential requirements for VLOP status, such as naming a contact person in the EU, which is necessary for regulatory oversight until it becomes a VLOP. Additionally, the operator of Bluesky is based in the USA and relies on EU standard contractual clauses for international data transfers while reserving the right to store data anywhere in the world. However, some rules will apply to the platform, starting no later than February 2024. This could mean a lot of work for TeamDataProtection, which is already active on the platform.
Jian G. is said to have made Maximilian Krah, a member of the AfD and a top candidate in the European elections, a significant figure in China. Krah’s Chinese-German employee, who is now a German citizen, has allegedly ensured over the years that the AfD politician was honored in China and offered prominent platforms as a speaker. For example, under the auspices of the “Silk Road Think Tank Association” (SRTA), which establishes contacts abroad on behalf of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC).
The case, extensively covered by the news portal t-online, seems to confirm the concerns of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). According to the report, Krah is said to have close connections to China and to have received financial support from there. Krah is also said to have initiated a German-Chinese lobbying network.
In late July, the BfV had warned about the IDCPC because it “effectively operates like an intelligence service of the People’s Republic of China and can therefore be attributed to the Chinese intelligence service”. The BfV explicitly formulated: “In dealing with IDCPC members, avoid any actions that could be classified as offenses under Section 99 of the German Criminal Code (StGB).” This refers to activities for the intelligence service of a foreign power.
In the European Parliament, Krah criticized the new China strategy as “neocolonialism” and argued that dialogue was necessary. He has also spoken in the past about a “Cold War 2.0 against Russia and China”. The lawyer once studied in China and, according to his own statements, continued to maintain contacts there after returning to Germany.
“Thus, at first glance, he appears to fit the standard narrative of the recruitment of foreign informants,” says Ralph Weber from the University of Basel. In his research, the political scientist deals with China’s influence on the politics of other countries through the United Front of the Communist Party (UFW) or the Ministry of State Security (MSS).
The BfV also says that the modus operandi of intelligence services is always similar. “They first identify who has interesting opportunities or knowledge and points of contact for the establishment of intelligence cooperation. Then, psychologically trained intelligence officers approach the target individuals as part of an initially harmless contact, such as during an exhibition or a conference.”
Krah and G. both deny any conflicts of interest. In recent years, however, Krah has repeatedly attracted attention by justifying repressive Chinese policies in Xinjiang or Hong Kong or by referring to Taiwan as part of Chinese territory. His employee, on the other hand, worked as a businessman in various industries in Germany before his employment in the politician’s office.
Chinese espionage is certainly not new in Germany. However, until now, its perception has been more focused on being a tool for the theft of intellectual property. For example, in 2018, the case of the Cologne-based chemical company Lanxess made headlines. Chinese-born employees were alleged to have passed on trade secrets to China for years. Just yesterday, the Financial Times reported that Belgian security services were scrutinizing the European logistics division of the Chinese online trading platform Alibaba.
Belgian authorities at the freight airport in Liège are investigating “possible espionage and/or interference activities” by Chinese companies, including Alibaba. The State Security Service (VSSE) is alarmed because Chinese legislation forces Chinese companies to share their data with authorities and intelligence agencies.
However, the political dimension of Chinese espionage is now increasingly coming to the forefront. Just a few weeks ago, the arrest of an alleged Chinese spy from the British Parliament caused a sensation.
There is currently no charge, nor are there any details circulating about the British citizen’s cooperation with an intelligence service of the People’s Republic. However, the case in the UK is part of a series of incidents in which suspicions revolve around the idea that Chinese interests are being introduced into the political decision-making processes of a target country through recruited intermediaries.
“All of these cases show that parliaments in Western democracies are a focus of Chinese intelligence activities. It would be naive to believe that Beijing would not also try to establish spies in and around the German parliament,” says United Front expert Weber.
He urges vigilance. United Front organizations, which strive worldwide to improve the image of the Communist Party and stifle political dissent, would sometimes also serve as cover for the Ministry of State Security. Nevertheless, it is important that Western societies do not succumb to hysteria and reflexively suspect Chinese espionage everywhere. Otherwise, says Weber, the Communist Party benefits from every accusation that turns out to be false.
Australia and New Zealand have long been dealing intensively with Chinese espionage. As part of the political West, both countries have been targets of intelligence activities by the People’s Republic for years. The General Secretary of the Labor Party in the Australian state of New South Wales, Sam Dastyari, resigned from his post after warning a Chinese-born major donor to his party about investigations by the Australian intelligence service.
In New Zealand, a Chinese-born member of the House of Representatives had to resign because of a warning from the intelligence service. The parliamentarian, Jian Yang, was a member of the Communist Party before moving from the People’s Republic and had worked for more than a decade for the People’s Liberation Army. He had kept these details secret for years. Meanwhile, he had worked intensively on New Zealand’s China strategy.
René Repasi has an ambitious goal: to conclude negotiations on the right to repair by the end of the current legislative period in spring. As the rapporteur in the European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee (IMCO), his focus in the coming months will be on this legislative proposal.
“The fact that my faction has given me, as a relatively new member with just over a year of experience as a MEP, the main responsibility for a very important legislative dossier is a sign of considerable appreciation,” says the 43-year-old SPD parliamentarian. Therefore, he wants to do good work now. “And you don’t deliver good work by giving beautiful speeches.”
By November, the EU Parliament is to vote on its report on the new directive. Trilogue negotiations with the Council and the Commission are then to begin in December. And by the end of April, he reckons at an event in Berlin, there must be an agreement so that the translations and final votes can take place before the end of this legislative period. That is very ambitious, Repasi admits.
The right to repair should grant consumers a legal right to manufacturers: Anyone who wants to repair something should be able to demand this from the manufacturer. Repasi insists that prices must be market-oriented. “Everyone must be able to afford a repair.”
His draft report suggests that EU member states should create financial incentives. Unlike the European Commission, Repasi believes that only a minimum harmonization of legal provisions is sensible for now. This can lead to individual, inspiring solutions, as seen in Austria, where funds from the EU’s coronavirus recovery fund were used for a repair bonus.
Repasi grew up in Stutensee, near Karlsruhe – just like Daniel Caspary, chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament. Both were once student representatives at the Thomas Mann Gymnasium there, which has already been the subject of a feature story in the Badische Neue Nachrichten.
His father is Hungarian from the minority in former Yugoslavia. However, Repasi does not speak Hungarian: His father associated the language with an unpleasant childhood and, therefore, set it aside in Germany. “Actually, only German was spoken at home. I always felt that as a loss,” he says. “That’s why I try to teach my own children, who are now also in a similar situation, the German language.” His wife is Polish, and they live with their sons in The Hague.
He didn’t really want to go there: After studying law, he was “programmed for a German academic career”, he says. He already had a professorship in Heidelberg and his boss had offered him the opportunity to habilitate. “Then love got in the way. And that’s what brought me here to move in 2015.”
In 2021, Repasi was appointed Professor of European Law at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. He continues to research and teach, albeit to a lesser extent, since he took up his mandate in the European Parliament in February 2022. He replaced long-serving SPD MEP Evelyne Gebhardt and has since represented Baden-Württemberg in Brussels and Strasbourg.
Repasi was well prepared for his new role as a MEP: He had regularly served as an expert on European constitutional law and financial market regulation in the European Parliament before. He was also a regular guest as an expert in the webinar series “Europe Calling,” founded by Sven Giegold. He maintains a personal friendship with Giegold, who is now a State Secretary in the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, and they had close exchanges during his parliamentary mandate until 2021. In Brussels, Repasi had already gained a reputation as a Green advisor before he arrived, he says with a wink.
The transition from academia to parliament was not a leap into the unknown for Repasi. “But when you go into practice, you still experience a practical shock,” he says. This was mainly due to dealing with lobbyists (“I eventually stopped talking to them, but then something was missing.”), finding the place where debates take place (“I still haven’t found it.”), and the secrecy surrounding trilogues (“As a scientist, you always wonder how things work behind closed doors. Then I was there, and I didn’t find it that exciting at all.”)
One thing in particular he finds good: “The opportunity to shape things here and really change things is enormous,” he says. An MEP has much more freedom than his colleagues in the Bundestag or the state parliament. For that, he says, one does pay the price of many conversations with lobbyists. “But I don’t have to support or not support any government for better or worse, I can always look for and work out new ways politically.” Leonie Düngefeld
The upcoming state elections on Sunday in Hesse and Bavaria don’t hold high expectations for the traffic light coalition parties. According to recent polls, the Free Democrats (FDP) face the risk of not making it into the state parliaments in both Bavaria and Hesse. The Social Democrats (SPD) could potentially achieve single-digit results in Bavaria, placing them fourth behind the CSU, Greens, Free Voters and AfD.
In Hesse, it has long been apparent that the SPD will not be able to reach its goal of becoming the strongest force. They are lagging far behind the Greens and a strengthened AfD, competing for second place. The Greens are also expected to perform worse in both states compared to the last state elections and might achieve only slightly better results than their meager nationwide poll numbers.
This will have consequences for the cooperation within the traffic light coalition and Germany’s European policy. The traffic light coalition parties will aim to strengthen their individual profiles. It is foreseeable that it will become even more challenging for the three governing parties to forge compromises.
In the past, the traffic light coalition parties repeatedly reached agreements on legislation crucial for the German industry, such as the Euro 7 emission standard, so late that the federal government could hardly influence the council’s position. If conflicts within the coalition intensify now, the traffic light coalition may appear even less united in Brussels.
For the most important pending issues, this does not bode well: In asylum policy, the Nature Renaturation Law, CO2 fleet limits for heavy-duty vehicles and Air Quality Directive, the federal government may not be able to adequately leverage Germany’s political weight in Brussels. We will, of course, keep you informed as usual.
Originally intended to be a relaxed format for informal high-level exchanges, perhaps a large event with nearly 50 heads of state and government is not the right framework for discussing war and peace. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev did not even attend the third meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) in Granada. Therefore, the planned bilateral discussion on steps toward normalization with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan could not take place.
Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo’s Vjosa Osmani both arrived on time but avoided each other. Osmani stated that as long as Serbia is not held accountable for the “act of aggression” in northern Kosovo, a dialogue is not possible, and they cannot simply return to business as usual. Currently, there is no basis for discussion. The Kosovar President presented the heads of state and government with new information, according to her, suggesting that Vučić was behind the bloody attack by Serbian paramilitaries on a police patrol in northern Kosovo. However, despite fairly clear facts, there is still no appetite among EU states to impose sanctions on Serbia.
The European Political Community was originally Macron’s idea, partly to keep potential accession candidates at arm’s length. Now, the new format may be reaching its limits. The semi-annual meetings, which are supposed to take place alternately in an EU state and outside the EU, worked quite well twice before. The first EPC meetings in Prague and Chisinau were more or less official anti-Putin summits against the backdrop of Russia’s war of aggression.
In Spain, however, unlike in the Czech Republic and Moldova, the war seemed far away. Moreover, the Russian war of annihilation in Ukraine may not be a sufficient unifying factor in the long run. Macron’s European Political Community, lacking structure, binding values, and a clear agenda, appears as an empty shell.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was again present in Granada but, for the first time, played a more supporting role than a star in the circle of heads of state and government. There is a certain fatigue in the air. In Granada, Zelenskiy warned that Putin planned a long war over several years. Europeans should be prepared to provide long-term support to Ukraine.
Russia’s war in Ukraine, and then Nagorno-Karabakh and northern Kosovo. In the face of war and crises, Europeans appeared powerless in Granada. Azerbaijan’s president seemed to deliberately snub the high-profile rendezvous: Even beforehand, it was said that President Ilham Aliyev would not fly to Granada due to the “anti-Azerbaijani sentiment” of some summit participants.
France, in particular, whose Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna had just been in Yerevan condemning the expulsion of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, does not position itself as ambiguously as some other EU states. France wants to support beleaguered Armenia with weapons.
The accusation from Baku is that France cannot be a neutral mediator and is spreading resentment. Not all EU countries take as clear a position as France, as Azerbaijan has become more important as an energy supplier. Another prominent absentee was Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who officially canceled due to a cold. Turkey sees itself as the protector of Azerbaijan.
EU Chief Diplomat Josep Borrell lamented that it was a shame that Azerbaijan and Turkey, as important supporters, were not in Granada. He said, “That’s why we can’t discuss something as serious as the displacement of more than 100,000 people from their homes due to military violence.”
The European Parliament, on the other hand, took a clear position, condemning Azerbaijan for its “unjustified military attack on Nagorno-Karabakh”. The attack is a gross violation of international law. The Parliament called on EU states to impose sanctions on Azerbaijani government members responsible for multiple human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On the sidelines of the summit, EU Council President Charles Michel, France’s Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz met with Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In a statement, Scholz, Macron and Charles Michel emphasized their “unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Armenia’s borders“. Armenia is also promised further humanitarian aid. Displaced persons have the right to return to their homes without conditions and under international supervision. Efforts toward normalizing relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue to be supported.
While the first official German institutions, including the Bundestag, the Foreign Office, and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, have already joined Bluesky, there is still little sign of Brussels institutions. “We are observing how Bluesky develops,” wrote the spokesperson for the Commission Representation in Germany, Birgit Schmeitzner – naturally on her Bluesky profile.
While the social media migration trucks of Berlin’s political scene are rolling, few Brussels policymakers have made their presence felt on the platform. However, the trend is rapidly growing: European Parliament Vice President Katarina Barley (SPD), MEPs Andreas Schwab (CDU), Michael Bloss (Greens), Tiemo Wölken (SPD), Terry Reintke (Greens), Delara Burkhardt (SPD), Austrian Thomas Waitz (Greens) and Dutchwoman Sophie in’t Veld (Volt/D66) are already present on the platform. Renew and the Greens are also making their first steps on Bluesky.
What stands out is that many actors from the academic field surrounding EU affairs have already joined Bluesky – from Nicolai von Ondarza (SWP) to Georgina Wright (Institut Montaigne), Anna Grzymala-Busse (Stanford), or Thu Nguyen (Hertie School).
So, could Bluesky actually become the better Twitter? Technically, it has a significant advantage over other alternatives: At first glance, it functions almost exactly like the former political communication powerhouse. There’s hardly any need to adapt. And the so-called critical mass, at which discussions develop spontaneously on platforms, creating lasting added value for participants, seems to have been reached, at least in Berlin. The presence of many European media representatives on the platform, including Table.Media, could further increase its attractiveness for the political scene in Brussels.
The platform is not yet publicly accessible. Users can invite interested parties to the platform to a limited extent. Those invited can then receive invitation codes themselves: A referral system used by other social media providers, most recently by the social audio platform Clubhouse, which seems to have been forgotten after a short-lived high. Alternatively, interested parties can join a waiting list on Bluesky.
However, the new platform is not without its pitfalls. Bluesky was launched as a project at Twitter in 2019 and spun off into its own company just a few days before Musk’s takeover bid. Jack Dorsey, one of Twitter’s founders, initiated Bluesky with the stated goal of not establishing algorithms that reward controversy and rage.
How the platform develops will be interesting for regulators in Brussels. Although Bluesky is far from achieving VLOP status according to the DSA, it still has a long way to go. Bluesky currently does not meet some of the essential requirements for VLOP status, such as naming a contact person in the EU, which is necessary for regulatory oversight until it becomes a VLOP. Additionally, the operator of Bluesky is based in the USA and relies on EU standard contractual clauses for international data transfers while reserving the right to store data anywhere in the world. However, some rules will apply to the platform, starting no later than February 2024. This could mean a lot of work for TeamDataProtection, which is already active on the platform.
Jian G. is said to have made Maximilian Krah, a member of the AfD and a top candidate in the European elections, a significant figure in China. Krah’s Chinese-German employee, who is now a German citizen, has allegedly ensured over the years that the AfD politician was honored in China and offered prominent platforms as a speaker. For example, under the auspices of the “Silk Road Think Tank Association” (SRTA), which establishes contacts abroad on behalf of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC).
The case, extensively covered by the news portal t-online, seems to confirm the concerns of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). According to the report, Krah is said to have close connections to China and to have received financial support from there. Krah is also said to have initiated a German-Chinese lobbying network.
In late July, the BfV had warned about the IDCPC because it “effectively operates like an intelligence service of the People’s Republic of China and can therefore be attributed to the Chinese intelligence service”. The BfV explicitly formulated: “In dealing with IDCPC members, avoid any actions that could be classified as offenses under Section 99 of the German Criminal Code (StGB).” This refers to activities for the intelligence service of a foreign power.
In the European Parliament, Krah criticized the new China strategy as “neocolonialism” and argued that dialogue was necessary. He has also spoken in the past about a “Cold War 2.0 against Russia and China”. The lawyer once studied in China and, according to his own statements, continued to maintain contacts there after returning to Germany.
“Thus, at first glance, he appears to fit the standard narrative of the recruitment of foreign informants,” says Ralph Weber from the University of Basel. In his research, the political scientist deals with China’s influence on the politics of other countries through the United Front of the Communist Party (UFW) or the Ministry of State Security (MSS).
The BfV also says that the modus operandi of intelligence services is always similar. “They first identify who has interesting opportunities or knowledge and points of contact for the establishment of intelligence cooperation. Then, psychologically trained intelligence officers approach the target individuals as part of an initially harmless contact, such as during an exhibition or a conference.”
Krah and G. both deny any conflicts of interest. In recent years, however, Krah has repeatedly attracted attention by justifying repressive Chinese policies in Xinjiang or Hong Kong or by referring to Taiwan as part of Chinese territory. His employee, on the other hand, worked as a businessman in various industries in Germany before his employment in the politician’s office.
Chinese espionage is certainly not new in Germany. However, until now, its perception has been more focused on being a tool for the theft of intellectual property. For example, in 2018, the case of the Cologne-based chemical company Lanxess made headlines. Chinese-born employees were alleged to have passed on trade secrets to China for years. Just yesterday, the Financial Times reported that Belgian security services were scrutinizing the European logistics division of the Chinese online trading platform Alibaba.
Belgian authorities at the freight airport in Liège are investigating “possible espionage and/or interference activities” by Chinese companies, including Alibaba. The State Security Service (VSSE) is alarmed because Chinese legislation forces Chinese companies to share their data with authorities and intelligence agencies.
However, the political dimension of Chinese espionage is now increasingly coming to the forefront. Just a few weeks ago, the arrest of an alleged Chinese spy from the British Parliament caused a sensation.
There is currently no charge, nor are there any details circulating about the British citizen’s cooperation with an intelligence service of the People’s Republic. However, the case in the UK is part of a series of incidents in which suspicions revolve around the idea that Chinese interests are being introduced into the political decision-making processes of a target country through recruited intermediaries.
“All of these cases show that parliaments in Western democracies are a focus of Chinese intelligence activities. It would be naive to believe that Beijing would not also try to establish spies in and around the German parliament,” says United Front expert Weber.
He urges vigilance. United Front organizations, which strive worldwide to improve the image of the Communist Party and stifle political dissent, would sometimes also serve as cover for the Ministry of State Security. Nevertheless, it is important that Western societies do not succumb to hysteria and reflexively suspect Chinese espionage everywhere. Otherwise, says Weber, the Communist Party benefits from every accusation that turns out to be false.
Australia and New Zealand have long been dealing intensively with Chinese espionage. As part of the political West, both countries have been targets of intelligence activities by the People’s Republic for years. The General Secretary of the Labor Party in the Australian state of New South Wales, Sam Dastyari, resigned from his post after warning a Chinese-born major donor to his party about investigations by the Australian intelligence service.
In New Zealand, a Chinese-born member of the House of Representatives had to resign because of a warning from the intelligence service. The parliamentarian, Jian Yang, was a member of the Communist Party before moving from the People’s Republic and had worked for more than a decade for the People’s Liberation Army. He had kept these details secret for years. Meanwhile, he had worked intensively on New Zealand’s China strategy.
René Repasi has an ambitious goal: to conclude negotiations on the right to repair by the end of the current legislative period in spring. As the rapporteur in the European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee (IMCO), his focus in the coming months will be on this legislative proposal.
“The fact that my faction has given me, as a relatively new member with just over a year of experience as a MEP, the main responsibility for a very important legislative dossier is a sign of considerable appreciation,” says the 43-year-old SPD parliamentarian. Therefore, he wants to do good work now. “And you don’t deliver good work by giving beautiful speeches.”
By November, the EU Parliament is to vote on its report on the new directive. Trilogue negotiations with the Council and the Commission are then to begin in December. And by the end of April, he reckons at an event in Berlin, there must be an agreement so that the translations and final votes can take place before the end of this legislative period. That is very ambitious, Repasi admits.
The right to repair should grant consumers a legal right to manufacturers: Anyone who wants to repair something should be able to demand this from the manufacturer. Repasi insists that prices must be market-oriented. “Everyone must be able to afford a repair.”
His draft report suggests that EU member states should create financial incentives. Unlike the European Commission, Repasi believes that only a minimum harmonization of legal provisions is sensible for now. This can lead to individual, inspiring solutions, as seen in Austria, where funds from the EU’s coronavirus recovery fund were used for a repair bonus.
Repasi grew up in Stutensee, near Karlsruhe – just like Daniel Caspary, chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament. Both were once student representatives at the Thomas Mann Gymnasium there, which has already been the subject of a feature story in the Badische Neue Nachrichten.
His father is Hungarian from the minority in former Yugoslavia. However, Repasi does not speak Hungarian: His father associated the language with an unpleasant childhood and, therefore, set it aside in Germany. “Actually, only German was spoken at home. I always felt that as a loss,” he says. “That’s why I try to teach my own children, who are now also in a similar situation, the German language.” His wife is Polish, and they live with their sons in The Hague.
He didn’t really want to go there: After studying law, he was “programmed for a German academic career”, he says. He already had a professorship in Heidelberg and his boss had offered him the opportunity to habilitate. “Then love got in the way. And that’s what brought me here to move in 2015.”
In 2021, Repasi was appointed Professor of European Law at Erasmus University in Rotterdam. He continues to research and teach, albeit to a lesser extent, since he took up his mandate in the European Parliament in February 2022. He replaced long-serving SPD MEP Evelyne Gebhardt and has since represented Baden-Württemberg in Brussels and Strasbourg.
Repasi was well prepared for his new role as a MEP: He had regularly served as an expert on European constitutional law and financial market regulation in the European Parliament before. He was also a regular guest as an expert in the webinar series “Europe Calling,” founded by Sven Giegold. He maintains a personal friendship with Giegold, who is now a State Secretary in the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, and they had close exchanges during his parliamentary mandate until 2021. In Brussels, Repasi had already gained a reputation as a Green advisor before he arrived, he says with a wink.
The transition from academia to parliament was not a leap into the unknown for Repasi. “But when you go into practice, you still experience a practical shock,” he says. This was mainly due to dealing with lobbyists (“I eventually stopped talking to them, but then something was missing.”), finding the place where debates take place (“I still haven’t found it.”), and the secrecy surrounding trilogues (“As a scientist, you always wonder how things work behind closed doors. Then I was there, and I didn’t find it that exciting at all.”)
One thing in particular he finds good: “The opportunity to shape things here and really change things is enormous,” he says. An MEP has much more freedom than his colleagues in the Bundestag or the state parliament. For that, he says, one does pay the price of many conversations with lobbyists. “But I don’t have to support or not support any government for better or worse, I can always look for and work out new ways politically.” Leonie Düngefeld
