The debate about the Euro 7 emissions standard is a prime example of the force with which the right level of environmental protection will be fought over in the coming years or, rather, decades. Euro 7 is also intended to regulate the emission of fine particles through brakes and tires, and for quite a long time: Manufacturers are to be liable for compliance with the limits for up to ten years or a mileage of 200,000 kilometers. Markus Grabitz has learned that car manufacturers consider the requirements to be almost impossible to implement and very expensive, while environmental associations criticize them as being too lax.
Yesterday, four EU commissioners presented an initiative to better protect the EU from hacker attacks. However, Eric Bonse reports that the initiative was disappointingly vague and, above all, not very concrete. The new strategy for cyberspace remains vague and ambivalent on important issues.
For the European Parliament, COVID-19 is not a major issue; there are more important tasks: €225 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRF) are still available, which should now flow primarily into investments for renewable energy projects. On Thursday, the parliamentarians voted in favor of a corresponding proposal from the EU Commission. They want to provide €20 billion in grants in addition to the COVID-19 funds.
Euro 7, the new emissions standard, is scheduled to take effect July 1, 2025, for cars and vans and July 1, 2027, for commercial vehicles. The proposal, which the Commission adopted Thursday, also sets targets for battery performance in EVs.
For battery EVs and plug-in hybrids, 80 percent of the charging power must be guaranteed up to a mileage of 100,000 kilometers or an age of five years. Up to an age of eight years or a mileage of 160,000 kilometers, the performance must not fall below 70 percent. For trucks, experience is still lacking for these specifications. The Commission intends to provide additional information as soon as possible.
Euro 7 also aims to regulate the emission of fine particles from brakes and tires. In the case of brakes, measuring devices for the release of fine particles already exist for passenger cars and delivery vans. Measuring devices for tire abrasion are under development. The Commission reserves the right to tighten the limits for brakes and tires via delegated acts for a period of five years after Euro 7 comes into force.
The emissions of each individual vehicle are to be transmitted digitally in the future. The Internet-enabled onboard diagnostic devices that are mandatory for new vehicles will be used for this purpose. Manufacturers must ensure that vehicles comply with the limits over longer mileage periods. In the future, they will have to be liable for mileage of 200,000 kilometers or ten years for cars and vans if the values are not met. For trucks, this applies to mileages of between 375,000 and 875,000 kilometers, depending on weight.
The pollutant limits have been adjusted very differently, as Europe.Table has already reported in advance. For gasoline passenger cars, for example, the limit value for nitrogen oxides was taken over from the current Euro 6 regulation. For diesel cars, the limit value was lowered by about 35 percent. The limits for delivery vans and light and heavy commercial vehicles will be significantly tightened. For trucks, the limit values for nitrogen oxides, for example, are to be lowered by up to 65 percent.
In the case of a pollutant standard, it is not only the limit values that count but also the criteria that are applied during the test drives. It is clear that the test conditions are being tightened. Under more difficult test conditions, Euro 7 vehicles have to comply with the values even up to altitudes of 1800 meters. For Euro 6, the value was 1300 meters.
The industry association VDA draws a very critical conclusion: “For passenger cars, Euro 7 is not feasible in terms of deadlines until July 2025, and for trucks, it is hardly technologically feasible until July 2027.” For heavy trucks, the proposal set “unrealistic targets.” The limit values were to be tightened by a factor of more than ten in some cases, with significantly stricter test conditions. VDA President Hildegard Müller is particularly harsh on the proposal for van limits, which are to be aligned with passenger car values.
The nitrogen oxide limit value for vans up to 3.5 tons is a particular challenge, she said: “The Commission’s promise that Euro 7 does not mean a de facto ban on the internal combustion engine has thus not been kept. The targeted limits are at the very edge of what is technologically feasible,” says Müller. Müller warns of significant cost increases if the proposal is not defused.
BMW CEO Oliver Zipse, who currently chairs the European industry association ACEA, takes a similar view: “Unfortunately, the consequences of the proposal for the environment would be very manageable, while the costs for manufacturers would be immense.” Volvo CEO Martin Lundstedt assesses the consequences of the proposal for truck manufacturers as follows: “In order to comply with Euro 7, manufacturers would have to divert engineering effort from the development of CO2-free powertrains on a large scale and reallocate it to the development of combustion technology.”
That would have massive transformational consequences: “It’s not good for the climate, it’s not good for people’s health, and it’s not good for industry.” Benjamin Krieger of the EU’s umbrella supplier association, Clepa, says, “A balanced Euro 7 proposal promotes product innovation and improves air quality.” However, he cautions, the proposal must remain realistic: “It’s about what’s technically achievable with the technology of today and the near future.”
The EU umbrella organization from the environmental organization Transport + Environment (T+E) criticizes the proposal as too lax. “The proposed limits for passenger cars are so weak, they could have come from the manufacturers themselves,” says Anna Krajinska of T+E. She says the car lobby has fiercely resisted all approaches to reform. “Now the Commission has folded, manufacturers’ profits are more important than people’s health,” Krajinka continued.
Jens Gieseke (CDU) says: “I reject stricter limits for tailpipe emissions. It has just been decided to phase out internal combustion engines for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles from 2035.” He adds that further “investment pressure” in combustion technology, which is being phased out in Europe, sends the wrong signal. Michael Bloss (Greens) sees it differently: “The Commission is once again buckling before the car lobby.” With its “lax” proposals, the Commission is accepting that an additional “100 million environmentally harmful cars will be driving on EU roads.”
It is not every day that four EU Commissioners appear together before the press to present an initiative. But for their new strategy on cyber defense and military mobility, Margrethe Vestager, Josep Borrell, Thierry Breton and Adina Valean made an exception. Against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine, Europeans need to reposition themselves and strengthen their defense, they said.
However, the 21-page communication on “EU Policy on Cyber Defence” that Borrell presented contains little in the way of specifics. Member states should “urgently commit to increasing their investment in the full range of cyber defense capabilities, including active defense capabilities,” it says. The EU will defend itself “by all available means” against hacker attacks, it said.
Borrell did not address the question of whether this includes controversial “hackbacks.” The strategy states that the EU “remains fully committed to international law and norms in cyberspace.” “Hackbacks” involve crippling the attacker’s servers or damaging critical infrastructure. Brussels relies on strategic ambiguity on this issue – it does not commit itself.
It also remained unclear why the Commission presented its strategy more than half a year after the start of the war in Ukraine, and not earlier. Has the danger of cyber attacks increased? Where are the biggest security gaps and how can they be closed? The commissioners were also silent on this issue.
Here, the EU Commission still has to follow up, said the liberal MEP Svenja Hahn to Europe.Table. “Here I expect clear plans from the Commission. IT security vulnerabilities must not be deliberately kept open for state surveillance measures, as they are also always a gateway for criminal or hostile actors. We need a Europe-wide vulnerability management system that closes security gaps.”
Vestager stressed that the threats are not only about military infrastructure, but also civil infrastructure. As an example, she pointed to the 5G networks for telecommunications. Germany, in particular, needs to better protect itself and exclude high-risk equipment suppliers like Huawei from China, she said. “It is not only Germany, but it is also Germany,” she explained when asked.
The countries must also coordinate their efforts better, she said. To this end, a Cyber Defense Coordination Center is to be established, and the EU Commission is also proposing a Cyber Commanders Conference. Borrell also advocated closer cooperation with NATO and with Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine is exemplary in cyber defense against Russian hacker attacks, he said.
Borrell had one piece of good news on military mobility. Great Britain wants to join the PESCO project. For London, this is a turnaround. Until now, the British were opposed to participating in the “Permanent Structured Cooperation.” However, when it comes to moving heavy military equipment to Eastern Europe, they depend on good infrastructure in continental Europe. The cooperation is to be formally agreed at the meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday.
On the international climate stage, Frans Timmermans‘ voice carries weight. Not only because the European Commission’s Vice President for the Green Deal can express himself perfectly in five languages, but because he is the EU’s chief negotiator.
For the highly complex negotiations, Timmermans relies on his team – the staff of the Directorate-General for Climate. A central figure is Jacob Werksman, special advisor to the Directorate General for International Climate Relations and head of the EU delegation to the UNFCCC. Werksman coordinates with the Czech government – the Czech Republic currently holds the rotating EU presidency, explains a senior EU climate official. “In this way, we ensure the representativeness of our negotiating team in the various international processes.”
“Climate,” as it is called in the Berlaymont, was founded in 2010 following COP15 in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen conference went down in history as the COP of all disasters, but it was also the starting point for a new dynamic that eventually led to the Paris Agreement. The Danish Commissioner in charge at the time, Connie Hedegaard, was very involved: “She was really instrumental in reviving the climate summit after Copenhagen,” it is said at the Berlaymont.
Since its creation, there has been no major restructuring in the DG, only an “adjustment” in the wake of the presentation of the Fit for 55 legislative package in July 2021 – a package that can be described as the regional implementation of the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015. Thus, two new departments were created in January 2022, bringing their total number to five.
The new organization allows for a horizontal treatment of the climate issue, which now concerns topics as diverse as agriculture, international trade or even defense. In addition, DG Climate has a second special advisor, Dušan Chrenek, who focuses on technological aspects. He works in particular with the directorate responsible for innovation and the decarbonization of the economy.
The 304-strong Directorate General needs new leadership after its Director General Mauro Petriccione died unexpectedly in August. According to the Commission, the appointment will be decided in the coming months.
However, Timmermans will not represent the EU alone in Sharm El-Sheikh: He will have to coordinate with the Czech presidency and the 27 member states. A unique constellation on the international climate stage. “Our negotiating partners have learned to appreciate and trust this unique entity with its peculiarities. But we have to keep explaining what the EU is doing and who is behind it,” explains a climate official.
The UN climate system does not limit membership to nation states. On the contrary, it allows regional economic integration (RWI) organizations like the EU to participate under the same conditions. Therefore, the EU is allowed to represent its own interests at the multilateral level. This means that it must formulate a common position with its member states before international negotiations begin. The EU’s mandate will be limited to internally agreed positions.
“This makes the EU less flexible in the negotiations, as it cannot deviate from the compromise reached,” criticized an EU diplomat. “Now, the arrival of ministers in the second week of negotiations may cause the lines to move.” European climate ministers travel to Sharm el-Sheikh next week. They will coordinate twice a day with the European Commission and the Czech presidency. So now there is movement in the negotiations.
Nov. 14-15, 2022
Council of the EU: Foreign Affairs
Topics: Exchange of views on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, exchange of views on the Western Balkans, exchange of views on Defence capabilities and operational realities. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)
Topics: Exchange of views with Mechthild Wörsdörfer (Deputy Director-General of DG Energy) on the upcoming electricity market reform, draft report on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, draft report on establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committe on Budgetary Control (CONT)
Topics: Draft Report on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank, report of the European Court of Auditors on the performance of the EU budget (status at the end of 2021), discharge of the 2021 general budget of the EU. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on International Trade (INTA)
Topics: Exchange of views on the state of play of international trade negotiations, draft opinion on the corporate sustainability due diligence, exchange of views with the Commission on the EU trade objectives ahead of the EU-ASEAN Summit in December 2022. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE)
Topics: Exchange of view on hybrid warfare: the vulnerability of undersea networks and other critical European infrastructures. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Special Committee on the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons learned and recommendations for the future (COVI)
Topics: Exchange of views with Lieve Verboven (International Labour Organization), exchange of views with Jan Willem Goudriaan (European Federation of Public Service Unions), exchange of views with Claes-Mikael Ståhl (European Trade Union Confederation). Draft Agenda
Nov. 15-16, 2022
G20 Summit
Topics: The presidents and heads of government of the 20 most important industrial nations meet for consultations. Infos
Nov. 15, 2022
Trilogue: RED III
Topics: The second trilogue meeting on the RED III dossier (Renewable Energy Directive) will start with “hard discussions” on the definition of green hydrogen. According to Markus Pieper, the European Parliament’s chief negotiator for the Renewable Energy Directive, the situation in the Council is “very delicate” as there are different views among Council members. Parliament will also propose “more ambitious” targets for the use of green hydrogen than the Council. The MP expressed confidence that Parliament’s positions will be successful as his clear and solid majority gives him a solid basis for negotiations.
Nov. 15, 2022
EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council
Topics: Bilateral relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, follow-up to the initialling of the EU-Kyrgyz Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, other political questions (constitutional reforms, rule of law and human rights, human rights), economic and trade issues. Infos
Nov. 16, 2022
Weekly Commission Meeting
Topics: Communication on Schengen enlargement. Draft Agenda
Nov. 16, 2022
Meeting of G7 Interior Ministers with EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Johansson
Topics: Exchange on the shared democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and social justice, equality and inclusive digitalisation. Infos
Nov. 17, 2022; 9 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
Topics: Draft opinion on corporate sustainability due diligence, draft report on markets in financial instruments. Draft Report
Nov. 17, 2022; 9 a.m-12:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Development (DEVE)
Topics: Presentation of the Youth Action Plan, draft opinion on the lessons learnt from the Pandora Papers and other revelations, exchange of views on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine ahead of the winter. Draft Agenda
Nov. 18, 2022; 10 a.m.
Council of the EU: General Affairs
Topics: State of play on the EU-UK relations, hearing on the values of the Union in Hungary, exchange of views on legislative programming: Commission work programme for 2023. Draft Agenda
In a late meeting last night, negotiators from the EU Parliament, Council and Commission agreed on a common denominator for the Land Use and Forestry Regulation (LULUCF). According to this, the target for the natural greenhouse gas reduction performance of the sector, divided among the EU states, will be set at 310 million tons of CO2-equivalents from 2030.
The trilogue result was essentially already known in advance and largely corresponds to the Commission proposal and the position of the parliament. But the total is higher than the 225 megatons originally envisaged in the EU climate law. The result is thus an important signal, also in the direction of the COP27 world climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh. The official conclusion of the negotiations paves the way for raising the EU climate target to 57 percent CO2 savings by 2030, which should strengthen the EU delegation’s negotiating position for NDC increases at the COP.
Ville Niinistö (Greens), rapporteur of the EU Parliament, expressed his satisfaction: “We now have a more ambitious target and stricter reporting requirements as well as more transparency. For the first time, biodiversity and the climate crisis are considered together in this legislation, and member states must also take the ‘Do no significant harm’ principle into account,” said the MEP.
Until 2025, the current requirements that emissions from the LULUCF sector must not exceed CO2 storage will continue to apply. From 2026, the sink performance must then be higher. This will require EU countries to take corrective action if progress toward their targets is insufficient.
What was contentious in the trilogue until the very end was, in particular, the question of the “flexibility” of these national targets to do justice to the major fluctuations within the sector, which are triggered by natural disasters or droughts, for example, and can vary greatly from country to country. The targets could thus be lower than initially assumed, as long as the overall EU-wide performance is achieved.
Due to external shocks, national LULUCF targets are also said to be “flexible” and could thus end up being lower than initially assumed as long as the overall EU target will be reached. Therefore, the agreement keeps the possibility to purchase and sell removal units between member states and use surplus annual emission allocations under the Effort Sharing Regulation to reach LULUCF targets. Most recently, the sector’s sink output had fallen from 322 to 249 million metric tons between 2013 and 2019 as a result of drought, forest fires, and pests, and continues to decline.
Accordingly, agriculture, which so far emits significantly more greenhouse gases than it stores, is also called upon to act. However, the LULUCF regulation does not provide for separate sub-targets for arable soils or peatlands. How exactly the targets are ultimately to be achieved therefore is not yet clear and is partly shifted to other legal acts. These include the planned Nature Restoration Law (NRL) and the legal framework for the certification of CO2 storage. til
The revision and extension of the Network and Information Security Directive NIS for cybersecurity has been approved by a large majority in parliament. “Even though it is the best cybersecurity legislation the continent has seen so far, we should not congratulate ourselves too much,” EP rapporteur Bart Groothuis (VVD/Renew) warned in plenary. Russia does not care about the legislation, he said, for that it needs further measures.
Groothuis called for active defense measures against attacks, which would require cooperation between ISPs and IT security authorities, for example, to block domains with malware. He said that NIS2 provides good opportunities to check risky providers. But it also needs further legislation to provide protection, for example, “when states enter our market with an offensive intellectual property theft program and their companies.” Infrastructure such as submarine cables would also be included in NIS2. But protection plans for them are inadequate, he said.
Margrethe Vestager agrees that NIS2 can hardly be the end of the discussions. It is “not a matter of adopting legislation” – but of applying it, says the Commission Vice President. Some member states had focused on a few infrastructures requiring special protection in the course of the previous NIS directive: “The number of essential and important organizations that now have to be protected in my country alone is around 6,000,” explained Czech Pirate MEP Marketa Gregorová (EFA). Previously, she said, there had only been 350.
Among other things, NIS2 expands the affected sectors covered by the regulations, as well as imposing further requirements on critical infrastructure operators. Exactly who is to be covered by the criteria has long been a matter of dispute – now two annexes to NIS2 define under which circumstances which sectors are subject to cybersecurity requirements.
Directly in the text of the directive itself, these are only telecommunications providers, trust service providers, DNS service providers, and name registrars as particularly relevant elements of the digital world. In the course of revising the IT Security Act, Germany had already anticipated which industries would be covered by NIS2 in the future, so the need for adaptation in Germany is likely to be rather low.
A new vulnerability register is being set up at the European Network Security Agency ENISA. However, it will remain rather weak and primarily active in a coordinating capacity. However, in the future, it will be responsible for assessing the member states’ mandatory cybersecurity concepts. The NIS2 also introduces a cooperation group for cooperation between the member states and with the Commission (Article 12), a cybersecurity incident response team network and a support network for the coordinated management of massive incidents called EU-CyCLONe.
“We have seen recent attacks on critical infrastructure in the Union. Legal implementation of the directive in the member states will take the agreed time, yes, but we should bring forward as much as possible on a voluntary basis,” Margrethe Vestager said. The attackers would not wait for a directive to be implemented, if they even appreciated or were capable of legal language, Vestager smirked into the Parliament’s semicircle. Adoption of the NIS2 in the Council in the coming weeks is only a formality – after that, the member states have 18 months to follow up the Brussels words with national legislative adjustments. fst
Yesterday, the European Parliament held a final vote on the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). With a majority of 525 votes in favor, 60 against and 28 abstentions, the plenary adopted the proposal on which Parliament, Council and Commission had agreed in June.
Around 50,000 companies in the EU are affected by the new sustainability reporting requirements. From 2024, these companies will have to disclose more detailed data on their environmental, social and governance impacts in accordance with uniform standards. The regulations will come into force in three stages:
The Council must now also formally adopt the proposal; this is announced for Nov. 28. It will then be signed and published in the Official Journal of the EU, and the directive will enter into force twenty days later. leo
The planned EU legislative package to strengthen the supply of strategically important raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act) will come at the end of March 2023, according to statements by the Commission. On the fringes of COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Peter Handley, Head of Unit for Raw Materials in DG Grow, presented the Commission’s plans and for the first time gave a concrete date. Originally, the package had been announced for the end of 2022; most recently, Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton had spoken of the first quarter of 2023.
At the beginning of October, Europe.Table had already learned the rough structure of the legal act. Handley now gave further details about the planned goals and measures:
Handley stressed the importance of a secure supply of critical raw materials for achieving the European Green Deal and the Paris climate targets. In global terms, he said, Europe was lagging behind China, Japan and the US, which had begun active raw materials policies earlier. “We look forward to a good discussion with our partners around the world once this piece of legislation is presented,” Handley said. leo
In light of the energy crisis, the European Parliament wants to use funds from the Reconstruction and Resilience Facility (RRF) for investments in energy infrastructure. On Thursday, the plenary adopted the amendments to the Commission proposal. Funding is to go primarily to renewable energy projects but also to fossil fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). About a third of the money is to be used for cross-border projects.
The parliamentarians want to go into the trilogue with the demand that a large part of the €20 billion in subsidies be made available by selling emission allowances earlier than planned. The EU states, on the other hand, had agreed to take money primarily from the Innovation Fund and to make only a small part available by shifting pollution rights.
The Parliament takes a critical view of this: “The council wants to plunder the innovation fund, which brings forward the development of innovative, clean technologies,” said Peter Liese (CDU). Especially in view of the planned investments of the USA in climate-friendly technology, this is a fatal signal. The EU Commission’s proposal to auction additional certificates from the market stability reserve to raise money was rejected. It was feared that this would cause additional emissions.
It was also stipulated that money from the COVID-19 Reconstruction Fund can be reallocated for energy purposes. According to the EU Commission, €225 billion in loans from the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRF) are still available. The Parliament also advocated using unused funds from the 2014-2020 EU budget for the investments.
“The ‘do no significant harm‘ principle should only be able to be suspended under strict conditions and within narrow limits. Investment in renewable energy is our priority,” said Jens Geier (SPD). “Gas pipelines needed to open up new supply routes must be hydrogen-capable so that the investment also makes sense when hydrogen production ramps up.” dpa/ber
In the trilogue negotiations on the regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, the Council, Parliament and Commission were able to reach agreement on some important issues this week. At the meeting on Wednesday evening, however, points of contention emerged at the same time for which no compromise is in sight in the near future. These include, above all, the inclusion of the financial sector.
The aim of the second trilogue was to exchange views on the most important issues and to reach initial agreements. The Czech Council Presidency wants to conclude the negotiations by the end of the year if possible. It is unclear whether this will be achievable.
The regulation provides for a ban on imports of many goods if forests have been cut down for their production. Topics discussed at Wednesday’s meeting included the definition of forest degradation, country risk assessment, due diligence, geolocation, controls, sanctions, access to justice, and scope.
On the issues of geolocation, simplified due diligence, and the country assessment system, the institutions were able to reach a political compromise so that the details do not need to be discussed at the technical level.
According to information from Europe.Table, one issue that continues to be contentious is the inclusion of the financial sector, in addition to the expansion of the scope (especially to include corn and rubber) and the definition of forest degradation. The Parliament is calling for additional requirements for investors here, and the Council has blocked attempts to go beyond the Commission’s proposal during the negotiations, according to a source in the Parliament. It is therefore hoped for more room for compromise by the political level of the Council, but a timely agreement would be surprising.
In the deliberations on the EU supply chain law, some member states are also calling for the financial sector to be excluded from due diligence requirements (Europe.Table reported). Luxembourg, Ireland and Germany have indicated they want to exclude asset managers and institutional investors from the scope, with France and Italy going further and calling for the entire financial sector to be exempted, according to an EU diplomat familiar with the negotiations.
A group of nine financial institutions, including GLS and Triodos Bank, had written an open letter to the Commission and the Council in the run-up to the trilogue on deforestation-free supply chains, calling for the involvement of the financial sector. “The financial sector plays a key role in shaping businesses and the economy, and thus in curbing deforestation and forest degradation,” it said.
The Commission presented its proposal in November 2021, and the Parliament adopted its position in September. All parties are still aiming to conclude the dossier by the end of the year under the Czech presidency. The next trilogue is scheduled for Dec. 5. leo/dpa
The European Parliament has given the green light to a new trade instrument aimed at preventing takeovers of European firms by highly subsidized foreign companies. MEPs voted by a large majority on Thursday in favor of the measure, which could come into force soon and is intended to combat market distortions.
Brussels also wants to prevent foreign companies supported with state money from taking public contracts away from European competitors. This could have a serious impact on Chinese companies.
This is what the new law is supposed to include:
The message for foreign companies is clear, said Christophe Hansen, the MEP responsible in the European Parliament. “They are welcome in the EU single market if they play by the rules. Those who don’t play fair will be left out.” Brussels has thus closed a major legal loophole, stressed CDU European politician Daniel Caspary. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Brussels said a large number of Chinese companies in the EU were concerned about the planned instrument. The EU Council of Member States still have to approve the proposed legislation. ari
Axel Voss, legal policy spokesman for the EPP group, is expected to become rapporteur for the AI Liability Directive. However, the Parliament has not yet officially assigned the lead for the report to the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI). There is still uncertainty about the final split with the Internal Market and Consumer Committee (IMCO), Europe.Table learned. Should the Legal Affairs Committee be given the lead, however, it will be no surprise if Axel Voss becomes the EPP rapporteur, it was said from his environment.
The legal policy expert was the rapporteur for the initiative report (AIDA) on the AI Act. For the AI Act itself, there had been long disputes about the allocation of the dossier. The directive on AI liability had been presented by EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders at the end of September. A few days later, Voss tweeted a joint photo with Reynders and wrote: “We are ready to continue the cooperation and lead the discussion on practical AI liability rules.”
Together with the regulation, the Commission also presented a revision of the General Product Liability Directive (PLD). Here, too, an EPP politician could become rapporteur, reports Contexte: Belgian MEP Pascal Arimont. vis
Nasi Goreng, the superstar street food dish in Bali, tries to balance flavor variety and nutritional content. And a balance between climate goals and the need for energy security is something that the G20 leaders will also have to strive for next week.
In fact, the signals coming out of the G20 summit on Nov. 15 and 16 will be crucial for the results achieved at COP27 two days later. Alden Meyer, climate advisor at UK think tank E3G, analyzes, “The geopolitical showdown will be in Bali, not Sharm El-Sheikh, to decide whether the coal phase-out commitments made in Glasgow should be maintained and action accelerated to stay below 1.5 degrees Celsius.”
“In terms of sequencing, Bali has real leverage. The G20 holds the cards for the fight against global warming,” says Friederike Röder, Vice President for advocacy at the NGO Global Citizen. And this summit is all the more important because the sherpas and ministers have failed to reach agreement on the controversial issues.
So it’s up to the leaders to provide the political impetus. No easy task: In early September, G20 ministers had been unable to agree on a joint declaration on climate protection. Some members, including China, India and Brazil, even refused to mention the 1.5 degree target or revised the resolutions so painfully reached at COP26.
“It is clear that this is where the most important opportunity for action lies; the G20 can make an enormous difference on the climate issue,” Röder continues. This is all the more true this year, as the various appearances by heads of state in Sharm El-Sheikh have not resulted in any major announcements or initiatives, and a number of G20 countries, including China, India, Canada and Australia, have not traveled to Egypt. “Everything remains to be done,” she sums up.
Although it is difficult to move forward without the European Union, observers outside the EU perceive it as weaker and more vulnerable than it was a year ago because of the war in Ukraine. “We need to restore the EU’s leadership and credibility on the international climate diplomacy stage. After all, the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine, which came from Germany in particular, was to free up investments for gas abroad,” Röder stresses.
The debate about the Euro 7 emissions standard is a prime example of the force with which the right level of environmental protection will be fought over in the coming years or, rather, decades. Euro 7 is also intended to regulate the emission of fine particles through brakes and tires, and for quite a long time: Manufacturers are to be liable for compliance with the limits for up to ten years or a mileage of 200,000 kilometers. Markus Grabitz has learned that car manufacturers consider the requirements to be almost impossible to implement and very expensive, while environmental associations criticize them as being too lax.
Yesterday, four EU commissioners presented an initiative to better protect the EU from hacker attacks. However, Eric Bonse reports that the initiative was disappointingly vague and, above all, not very concrete. The new strategy for cyberspace remains vague and ambivalent on important issues.
For the European Parliament, COVID-19 is not a major issue; there are more important tasks: €225 billion from the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRF) are still available, which should now flow primarily into investments for renewable energy projects. On Thursday, the parliamentarians voted in favor of a corresponding proposal from the EU Commission. They want to provide €20 billion in grants in addition to the COVID-19 funds.
Euro 7, the new emissions standard, is scheduled to take effect July 1, 2025, for cars and vans and July 1, 2027, for commercial vehicles. The proposal, which the Commission adopted Thursday, also sets targets for battery performance in EVs.
For battery EVs and plug-in hybrids, 80 percent of the charging power must be guaranteed up to a mileage of 100,000 kilometers or an age of five years. Up to an age of eight years or a mileage of 160,000 kilometers, the performance must not fall below 70 percent. For trucks, experience is still lacking for these specifications. The Commission intends to provide additional information as soon as possible.
Euro 7 also aims to regulate the emission of fine particles from brakes and tires. In the case of brakes, measuring devices for the release of fine particles already exist for passenger cars and delivery vans. Measuring devices for tire abrasion are under development. The Commission reserves the right to tighten the limits for brakes and tires via delegated acts for a period of five years after Euro 7 comes into force.
The emissions of each individual vehicle are to be transmitted digitally in the future. The Internet-enabled onboard diagnostic devices that are mandatory for new vehicles will be used for this purpose. Manufacturers must ensure that vehicles comply with the limits over longer mileage periods. In the future, they will have to be liable for mileage of 200,000 kilometers or ten years for cars and vans if the values are not met. For trucks, this applies to mileages of between 375,000 and 875,000 kilometers, depending on weight.
The pollutant limits have been adjusted very differently, as Europe.Table has already reported in advance. For gasoline passenger cars, for example, the limit value for nitrogen oxides was taken over from the current Euro 6 regulation. For diesel cars, the limit value was lowered by about 35 percent. The limits for delivery vans and light and heavy commercial vehicles will be significantly tightened. For trucks, the limit values for nitrogen oxides, for example, are to be lowered by up to 65 percent.
In the case of a pollutant standard, it is not only the limit values that count but also the criteria that are applied during the test drives. It is clear that the test conditions are being tightened. Under more difficult test conditions, Euro 7 vehicles have to comply with the values even up to altitudes of 1800 meters. For Euro 6, the value was 1300 meters.
The industry association VDA draws a very critical conclusion: “For passenger cars, Euro 7 is not feasible in terms of deadlines until July 2025, and for trucks, it is hardly technologically feasible until July 2027.” For heavy trucks, the proposal set “unrealistic targets.” The limit values were to be tightened by a factor of more than ten in some cases, with significantly stricter test conditions. VDA President Hildegard Müller is particularly harsh on the proposal for van limits, which are to be aligned with passenger car values.
The nitrogen oxide limit value for vans up to 3.5 tons is a particular challenge, she said: “The Commission’s promise that Euro 7 does not mean a de facto ban on the internal combustion engine has thus not been kept. The targeted limits are at the very edge of what is technologically feasible,” says Müller. Müller warns of significant cost increases if the proposal is not defused.
BMW CEO Oliver Zipse, who currently chairs the European industry association ACEA, takes a similar view: “Unfortunately, the consequences of the proposal for the environment would be very manageable, while the costs for manufacturers would be immense.” Volvo CEO Martin Lundstedt assesses the consequences of the proposal for truck manufacturers as follows: “In order to comply with Euro 7, manufacturers would have to divert engineering effort from the development of CO2-free powertrains on a large scale and reallocate it to the development of combustion technology.”
That would have massive transformational consequences: “It’s not good for the climate, it’s not good for people’s health, and it’s not good for industry.” Benjamin Krieger of the EU’s umbrella supplier association, Clepa, says, “A balanced Euro 7 proposal promotes product innovation and improves air quality.” However, he cautions, the proposal must remain realistic: “It’s about what’s technically achievable with the technology of today and the near future.”
The EU umbrella organization from the environmental organization Transport + Environment (T+E) criticizes the proposal as too lax. “The proposed limits for passenger cars are so weak, they could have come from the manufacturers themselves,” says Anna Krajinska of T+E. She says the car lobby has fiercely resisted all approaches to reform. “Now the Commission has folded, manufacturers’ profits are more important than people’s health,” Krajinka continued.
Jens Gieseke (CDU) says: “I reject stricter limits for tailpipe emissions. It has just been decided to phase out internal combustion engines for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles from 2035.” He adds that further “investment pressure” in combustion technology, which is being phased out in Europe, sends the wrong signal. Michael Bloss (Greens) sees it differently: “The Commission is once again buckling before the car lobby.” With its “lax” proposals, the Commission is accepting that an additional “100 million environmentally harmful cars will be driving on EU roads.”
It is not every day that four EU Commissioners appear together before the press to present an initiative. But for their new strategy on cyber defense and military mobility, Margrethe Vestager, Josep Borrell, Thierry Breton and Adina Valean made an exception. Against the backdrop of the Russian war in Ukraine, Europeans need to reposition themselves and strengthen their defense, they said.
However, the 21-page communication on “EU Policy on Cyber Defence” that Borrell presented contains little in the way of specifics. Member states should “urgently commit to increasing their investment in the full range of cyber defense capabilities, including active defense capabilities,” it says. The EU will defend itself “by all available means” against hacker attacks, it said.
Borrell did not address the question of whether this includes controversial “hackbacks.” The strategy states that the EU “remains fully committed to international law and norms in cyberspace.” “Hackbacks” involve crippling the attacker’s servers or damaging critical infrastructure. Brussels relies on strategic ambiguity on this issue – it does not commit itself.
It also remained unclear why the Commission presented its strategy more than half a year after the start of the war in Ukraine, and not earlier. Has the danger of cyber attacks increased? Where are the biggest security gaps and how can they be closed? The commissioners were also silent on this issue.
Here, the EU Commission still has to follow up, said the liberal MEP Svenja Hahn to Europe.Table. “Here I expect clear plans from the Commission. IT security vulnerabilities must not be deliberately kept open for state surveillance measures, as they are also always a gateway for criminal or hostile actors. We need a Europe-wide vulnerability management system that closes security gaps.”
Vestager stressed that the threats are not only about military infrastructure, but also civil infrastructure. As an example, she pointed to the 5G networks for telecommunications. Germany, in particular, needs to better protect itself and exclude high-risk equipment suppliers like Huawei from China, she said. “It is not only Germany, but it is also Germany,” she explained when asked.
The countries must also coordinate their efforts better, she said. To this end, a Cyber Defense Coordination Center is to be established, and the EU Commission is also proposing a Cyber Commanders Conference. Borrell also advocated closer cooperation with NATO and with Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine is exemplary in cyber defense against Russian hacker attacks, he said.
Borrell had one piece of good news on military mobility. Great Britain wants to join the PESCO project. For London, this is a turnaround. Until now, the British were opposed to participating in the “Permanent Structured Cooperation.” However, when it comes to moving heavy military equipment to Eastern Europe, they depend on good infrastructure in continental Europe. The cooperation is to be formally agreed at the meeting of EU foreign ministers on Monday.
On the international climate stage, Frans Timmermans‘ voice carries weight. Not only because the European Commission’s Vice President for the Green Deal can express himself perfectly in five languages, but because he is the EU’s chief negotiator.
For the highly complex negotiations, Timmermans relies on his team – the staff of the Directorate-General for Climate. A central figure is Jacob Werksman, special advisor to the Directorate General for International Climate Relations and head of the EU delegation to the UNFCCC. Werksman coordinates with the Czech government – the Czech Republic currently holds the rotating EU presidency, explains a senior EU climate official. “In this way, we ensure the representativeness of our negotiating team in the various international processes.”
“Climate,” as it is called in the Berlaymont, was founded in 2010 following COP15 in Copenhagen. The Copenhagen conference went down in history as the COP of all disasters, but it was also the starting point for a new dynamic that eventually led to the Paris Agreement. The Danish Commissioner in charge at the time, Connie Hedegaard, was very involved: “She was really instrumental in reviving the climate summit after Copenhagen,” it is said at the Berlaymont.
Since its creation, there has been no major restructuring in the DG, only an “adjustment” in the wake of the presentation of the Fit for 55 legislative package in July 2021 – a package that can be described as the regional implementation of the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015. Thus, two new departments were created in January 2022, bringing their total number to five.
The new organization allows for a horizontal treatment of the climate issue, which now concerns topics as diverse as agriculture, international trade or even defense. In addition, DG Climate has a second special advisor, Dušan Chrenek, who focuses on technological aspects. He works in particular with the directorate responsible for innovation and the decarbonization of the economy.
The 304-strong Directorate General needs new leadership after its Director General Mauro Petriccione died unexpectedly in August. According to the Commission, the appointment will be decided in the coming months.
However, Timmermans will not represent the EU alone in Sharm El-Sheikh: He will have to coordinate with the Czech presidency and the 27 member states. A unique constellation on the international climate stage. “Our negotiating partners have learned to appreciate and trust this unique entity with its peculiarities. But we have to keep explaining what the EU is doing and who is behind it,” explains a climate official.
The UN climate system does not limit membership to nation states. On the contrary, it allows regional economic integration (RWI) organizations like the EU to participate under the same conditions. Therefore, the EU is allowed to represent its own interests at the multilateral level. This means that it must formulate a common position with its member states before international negotiations begin. The EU’s mandate will be limited to internally agreed positions.
“This makes the EU less flexible in the negotiations, as it cannot deviate from the compromise reached,” criticized an EU diplomat. “Now, the arrival of ministers in the second week of negotiations may cause the lines to move.” European climate ministers travel to Sharm el-Sheikh next week. They will coordinate twice a day with the European Commission and the Czech presidency. So now there is movement in the negotiations.
Nov. 14-15, 2022
Council of the EU: Foreign Affairs
Topics: Exchange of views on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, exchange of views on the Western Balkans, exchange of views on Defence capabilities and operational realities. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)
Topics: Exchange of views with Mechthild Wörsdörfer (Deputy Director-General of DG Energy) on the upcoming electricity market reform, draft report on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, draft report on establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committe on Budgetary Control (CONT)
Topics: Draft Report on the control of the financial activities of the European Investment Bank, report of the European Court of Auditors on the performance of the EU budget (status at the end of 2021), discharge of the 2021 general budget of the EU. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on International Trade (INTA)
Topics: Exchange of views on the state of play of international trade negotiations, draft opinion on the corporate sustainability due diligence, exchange of views with the Commission on the EU trade objectives ahead of the EU-ASEAN Summit in December 2022. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE)
Topics: Exchange of view on hybrid warfare: the vulnerability of undersea networks and other critical European infrastructures. Draft Agenda
Nov. 14, 2022; 3-6:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Special Committee on the COVID-19 pandemic: lessons learned and recommendations for the future (COVI)
Topics: Exchange of views with Lieve Verboven (International Labour Organization), exchange of views with Jan Willem Goudriaan (European Federation of Public Service Unions), exchange of views with Claes-Mikael Ståhl (European Trade Union Confederation). Draft Agenda
Nov. 15-16, 2022
G20 Summit
Topics: The presidents and heads of government of the 20 most important industrial nations meet for consultations. Infos
Nov. 15, 2022
Trilogue: RED III
Topics: The second trilogue meeting on the RED III dossier (Renewable Energy Directive) will start with “hard discussions” on the definition of green hydrogen. According to Markus Pieper, the European Parliament’s chief negotiator for the Renewable Energy Directive, the situation in the Council is “very delicate” as there are different views among Council members. Parliament will also propose “more ambitious” targets for the use of green hydrogen than the Council. The MP expressed confidence that Parliament’s positions will be successful as his clear and solid majority gives him a solid basis for negotiations.
Nov. 15, 2022
EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council
Topics: Bilateral relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, follow-up to the initialling of the EU-Kyrgyz Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, other political questions (constitutional reforms, rule of law and human rights, human rights), economic and trade issues. Infos
Nov. 16, 2022
Weekly Commission Meeting
Topics: Communication on Schengen enlargement. Draft Agenda
Nov. 16, 2022
Meeting of G7 Interior Ministers with EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Johansson
Topics: Exchange on the shared democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and social justice, equality and inclusive digitalisation. Infos
Nov. 17, 2022; 9 a.m.-12:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)
Topics: Draft opinion on corporate sustainability due diligence, draft report on markets in financial instruments. Draft Report
Nov. 17, 2022; 9 a.m-12:30 p.m.
Meeting of the Committee on Development (DEVE)
Topics: Presentation of the Youth Action Plan, draft opinion on the lessons learnt from the Pandora Papers and other revelations, exchange of views on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine ahead of the winter. Draft Agenda
Nov. 18, 2022; 10 a.m.
Council of the EU: General Affairs
Topics: State of play on the EU-UK relations, hearing on the values of the Union in Hungary, exchange of views on legislative programming: Commission work programme for 2023. Draft Agenda
In a late meeting last night, negotiators from the EU Parliament, Council and Commission agreed on a common denominator for the Land Use and Forestry Regulation (LULUCF). According to this, the target for the natural greenhouse gas reduction performance of the sector, divided among the EU states, will be set at 310 million tons of CO2-equivalents from 2030.
The trilogue result was essentially already known in advance and largely corresponds to the Commission proposal and the position of the parliament. But the total is higher than the 225 megatons originally envisaged in the EU climate law. The result is thus an important signal, also in the direction of the COP27 world climate conference in Sharm el-Sheikh. The official conclusion of the negotiations paves the way for raising the EU climate target to 57 percent CO2 savings by 2030, which should strengthen the EU delegation’s negotiating position for NDC increases at the COP.
Ville Niinistö (Greens), rapporteur of the EU Parliament, expressed his satisfaction: “We now have a more ambitious target and stricter reporting requirements as well as more transparency. For the first time, biodiversity and the climate crisis are considered together in this legislation, and member states must also take the ‘Do no significant harm’ principle into account,” said the MEP.
Until 2025, the current requirements that emissions from the LULUCF sector must not exceed CO2 storage will continue to apply. From 2026, the sink performance must then be higher. This will require EU countries to take corrective action if progress toward their targets is insufficient.
What was contentious in the trilogue until the very end was, in particular, the question of the “flexibility” of these national targets to do justice to the major fluctuations within the sector, which are triggered by natural disasters or droughts, for example, and can vary greatly from country to country. The targets could thus be lower than initially assumed, as long as the overall EU-wide performance is achieved.
Due to external shocks, national LULUCF targets are also said to be “flexible” and could thus end up being lower than initially assumed as long as the overall EU target will be reached. Therefore, the agreement keeps the possibility to purchase and sell removal units between member states and use surplus annual emission allocations under the Effort Sharing Regulation to reach LULUCF targets. Most recently, the sector’s sink output had fallen from 322 to 249 million metric tons between 2013 and 2019 as a result of drought, forest fires, and pests, and continues to decline.
Accordingly, agriculture, which so far emits significantly more greenhouse gases than it stores, is also called upon to act. However, the LULUCF regulation does not provide for separate sub-targets for arable soils or peatlands. How exactly the targets are ultimately to be achieved therefore is not yet clear and is partly shifted to other legal acts. These include the planned Nature Restoration Law (NRL) and the legal framework for the certification of CO2 storage. til
The revision and extension of the Network and Information Security Directive NIS for cybersecurity has been approved by a large majority in parliament. “Even though it is the best cybersecurity legislation the continent has seen so far, we should not congratulate ourselves too much,” EP rapporteur Bart Groothuis (VVD/Renew) warned in plenary. Russia does not care about the legislation, he said, for that it needs further measures.
Groothuis called for active defense measures against attacks, which would require cooperation between ISPs and IT security authorities, for example, to block domains with malware. He said that NIS2 provides good opportunities to check risky providers. But it also needs further legislation to provide protection, for example, “when states enter our market with an offensive intellectual property theft program and their companies.” Infrastructure such as submarine cables would also be included in NIS2. But protection plans for them are inadequate, he said.
Margrethe Vestager agrees that NIS2 can hardly be the end of the discussions. It is “not a matter of adopting legislation” – but of applying it, says the Commission Vice President. Some member states had focused on a few infrastructures requiring special protection in the course of the previous NIS directive: “The number of essential and important organizations that now have to be protected in my country alone is around 6,000,” explained Czech Pirate MEP Marketa Gregorová (EFA). Previously, she said, there had only been 350.
Among other things, NIS2 expands the affected sectors covered by the regulations, as well as imposing further requirements on critical infrastructure operators. Exactly who is to be covered by the criteria has long been a matter of dispute – now two annexes to NIS2 define under which circumstances which sectors are subject to cybersecurity requirements.
Directly in the text of the directive itself, these are only telecommunications providers, trust service providers, DNS service providers, and name registrars as particularly relevant elements of the digital world. In the course of revising the IT Security Act, Germany had already anticipated which industries would be covered by NIS2 in the future, so the need for adaptation in Germany is likely to be rather low.
A new vulnerability register is being set up at the European Network Security Agency ENISA. However, it will remain rather weak and primarily active in a coordinating capacity. However, in the future, it will be responsible for assessing the member states’ mandatory cybersecurity concepts. The NIS2 also introduces a cooperation group for cooperation between the member states and with the Commission (Article 12), a cybersecurity incident response team network and a support network for the coordinated management of massive incidents called EU-CyCLONe.
“We have seen recent attacks on critical infrastructure in the Union. Legal implementation of the directive in the member states will take the agreed time, yes, but we should bring forward as much as possible on a voluntary basis,” Margrethe Vestager said. The attackers would not wait for a directive to be implemented, if they even appreciated or were capable of legal language, Vestager smirked into the Parliament’s semicircle. Adoption of the NIS2 in the Council in the coming weeks is only a formality – after that, the member states have 18 months to follow up the Brussels words with national legislative adjustments. fst
Yesterday, the European Parliament held a final vote on the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD). With a majority of 525 votes in favor, 60 against and 28 abstentions, the plenary adopted the proposal on which Parliament, Council and Commission had agreed in June.
Around 50,000 companies in the EU are affected by the new sustainability reporting requirements. From 2024, these companies will have to disclose more detailed data on their environmental, social and governance impacts in accordance with uniform standards. The regulations will come into force in three stages:
The Council must now also formally adopt the proposal; this is announced for Nov. 28. It will then be signed and published in the Official Journal of the EU, and the directive will enter into force twenty days later. leo
The planned EU legislative package to strengthen the supply of strategically important raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act) will come at the end of March 2023, according to statements by the Commission. On the fringes of COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Peter Handley, Head of Unit for Raw Materials in DG Grow, presented the Commission’s plans and for the first time gave a concrete date. Originally, the package had been announced for the end of 2022; most recently, Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton had spoken of the first quarter of 2023.
At the beginning of October, Europe.Table had already learned the rough structure of the legal act. Handley now gave further details about the planned goals and measures:
Handley stressed the importance of a secure supply of critical raw materials for achieving the European Green Deal and the Paris climate targets. In global terms, he said, Europe was lagging behind China, Japan and the US, which had begun active raw materials policies earlier. “We look forward to a good discussion with our partners around the world once this piece of legislation is presented,” Handley said. leo
In light of the energy crisis, the European Parliament wants to use funds from the Reconstruction and Resilience Facility (RRF) for investments in energy infrastructure. On Thursday, the plenary adopted the amendments to the Commission proposal. Funding is to go primarily to renewable energy projects but also to fossil fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG). About a third of the money is to be used for cross-border projects.
The parliamentarians want to go into the trilogue with the demand that a large part of the €20 billion in subsidies be made available by selling emission allowances earlier than planned. The EU states, on the other hand, had agreed to take money primarily from the Innovation Fund and to make only a small part available by shifting pollution rights.
The Parliament takes a critical view of this: “The council wants to plunder the innovation fund, which brings forward the development of innovative, clean technologies,” said Peter Liese (CDU). Especially in view of the planned investments of the USA in climate-friendly technology, this is a fatal signal. The EU Commission’s proposal to auction additional certificates from the market stability reserve to raise money was rejected. It was feared that this would cause additional emissions.
It was also stipulated that money from the COVID-19 Reconstruction Fund can be reallocated for energy purposes. According to the EU Commission, €225 billion in loans from the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRF) are still available. The Parliament also advocated using unused funds from the 2014-2020 EU budget for the investments.
“The ‘do no significant harm‘ principle should only be able to be suspended under strict conditions and within narrow limits. Investment in renewable energy is our priority,” said Jens Geier (SPD). “Gas pipelines needed to open up new supply routes must be hydrogen-capable so that the investment also makes sense when hydrogen production ramps up.” dpa/ber
In the trilogue negotiations on the regulation on deforestation-free supply chains, the Council, Parliament and Commission were able to reach agreement on some important issues this week. At the meeting on Wednesday evening, however, points of contention emerged at the same time for which no compromise is in sight in the near future. These include, above all, the inclusion of the financial sector.
The aim of the second trilogue was to exchange views on the most important issues and to reach initial agreements. The Czech Council Presidency wants to conclude the negotiations by the end of the year if possible. It is unclear whether this will be achievable.
The regulation provides for a ban on imports of many goods if forests have been cut down for their production. Topics discussed at Wednesday’s meeting included the definition of forest degradation, country risk assessment, due diligence, geolocation, controls, sanctions, access to justice, and scope.
On the issues of geolocation, simplified due diligence, and the country assessment system, the institutions were able to reach a political compromise so that the details do not need to be discussed at the technical level.
According to information from Europe.Table, one issue that continues to be contentious is the inclusion of the financial sector, in addition to the expansion of the scope (especially to include corn and rubber) and the definition of forest degradation. The Parliament is calling for additional requirements for investors here, and the Council has blocked attempts to go beyond the Commission’s proposal during the negotiations, according to a source in the Parliament. It is therefore hoped for more room for compromise by the political level of the Council, but a timely agreement would be surprising.
In the deliberations on the EU supply chain law, some member states are also calling for the financial sector to be excluded from due diligence requirements (Europe.Table reported). Luxembourg, Ireland and Germany have indicated they want to exclude asset managers and institutional investors from the scope, with France and Italy going further and calling for the entire financial sector to be exempted, according to an EU diplomat familiar with the negotiations.
A group of nine financial institutions, including GLS and Triodos Bank, had written an open letter to the Commission and the Council in the run-up to the trilogue on deforestation-free supply chains, calling for the involvement of the financial sector. “The financial sector plays a key role in shaping businesses and the economy, and thus in curbing deforestation and forest degradation,” it said.
The Commission presented its proposal in November 2021, and the Parliament adopted its position in September. All parties are still aiming to conclude the dossier by the end of the year under the Czech presidency. The next trilogue is scheduled for Dec. 5. leo/dpa
The European Parliament has given the green light to a new trade instrument aimed at preventing takeovers of European firms by highly subsidized foreign companies. MEPs voted by a large majority on Thursday in favor of the measure, which could come into force soon and is intended to combat market distortions.
Brussels also wants to prevent foreign companies supported with state money from taking public contracts away from European competitors. This could have a serious impact on Chinese companies.
This is what the new law is supposed to include:
The message for foreign companies is clear, said Christophe Hansen, the MEP responsible in the European Parliament. “They are welcome in the EU single market if they play by the rules. Those who don’t play fair will be left out.” Brussels has thus closed a major legal loophole, stressed CDU European politician Daniel Caspary. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Brussels said a large number of Chinese companies in the EU were concerned about the planned instrument. The EU Council of Member States still have to approve the proposed legislation. ari
Axel Voss, legal policy spokesman for the EPP group, is expected to become rapporteur for the AI Liability Directive. However, the Parliament has not yet officially assigned the lead for the report to the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI). There is still uncertainty about the final split with the Internal Market and Consumer Committee (IMCO), Europe.Table learned. Should the Legal Affairs Committee be given the lead, however, it will be no surprise if Axel Voss becomes the EPP rapporteur, it was said from his environment.
The legal policy expert was the rapporteur for the initiative report (AIDA) on the AI Act. For the AI Act itself, there had been long disputes about the allocation of the dossier. The directive on AI liability had been presented by EU Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders at the end of September. A few days later, Voss tweeted a joint photo with Reynders and wrote: “We are ready to continue the cooperation and lead the discussion on practical AI liability rules.”
Together with the regulation, the Commission also presented a revision of the General Product Liability Directive (PLD). Here, too, an EPP politician could become rapporteur, reports Contexte: Belgian MEP Pascal Arimont. vis
Nasi Goreng, the superstar street food dish in Bali, tries to balance flavor variety and nutritional content. And a balance between climate goals and the need for energy security is something that the G20 leaders will also have to strive for next week.
In fact, the signals coming out of the G20 summit on Nov. 15 and 16 will be crucial for the results achieved at COP27 two days later. Alden Meyer, climate advisor at UK think tank E3G, analyzes, “The geopolitical showdown will be in Bali, not Sharm El-Sheikh, to decide whether the coal phase-out commitments made in Glasgow should be maintained and action accelerated to stay below 1.5 degrees Celsius.”
“In terms of sequencing, Bali has real leverage. The G20 holds the cards for the fight against global warming,” says Friederike Röder, Vice President for advocacy at the NGO Global Citizen. And this summit is all the more important because the sherpas and ministers have failed to reach agreement on the controversial issues.
So it’s up to the leaders to provide the political impetus. No easy task: In early September, G20 ministers had been unable to agree on a joint declaration on climate protection. Some members, including China, India and Brazil, even refused to mention the 1.5 degree target or revised the resolutions so painfully reached at COP26.
“It is clear that this is where the most important opportunity for action lies; the G20 can make an enormous difference on the climate issue,” Röder continues. This is all the more true this year, as the various appearances by heads of state in Sharm El-Sheikh have not resulted in any major announcements or initiatives, and a number of G20 countries, including China, India, Canada and Australia, have not traveled to Egypt. “Everything remains to be done,” she sums up.
Although it is difficult to move forward without the European Union, observers outside the EU perceive it as weaker and more vulnerable than it was a year ago because of the war in Ukraine. “We need to restore the EU’s leadership and credibility on the international climate diplomacy stage. After all, the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine, which came from Germany in particular, was to free up investments for gas abroad,” Röder stresses.