Brussels refuses to be impressed by Moscow’s further moves around energy supply. The EU states are to cut gas consumption by 15 percent possibly starting already in August – mandatorily if necessary. Manuel Berkel analyzes why this sweeping broad-brush approach could be risky.
Early elections are on the horizon in Italy. Yesterday, Prime Minister Mario Draghi won the vote of confidence but is expected to offer his resignation to head of state Sergio Mattarella again soon regardless. Isabel Cuesta Camacho reports from Italy.
The political scene in Brussels goes on its obligatory summer break in August, despite war and crises. However, EU diplomats like Michael Clauß continue to work under high pressure. In addition to the sanctions, the German must also discuss the Commission’s new gas emergency plan with the other permanent representatives of the EU states in a fast-track procedure. Till Hoppe presents a profile of the long-distance runner.
I wish you an exciting read or, in the words of Boris Johnson at his last parliamentary appearance yesterday, “Hasta la vista, baby.”
Brussels would like to see as much unity as in the Commission among the EU members. Yesterday, no less than four members of the College presented the gas emergency plan for the winter – from President Ursula von der Leyen and her Vice President Frans Timmermans to the heads of energy and the internal market Kadri Simson and Thierry Breton.
Von der Leyen left no doubt about the seriousness of the situation: “Russia is blackmailing us and using energy as a weapon. With the “Save Gas for a Safe Winter” plan, the EU wants to prepare for all possible courses of action, be it a partial or even a complete halt to Russian supplies. Putin should therefore be given no more room to delay a decisive response by the community of states with ever new maneuvers.
The steps largely correspond to the drafts made public on Tuesday and a week ago. The Council is to adopt a regulation as early as July 26, the draft of which was also presented by the Commission yesterday. The timetable has been clear since yesterday: Already from August and until the end of March, each member state should reduce its gas consumption by 15 percent. The comparison period is to be the average of the years 2016 to 2021, also taking harsher winters into account.
In a first step, the target is still voluntary. The goal is to save 45 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas by the end of the heating period. According to the Commission’s latest scenarios, this would leave a buffer of 15 percent in storage at the end of March, assuming a complete Russian supply freeze from July. Even if some gas were to flow again from Russia on a weekly basis, this would not be a reason to sound the all-clear – with a view to the heating season after next.
Even with the enormous savings this year, the storage facilities could only be filled to 56 percent by October 2023. The target is actually 80 to 90 percent, so the winter after next is likely to be even more difficult.
To prevent this from happening, the Commission relies on the economic rationality of the member states. If one country’s industry folds, other states are also at risk due to dependencies in common supply chains, a Commission official explains. And if a country fails to implement appropriate conservation measures and there is a regional gas shortage, production facilities could be damaged, leading to high costs. Last but not least, functioning solidarity also has a dampening effect on gas prices.
If this is not sufficient, the Commission intends to use the regulation to give itself the power to declare a Union-wide alert on its own initiative. Alternatively, at least three member states can request it. As a consequence, the 15 percent savings target will become mandatory. The prerequisite is a severe shortage of gas supply or exceptionally high consumption.
In its communication, the Commission makes it clear that the alarm could be sounded at any time in the coming weeks or months. Next Tuesday will show whether the energy ministers in the Council actually agree to these far-reaching powers.
At the same time, many countries would still be well off with the flat target of 15 percent because the broad-brush approach does not take into account the condition of the European gas network. The think tank Bruegel had also recently advocated average savings of the same amount, but with considerable differences in individual European regions.
While Italy would only have to cut back by nine percent, Germany would have to cut back by a good 29 percent. Many other countries would also have to do without much more gas than 15 percent. The reason is the limited pipeline capacities, which are not designed for the flow of gas from west to east. With Russian supplies stopped, more gas will come from Norway, the Netherlands and the LNG terminals on the North Sea, which will have to flow as far as Slovakia, for example. “The EU’s internal gas market is not perfectly interconnected, which means that certain groups of countries will need much more demand reduction,” Bruegel writes.
The Commission’s across-the-board 15 percent target could therefore conceal the real cuts needed in many states. The uniform target was chosen because it is transparent and can be implemented quickly, Timmermans said yesterday, explaining the decision.
Rapid investments in pipelines and new LNG terminals could ease the situation. Announced infrastructure has in fact not been included in Bruegel’s calculation. Only on Tuesday, the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology announced that three new floating regasification plants are to go into operation on the German North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts by the beginning of 2023.
According to a rough calculation, the new LNG terminals would probably bring Germany closer to a necessary consumption reduction of 20 percent, Bruegel expert Ben McWilliams told Europe.Table yesterday. Even with the FSRUs, which cost billions, Germany would still have to make disproportionate efforts.
After all, a gas saving of 20 percent is exactly the figure that the Federal Network Agency recently calculated in its scenarios. Officially, this was played down as an “arbitrary figure”. But Germany’s neighbors could measure European solidarity against it in the winter. “The Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, and Slovenia will be heavily dependent on Germany if Russian gas supplies through Ukraine fail,” Bruegel writes. “A key factor will be how demand in southern Germany responds and whether sufficient gas continues to flow to the Czech Republic and Austria.”
The right-wing parties Forza Italia of Silvio Berlusconi and Lega Nord of Matteo Salvini have turned their backs on Prime Minister Mario Draghi and declared Wednesday morning that they will abstain from the confidence vote. Giuseppe Conte’s Five Star Movement, already the biggest culprit in the government crisis, had turned its back on the coalition since last week.
Draghi did not wait for the results of the vote, which could be considered invalid due to the lack of participation, and left the Palazzo Madame hall before the official results were announced. Draghi is expected to resubmit his resignation to President Sergio Mattarella again, which could trigger early elections and exacerbate a political crisis.
Although the government received the vote of confidence with 95 votes in favor, Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and M5S did not vote. The M5S deputies ensured a quorum by remaining in the plenary chamber. The numbers in these votes were ultimately irrelevant because the point was to see whether he still had unified support.
The day of the vote began with a speech by Draghi outlining the great achievements of his executive over the past 17 months, pointing to the reasons for the collapse and the need to restore national unity to move forward. “The only way forward if we want to stay together is to rebuild afresh this (government) pact with courage, selflessness, credibility,” Mario Draghi said during his appearance before the Senate on Wednesday ahead of the vote on the confidence vote.
Draghi then set out his conditions for moving forward as head of government and struck very harsh tones toward the political forces. He referred in particular to the Five Star Movement, which did not express confidence in the government last week: “Not expressing confidence in a government you belong to has a clear political meaning. It cannot be ignored because it would mean ignoring Parliament, it cannot be ignored because it would mean allowing it to happen again. It cannot be downplayed because it comes after months of conflict and ultimatums.”
Draghi explained that after his resignation last week, there were two options: “One was to go before Parliament, confirm my resignation, and leave without a vote. The support I have seen in the country for the continuity of government is unprecedented and not to be overlooked. This support has led me to come to the Chamber and put the government pact to a vote.” Draghi has been urged in Brussels as well as in Washington and by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in recent days to reverse his decision to resign.
Draghi had repeatedly stated that he would only remain at the helm of government if he received as much support as possible from the parties in the grand coalition. Forza Italia and the Lega Nord left Draghi to deal with a request for a new executive without the Five Star Movement.
The prime minister called for the completion of the post-pandemic recovery plan and the reforms demanded by the European Union so that the agreed funds (up to €230 billion) can continue to flow. He also referred to international affairs, particularly support for Ukraine based on continued arms supplies. A measure that the Five Star Movement opposes.
Commenting on the political crisis and the government’s probable final hours, the daily La Repubblica said, “Conte has made a mess of things. Perhaps Draghi gave him too much importance, but there is no doubt that the center-right made the decisive choice today.”
Forza Italia also lost some of its members today. Maria Stella Gelmini, Minister for Regional Affairs, has left Forza Italia: “I’m leaving the party, it has turned its back on Italians. Today, one must stand by Draghi without any ifs or buts. The center-right has managed to take responsibility for the crisis away from Conte. This Forza Italia is not the political movement in which I have been involved for almost twenty-five years,” Gelmini continued, “I can’t stay in this party one minute longer.”
It’s nine in the morning, but Michael Clauß kindly declines a cup of coffee. He already had two breakfast appointments, says the German EU ambassador, so his caffeine needs are covered. The next appointment is already scheduled, and it will take Clauß to the so-called confessional. The cabinet of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is once again sounding out in small groups what concerns the member states have about the new sanctions against Russia.
Brussels’ political scene goes on its obligatory summer break in August, despite war and crises. Clauß, however, cannot let it end. In addition to the sanctions, the Permanent Representatives of the EU states must also discuss the Commission’s new gas emergency plan in a fast-track procedure before the energy ministers deal with it next Tuesday.
Crisis is now piling up on crisis, and Clauß is right in the middle of the EU’s political efforts to manage it. The leaders negotiate the broad lines among themselves – von der Leyen, Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron and their sherpas. But for preparation and implementation, they need Coreper, the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Brussels governors examine and decide on the sanctions packages in a rush and bend over the draft conclusions for the European Councils until the very most has been consented to. Otherwise, the heads of state and government would never get to bed on summit nights.
Clauß knows the EU business like no one else. The 60-year-old has managed Germany’s past two Council presidencies, in 2020 as ambassador and in 2007 as deputy head of department at the Federal Foreign Office. As head of the German Convention Secretariat, he accompanied the process of drafting a European constitution from its start in 2002 to its bitter end – the rejection of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. Because of his European expertise, the then State Secretary Gunter Pleuger had previously brought the diplomat to him, first as a personal advisor, then as head of the Office of the State Secretaries.
However, Clauß imagined things quite differently. After his first years in the foreign office, he was supposed to become ambassador to Sierra Leone. “My wife and I found the adventure very appealing,” he says. A few hours before his departure, however, there was a coup in the West African country, and the German mission in the capital, Freetown, had to be evacuated. So another use had to be found for Clauß – as an embassy counselor at the EU representation. “The fact that I was sent to Brussels instead was pure coincidence,” he says.
At first, Clauß was not particularly enthusiastic about it. He knew Belgium from his school days, and his father was a Bundeswehr officer stationed for a time at the NATO High Command in Mons. Clauß, however, wanted to experience distant countries. That was one of the reasons why, after two years as a regular soldier, he decided to join the diplomatic service – and not to join the army, where his father had made it to the rank of four-star general.
But it ended up being Brussels instead of Freetown. This was followed by 14 years at the headquarters in Werderscher Markt, most recently as Head of the European Department. In 2013, it was time for a change of scenery, says Clauß: He became ambassador to China. “It’s healing and helpful to look at things from the outside,” he says. “Looking from Beijing, Brussels is not the navel of the world.” Compared to the enormous dynamism in China, he says, processes in Europe are often cumbersome and bureaucratic.
It is difficult for foreigners to look behind the curtains of the Chinese system in Beijing. Contact with Western diplomats is unwelcome for CP cadres. His wife, however, gave Clauß insights that he otherwise would have missed. Through her, he gained access to the Chinese elite, members of the so-called Revolutionary Families: sons, daughters and grandchildren of Mao’s former comrades-in-arms, without an official party position but influential and well-informed nonetheless. Many of them were educated at elite US universities and therefore speak English very well.
“The women met every now and then on weekends, and we men just tagged along,” Clauß says. In this context, it was possible to speak quite openly with each other. “That opened the door for me to a shielded world. And it helped to put the official information in perspective.”
Since then, he no longer harbors any illusions about how the system works or its claim to power. “China derives great self-confidence from its development and is questioning our political and social system,” he says. The CCP is becoming increasingly repressive and is trying to reshape the international order to its liking. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative would serve to establish a hierarchical relationship with other states, with Beijing at the top. “In Europe, it has not been seen for a long time that China is a systemic rival. It was important for me to convey here in Brussels that we need to shed this naiveté.”
By now, that message has sunk in. Clauß contributed to it after his transfer to Brussels in 2018, hand in hand with other China aficionados like Green Party MEP Reinhard Bütikofer. Meanwhile, the EU has launched a €300 billion counterpart to the New Silk Road. “Global Gateway has the potential to be a real alternative,” Clauß says. “But now we have to move forward, taking a value-based approach, but also a realistic one, to involve as many countries as possible.”
In Berlin, the diplomat is held in high esteem across party lines for his competence and objectivity, and the government coalition is also keeping him on board. Clauß has no party affiliation, something that is incompatible with his civil servant ethos. He tries to feed the insights gained in Brussels into the German government’s European policy coordination processes, for example, regarding the majority ratios in the Council and the European Parliament.
Sometimes he has to use his connections in the ministries and the chancellor’s office when the ministries find it difficult to formulate a coordinated position. The “German Vote” is proverbial in Brussels, but during Clauß’s tenure, Germany has only once had to abstain from voting due to a lack of unity in the Council – at the most recent meeting of interior ministers.
To shake off the stress, Clauß goes running every weekend for many, many kilometers, and sometimes he even gets on his racing bicycle. During the week, he tries to keep an extra date in his calendar free for it. “I’m a long-distance runner, it’s a real passion,” he says. He needs the athletic balance for physical health but also for mental hygiene.
Clauß has long since made peace with the fact that his career has taken him to the EU’s jungle of regulations instead of the African rainforest. “Brussels may not be as exotic,” he says, “but it’s also adventurous here at times.” Till Hoppe
Brussels refuses to be impressed by Moscow’s further moves around energy supply. The EU states are to cut gas consumption by 15 percent possibly starting already in August – mandatorily if necessary. Manuel Berkel analyzes why this sweeping broad-brush approach could be risky.
Early elections are on the horizon in Italy. Yesterday, Prime Minister Mario Draghi won the vote of confidence but is expected to offer his resignation to head of state Sergio Mattarella again soon regardless. Isabel Cuesta Camacho reports from Italy.
The political scene in Brussels goes on its obligatory summer break in August, despite war and crises. However, EU diplomats like Michael Clauß continue to work under high pressure. In addition to the sanctions, the German must also discuss the Commission’s new gas emergency plan with the other permanent representatives of the EU states in a fast-track procedure. Till Hoppe presents a profile of the long-distance runner.
I wish you an exciting read or, in the words of Boris Johnson at his last parliamentary appearance yesterday, “Hasta la vista, baby.”
Brussels would like to see as much unity as in the Commission among the EU members. Yesterday, no less than four members of the College presented the gas emergency plan for the winter – from President Ursula von der Leyen and her Vice President Frans Timmermans to the heads of energy and the internal market Kadri Simson and Thierry Breton.
Von der Leyen left no doubt about the seriousness of the situation: “Russia is blackmailing us and using energy as a weapon. With the “Save Gas for a Safe Winter” plan, the EU wants to prepare for all possible courses of action, be it a partial or even a complete halt to Russian supplies. Putin should therefore be given no more room to delay a decisive response by the community of states with ever new maneuvers.
The steps largely correspond to the drafts made public on Tuesday and a week ago. The Council is to adopt a regulation as early as July 26, the draft of which was also presented by the Commission yesterday. The timetable has been clear since yesterday: Already from August and until the end of March, each member state should reduce its gas consumption by 15 percent. The comparison period is to be the average of the years 2016 to 2021, also taking harsher winters into account.
In a first step, the target is still voluntary. The goal is to save 45 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas by the end of the heating period. According to the Commission’s latest scenarios, this would leave a buffer of 15 percent in storage at the end of March, assuming a complete Russian supply freeze from July. Even if some gas were to flow again from Russia on a weekly basis, this would not be a reason to sound the all-clear – with a view to the heating season after next.
Even with the enormous savings this year, the storage facilities could only be filled to 56 percent by October 2023. The target is actually 80 to 90 percent, so the winter after next is likely to be even more difficult.
To prevent this from happening, the Commission relies on the economic rationality of the member states. If one country’s industry folds, other states are also at risk due to dependencies in common supply chains, a Commission official explains. And if a country fails to implement appropriate conservation measures and there is a regional gas shortage, production facilities could be damaged, leading to high costs. Last but not least, functioning solidarity also has a dampening effect on gas prices.
If this is not sufficient, the Commission intends to use the regulation to give itself the power to declare a Union-wide alert on its own initiative. Alternatively, at least three member states can request it. As a consequence, the 15 percent savings target will become mandatory. The prerequisite is a severe shortage of gas supply or exceptionally high consumption.
In its communication, the Commission makes it clear that the alarm could be sounded at any time in the coming weeks or months. Next Tuesday will show whether the energy ministers in the Council actually agree to these far-reaching powers.
At the same time, many countries would still be well off with the flat target of 15 percent because the broad-brush approach does not take into account the condition of the European gas network. The think tank Bruegel had also recently advocated average savings of the same amount, but with considerable differences in individual European regions.
While Italy would only have to cut back by nine percent, Germany would have to cut back by a good 29 percent. Many other countries would also have to do without much more gas than 15 percent. The reason is the limited pipeline capacities, which are not designed for the flow of gas from west to east. With Russian supplies stopped, more gas will come from Norway, the Netherlands and the LNG terminals on the North Sea, which will have to flow as far as Slovakia, for example. “The EU’s internal gas market is not perfectly interconnected, which means that certain groups of countries will need much more demand reduction,” Bruegel writes.
The Commission’s across-the-board 15 percent target could therefore conceal the real cuts needed in many states. The uniform target was chosen because it is transparent and can be implemented quickly, Timmermans said yesterday, explaining the decision.
Rapid investments in pipelines and new LNG terminals could ease the situation. Announced infrastructure has in fact not been included in Bruegel’s calculation. Only on Tuesday, the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology announced that three new floating regasification plants are to go into operation on the German North Sea and Baltic Sea coasts by the beginning of 2023.
According to a rough calculation, the new LNG terminals would probably bring Germany closer to a necessary consumption reduction of 20 percent, Bruegel expert Ben McWilliams told Europe.Table yesterday. Even with the FSRUs, which cost billions, Germany would still have to make disproportionate efforts.
After all, a gas saving of 20 percent is exactly the figure that the Federal Network Agency recently calculated in its scenarios. Officially, this was played down as an “arbitrary figure”. But Germany’s neighbors could measure European solidarity against it in the winter. “The Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, and Slovenia will be heavily dependent on Germany if Russian gas supplies through Ukraine fail,” Bruegel writes. “A key factor will be how demand in southern Germany responds and whether sufficient gas continues to flow to the Czech Republic and Austria.”
The right-wing parties Forza Italia of Silvio Berlusconi and Lega Nord of Matteo Salvini have turned their backs on Prime Minister Mario Draghi and declared Wednesday morning that they will abstain from the confidence vote. Giuseppe Conte’s Five Star Movement, already the biggest culprit in the government crisis, had turned its back on the coalition since last week.
Draghi did not wait for the results of the vote, which could be considered invalid due to the lack of participation, and left the Palazzo Madame hall before the official results were announced. Draghi is expected to resubmit his resignation to President Sergio Mattarella again, which could trigger early elections and exacerbate a political crisis.
Although the government received the vote of confidence with 95 votes in favor, Forza Italia, Lega Nord, and M5S did not vote. The M5S deputies ensured a quorum by remaining in the plenary chamber. The numbers in these votes were ultimately irrelevant because the point was to see whether he still had unified support.
The day of the vote began with a speech by Draghi outlining the great achievements of his executive over the past 17 months, pointing to the reasons for the collapse and the need to restore national unity to move forward. “The only way forward if we want to stay together is to rebuild afresh this (government) pact with courage, selflessness, credibility,” Mario Draghi said during his appearance before the Senate on Wednesday ahead of the vote on the confidence vote.
Draghi then set out his conditions for moving forward as head of government and struck very harsh tones toward the political forces. He referred in particular to the Five Star Movement, which did not express confidence in the government last week: “Not expressing confidence in a government you belong to has a clear political meaning. It cannot be ignored because it would mean ignoring Parliament, it cannot be ignored because it would mean allowing it to happen again. It cannot be downplayed because it comes after months of conflict and ultimatums.”
Draghi explained that after his resignation last week, there were two options: “One was to go before Parliament, confirm my resignation, and leave without a vote. The support I have seen in the country for the continuity of government is unprecedented and not to be overlooked. This support has led me to come to the Chamber and put the government pact to a vote.” Draghi has been urged in Brussels as well as in Washington and by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in recent days to reverse his decision to resign.
Draghi had repeatedly stated that he would only remain at the helm of government if he received as much support as possible from the parties in the grand coalition. Forza Italia and the Lega Nord left Draghi to deal with a request for a new executive without the Five Star Movement.
The prime minister called for the completion of the post-pandemic recovery plan and the reforms demanded by the European Union so that the agreed funds (up to €230 billion) can continue to flow. He also referred to international affairs, particularly support for Ukraine based on continued arms supplies. A measure that the Five Star Movement opposes.
Commenting on the political crisis and the government’s probable final hours, the daily La Repubblica said, “Conte has made a mess of things. Perhaps Draghi gave him too much importance, but there is no doubt that the center-right made the decisive choice today.”
Forza Italia also lost some of its members today. Maria Stella Gelmini, Minister for Regional Affairs, has left Forza Italia: “I’m leaving the party, it has turned its back on Italians. Today, one must stand by Draghi without any ifs or buts. The center-right has managed to take responsibility for the crisis away from Conte. This Forza Italia is not the political movement in which I have been involved for almost twenty-five years,” Gelmini continued, “I can’t stay in this party one minute longer.”
It’s nine in the morning, but Michael Clauß kindly declines a cup of coffee. He already had two breakfast appointments, says the German EU ambassador, so his caffeine needs are covered. The next appointment is already scheduled, and it will take Clauß to the so-called confessional. The cabinet of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is once again sounding out in small groups what concerns the member states have about the new sanctions against Russia.
Brussels’ political scene goes on its obligatory summer break in August, despite war and crises. Clauß, however, cannot let it end. In addition to the sanctions, the Permanent Representatives of the EU states must also discuss the Commission’s new gas emergency plan in a fast-track procedure before the energy ministers deal with it next Tuesday.
Crisis is now piling up on crisis, and Clauß is right in the middle of the EU’s political efforts to manage it. The leaders negotiate the broad lines among themselves – von der Leyen, Olaf Scholz, Emmanuel Macron and their sherpas. But for preparation and implementation, they need Coreper, the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Brussels governors examine and decide on the sanctions packages in a rush and bend over the draft conclusions for the European Councils until the very most has been consented to. Otherwise, the heads of state and government would never get to bed on summit nights.
Clauß knows the EU business like no one else. The 60-year-old has managed Germany’s past two Council presidencies, in 2020 as ambassador and in 2007 as deputy head of department at the Federal Foreign Office. As head of the German Convention Secretariat, he accompanied the process of drafting a European constitution from its start in 2002 to its bitter end – the rejection of the referenda in France and the Netherlands. Because of his European expertise, the then State Secretary Gunter Pleuger had previously brought the diplomat to him, first as a personal advisor, then as head of the Office of the State Secretaries.
However, Clauß imagined things quite differently. After his first years in the foreign office, he was supposed to become ambassador to Sierra Leone. “My wife and I found the adventure very appealing,” he says. A few hours before his departure, however, there was a coup in the West African country, and the German mission in the capital, Freetown, had to be evacuated. So another use had to be found for Clauß – as an embassy counselor at the EU representation. “The fact that I was sent to Brussels instead was pure coincidence,” he says.
At first, Clauß was not particularly enthusiastic about it. He knew Belgium from his school days, and his father was a Bundeswehr officer stationed for a time at the NATO High Command in Mons. Clauß, however, wanted to experience distant countries. That was one of the reasons why, after two years as a regular soldier, he decided to join the diplomatic service – and not to join the army, where his father had made it to the rank of four-star general.
But it ended up being Brussels instead of Freetown. This was followed by 14 years at the headquarters in Werderscher Markt, most recently as Head of the European Department. In 2013, it was time for a change of scenery, says Clauß: He became ambassador to China. “It’s healing and helpful to look at things from the outside,” he says. “Looking from Beijing, Brussels is not the navel of the world.” Compared to the enormous dynamism in China, he says, processes in Europe are often cumbersome and bureaucratic.
It is difficult for foreigners to look behind the curtains of the Chinese system in Beijing. Contact with Western diplomats is unwelcome for CP cadres. His wife, however, gave Clauß insights that he otherwise would have missed. Through her, he gained access to the Chinese elite, members of the so-called Revolutionary Families: sons, daughters and grandchildren of Mao’s former comrades-in-arms, without an official party position but influential and well-informed nonetheless. Many of them were educated at elite US universities and therefore speak English very well.
“The women met every now and then on weekends, and we men just tagged along,” Clauß says. In this context, it was possible to speak quite openly with each other. “That opened the door for me to a shielded world. And it helped to put the official information in perspective.”
Since then, he no longer harbors any illusions about how the system works or its claim to power. “China derives great self-confidence from its development and is questioning our political and social system,” he says. The CCP is becoming increasingly repressive and is trying to reshape the international order to its liking. For example, the Belt and Road Initiative would serve to establish a hierarchical relationship with other states, with Beijing at the top. “In Europe, it has not been seen for a long time that China is a systemic rival. It was important for me to convey here in Brussels that we need to shed this naiveté.”
By now, that message has sunk in. Clauß contributed to it after his transfer to Brussels in 2018, hand in hand with other China aficionados like Green Party MEP Reinhard Bütikofer. Meanwhile, the EU has launched a €300 billion counterpart to the New Silk Road. “Global Gateway has the potential to be a real alternative,” Clauß says. “But now we have to move forward, taking a value-based approach, but also a realistic one, to involve as many countries as possible.”
In Berlin, the diplomat is held in high esteem across party lines for his competence and objectivity, and the government coalition is also keeping him on board. Clauß has no party affiliation, something that is incompatible with his civil servant ethos. He tries to feed the insights gained in Brussels into the German government’s European policy coordination processes, for example, regarding the majority ratios in the Council and the European Parliament.
Sometimes he has to use his connections in the ministries and the chancellor’s office when the ministries find it difficult to formulate a coordinated position. The “German Vote” is proverbial in Brussels, but during Clauß’s tenure, Germany has only once had to abstain from voting due to a lack of unity in the Council – at the most recent meeting of interior ministers.
To shake off the stress, Clauß goes running every weekend for many, many kilometers, and sometimes he even gets on his racing bicycle. During the week, he tries to keep an extra date in his calendar free for it. “I’m a long-distance runner, it’s a real passion,” he says. He needs the athletic balance for physical health but also for mental hygiene.
Clauß has long since made peace with the fact that his career has taken him to the EU’s jungle of regulations instead of the African rainforest. “Brussels may not be as exotic,” he says, “but it’s also adventurous here at times.” Till Hoppe
