As the last of the three traffic light parties, the Greens have now also approved the coalition agreement. Around 86 percent of the approximately 125,000 Green Party members favored the coalition agreement. “That’s quite a massive result,” said the future Minister of State for Culture in the Chancellery, Claudia Roth.
And another long-awaited step towards a traffic light government has been taken: Olaf Scholz has announced his ministerial line-up and caused a surprise. Karl Lauterbach is the new health minister – despite his popularity, many observers had not expected this decision.
In the public perception, the question of how the coalition positions itself at EU level plays a much smaller role than the filling of ministerial posts. But for the future government itself, this question is central – both for the projects in the European framework and in Germany. The Greens have obviously understood this. As Till Hoppe examines, they are in the process of filling the key positions for European policy coordination. This strong position in EU policy is “an enormous institutional success” for the party, says one of the new partners.
Pop culture is familiar with the term “supergroup”, which is usually used when famous musicians join forces to form a new band. In the future federal government, two areas that have often been diametrically opposed to each other are now to be brought together in a “super ministry”: Climate protection and the economy. Timo Landenberger found out why this plan is a “risky strategy”, where the future minister Robert Habeck will have to reckon with headwinds and on which points the designated foreign minister Annalena Baerbock will be in charge of the climate issue.
The new federal cabinet is now complete after the SPD was the last of the three parties to present its ministers on Monday. So the personnel tableau is largely in place, but the structures are not yet. In digital policy, for example, several ministries are still fiercely battling over responsibilities one day before the election of the new chancellor.
One thing, however, is already clear: In the future, the Greens will have a decisive influence on how the new federal government positions itself at EU level. The issue hardly plays a role in the public eye, but it is central to the new federal government’s power tectonics. Major decisions are being made at EU level, be it in climate, industrial or digital policy. Whoever sets the German position in the EU Council can also push their own agenda in Germany via Brussels.
The Greens have recognized this and are preparing to occupy the relevant positions in the Berlin government apparatus. They control the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Federal Foreign Office, the two institutions that have been responsible for coordinating European policy since 2005 – and will probably remain so. Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock have also brought in Sven Giegold and Franziska Brantner, high-profile European politicians who know the Brussels machinery inside out.
Until now, it was considered likely that Olaf Scholz, as chancellor, would pull the major decisions in EU policy even more strongly to himself than Angela Merkel did. The European Movement Germany and other experts also recommended a greater centralization of European policy coordination in the Chancellor’s Office, with additional staff resources to reduce the previous friction in departmental coordination. In the coalition agreement, the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP also advocate “more stringent coordination”.
However, the Greens understand it differently than the chancellor’s party SPD and said experts. “We Greens are in a strong position to implement a strong German European policy because all proposals on EU issues in the Council go through either the Federal Ministry of Economics (COREPER 1) or the Foreign Ministry (COREPER 2),” Giegold writes in an article on his website. The new constellation, with both houses in one hand, could “guarantee consistent European coordination”, according to the Greens.
In the public eye, the Greens have so far been seen as the losers in the traffic light power poker game. In the meantime, however, some SPD and FDP members have begun to suspect that they are giving their coalition partner an important instrument of power politics. Especially since the eco-party controls two other ministries that play an important role in Brussels, the environment and agriculture ministries, and has secured the right to propose the next German EU commissioner. So far, there has been no talk of strengthening the European department in the chancellery.
The strong position on European policy is “an enormous institutional success” for the party, one of the new partners warns. The Greens could thus shape Germany’s role in the EU Council, especially on Green Deal legislation.
Via Brussels, for example, the Greens could work towards tightening up the CO2 limits for passenger cars even more. The BMU is likely to remain in charge of the dossier within the federal government. The FDP-led transport ministry could stand on its hind legs, but then it would have to deal with the BMU and Habeck’s climate ministry as mediators.
Habeck seems determined to use this lever. He is concentrating energy and climate policy in his new super-ministry, bringing in departments from the Federal Environment Ministry for this purpose (see analysis on climate policy).
The technical supervision of climate and energy policy among the civil servant state secretaries lies with Patrick Graichen, ex-executive director of Agora Energiewende. Giegold will act as the interface to Brussels, reporting to the European department, among others. The Attac co-founder will thus be responsible for directives to the Permanent Representation in Brussels, which fall within COREPER 1’s scope of work. Giegold is considered to be assertive and is known to delve deeply into his topics. The long-serving MEP makes no secret of the fact that he wants to make the most of his new position.
As Habeck’s Parliamentary State Secretary, Franziska Brantner will be less closely involved in legislative projects at EU level than Giegold. The 42-year-old has gained experience in the Bundestag and the European Parliament and is well connected in other capitals. She knows France’s Secretary of State for Europe, Clément Beaune, from her studies. Brantner is, therefore, likely to be more effective at the diplomatic level.
The new Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, is also influenced by European policy. In Berlin, she is expected to be much more intensively involved at EU level than her predecessor Heiko Maas. The Foreign Office is also the second important interface with Brussels, it coordinates departmental coordination and signs the directives for COREPER 2, in which foreign and financial policy is negotiated.
The traffic light coalition wants to restructure its climate policy, and this includes a realignment of the ministries. The biggest change will be the responsibility of Robert Habeck. He, as Economics Minister, will also be responsible for climate protection in the new government – except international climate policy, which according to insiders, will probably be assigned to the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock will represent the German position at climate conferences in the future. The Environment Ministry, on the other hand, had to make significant cutbacks.
The occasional adjustments to the areas of responsibility are not unusual. The most recent addition to the Ministry of Economics was power policy under Sigmar Gabriel in 2013, which means that it has already been responsible for a core area of climate protection for several years. However, the fact that the entire area of European and national climate policy is now moving from the Environment Ministry to the Economics Ministry is a big step. A comparable expansion of competencies last took place in 2002 with the (ultimately unsuccessful) integration of the Labour Department, earning the BMWi the designation of “super ministry” both then and now.
The merger will once again bring together under one roof two areas that were often diametrically opposed in the past, which repeatedly caused disputes between the BMU and the BMWi. This is now to come to an end. Climate policy from a single source, that is the Greens’ plan.
Christoph Bals, political director of the environmental organization Germanwatch, calls this plan a “risky strategy”. Habeck and his team would now have to “form powerful departments for all sectors for the implementation of an ecologically, economically and socially just transformation, although many in these departments have so far been rather on the brakes,” Bals tells Europe.Table. “If this succeeds, it will be much more effective than the cacophony of the BMWi with the BMU so far. If it fails, the pressure of a BMU committed to climate, and sustainability goals will be missing.”
In any case, the new “super minister” Habeck will have to reckon with headwinds. After all, the liberal-led ministries of finance and transport are among the key ministries for climate protection. Already the renunciation of the ministry of transport had caused displeasure in the Green base. The subsequent announcement by the designated minister, Volker Wissing, that he wanted to ease the burden on car drivers first did not exactly calm Green tempers. And even Finance Minister Christian Lindner, as treasurer, can thwart many of the Greens’ climate plans.
However, Robert Habeck could soon have a corresponding equivalent at his disposal. In its coalition agreement, the CDU/CSU has declared its intention to review all legislative projects for their impact on the climate. How exactly this “climate check” is to look is not specified. However, both the Liberals and the Greens have instruments at their disposal to put a spoke in each other’s wheel.
This also applies to the European level, where, for example, the role of natural gas in achieving the EU’s climate targets remains controversial. The Greens and the FDP have no common position here. In the coalition agreement, they both support a rapid market ramp-up of hydrogen and European import partnerships.
However, the “technology-open design” includes H2 production from fossil fuels and clearly bears the Liberals’ signature. The same applies to the commitment to extend European emissions trading to the areas of buildings and transport, which has so far been rejected by the Greens in Brussels.
On the other hand, the fact that the BMU and BMWi no longer stand in each other’s way will be an advantage here. Provided that the marriage of climate protection and industrial interests succeeds, Germany could indeed take on the pioneering role it aspires to.
It is one of the most important initiatives in the EU Commission’s new circular economy package, which is planned for the first quarter of 2022. In theory, the idea of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) is a good one: In the future, companies will document all the substances used in their products. They name spare parts and calculate the CO2 footprint of their actions. This will make processes more transparent and give products sustainability criteria. In this way, the circular economy can be advanced.
This may also work for the production of a T-shirt or a hairdryer. The less waste we produce and the more products are integrated within a functioning circular economy, the more we protect our planet and contribute to sustainability.
However, the problem with such a regulatory idea, as envisaged in the EU’s Digital Product Passport, is that it puts different industries on an equal footing. Consumer goods such as clothing or small electronics should neither be equated with complex machinery and equipment nor be subject to the same rules. Unlike consumer goods, capital goods are always repairable, upgradable, often reusable, and have a lifespan of 20 years or more. Therefore, it is clear: There must not be a one-size-fits-all solution for all industries under the Digital Product Passport.
Mechanical and plant engineering is an export-oriented industry, operates on global markets, and is part of complex value chains. A machine, which is usually a product tailored to special customer requirements, consists of thousands of components and lots of input from external suppliers. Collecting all this data in the Digital Product Passport would be too much for small and medium-sized companies in particular. Neither machine manufacturers nor their suppliers can provide all the data along the complex supply chains in everyday practice.
And the necessary support from policymakers is also lacking: For example, there are no freely available tools for calculating the carbon footprint that take into account the specific needs of the industry. Here, policy objectives and entrepreneurial reality drift far apart. There is a threat of bureaucratic chaos, rising costs, and overlapping reporting obligations, for example, with the SCIP database, which already identifies substances of concern in products.
How can the Digital Product Passport still be a success? After all, the EU Commission’s basic idea of only bringing sustainable and recyclable products onto the European market is right and important. Also, in order to achieve the climate goals of the Green Deal. Everyone – whether citizens, companies, or industry – can make a contribution here.
For mechanical and plant engineering, the circular economy has been a megatrend for some years now. We produce machines that are not only used for decades but are also returned to the cycle as material. From the reuse of components and the use of state-of-the-art recycling technology to the optimization of our own production processes – mechanical engineering is essential for a functioning circular economy. Utilizing this potential and driving innovation must be in the interest and task of politics.
In order to achieve the required climate neutrality of the economy, we, therefore, need much more dialogue between politics and industry. The mechanical and plant engineering sector is ready for this. We want to get involved in the conception of the Digital Product Passport and, together with the EU, find ways that are also viable for the numerous hidden champions within Europe.
Done correctly, the Digital Product Passport is not only a step towards more climate protection but also an instrument that enables new business models and allows learning effects for the industry. In this way, it could actually become an added value for the mechanical engineering industry and an opportunity for all SMEs.
As the last of the three traffic light parties, the Greens have now also approved the coalition agreement. Around 86 percent of the approximately 125,000 Green Party members favored the coalition agreement. “That’s quite a massive result,” said the future Minister of State for Culture in the Chancellery, Claudia Roth.
And another long-awaited step towards a traffic light government has been taken: Olaf Scholz has announced his ministerial line-up and caused a surprise. Karl Lauterbach is the new health minister – despite his popularity, many observers had not expected this decision.
In the public perception, the question of how the coalition positions itself at EU level plays a much smaller role than the filling of ministerial posts. But for the future government itself, this question is central – both for the projects in the European framework and in Germany. The Greens have obviously understood this. As Till Hoppe examines, they are in the process of filling the key positions for European policy coordination. This strong position in EU policy is “an enormous institutional success” for the party, says one of the new partners.
Pop culture is familiar with the term “supergroup”, which is usually used when famous musicians join forces to form a new band. In the future federal government, two areas that have often been diametrically opposed to each other are now to be brought together in a “super ministry”: Climate protection and the economy. Timo Landenberger found out why this plan is a “risky strategy”, where the future minister Robert Habeck will have to reckon with headwinds and on which points the designated foreign minister Annalena Baerbock will be in charge of the climate issue.
The new federal cabinet is now complete after the SPD was the last of the three parties to present its ministers on Monday. So the personnel tableau is largely in place, but the structures are not yet. In digital policy, for example, several ministries are still fiercely battling over responsibilities one day before the election of the new chancellor.
One thing, however, is already clear: In the future, the Greens will have a decisive influence on how the new federal government positions itself at EU level. The issue hardly plays a role in the public eye, but it is central to the new federal government’s power tectonics. Major decisions are being made at EU level, be it in climate, industrial or digital policy. Whoever sets the German position in the EU Council can also push their own agenda in Germany via Brussels.
The Greens have recognized this and are preparing to occupy the relevant positions in the Berlin government apparatus. They control the Federal Ministry of Economics and the Federal Foreign Office, the two institutions that have been responsible for coordinating European policy since 2005 – and will probably remain so. Robert Habeck and Annalena Baerbock have also brought in Sven Giegold and Franziska Brantner, high-profile European politicians who know the Brussels machinery inside out.
Until now, it was considered likely that Olaf Scholz, as chancellor, would pull the major decisions in EU policy even more strongly to himself than Angela Merkel did. The European Movement Germany and other experts also recommended a greater centralization of European policy coordination in the Chancellor’s Office, with additional staff resources to reduce the previous friction in departmental coordination. In the coalition agreement, the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP also advocate “more stringent coordination”.
However, the Greens understand it differently than the chancellor’s party SPD and said experts. “We Greens are in a strong position to implement a strong German European policy because all proposals on EU issues in the Council go through either the Federal Ministry of Economics (COREPER 1) or the Foreign Ministry (COREPER 2),” Giegold writes in an article on his website. The new constellation, with both houses in one hand, could “guarantee consistent European coordination”, according to the Greens.
In the public eye, the Greens have so far been seen as the losers in the traffic light power poker game. In the meantime, however, some SPD and FDP members have begun to suspect that they are giving their coalition partner an important instrument of power politics. Especially since the eco-party controls two other ministries that play an important role in Brussels, the environment and agriculture ministries, and has secured the right to propose the next German EU commissioner. So far, there has been no talk of strengthening the European department in the chancellery.
The strong position on European policy is “an enormous institutional success” for the party, one of the new partners warns. The Greens could thus shape Germany’s role in the EU Council, especially on Green Deal legislation.
Via Brussels, for example, the Greens could work towards tightening up the CO2 limits for passenger cars even more. The BMU is likely to remain in charge of the dossier within the federal government. The FDP-led transport ministry could stand on its hind legs, but then it would have to deal with the BMU and Habeck’s climate ministry as mediators.
Habeck seems determined to use this lever. He is concentrating energy and climate policy in his new super-ministry, bringing in departments from the Federal Environment Ministry for this purpose (see analysis on climate policy).
The technical supervision of climate and energy policy among the civil servant state secretaries lies with Patrick Graichen, ex-executive director of Agora Energiewende. Giegold will act as the interface to Brussels, reporting to the European department, among others. The Attac co-founder will thus be responsible for directives to the Permanent Representation in Brussels, which fall within COREPER 1’s scope of work. Giegold is considered to be assertive and is known to delve deeply into his topics. The long-serving MEP makes no secret of the fact that he wants to make the most of his new position.
As Habeck’s Parliamentary State Secretary, Franziska Brantner will be less closely involved in legislative projects at EU level than Giegold. The 42-year-old has gained experience in the Bundestag and the European Parliament and is well connected in other capitals. She knows France’s Secretary of State for Europe, Clément Beaune, from her studies. Brantner is, therefore, likely to be more effective at the diplomatic level.
The new Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, is also influenced by European policy. In Berlin, she is expected to be much more intensively involved at EU level than her predecessor Heiko Maas. The Foreign Office is also the second important interface with Brussels, it coordinates departmental coordination and signs the directives for COREPER 2, in which foreign and financial policy is negotiated.
The traffic light coalition wants to restructure its climate policy, and this includes a realignment of the ministries. The biggest change will be the responsibility of Robert Habeck. He, as Economics Minister, will also be responsible for climate protection in the new government – except international climate policy, which according to insiders, will probably be assigned to the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock will represent the German position at climate conferences in the future. The Environment Ministry, on the other hand, had to make significant cutbacks.
The occasional adjustments to the areas of responsibility are not unusual. The most recent addition to the Ministry of Economics was power policy under Sigmar Gabriel in 2013, which means that it has already been responsible for a core area of climate protection for several years. However, the fact that the entire area of European and national climate policy is now moving from the Environment Ministry to the Economics Ministry is a big step. A comparable expansion of competencies last took place in 2002 with the (ultimately unsuccessful) integration of the Labour Department, earning the BMWi the designation of “super ministry” both then and now.
The merger will once again bring together under one roof two areas that were often diametrically opposed in the past, which repeatedly caused disputes between the BMU and the BMWi. This is now to come to an end. Climate policy from a single source, that is the Greens’ plan.
Christoph Bals, political director of the environmental organization Germanwatch, calls this plan a “risky strategy”. Habeck and his team would now have to “form powerful departments for all sectors for the implementation of an ecologically, economically and socially just transformation, although many in these departments have so far been rather on the brakes,” Bals tells Europe.Table. “If this succeeds, it will be much more effective than the cacophony of the BMWi with the BMU so far. If it fails, the pressure of a BMU committed to climate, and sustainability goals will be missing.”
In any case, the new “super minister” Habeck will have to reckon with headwinds. After all, the liberal-led ministries of finance and transport are among the key ministries for climate protection. Already the renunciation of the ministry of transport had caused displeasure in the Green base. The subsequent announcement by the designated minister, Volker Wissing, that he wanted to ease the burden on car drivers first did not exactly calm Green tempers. And even Finance Minister Christian Lindner, as treasurer, can thwart many of the Greens’ climate plans.
However, Robert Habeck could soon have a corresponding equivalent at his disposal. In its coalition agreement, the CDU/CSU has declared its intention to review all legislative projects for their impact on the climate. How exactly this “climate check” is to look is not specified. However, both the Liberals and the Greens have instruments at their disposal to put a spoke in each other’s wheel.
This also applies to the European level, where, for example, the role of natural gas in achieving the EU’s climate targets remains controversial. The Greens and the FDP have no common position here. In the coalition agreement, they both support a rapid market ramp-up of hydrogen and European import partnerships.
However, the “technology-open design” includes H2 production from fossil fuels and clearly bears the Liberals’ signature. The same applies to the commitment to extend European emissions trading to the areas of buildings and transport, which has so far been rejected by the Greens in Brussels.
On the other hand, the fact that the BMU and BMWi no longer stand in each other’s way will be an advantage here. Provided that the marriage of climate protection and industrial interests succeeds, Germany could indeed take on the pioneering role it aspires to.
It is one of the most important initiatives in the EU Commission’s new circular economy package, which is planned for the first quarter of 2022. In theory, the idea of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) is a good one: In the future, companies will document all the substances used in their products. They name spare parts and calculate the CO2 footprint of their actions. This will make processes more transparent and give products sustainability criteria. In this way, the circular economy can be advanced.
This may also work for the production of a T-shirt or a hairdryer. The less waste we produce and the more products are integrated within a functioning circular economy, the more we protect our planet and contribute to sustainability.
However, the problem with such a regulatory idea, as envisaged in the EU’s Digital Product Passport, is that it puts different industries on an equal footing. Consumer goods such as clothing or small electronics should neither be equated with complex machinery and equipment nor be subject to the same rules. Unlike consumer goods, capital goods are always repairable, upgradable, often reusable, and have a lifespan of 20 years or more. Therefore, it is clear: There must not be a one-size-fits-all solution for all industries under the Digital Product Passport.
Mechanical and plant engineering is an export-oriented industry, operates on global markets, and is part of complex value chains. A machine, which is usually a product tailored to special customer requirements, consists of thousands of components and lots of input from external suppliers. Collecting all this data in the Digital Product Passport would be too much for small and medium-sized companies in particular. Neither machine manufacturers nor their suppliers can provide all the data along the complex supply chains in everyday practice.
And the necessary support from policymakers is also lacking: For example, there are no freely available tools for calculating the carbon footprint that take into account the specific needs of the industry. Here, policy objectives and entrepreneurial reality drift far apart. There is a threat of bureaucratic chaos, rising costs, and overlapping reporting obligations, for example, with the SCIP database, which already identifies substances of concern in products.
How can the Digital Product Passport still be a success? After all, the EU Commission’s basic idea of only bringing sustainable and recyclable products onto the European market is right and important. Also, in order to achieve the climate goals of the Green Deal. Everyone – whether citizens, companies, or industry – can make a contribution here.
For mechanical and plant engineering, the circular economy has been a megatrend for some years now. We produce machines that are not only used for decades but are also returned to the cycle as material. From the reuse of components and the use of state-of-the-art recycling technology to the optimization of our own production processes – mechanical engineering is essential for a functioning circular economy. Utilizing this potential and driving innovation must be in the interest and task of politics.
In order to achieve the required climate neutrality of the economy, we, therefore, need much more dialogue between politics and industry. The mechanical and plant engineering sector is ready for this. We want to get involved in the conception of the Digital Product Passport and, together with the EU, find ways that are also viable for the numerous hidden champions within Europe.
Done correctly, the Digital Product Passport is not only a step towards more climate protection but also an instrument that enables new business models and allows learning effects for the industry. In this way, it could actually become an added value for the mechanical engineering industry and an opportunity for all SMEs.
