Over the weekend, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict was the dominant topic at this year’s Munich Security Conference, held without Russia for the first time in decades. Europe’s leaders appeared emphatically united at the diplomatic meeting and assured Ukraine of further support. EU Council President Charles Michel announced a donor conference for the country on Sunday and warned Russia once again of “massive sanctions” in the event of an attack.
On the television program “Anne Will” on Sunday evening, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen specified that Russia would be “practically cut off from the international financial markets” in the event of military intervention. She also said sanctions against Russia’s energy industry, which is heavily dependent on fossil fuel exports, are a powerful lever that gives diplomacy a very strong weight. More on this in the News.
Despite Western warnings, Moscow remains on a confrontational course in the conflict over Ukraine. The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced on Sunday that a military maneuver with Russian troops would be extended. Initially, the large-scale maneuver was to end on Sunday.
The European Commission wants to respond to persistently high gas prices by obliging member states to ensure that gas storage facilities are filled to a minimum level in the fall of each year. To compensate for the lack of economic incentives for energy companies, the Commission is relying on national financial support, for example, in the form of contracts for differences for storage operators.
EU states are to coordinate with each other on storage, and the possibility of joint procurement of strategic reserves is also to be advanced. This was announced by the Brussels authority in a communication to be officially published at the beginning of March. Manuel Berkel evaluated the document in advance. The draft also includes “measures to recycle high rents“, which means profits made by energy companies from high electricity prices. Therefore, the money collected could be returned to households and companies, as you can read in the News.
Bernd Lange is Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade. The fact that the Commission’s supply chain legislation expected for Wednesday does not include an import ban on products from forced labor is difficult for the SPD MEP to accept. After all, a ban along these lines was already announced a long while back. The politician now expects independent legislation for such an import ban, as he explains in an interview with Amelie Richter, also shedding light on possible effects on the EU’s trade with China.
Have a great start to the week,
In the gas crisis, the EU Commission does not raise hope that the situation will ease soon. “Gas and electricity prices will remain high and volatile until at least 2023,” the authority writes in a draft communication on energy prices obtained by Europe.Table. Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans plans to present the final version of the 30-page paper on March 2. The draft suggests that additional financial resources from state budgets or consumers may be needed for greater security of supply.
With prices remaining high, the paper said the market will continue to provide insufficient incentives to buy gas for storage. This was common practice for decades for trading in the summer when demand was low. Therefore, the Commission urges member states to set minimum fill levels for storage operators so that reservoirs are sufficiently full at the start of the heating season. At the same time, however, the paper also points to possible subsidies or regulatory relief. For example, the storage facilities could be fully exempted from the network fees that are passed on to gas customers.
The Commission mentions contracts for differences for traders who book and use storage capacities as new possible subsidies. The state would bear the traders’ additional costs compared with a fixed strike price. If the gas price falls below this value, the difference would flow to the state. In return for aid, recipients would be able to be obliged to store gas in stages during winter.
The need for action is so urgent for the Commission that, according to the paper, it even wants to dispense with a competitive determination of the exercise price via tenders. The member states are to use national rules to ensure that costs do not get out of hand, but the Commission does not provide any further details.
The states are to coordinate their storage activities since not all of them have the necessary infrastructure. By summer, the Commission intends to present a guidance document on financing, fair distribution of costs, and regionally differentiated storage levels. A further working document will also identify possible additional storage requirements.
The Commission also wants to support the joint procurement of gas stocks with a pilot project, which was already announced in the gas package in December. In order to better utilize LNG terminals, there is to be a new coordination platform between member states and liquefied natural gas operators.
The Greens in the European Parliament are ambivalent about the fossil infrastructure measures. “It is good that the Commission now wants to declare gas storage facilities as a strategic reserve, putting a stop to Gazprom’s games with those who can no longer afford to heat their homes,” MEP Michael Bloss told Europe.Table. “But investing even more in fossil infrastructure is the wrong way to go. The money is needed to expand renewables.”
In the draft communication, the Commission actually refers to a faster expansion of renewable energies, considers the introduction of a European hydrogen exchange, and wants to massively expand biogas production: “The Commission proposes a target of 35 billion cubic meters of biogas by 2030 at EU level. Member states should adopt renewable gas strategies that are in line with this target.”
For this target, the Union would have to double its biogas production. The 35 billion cubic meters correspond to the energy content of 1260 petajoules; according to Eurostat, domestic production in 2020 was only 616 petajoules. However, greater use of biogas could cause conflicts. The think tank Agora Energiewende, for example, expects a decline in gaseous biomass in favor of solid biomass such as wood and short-rotation plantations on fields as early as 2030 in its study “Climate-neutral Germany”.
If, for example, farmers were to grow fast-growing poplars instead of corn for fermentation and gas production in the future, forests as CO2 reservoirs would not be additionally endangered. It goes on to say: “From an agricultural perspective, the switch from corn to woody crop biomass also has advantages from a climate point of view. Here, the reduction of fertilizer use, additional humus build-up and better adaptability to climate change are particularly worth mentioning as advantages.”
A new EU target for biogas would therefore also have an impact on the German government’s climate policy. The Climate Protection Act relies heavily on natural CO2 reservoirs such as forests and soils, and the traffic light party has also announced a biomass strategy in the coalition agreement.
Mr. Lange, how disappointed are you and the European Parliament that the import ban on products from forced labor will not be included in the EU supply chain law?
First of all, we are furious that the entire legislative process took so long in the first place. There were delays, including by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The ban on forced labor products also came later in the supply chain legislation process and has a different focus. But we would have liked to see a joint legislative package. There are, of course, still a few substantive issues to be addressed. How do you deal with the products? Is there a dialogue period? Is it really an import ban directly at the port? Or should it also be a marketing ban if these products are imported via a third country? There are actually still a few technical questions that need to be resolved. In this respect, there is a certain logic to the fact that this will now be done even more thoroughly and that there will also be an impact assessment. If this had simply been slapped together, there simply would not have been one. It would have been nicer to have done everything last year, but unfortunately, some things prevented that.
The EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen announced the import ban in a big way. Did they perhaps bite off more than they could chew?
The import ban on products made by forced labor was not included in the Commissioner of Justice Reynders’ original plans. I talked to him about it, and the approach always ran a bit on the side. Then the question of corporate governance, in particular, came up and Internal Market Commissioner Breton got involved. Corporate governance was a big point of contention. And it is, after all, a pretty fundamental question whether you regulate obligations of a company in the objective and in which direction you regulate. And there are certainly major departures from Mr. Reynders’ original approach. “Forced labor” therefore ran a little bit alongside, and that’s where Ursula von der Leyen really bit off more than she could chew. But we all know her, how she announces many things very theatrically and lavishly, and then, in the end, the balance sheet looks a bit more meager. However, as the European Union, we have the right, compared to other legislators worldwide, to keep an eye on how a law is drafted and what its consequences are. And we have to do that carefully when it comes to the import ban on products from forced labor. However, we are not putting it on the back burner but want to get it on the table quickly.
What are the options now for this import ban? Will it become a stand-alone law?
I assume that it will become a separate law. I could well imagine that it will then also become a so-called trade instrument, which means that we will also have to look at legal questions again. The supply chain legislation will probably become more of a directive because of the corporate governance, which I don’t think is such a good thing. Because this gives member states more options in the national implementation to give themselves more leeway and also to use certain loopholes. In this respect, I have always called for a regulation. As far as the import restrictions on forced labor are concerned, I assume that it will be a regulation that applies immediately and equally to all member states.
Do you think, then, that the intra-commission wrangling and the delays have massively diluted the Supply Chain Act?
We’ll have to see which proposal is actually on the table on February 23. It was a difficult operation because we still have 27 different national legal frameworks for this. In the beginning, I was in any case in favor of greater separating the supply chain law and corporate due diligence. But the die has been cast differently. There will probably be greater exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU supply chain law than originally envisaged. But otherwise, I don’t anticipate there will be more dilution.
When can we expect a vote on this in the European Parliament? And when could the supply chain law then come into force?
It is a very complex piece of legislation. We have a little bit of a template for due diligence when dealing with minerals from conflict regions. We learned a little from that: We need to have relatively clear legislation. So, what are due diligence requirements, to also make it court-proof. In France, we have the problem that French legislation leaves so much room for interpretation that it is not court-proof. The requirements must be clearly defined. Then we still have to negotiate with the EU Council. And we also need the certifiers to be able to inspect it. Based on experience with conflict minerals, it all takes about five years. Now, I’m not saying that I will see the EU supply chain law coming into full effect on January 1, 2026, but that could be a time frame.
What impact do you expect this to have on trade with China?
This is not a “Lex China”, it is a general due diligence. But we must also make this a reality for products from China: In other words, we need to carry out risk assessments to determine where due diligence obligations are being violated and what can be done to get this under control. We don’t want a “cut and go” approach, that’s certainly not our approach.
So not a sudden break in trade relations, but rather an improvement in companies’ practices.
That is why we will also demand risk assessments and corresponding management plans for China. Naturally, this will be a difficult matter as far as certification is concerned. We all know that certification is no longer possible in Xinjiang. But still, the requirement is there. And if it is not possible, then it is not possible to check due diligence. This must then also be discussed with those responsible in China. China is not only a one-sided dependency for us, but there is also a dependency on European companies. This is not a one-sided power situation that would perhaps call the implementation of the Supply Chain Act into question. I don’t want to rule out potential conflicts, but we need to speak clearly with responsible parties and make it clear that we will not accept any interference in European legislation.
EU industry representatives in China argue that it is almost impossible to detect forced labor there because Chinese law does not acknowledge forced labor. What problems could arise for traders who want to export their goods to the EU?
This is exactly the problem with forced labor legislation and China. The United States, for example, has developed procedures in cooperation with the ILO and non-governmental organizations to identify forced labor and to verify it accordingly. Legislation should not be a political weapon but should be based on facts. And I believe that it doesn’t matter whether China allows forced labor to exist in law or not. The practice is the decisive factor. The individual case at companies should be evaluated and then decided.
In the trade dispute over Lithuania, the EU and China have until March 6 to begin talks as part of a WTO request. Do you expect this to resolve the conflict?
We have to see what will come out of it. It is normal WTO procedure that there is a dialog process first, which I also think is good. We shouldn’t pull the guns out of the cellar right away. The extent to which China will be willing to do so remains to be seen. In my view, it is quite clear that WTO rules are being violated and trade measures are being used as a political weapon. That is not acceptable.
The planned instrument against economic coercion could provide a remedy for such situations in the future. The French EU Council Presidency wants to push this issue. What is the current status?
There are three legislative processes currently on the table that are intended to make us more defensible: The one on access to public procurement on a level playing field, i.e., the International Procurement Instrument IPI, the exclusion of illegal subsidization for foreign companies, and precisely the possibility to defend ourselves against coercive measures of a political nature that are, however, pushed through by economical means. These three defensive instruments are certainly a priority of the French presidency. Given the lead-up and the state of discussions, it is realistic to say that IPI could be finalized under the French EU presidency, perhaps even in March.
What are the sticking points here?
The matters of illegal subsidies, direct or indirect, to foreign companies in the domestic market, in that regard, we might have to begin negotiations with the French. The anti-coercion instrument is the most recent in terms of the legislative process. I am just finishing my report on that. I assume that we will perhaps have a position in Parliament before the summer break. We certainly won’t be able to reach an agreement on this under the French Council Presidency. But I hope that legislation will be passed as quickly as possible this year.
Last but not least: an EU trade long-standing issue, the CAI investment agreement. Is there any new progress? Is China secretly trying to push the agreement after all?
The sanctions against my colleagues in the European Parliament are still in place, so it is clear that we will not do anything now and that there will be no further work in Parliament. The agreement itself has a few positive elements. But there are also things that the EU Parliament would like to see improved anyway. But we’re not dealing with that either at the moment. It’s high up on the shelf – next to the EU-Mercosur agreement. And I don’t see anyone opening the door at the moment.
Bernd Lange has been a member of the EU Parliament since 1994, with one interruption (2005-2009). The Oldenburg native has been Chair of the Trade Committee since July 2014. Lange is also a member of the Delegation for relations with Southeast Asia and the ASEAN countries in the European Parliament.
“The amended Climate Protection Act is still not sufficient to ensure Germany’s contribution to compliance with the Paris Agreement,” Sascha Müller-Kraenner said at the end of January. The federal managing director of Environmental Action Germany (DUH) stressed: In the new law, the requirements of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court would not be sufficiently implemented. The consequence: a new climate complaint. Nine young adults and children, supported by DUH, are filing a constitutional complaint against the German government’s climate protection law. For the second time.
Müller-Kraenner has been heading Environmental Action Germany together with Jürgen Resch for seven years. Since then, the association has caused a stir with a number of major lawsuits and developed from a small and relatively unknown organization into one of the most powerful German campaign organizations in environmental and consumer protection. “Environmental issues are booming right now. This is a window of opportunity that we have to take advantage of,” says Müller-Kraenner. And indeed, the membership and donations of many environmental organizations have been growing for about a decade. The biologist knows from his own experience that this can also change again quickly.
He began his political involvement in the peace and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s. “For a time, this movement had an enormous amount of energy, but that has rippled out over the years.” Still, those who went into the club structure or into politics, like he did, continue to shape society today with their experiences from that time.
There are also parallels between the climate movements of that time and today, especially Fridays for Future. It is important that existing organizations make offers to activists and that new organizations are founded, he says. Because there will also be a time when other issues are in the spotlight. “There is always a media flicker like that, but institutions remain.”
In his more than 30 years as a nature conservationist, Sascha Müller-Kraenner himself has laid the foundations of several institutions. In the 1990s, he established the EU coordination of the Deutscher Naturschutzring. On behalf of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, he established its first headquarters in Washington, D.C., before joining Environmental Action Germany in 2015.
Müller-Kraenner’s path into conservation was not accidental. He studied biology to gain a better understanding of ecosystems. Even then, his goal was to use his knowledge to protect the environment. In 1990, he made a brief detour into politics as a direct candidate for the Green Party in the Bundestag before devoting himself entirely to association work.
He does not always agree with the German government’s climate policy, despite having a Green Minister for the Economy and Climate. Müller-Kraenner would have liked to see a much clearer statement from the German government on the European Commission’s plans to include natural gas and nuclear energy in the EU taxonomy. He believes that gas-fired power plants are indispensable as a bridging technology. However, labeling them as sustainable is a step in the wrong direction. “In the supermarket, there are organic tomatoes and conventional tomatoes. Both are allowed, but they must be clearly labeled.”
Müller-Kraenner follows climate and environmental policy developments at EU level very closely. To do something about climate change, one should not remain within national borders. In Europe in particular, all countries must pull together. The environmentalist spent two years of his youth in France, went to school there, and still maintains many friendships. This personal connection taught him early on the value of European solidarity and, in particular, of Franco-German friendship.
He also very much welcomed Macron’s initiative to include environmental protection in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Legally, that wouldn’t change much, Müller-Kraenner says. “But it would have great symbolic power.” The ruling on the last constitutional complaint against the German government’s climate law also had great symbolic power. This set a precedent that caused a stir far beyond Germany’s borders. Whether the new constitutional complaint will have a similar reach remains to be seen. David Zauner
Over the weekend, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict was the dominant topic at this year’s Munich Security Conference, held without Russia for the first time in decades. Europe’s leaders appeared emphatically united at the diplomatic meeting and assured Ukraine of further support. EU Council President Charles Michel announced a donor conference for the country on Sunday and warned Russia once again of “massive sanctions” in the event of an attack.
On the television program “Anne Will” on Sunday evening, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen specified that Russia would be “practically cut off from the international financial markets” in the event of military intervention. She also said sanctions against Russia’s energy industry, which is heavily dependent on fossil fuel exports, are a powerful lever that gives diplomacy a very strong weight. More on this in the News.
Despite Western warnings, Moscow remains on a confrontational course in the conflict over Ukraine. The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced on Sunday that a military maneuver with Russian troops would be extended. Initially, the large-scale maneuver was to end on Sunday.
The European Commission wants to respond to persistently high gas prices by obliging member states to ensure that gas storage facilities are filled to a minimum level in the fall of each year. To compensate for the lack of economic incentives for energy companies, the Commission is relying on national financial support, for example, in the form of contracts for differences for storage operators.
EU states are to coordinate with each other on storage, and the possibility of joint procurement of strategic reserves is also to be advanced. This was announced by the Brussels authority in a communication to be officially published at the beginning of March. Manuel Berkel evaluated the document in advance. The draft also includes “measures to recycle high rents“, which means profits made by energy companies from high electricity prices. Therefore, the money collected could be returned to households and companies, as you can read in the News.
Bernd Lange is Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade. The fact that the Commission’s supply chain legislation expected for Wednesday does not include an import ban on products from forced labor is difficult for the SPD MEP to accept. After all, a ban along these lines was already announced a long while back. The politician now expects independent legislation for such an import ban, as he explains in an interview with Amelie Richter, also shedding light on possible effects on the EU’s trade with China.
Have a great start to the week,
In the gas crisis, the EU Commission does not raise hope that the situation will ease soon. “Gas and electricity prices will remain high and volatile until at least 2023,” the authority writes in a draft communication on energy prices obtained by Europe.Table. Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans plans to present the final version of the 30-page paper on March 2. The draft suggests that additional financial resources from state budgets or consumers may be needed for greater security of supply.
With prices remaining high, the paper said the market will continue to provide insufficient incentives to buy gas for storage. This was common practice for decades for trading in the summer when demand was low. Therefore, the Commission urges member states to set minimum fill levels for storage operators so that reservoirs are sufficiently full at the start of the heating season. At the same time, however, the paper also points to possible subsidies or regulatory relief. For example, the storage facilities could be fully exempted from the network fees that are passed on to gas customers.
The Commission mentions contracts for differences for traders who book and use storage capacities as new possible subsidies. The state would bear the traders’ additional costs compared with a fixed strike price. If the gas price falls below this value, the difference would flow to the state. In return for aid, recipients would be able to be obliged to store gas in stages during winter.
The need for action is so urgent for the Commission that, according to the paper, it even wants to dispense with a competitive determination of the exercise price via tenders. The member states are to use national rules to ensure that costs do not get out of hand, but the Commission does not provide any further details.
The states are to coordinate their storage activities since not all of them have the necessary infrastructure. By summer, the Commission intends to present a guidance document on financing, fair distribution of costs, and regionally differentiated storage levels. A further working document will also identify possible additional storage requirements.
The Commission also wants to support the joint procurement of gas stocks with a pilot project, which was already announced in the gas package in December. In order to better utilize LNG terminals, there is to be a new coordination platform between member states and liquefied natural gas operators.
The Greens in the European Parliament are ambivalent about the fossil infrastructure measures. “It is good that the Commission now wants to declare gas storage facilities as a strategic reserve, putting a stop to Gazprom’s games with those who can no longer afford to heat their homes,” MEP Michael Bloss told Europe.Table. “But investing even more in fossil infrastructure is the wrong way to go. The money is needed to expand renewables.”
In the draft communication, the Commission actually refers to a faster expansion of renewable energies, considers the introduction of a European hydrogen exchange, and wants to massively expand biogas production: “The Commission proposes a target of 35 billion cubic meters of biogas by 2030 at EU level. Member states should adopt renewable gas strategies that are in line with this target.”
For this target, the Union would have to double its biogas production. The 35 billion cubic meters correspond to the energy content of 1260 petajoules; according to Eurostat, domestic production in 2020 was only 616 petajoules. However, greater use of biogas could cause conflicts. The think tank Agora Energiewende, for example, expects a decline in gaseous biomass in favor of solid biomass such as wood and short-rotation plantations on fields as early as 2030 in its study “Climate-neutral Germany”.
If, for example, farmers were to grow fast-growing poplars instead of corn for fermentation and gas production in the future, forests as CO2 reservoirs would not be additionally endangered. It goes on to say: “From an agricultural perspective, the switch from corn to woody crop biomass also has advantages from a climate point of view. Here, the reduction of fertilizer use, additional humus build-up and better adaptability to climate change are particularly worth mentioning as advantages.”
A new EU target for biogas would therefore also have an impact on the German government’s climate policy. The Climate Protection Act relies heavily on natural CO2 reservoirs such as forests and soils, and the traffic light party has also announced a biomass strategy in the coalition agreement.
Mr. Lange, how disappointed are you and the European Parliament that the import ban on products from forced labor will not be included in the EU supply chain law?
First of all, we are furious that the entire legislative process took so long in the first place. There were delays, including by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. The ban on forced labor products also came later in the supply chain legislation process and has a different focus. But we would have liked to see a joint legislative package. There are, of course, still a few substantive issues to be addressed. How do you deal with the products? Is there a dialogue period? Is it really an import ban directly at the port? Or should it also be a marketing ban if these products are imported via a third country? There are actually still a few technical questions that need to be resolved. In this respect, there is a certain logic to the fact that this will now be done even more thoroughly and that there will also be an impact assessment. If this had simply been slapped together, there simply would not have been one. It would have been nicer to have done everything last year, but unfortunately, some things prevented that.
The EU Commission and Ursula von der Leyen announced the import ban in a big way. Did they perhaps bite off more than they could chew?
The import ban on products made by forced labor was not included in the Commissioner of Justice Reynders’ original plans. I talked to him about it, and the approach always ran a bit on the side. Then the question of corporate governance, in particular, came up and Internal Market Commissioner Breton got involved. Corporate governance was a big point of contention. And it is, after all, a pretty fundamental question whether you regulate obligations of a company in the objective and in which direction you regulate. And there are certainly major departures from Mr. Reynders’ original approach. “Forced labor” therefore ran a little bit alongside, and that’s where Ursula von der Leyen really bit off more than she could chew. But we all know her, how she announces many things very theatrically and lavishly, and then, in the end, the balance sheet looks a bit more meager. However, as the European Union, we have the right, compared to other legislators worldwide, to keep an eye on how a law is drafted and what its consequences are. And we have to do that carefully when it comes to the import ban on products from forced labor. However, we are not putting it on the back burner but want to get it on the table quickly.
What are the options now for this import ban? Will it become a stand-alone law?
I assume that it will become a separate law. I could well imagine that it will then also become a so-called trade instrument, which means that we will also have to look at legal questions again. The supply chain legislation will probably become more of a directive because of the corporate governance, which I don’t think is such a good thing. Because this gives member states more options in the national implementation to give themselves more leeway and also to use certain loopholes. In this respect, I have always called for a regulation. As far as the import restrictions on forced labor are concerned, I assume that it will be a regulation that applies immediately and equally to all member states.
Do you think, then, that the intra-commission wrangling and the delays have massively diluted the Supply Chain Act?
We’ll have to see which proposal is actually on the table on February 23. It was a difficult operation because we still have 27 different national legal frameworks for this. In the beginning, I was in any case in favor of greater separating the supply chain law and corporate due diligence. But the die has been cast differently. There will probably be greater exemptions for small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU supply chain law than originally envisaged. But otherwise, I don’t anticipate there will be more dilution.
When can we expect a vote on this in the European Parliament? And when could the supply chain law then come into force?
It is a very complex piece of legislation. We have a little bit of a template for due diligence when dealing with minerals from conflict regions. We learned a little from that: We need to have relatively clear legislation. So, what are due diligence requirements, to also make it court-proof. In France, we have the problem that French legislation leaves so much room for interpretation that it is not court-proof. The requirements must be clearly defined. Then we still have to negotiate with the EU Council. And we also need the certifiers to be able to inspect it. Based on experience with conflict minerals, it all takes about five years. Now, I’m not saying that I will see the EU supply chain law coming into full effect on January 1, 2026, but that could be a time frame.
What impact do you expect this to have on trade with China?
This is not a “Lex China”, it is a general due diligence. But we must also make this a reality for products from China: In other words, we need to carry out risk assessments to determine where due diligence obligations are being violated and what can be done to get this under control. We don’t want a “cut and go” approach, that’s certainly not our approach.
So not a sudden break in trade relations, but rather an improvement in companies’ practices.
That is why we will also demand risk assessments and corresponding management plans for China. Naturally, this will be a difficult matter as far as certification is concerned. We all know that certification is no longer possible in Xinjiang. But still, the requirement is there. And if it is not possible, then it is not possible to check due diligence. This must then also be discussed with those responsible in China. China is not only a one-sided dependency for us, but there is also a dependency on European companies. This is not a one-sided power situation that would perhaps call the implementation of the Supply Chain Act into question. I don’t want to rule out potential conflicts, but we need to speak clearly with responsible parties and make it clear that we will not accept any interference in European legislation.
EU industry representatives in China argue that it is almost impossible to detect forced labor there because Chinese law does not acknowledge forced labor. What problems could arise for traders who want to export their goods to the EU?
This is exactly the problem with forced labor legislation and China. The United States, for example, has developed procedures in cooperation with the ILO and non-governmental organizations to identify forced labor and to verify it accordingly. Legislation should not be a political weapon but should be based on facts. And I believe that it doesn’t matter whether China allows forced labor to exist in law or not. The practice is the decisive factor. The individual case at companies should be evaluated and then decided.
In the trade dispute over Lithuania, the EU and China have until March 6 to begin talks as part of a WTO request. Do you expect this to resolve the conflict?
We have to see what will come out of it. It is normal WTO procedure that there is a dialog process first, which I also think is good. We shouldn’t pull the guns out of the cellar right away. The extent to which China will be willing to do so remains to be seen. In my view, it is quite clear that WTO rules are being violated and trade measures are being used as a political weapon. That is not acceptable.
The planned instrument against economic coercion could provide a remedy for such situations in the future. The French EU Council Presidency wants to push this issue. What is the current status?
There are three legislative processes currently on the table that are intended to make us more defensible: The one on access to public procurement on a level playing field, i.e., the International Procurement Instrument IPI, the exclusion of illegal subsidization for foreign companies, and precisely the possibility to defend ourselves against coercive measures of a political nature that are, however, pushed through by economical means. These three defensive instruments are certainly a priority of the French presidency. Given the lead-up and the state of discussions, it is realistic to say that IPI could be finalized under the French EU presidency, perhaps even in March.
What are the sticking points here?
The matters of illegal subsidies, direct or indirect, to foreign companies in the domestic market, in that regard, we might have to begin negotiations with the French. The anti-coercion instrument is the most recent in terms of the legislative process. I am just finishing my report on that. I assume that we will perhaps have a position in Parliament before the summer break. We certainly won’t be able to reach an agreement on this under the French Council Presidency. But I hope that legislation will be passed as quickly as possible this year.
Last but not least: an EU trade long-standing issue, the CAI investment agreement. Is there any new progress? Is China secretly trying to push the agreement after all?
The sanctions against my colleagues in the European Parliament are still in place, so it is clear that we will not do anything now and that there will be no further work in Parliament. The agreement itself has a few positive elements. But there are also things that the EU Parliament would like to see improved anyway. But we’re not dealing with that either at the moment. It’s high up on the shelf – next to the EU-Mercosur agreement. And I don’t see anyone opening the door at the moment.
Bernd Lange has been a member of the EU Parliament since 1994, with one interruption (2005-2009). The Oldenburg native has been Chair of the Trade Committee since July 2014. Lange is also a member of the Delegation for relations with Southeast Asia and the ASEAN countries in the European Parliament.
“The amended Climate Protection Act is still not sufficient to ensure Germany’s contribution to compliance with the Paris Agreement,” Sascha Müller-Kraenner said at the end of January. The federal managing director of Environmental Action Germany (DUH) stressed: In the new law, the requirements of the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court would not be sufficiently implemented. The consequence: a new climate complaint. Nine young adults and children, supported by DUH, are filing a constitutional complaint against the German government’s climate protection law. For the second time.
Müller-Kraenner has been heading Environmental Action Germany together with Jürgen Resch for seven years. Since then, the association has caused a stir with a number of major lawsuits and developed from a small and relatively unknown organization into one of the most powerful German campaign organizations in environmental and consumer protection. “Environmental issues are booming right now. This is a window of opportunity that we have to take advantage of,” says Müller-Kraenner. And indeed, the membership and donations of many environmental organizations have been growing for about a decade. The biologist knows from his own experience that this can also change again quickly.
He began his political involvement in the peace and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s. “For a time, this movement had an enormous amount of energy, but that has rippled out over the years.” Still, those who went into the club structure or into politics, like he did, continue to shape society today with their experiences from that time.
There are also parallels between the climate movements of that time and today, especially Fridays for Future. It is important that existing organizations make offers to activists and that new organizations are founded, he says. Because there will also be a time when other issues are in the spotlight. “There is always a media flicker like that, but institutions remain.”
In his more than 30 years as a nature conservationist, Sascha Müller-Kraenner himself has laid the foundations of several institutions. In the 1990s, he established the EU coordination of the Deutscher Naturschutzring. On behalf of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, he established its first headquarters in Washington, D.C., before joining Environmental Action Germany in 2015.
Müller-Kraenner’s path into conservation was not accidental. He studied biology to gain a better understanding of ecosystems. Even then, his goal was to use his knowledge to protect the environment. In 1990, he made a brief detour into politics as a direct candidate for the Green Party in the Bundestag before devoting himself entirely to association work.
He does not always agree with the German government’s climate policy, despite having a Green Minister for the Economy and Climate. Müller-Kraenner would have liked to see a much clearer statement from the German government on the European Commission’s plans to include natural gas and nuclear energy in the EU taxonomy. He believes that gas-fired power plants are indispensable as a bridging technology. However, labeling them as sustainable is a step in the wrong direction. “In the supermarket, there are organic tomatoes and conventional tomatoes. Both are allowed, but they must be clearly labeled.”
Müller-Kraenner follows climate and environmental policy developments at EU level very closely. To do something about climate change, one should not remain within national borders. In Europe in particular, all countries must pull together. The environmentalist spent two years of his youth in France, went to school there, and still maintains many friendships. This personal connection taught him early on the value of European solidarity and, in particular, of Franco-German friendship.
He also very much welcomed Macron’s initiative to include environmental protection in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Legally, that wouldn’t change much, Müller-Kraenner says. “But it would have great symbolic power.” The ruling on the last constitutional complaint against the German government’s climate law also had great symbolic power. This set a precedent that caused a stir far beyond Germany’s borders. Whether the new constitutional complaint will have a similar reach remains to be seen. David Zauner
