Ursula von der Leyen announced it last September, now, on Wednesday, the Commission will present its plans for the European Sovereignty Fund.
In its financial dimension, the fund will not be an answer to the Inflation Reduction Act but will provide investors with orientation in the thicket of different EU programs: as a central contact for funds from the European Innovation Fund, the European Innovation Council and InvestEU. A one-stop shop for young and no-longer-young companies that want to invest in green or digital technologies in Europe.
The concern is that many companies will invest not here but in the US, attracted by the IRA’s lavish tax credits. The EU also has many billions in subsidies to distribute, but the programs involve a lot of paperwork and rarely encourage mass production.
The extent of the sovereignty fund is still unclear, as is the amount the Commission will ask for on Wednesday for the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). An amount of €70 to €80 billion, which circulated in Brussels and Berlin last week, was denied in the Commission.
It is clear, however, that financial assistance to Ukraine (in the form of loans but also grants) is to be organized in a new instrument. Given Kyiv’s unclear financial needs in the coming years, it is appropriate to organize assistance outside the MFF ceilings, argues the Commission.
Have a good start to the week!
The legislative process for the Euro 7 emissions standard is turning into a hanging game. There is little prospect of it being adopted before the end of this mandate. In Parliament, rapporteur Alexandr Vondra (EKR) presented his proposal at the end of May. However, reaching a compromise on this basis is likely to be difficult, as the report takes strong account of manufacturers’ objections.
On June 27, the Environment Committee (ENVI) will debate the matter for the first time. Given the report’s severe differences with the positions of the Greens, some Liberals and Socialists, it is hard to imagine that the October deadline for voting on the report in plenary can be met.
The negotiations in the Council are at least as difficult. The outgoing Swedish presidency has done little to establish a common line among the member states. Sweden did present a compromise paper at a working group meeting last week. But there is little substance. Only on the deadlines for entry into force does the paper move toward the critics.
Meanwhile, the split in the Council seems to be widening: On one side is the group of around eight member states such as France, Italy and the Czech Republic, which have a blocking minority and reject any tightening of emissions standards on the tailpipe. This group has now been joined by Portugal and Slovenia. Spain has indicated that it also sees itself in the camp of France and the blocking minority but remains neutral because of its presidency of the Council in the second half of the year.
Several countries have formed against this, wanting even more ambitious emission standards than the Commission proposes: Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Malta and now Austria. Spain wants to achieve general alignment at the Competitiveness Council on September 25. With early elections taking place in Spain in July, the government could change. It can be assumed that in the event of a change of government, the Christian Democrats (PP) are more likely to be even more critical of the Euro 7 standard than the Spanish Socialists already are.
The German government is also divided on this issue and cannot agree on a position: Transport Minister Volker Wissing (FDP) rejects the Commission’s proposal and thus would be in the blocking minority camp with France and other member states. Environment Minister Steffi Lemke (Greens) is in favor of tightening up. Chancellor Olaf Scholz would have to make use of his guideline competence in this dossier as well and ensure a positioning of Germany in the Council. The next meetings in the Council are scheduled for July 11 and 12, and on July 19 the EU ambassadors (Coreper) are to deal with Euro 7.
It will be difficult to reach compromises on the substance. The positions are far apart. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Commission’s proposal seeks to reform pollutant limits for all vehicle categories – passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and heavy trucks. While in the case of passenger cars, it is above all the test limits that are causing the industry to be annoyed, in the case of commercial vehicles, the proposals for air pollutant limits are also very ambitious. The industry says that, in part, they cannot be achieved even with a high level of technical effort.
The conflict over the introduction deadlines is probably the most likely to be resolved. The planned introduction of passenger cars in the summer of 2025 is unrealistic. Brussels says that the date may be due to an editorial error. For new passenger car models, the Euro 7 standard could come not earlier than 24 months after it comes into force, i.e. in the fall of 2026, and for all models already on the market one year later. For heavy commercial vehicles, the pollutant standard could come into force as late as 2030, if possible, when the carbon fleet limits are also tightened.
Manufacturers are watching the delays in the legislative process with unease. New pollutant standards are in the works in both China and the USA. Manufacturers reckon that this is another reason why the Commission is under pressure and would act anyway if the legislative process for Euro 7 fails. It could use the comitology procedure to tighten the Euro 6/VI emissions standard. If, for example, “Euro 6 f” were to be introduced via this procedure, the legislative competence would lie very much with the Commission; the European Parliament and member states would largely be left out in the cold.
Mr. Andersson, as a migration researcher, you coined the term “business of bordering Europe.” What do you understand by this?
In the early 2000s, long before the so-called migration crisis, I watched as the EU increasingly relied on surveillance technology, border patrols, and cooperation with neighboring countries to control migration. However, such measures usually lead to more problems and crises at Europe’s external borders or beyond in third countries. Specifically, for example, through violence at the borders, a shift of migration routes to more dangerous areas, and the strengthening of smuggling networks. These problems, in turn, serve as justification for even more border security.
Who benefits from this?
Beneficiaries include, for example, certain political actors in destination and transit states. Smugglers benefit from the pushing of migrants onto more dangerous routes. In recent decades, however, border authorities have also deliberately stoked fear of migration to obtain public funds. In this way, they have managed to ensure that migration is now treated almost exclusively as a security issue, rather than a labor or protection issue. This has enabled them to strengthen their role and that of the ministries of the interior in solving the migration problem and to justify new investments, high-tech equipment, infrastructure and personnel.
What is the role of the private sector?
The private defense industry also invests heavily in border security and has done so for decades. It advocates for more funds and surveillance as a solution to what is actually the political, social and economic challenge of international migration. Different studies confirm that a symbiotic relationship has developed between law enforcement and the security apparatus on the one hand and the private security and defense industry on the other. They call for a security solution to combat migration, and this is regardless of the detrimental effects of such a solution. After all, the latter has provided political and financial benefits to a whole range of actors within and outside the security sector.
You have been working on migration control for quite some time. Are there any new approaches to solutions at the moment?
The Commission’s recent proposals, communications, and action plans essentially recycle old ideas from the last twenty or thirty years: Cooperation with partner countries, integrated border management, cooperation on repatriation, increased use of surveillance and security technologies. All of this has long been applied and yet is once again presented as new solutions.
However, the focus is shifting to technological solutions. More and more private sector providers are being brought in as part of the solution. Since 2015 in particular, management consultancies, Big Data and Big Tech companies have positioned themselves as the answer to the migration question.
And can they solve the problem?
The solution to the so-called migration crisis can never be technological. It must be political. And often these border protection strategies ignore what migration policy we actually want in Europe. For example: What trade-offs between migration control and human rights are politicians and voters willing to make? What relationships do we want to build with countries in Europe’s neighborhood? How do we deal with the economic needs of the countries of origin and destination?
Politicians can face all these issues quite relaxed: The massive investment of political and financial capital in strengthening the border – at whatever cost – has shifted the migration problem to other countries. In the short term, some actors can make political capital out of this, but in the longer term, we are creating many problems for the future.
What are the problems?
Migration numbers in Europe may have declined, but these solutions do little to address the underlying political, demographic, and economic challenges that fuel migration and refugee flows. And if European states view migration as an existential risk and push neighboring states to secure and militarize borders, it will be very easy for these states to use this to their advantage.
In the course of your work, you have seen many of the technical solutions to migration firsthand. What were your impressions?
There is a lot of surplus technology. For many defense contractors and other technology providers, border security has become a kind of test lab, where they develop and test dual-use technologies to gain a foothold in civil security. There is a mass of technology but little evidence of what it can achieve in migration control. There is a great deal of skepticism about these technologies among border guards. There have been many exaggerated claims about how much technological solutions can achieve.
It was very easy for national authorities and for Frontex to present such technologies as a magic solution. I saw this in action more than a decade ago when the European External Borders Surveillance System (Eurosur) was deployed in the Mediterranean. Within the law enforcement community, many voices were calling these investments mere window dressing: A show designed to present a very clean, transparent picture of how borders work. However, this view has nothing to do with reality, where border management depends on good relations with European neighbors and work on the ground.
Are there ethical concerns regarding the use of technological solutions for migration control?
In the field of artificial intelligence or the surveillance of migrants, technologies have developed so rapidly in recent years that we are now facing another problem: To what extent do governments and citizens still have control over this increasingly sophisticated surveillance apparatus? These technologies are not only intruding into the lives of migrants, their dignity and their rights but increasingly into the lives of citizens inside and outside the EU. This is even though there is no evidence whatsoever as to whether these systems are even serving their stated purpose. It is a disturbing development and one we must address politically and legally.
Has the way migration is talked about changed along with this technological change?
When I worked on the Spanish-African border around 2010, there was still a humanitarian discourse about migration across the Mediterranean. Today, we are dealing with a militarized notion and representation of external borders, mixing migration with other issues such as smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, instability, and even epidemiology and disease. A range of fears and dangers converge at borders. Migration is presented as a link between all of these factors. It is increasingly dehumanizing language that does not allow us to see the underlying political nuances, such as the social and economic factors that lead to migration.
The European Union is divided over the reform of European debt rules. In an initial debate among finance ministers following the presentation of legislative proposals, a group led by Germany stressed there must be uniform rules for all EU states in the future fiscal framework. Another group led by France is backing individual budget plans to reduce debt and boost growth. In the public session, France’s Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire responded to the German demand: “Our answer is clearly ‘no,’ for reasons based on our past experience.”
According to Le Maire, the approach of uniform rules has not worked. This has led to catastrophic consequences for the EU, “which also have to do with political issues, namely respect for the sovereignty of states.” The French Finance Minister recalled, “The European Union is still built on the sovereignty of nations and states.” In contrast, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner clarified at the meeting that European stability and growth policy could only work with uniform regulations: “We need common rules that are the same for everyone,” he said Friday in Luxembourg.
Lindner has secured the support of other EU member states. With counterparts from ten member states, he called in a guest article in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica for the rules to be made stricter than the European Commission proposed. The contribution was signed by the ministers of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the three Baltic states, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Luxembourg. The Netherlands, otherwise a close ally of Berlin in fiscal policy, is not on board but also called in Luxembourg for clear targets to achieve credible debt reduction.
Austria’s Finance Minister Magnus Brunner gave an example to illustrate what is important in the reform. The Commission’s proposal stipulates, for example, that the debt level at the end of the medium-term budget period must be below the starting level. But what exactly does this mean: “If the debt level is 140 percent of GDP at the beginning, is it sufficient if it is at 139 percent at the end?” There must be clear numerical guidelines here, he said. The German Finance Minister demands, among other things, that states with high liabilities must reduce debt by at least one percent per year.
Currently, the Stability and Growth Pact is suspended until the end of the year due to the Covid crisis and the consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine. By then, the EU member states and the European Parliament must adopt the new set of rules, otherwise, the previous regulations will take effect. Given the deep division into two camps, however, this seems extremely ambitious, even if all ministers in Luxembourg have signaled a constructive attitude with regard to the upcoming negotiations. In mid-April, the Commission had proposed to give states more flexibility in reducing debt and reforming and investing to strengthen growth via individual multi-year budgets. cr/ dpa
The Swedish EU Council Presidency had set June 16 as the deadline for naming candidates to succeed Werner Hoyer as head of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Only Italy and Poland have raised their hands. Rome has put former Economy Minister Daniele Franco into the race, Warsaw, the current EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwinska. However, both are considered to have little chance of succeeding Hoyer.
Even though the Italian Franco has an impeccable resume that absolutely qualifies him for the job at the head of the EU’s house bank, his age of 70 makes him an unlikely candidate. In the case of Poland’s Czerwinska, no one believes that the EU states will offer the current PiS government in Warsaw a top EU job. Franco and Czerwinska are thus seen as stooges of their states for other high-ranking EU posts.
In general, the heavyweights are conspicuously holding back. The most recent candidates were Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice President of the EU Commission, and Margrethe Vestanger. Dombrovskis, it is now said, has secured another mandate in the EU Commission after the 2024 European elections, and her country’s own Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, stands in the way of Vestager. Frederiksen, it is rumored, wants to succeed Jens Stoltenberg at NATO and is thus uninterested in pushing her compatriot at the EIB.
That leaves Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calviño as a potential candidate and heavyweight in the race for the EIB job. However, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called early elections in Spain for July 23 – with an open outcome. The country, which will take over the EU Council presidency on July 1, would have the best chance of placing Calviño at the head of the EU’s house bank. However, it is rather against political custom to quickly elevate a member of the current government to a top EU post in the event of a defeat.
The race is thus still open, and the only certainty is that nothing will happen before July 23. What is also clear, however, is that the successor should be in place by the end of the year. The EIB job should not be included in the personnel merry-go-round after the European elections. This has been internally communicated to the bank by Belgium’s Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem, currently Chairman of the EIB’s Board of Directors. This leaves a maximum of October to find a timely successor for Hoyer. Otherwise, internal procedures, such as a review of candidates by the in-house ethics committee, can no longer be guaranteed. tho
Last Friday, the EU Commission presented a proposal for a new label for smartphones, cordless phones and tablets. It is to disclose information about the energy efficiency of the devices, the longevity of the battery, protection against dust and water, and resistance to accidental drops. This means that, for the first time, a product placed on the EU market must show an assessment of its repairability. Consumers will thus be able to make more informed and sustainable purchasing decisions, the Commission explained.
The existing and familiar EU A to G scale energy labels will be used for the new products. The EU-wide European Product Registry for Energy Labels (EPREL) database will provide additional information about the product.
The delegated act falls under the Energy Labelling Directive. It will now be submitted to the EU Parliament and Council for a two-month review. Another proposal with new ecodesign requirements for the same product groups, aimed at increasing the energy efficiency, durability and repairability of these appliances, was adopted by the Parliament and Council on Friday. This falls under the Ecodesign Directive, which aims to reduce the environmental impact of energy-related products. Both pieces of legislation are scheduled to enter into force at the same time. A 21-month transition period will then initially apply. leo
The EU Commission wants to review the Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE) and is thus holding a consultation until September 22. Stakeholders and citizens are expected to help identify equipment with proportions of critical raw materials and to locate existing recycling practices for these materials.
The Commission plans to use the feedback to reassess the directive in terms of access to critical raw materials, increased consumption and digitization, and identify gaps in implementation and enforcement. Depending on the outcome, it could consider revising the WEEE Directive. This was adopted in 2002 and first revised in 2012.
According to a Commission press release, waste from electrical and electronic equipment is among the fastest-growing waste streams. It contains valuable raw materials, the recovery of which is crucial for a more circular economy and for the EU’s strategic autonomy. leo
Malte Gallée hurries energetically through the long corridors of the Brussels Parliament building. He has just returned from a plenary session and is very pleased because, for his group, today’s session was “a complete success.” The supply chain bill has just been voted on. “We got it through to a very large extent according to our ideas,” he says happily. Arriving at his office, various flags in the rainbow colors of the LGBTQ community stand out in the background next to a prominent European flag.
In the 2019 European elections, then still a student of philosophy and economics at the University of Bayreuth, Gallée narrowly missed entering Parliament. But when Sven Giegold moved to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection in December 2021, he moved up for the Greens. Joining in the middle of the running felt “like jumping on a speeding train at full speed.” He has since become a permanent member of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and a substitute member of the Committee on Development (DEVE) and the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). His constituency office is in Bamberg.
At 29, Malte Gallée is Germany’s youngest MEP. In the 2014 European elections, he was disappointed by the low number of young people who stood for election and decided to run in the next election. Now he sees it as his duty to “make politics accessible to young people in particular.” On social platforms like Tik Tok, he makes himself approachable and conveys his content in short, often entertaining videos. Unlike some of his party colleagues, he shows full understanding and sympathy for political activism like the group Letzte Generation (last generation). He himself was politicized as a youth by the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
He is also committed to the interests of the younger and upcoming generations in terms of content. Or, as he says, “Everything that somehow affects the environment and climate.” His heartfelt topic is the circular economy. Because Gallée is convinced: “We must succeed in decoupling our prosperity from resource consumption. This is essential so that we can still live well on the planet without destroying it. And, of course, this has to be done in a globally equitable way.” Specifically, he is working primarily on dossiers such as the Right to Repair and the Packaging Regulation. As shadow rapporteur, he also helped negotiate the Battery Regulation, which he calls “groundbreaking” and counts among his greatest successes in Parliament.
He questions “our definition of waste and who is responsible for it” very fundamentally. With the Packaging Regulation, which lays down rules for all packaged products on the European market, Gallée wants to ensure, among other things, that reusable alternatives, such as takeaway meal boxes, must always be cheaper than single-use packaging. But that does not go far enough for him. He says in his utopia, there would be a system change in which manufacturers would be held responsible for taking back all the packaging they produce. Then, according to his idea, manufacturers would only bring reusable products to market. “I think the concept of trash is inherently wrong,” he says. In a world with limited resources, we can’t afford to give any one thing zero value.”
He also likes to spend the little free time he has green. He now has 60 plants at home, which he nurtures and cares for and with which he has built “a very intimate relationship.” An important balance to the long and stressful days.
Nevertheless, the half-term in the European Parliament is too short for Malte Gallée. Now that he knows “how things work,” he does not want to quit and is running for the 2024 European elections. He has already achieved the top vote of the Greens from Bavaria. How promising his chances are will be decided at the federal delegates’ conference of the Greens in November. For him one thing is certain: “I’m definitely up for it and believe that I can still move a lot, especially for young people.” Clara Baldus
Ursula von der Leyen announced it last September, now, on Wednesday, the Commission will present its plans for the European Sovereignty Fund.
In its financial dimension, the fund will not be an answer to the Inflation Reduction Act but will provide investors with orientation in the thicket of different EU programs: as a central contact for funds from the European Innovation Fund, the European Innovation Council and InvestEU. A one-stop shop for young and no-longer-young companies that want to invest in green or digital technologies in Europe.
The concern is that many companies will invest not here but in the US, attracted by the IRA’s lavish tax credits. The EU also has many billions in subsidies to distribute, but the programs involve a lot of paperwork and rarely encourage mass production.
The extent of the sovereignty fund is still unclear, as is the amount the Commission will ask for on Wednesday for the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). An amount of €70 to €80 billion, which circulated in Brussels and Berlin last week, was denied in the Commission.
It is clear, however, that financial assistance to Ukraine (in the form of loans but also grants) is to be organized in a new instrument. Given Kyiv’s unclear financial needs in the coming years, it is appropriate to organize assistance outside the MFF ceilings, argues the Commission.
Have a good start to the week!
The legislative process for the Euro 7 emissions standard is turning into a hanging game. There is little prospect of it being adopted before the end of this mandate. In Parliament, rapporteur Alexandr Vondra (EKR) presented his proposal at the end of May. However, reaching a compromise on this basis is likely to be difficult, as the report takes strong account of manufacturers’ objections.
On June 27, the Environment Committee (ENVI) will debate the matter for the first time. Given the report’s severe differences with the positions of the Greens, some Liberals and Socialists, it is hard to imagine that the October deadline for voting on the report in plenary can be met.
The negotiations in the Council are at least as difficult. The outgoing Swedish presidency has done little to establish a common line among the member states. Sweden did present a compromise paper at a working group meeting last week. But there is little substance. Only on the deadlines for entry into force does the paper move toward the critics.
Meanwhile, the split in the Council seems to be widening: On one side is the group of around eight member states such as France, Italy and the Czech Republic, which have a blocking minority and reject any tightening of emissions standards on the tailpipe. This group has now been joined by Portugal and Slovenia. Spain has indicated that it also sees itself in the camp of France and the blocking minority but remains neutral because of its presidency of the Council in the second half of the year.
Several countries have formed against this, wanting even more ambitious emission standards than the Commission proposes: Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Malta and now Austria. Spain wants to achieve general alignment at the Competitiveness Council on September 25. With early elections taking place in Spain in July, the government could change. It can be assumed that in the event of a change of government, the Christian Democrats (PP) are more likely to be even more critical of the Euro 7 standard than the Spanish Socialists already are.
The German government is also divided on this issue and cannot agree on a position: Transport Minister Volker Wissing (FDP) rejects the Commission’s proposal and thus would be in the blocking minority camp with France and other member states. Environment Minister Steffi Lemke (Greens) is in favor of tightening up. Chancellor Olaf Scholz would have to make use of his guideline competence in this dossier as well and ensure a positioning of Germany in the Council. The next meetings in the Council are scheduled for July 11 and 12, and on July 19 the EU ambassadors (Coreper) are to deal with Euro 7.
It will be difficult to reach compromises on the substance. The positions are far apart. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Commission’s proposal seeks to reform pollutant limits for all vehicle categories – passenger cars, light commercial vehicles and heavy trucks. While in the case of passenger cars, it is above all the test limits that are causing the industry to be annoyed, in the case of commercial vehicles, the proposals for air pollutant limits are also very ambitious. The industry says that, in part, they cannot be achieved even with a high level of technical effort.
The conflict over the introduction deadlines is probably the most likely to be resolved. The planned introduction of passenger cars in the summer of 2025 is unrealistic. Brussels says that the date may be due to an editorial error. For new passenger car models, the Euro 7 standard could come not earlier than 24 months after it comes into force, i.e. in the fall of 2026, and for all models already on the market one year later. For heavy commercial vehicles, the pollutant standard could come into force as late as 2030, if possible, when the carbon fleet limits are also tightened.
Manufacturers are watching the delays in the legislative process with unease. New pollutant standards are in the works in both China and the USA. Manufacturers reckon that this is another reason why the Commission is under pressure and would act anyway if the legislative process for Euro 7 fails. It could use the comitology procedure to tighten the Euro 6/VI emissions standard. If, for example, “Euro 6 f” were to be introduced via this procedure, the legislative competence would lie very much with the Commission; the European Parliament and member states would largely be left out in the cold.
Mr. Andersson, as a migration researcher, you coined the term “business of bordering Europe.” What do you understand by this?
In the early 2000s, long before the so-called migration crisis, I watched as the EU increasingly relied on surveillance technology, border patrols, and cooperation with neighboring countries to control migration. However, such measures usually lead to more problems and crises at Europe’s external borders or beyond in third countries. Specifically, for example, through violence at the borders, a shift of migration routes to more dangerous areas, and the strengthening of smuggling networks. These problems, in turn, serve as justification for even more border security.
Who benefits from this?
Beneficiaries include, for example, certain political actors in destination and transit states. Smugglers benefit from the pushing of migrants onto more dangerous routes. In recent decades, however, border authorities have also deliberately stoked fear of migration to obtain public funds. In this way, they have managed to ensure that migration is now treated almost exclusively as a security issue, rather than a labor or protection issue. This has enabled them to strengthen their role and that of the ministries of the interior in solving the migration problem and to justify new investments, high-tech equipment, infrastructure and personnel.
What is the role of the private sector?
The private defense industry also invests heavily in border security and has done so for decades. It advocates for more funds and surveillance as a solution to what is actually the political, social and economic challenge of international migration. Different studies confirm that a symbiotic relationship has developed between law enforcement and the security apparatus on the one hand and the private security and defense industry on the other. They call for a security solution to combat migration, and this is regardless of the detrimental effects of such a solution. After all, the latter has provided political and financial benefits to a whole range of actors within and outside the security sector.
You have been working on migration control for quite some time. Are there any new approaches to solutions at the moment?
The Commission’s recent proposals, communications, and action plans essentially recycle old ideas from the last twenty or thirty years: Cooperation with partner countries, integrated border management, cooperation on repatriation, increased use of surveillance and security technologies. All of this has long been applied and yet is once again presented as new solutions.
However, the focus is shifting to technological solutions. More and more private sector providers are being brought in as part of the solution. Since 2015 in particular, management consultancies, Big Data and Big Tech companies have positioned themselves as the answer to the migration question.
And can they solve the problem?
The solution to the so-called migration crisis can never be technological. It must be political. And often these border protection strategies ignore what migration policy we actually want in Europe. For example: What trade-offs between migration control and human rights are politicians and voters willing to make? What relationships do we want to build with countries in Europe’s neighborhood? How do we deal with the economic needs of the countries of origin and destination?
Politicians can face all these issues quite relaxed: The massive investment of political and financial capital in strengthening the border – at whatever cost – has shifted the migration problem to other countries. In the short term, some actors can make political capital out of this, but in the longer term, we are creating many problems for the future.
What are the problems?
Migration numbers in Europe may have declined, but these solutions do little to address the underlying political, demographic, and economic challenges that fuel migration and refugee flows. And if European states view migration as an existential risk and push neighboring states to secure and militarize borders, it will be very easy for these states to use this to their advantage.
In the course of your work, you have seen many of the technical solutions to migration firsthand. What were your impressions?
There is a lot of surplus technology. For many defense contractors and other technology providers, border security has become a kind of test lab, where they develop and test dual-use technologies to gain a foothold in civil security. There is a mass of technology but little evidence of what it can achieve in migration control. There is a great deal of skepticism about these technologies among border guards. There have been many exaggerated claims about how much technological solutions can achieve.
It was very easy for national authorities and for Frontex to present such technologies as a magic solution. I saw this in action more than a decade ago when the European External Borders Surveillance System (Eurosur) was deployed in the Mediterranean. Within the law enforcement community, many voices were calling these investments mere window dressing: A show designed to present a very clean, transparent picture of how borders work. However, this view has nothing to do with reality, where border management depends on good relations with European neighbors and work on the ground.
Are there ethical concerns regarding the use of technological solutions for migration control?
In the field of artificial intelligence or the surveillance of migrants, technologies have developed so rapidly in recent years that we are now facing another problem: To what extent do governments and citizens still have control over this increasingly sophisticated surveillance apparatus? These technologies are not only intruding into the lives of migrants, their dignity and their rights but increasingly into the lives of citizens inside and outside the EU. This is even though there is no evidence whatsoever as to whether these systems are even serving their stated purpose. It is a disturbing development and one we must address politically and legally.
Has the way migration is talked about changed along with this technological change?
When I worked on the Spanish-African border around 2010, there was still a humanitarian discourse about migration across the Mediterranean. Today, we are dealing with a militarized notion and representation of external borders, mixing migration with other issues such as smuggling, human trafficking, terrorism, instability, and even epidemiology and disease. A range of fears and dangers converge at borders. Migration is presented as a link between all of these factors. It is increasingly dehumanizing language that does not allow us to see the underlying political nuances, such as the social and economic factors that lead to migration.
The European Union is divided over the reform of European debt rules. In an initial debate among finance ministers following the presentation of legislative proposals, a group led by Germany stressed there must be uniform rules for all EU states in the future fiscal framework. Another group led by France is backing individual budget plans to reduce debt and boost growth. In the public session, France’s Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire responded to the German demand: “Our answer is clearly ‘no,’ for reasons based on our past experience.”
According to Le Maire, the approach of uniform rules has not worked. This has led to catastrophic consequences for the EU, “which also have to do with political issues, namely respect for the sovereignty of states.” The French Finance Minister recalled, “The European Union is still built on the sovereignty of nations and states.” In contrast, German Finance Minister Christian Lindner clarified at the meeting that European stability and growth policy could only work with uniform regulations: “We need common rules that are the same for everyone,” he said Friday in Luxembourg.
Lindner has secured the support of other EU member states. With counterparts from ten member states, he called in a guest article in the Italian newspaper La Repubblica for the rules to be made stricter than the European Commission proposed. The contribution was signed by the ministers of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the three Baltic states, Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Luxembourg. The Netherlands, otherwise a close ally of Berlin in fiscal policy, is not on board but also called in Luxembourg for clear targets to achieve credible debt reduction.
Austria’s Finance Minister Magnus Brunner gave an example to illustrate what is important in the reform. The Commission’s proposal stipulates, for example, that the debt level at the end of the medium-term budget period must be below the starting level. But what exactly does this mean: “If the debt level is 140 percent of GDP at the beginning, is it sufficient if it is at 139 percent at the end?” There must be clear numerical guidelines here, he said. The German Finance Minister demands, among other things, that states with high liabilities must reduce debt by at least one percent per year.
Currently, the Stability and Growth Pact is suspended until the end of the year due to the Covid crisis and the consequences of the Russian attack on Ukraine. By then, the EU member states and the European Parliament must adopt the new set of rules, otherwise, the previous regulations will take effect. Given the deep division into two camps, however, this seems extremely ambitious, even if all ministers in Luxembourg have signaled a constructive attitude with regard to the upcoming negotiations. In mid-April, the Commission had proposed to give states more flexibility in reducing debt and reforming and investing to strengthen growth via individual multi-year budgets. cr/ dpa
The Swedish EU Council Presidency had set June 16 as the deadline for naming candidates to succeed Werner Hoyer as head of the European Investment Bank (EIB). Only Italy and Poland have raised their hands. Rome has put former Economy Minister Daniele Franco into the race, Warsaw, the current EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwinska. However, both are considered to have little chance of succeeding Hoyer.
Even though the Italian Franco has an impeccable resume that absolutely qualifies him for the job at the head of the EU’s house bank, his age of 70 makes him an unlikely candidate. In the case of Poland’s Czerwinska, no one believes that the EU states will offer the current PiS government in Warsaw a top EU job. Franco and Czerwinska are thus seen as stooges of their states for other high-ranking EU posts.
In general, the heavyweights are conspicuously holding back. The most recent candidates were Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice President of the EU Commission, and Margrethe Vestanger. Dombrovskis, it is now said, has secured another mandate in the EU Commission after the 2024 European elections, and her country’s own Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, stands in the way of Vestager. Frederiksen, it is rumored, wants to succeed Jens Stoltenberg at NATO and is thus uninterested in pushing her compatriot at the EIB.
That leaves Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calviño as a potential candidate and heavyweight in the race for the EIB job. However, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called early elections in Spain for July 23 – with an open outcome. The country, which will take over the EU Council presidency on July 1, would have the best chance of placing Calviño at the head of the EU’s house bank. However, it is rather against political custom to quickly elevate a member of the current government to a top EU post in the event of a defeat.
The race is thus still open, and the only certainty is that nothing will happen before July 23. What is also clear, however, is that the successor should be in place by the end of the year. The EIB job should not be included in the personnel merry-go-round after the European elections. This has been internally communicated to the bank by Belgium’s Finance Minister Vincent Van Peteghem, currently Chairman of the EIB’s Board of Directors. This leaves a maximum of October to find a timely successor for Hoyer. Otherwise, internal procedures, such as a review of candidates by the in-house ethics committee, can no longer be guaranteed. tho
Last Friday, the EU Commission presented a proposal for a new label for smartphones, cordless phones and tablets. It is to disclose information about the energy efficiency of the devices, the longevity of the battery, protection against dust and water, and resistance to accidental drops. This means that, for the first time, a product placed on the EU market must show an assessment of its repairability. Consumers will thus be able to make more informed and sustainable purchasing decisions, the Commission explained.
The existing and familiar EU A to G scale energy labels will be used for the new products. The EU-wide European Product Registry for Energy Labels (EPREL) database will provide additional information about the product.
The delegated act falls under the Energy Labelling Directive. It will now be submitted to the EU Parliament and Council for a two-month review. Another proposal with new ecodesign requirements for the same product groups, aimed at increasing the energy efficiency, durability and repairability of these appliances, was adopted by the Parliament and Council on Friday. This falls under the Ecodesign Directive, which aims to reduce the environmental impact of energy-related products. Both pieces of legislation are scheduled to enter into force at the same time. A 21-month transition period will then initially apply. leo
The EU Commission wants to review the Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE) and is thus holding a consultation until September 22. Stakeholders and citizens are expected to help identify equipment with proportions of critical raw materials and to locate existing recycling practices for these materials.
The Commission plans to use the feedback to reassess the directive in terms of access to critical raw materials, increased consumption and digitization, and identify gaps in implementation and enforcement. Depending on the outcome, it could consider revising the WEEE Directive. This was adopted in 2002 and first revised in 2012.
According to a Commission press release, waste from electrical and electronic equipment is among the fastest-growing waste streams. It contains valuable raw materials, the recovery of which is crucial for a more circular economy and for the EU’s strategic autonomy. leo
Malte Gallée hurries energetically through the long corridors of the Brussels Parliament building. He has just returned from a plenary session and is very pleased because, for his group, today’s session was “a complete success.” The supply chain bill has just been voted on. “We got it through to a very large extent according to our ideas,” he says happily. Arriving at his office, various flags in the rainbow colors of the LGBTQ community stand out in the background next to a prominent European flag.
In the 2019 European elections, then still a student of philosophy and economics at the University of Bayreuth, Gallée narrowly missed entering Parliament. But when Sven Giegold moved to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection in December 2021, he moved up for the Greens. Joining in the middle of the running felt “like jumping on a speeding train at full speed.” He has since become a permanent member of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and a substitute member of the Committee on Development (DEVE) and the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). His constituency office is in Bamberg.
At 29, Malte Gallée is Germany’s youngest MEP. In the 2014 European elections, he was disappointed by the low number of young people who stood for election and decided to run in the next election. Now he sees it as his duty to “make politics accessible to young people in particular.” On social platforms like Tik Tok, he makes himself approachable and conveys his content in short, often entertaining videos. Unlike some of his party colleagues, he shows full understanding and sympathy for political activism like the group Letzte Generation (last generation). He himself was politicized as a youth by the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
He is also committed to the interests of the younger and upcoming generations in terms of content. Or, as he says, “Everything that somehow affects the environment and climate.” His heartfelt topic is the circular economy. Because Gallée is convinced: “We must succeed in decoupling our prosperity from resource consumption. This is essential so that we can still live well on the planet without destroying it. And, of course, this has to be done in a globally equitable way.” Specifically, he is working primarily on dossiers such as the Right to Repair and the Packaging Regulation. As shadow rapporteur, he also helped negotiate the Battery Regulation, which he calls “groundbreaking” and counts among his greatest successes in Parliament.
He questions “our definition of waste and who is responsible for it” very fundamentally. With the Packaging Regulation, which lays down rules for all packaged products on the European market, Gallée wants to ensure, among other things, that reusable alternatives, such as takeaway meal boxes, must always be cheaper than single-use packaging. But that does not go far enough for him. He says in his utopia, there would be a system change in which manufacturers would be held responsible for taking back all the packaging they produce. Then, according to his idea, manufacturers would only bring reusable products to market. “I think the concept of trash is inherently wrong,” he says. In a world with limited resources, we can’t afford to give any one thing zero value.”
He also likes to spend the little free time he has green. He now has 60 plants at home, which he nurtures and cares for and with which he has built “a very intimate relationship.” An important balance to the long and stressful days.
Nevertheless, the half-term in the European Parliament is too short for Malte Gallée. Now that he knows “how things work,” he does not want to quit and is running for the 2024 European elections. He has already achieved the top vote of the Greens from Bavaria. How promising his chances are will be decided at the federal delegates’ conference of the Greens in November. For him one thing is certain: “I’m definitely up for it and believe that I can still move a lot, especially for young people.” Clara Baldus