More than two years ago, the EU Commission presented an action plan for more organic agriculture. The goal was to increase the organic share in food production to 25 percent by 2030. Germany is even more ambitious and wants to reach 30 percent by the same date. My colleague Timo Landenberger and I have put the action plan, its implementation to date and the meaningfulness of the target to the test in the context of food safety in the EU. I can say this much in advance: There are major doubts about the Commission’s plans.
In addition, today you can read the second part of the interview with Gunnar Wiegand, the outgoing Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS). He sees the German-China strategy as a crucial step in the implementation of the European-China policy.
In today’s Heads, we introduce the chief lobbyist of the German arms industry, Hans Christoph Atzpodien. Among other things, he calls for weapons to be included in the EU’s sustainability taxonomy, because: “Without weapons, there is no defense readiness and also no peace.”
I hope you enjoy reading today’s issue and have a great day.
More than two years ago, the EU Commission presented its action plan for the development of organic production. The aim was to increase the production and consumption of organic products and to farm at least 25 percent of agricultural land organically by 2030. At the time, the Commission promised more biodiversity, animal welfare and higher incomes for farmers from its plans.
The Commission explicitly considered the 25 percent target to be feasible. In March 2021, the share of organic agriculture in the EU was only around 9 percent, according to the Commission. However, some member states already had a share of over 25 percent in 2021, while others had only 0.5 percent.
Through information campaigns, surveys and data collection, the Commission wants to boost the consumption of organic products, and through research and innovation, production is to be increased. Whether this will be enough to reach the 25 percent target is questionable. At the current annual rate of increase in organically farmed agricultural land, an EU-wide share of just about 16 percent would be reached in 2030. This means that to reach the EU target, the annual conversion rate would have to almost double and the organically farmed area would have to almost triple compared to today.
Given stagnating sales of organic products due to inflation and increased food prices, such growth seems unrealistic. In surveys, many EU citizens do indicate a high level of interest in organic products. However, purchasing behavior speaks a different language; after all, organic products are generally significantly more expensive.
The high level of ambition of the European organic farming targets becomes even clearer when looking at the example of Germany. The German government has set itself even higher goals and aims to achieve as much as 30 percent organic farming by 2030. 11.2 percent of Germany’s agricultural land is currently farmed organically. The annual conversion rate is currently 3.7 percent, but it would have to exceed twelve percent to reach the target agreed in the coalition agreement.
So the efforts made so far do not seem sufficient. And most national strategic plans for implementing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are not geared to the goal either. In this context, the Commission had called on member states to integrate the development of national organic agriculture action plans into their CAP strategic plans. The German CAP strategic plan also only provides for the use of new financial scope created by the organic regulations of the CAP also for the expansion of organic farming.
Green agricultural politician and MEP Martin Häusling welcomes the envisaged greening of agriculture, but describes the Commission’s plans to use the CAP’s so-called eco-schemes to support organic farming as a “bag of tricks”. Organic farming is not even allowed to participate in many CAP programs because of general organic support, he says. The Commission claims that direct payments through the CAP’s eco-schemes support conversion and retention of organic farming. Häusling has doubts about that, saying the minimum requirements for eco-schemes and organic farming are not comparable. “A little less pesticide and mineral fertilizer use is absolutely not the same as the soil- and ecosystem-enhancing approach of organic farming.”
The next question is: Does the target of 25 percent organic farming make sense from a food security perspective? The differences in yield between organic and conventional agriculture are sometimes immense. And the EU is aiming for the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency through European agricultural products, which could be hampered by 25 percent organic and the lower yield. That’s why Bernhard Krüsken, secretary general of the German Farmers’ Association (DBV), warns, “In the event of large-scale conversion, it can be assumed that imports of low-priced food from non-European countries would increase even further.” This also applies to organic products, Krüsken said.
Norbert Lins (CDU), chairman of the Agriculture Committee in the EU Parliament, also believes that a complete switch to organic would have a negative impact on self-sufficiency. “We need to move away from the organic or non-organic debate and towards a more realistic agriculture that is even better adapted to the respective location.”
Green Party politician Häusling believes this is an “industry narrative”. “Intensive conventional farming may produce higher yields in the short term, but it leads to dwindling harvests and high social costs in the long term due to soil depletion and overuse of ecosystems.” To be sure, he said, the yield difference between organic and conventional farming averages about 16 percent across all crops. But Häusling argues for a far-reaching change in land use as well as food handling: less grain in the feed trough, more for human consumption, less land for agrofuel production and less food waste.
There is also the question of whether larger quantities of organic products would be bought at all. For Krüsken of the DBV, it is clear that the market will decide. “Should consumers turn to organic products to the appropriate extent, farmers will adapt to consumer behavior.” Currently, however, one sees rather the opposite trend – as with all products that define themselves by regionality or higher standards, says Krüsken. “The inflation debate is driving consumer price orientation.”
Lins argues similarly: “Converting to organic without the appropriate market and customers willing to dig deeper into their pockets for it does nothing for the farmer, nor does it bring us any closer to the 25 percent target.” Häusling, on the other hand, sees the Commission in particular as having a responsibility. There is still a lack of information campaigns and funds for research, he said. Of the €48 million in EU research funds for sustainable agriculture in 2023, only about €28 million would go to organic farming research. “And with the watering can allocation of €290 billion for CAP direct payments alone, largely linked to the number of hectares, I clearly see the EU as having a duty to change course.”
Berlin published its China strategy just a few weeks ago. What impetus did this give Brussels?
The colleagues in Germany have developed a very comprehensive strategy. An important contribution was made here by one of the most important European partners as part of the European positioning on China. It is part of the common EU position towards China and supports and strengthens it by translating the EU strategy into the imperatives and capabilities of a member state. Namely, for the national, state and municipal level, for the official institutions, as well as for universities or companies. For me, this is an essential contribution to strengthening the EU and its policy towards Beijing. It is not a deviation or a new impetus, but the implementation of the European framework. I’m glad that Germany has now done the same, as other member states have done so before.
The European elections are coming up next year. Do you think China will play a role in this and the election campaigns?
Traditionally, foreign and security policy issues are very seldom of decisive importance in elections. I think China plays a more indirect role in this, especially when it comes to the economic links and dependencies between both sides.
Is there an approach for the European elections, and also in general, to do more against Chinese disinformation? Especially on platforms like X, better known as Twitter, these are sprouting without any context or explanations.
In the most recent EEAS report on disinformation, there was a chapter on Chinese support for Russian information manipulation. We deliberately included Chinese publications and actions in social media, given their ever-growing importance. And especially in countries where China is often an efficient amplifier of Russian disinformation. It is important not only to address this diplomatically whenever possible, but also to concretely refute it, including with reactions on social media. We have to actively clarify things here.
You can only clarify when there are facts. This is not possible, for example, in the case of the disappeared Foreign Minister Qin Gang, because his whereabouts are still unclear. The rumor mill is churning. Have you been given more information about this? EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s visit to China had to be postponed because of this.
I have to disappoint you. We were informed at relatively short notice that the visit was no longer feasible. Then the impression was given that it was due to a health-related problem. Which still cannot be entirely ruled out. But we will not comment on this, only the relevant Chinese authorities can do that.
Has a date already been set for the EU-China summit?
The summit is planned to be held this year, but the date has not yet been set.
Do you have a personal highlight of your time as Asia Director of the EEAS?
There are quite a few. But one was certainly: to see how strongly the Union is now willing to expand and proactively engage in a part of the world that is both far away, but more and more closely connected to us. One highlight is that we developed a new EU Indo-Pacific strategy with all member states in 2021, which we then began to fully implement in 2022 despite the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This was nowhere as apparent as with the first Ministerial Forum on Indo-Pacific Cooperation in Paris on February 22, just before the start of the Russian invasion. Europe managed to act globally, despite the threat of war in its immediate vicinity.
What other developments do you consider important?
That we have now slowly set the Global Gateway Initiative in the right direction and there are a number of concrete flagship projects driving the green and digital transition and contributing to infrastructure development and connectivity. I could name a lot more, but I think these are pretty good highlights. However, there were also a number of highly negative experiences, such as the military coup in Myanmar or the developments in Afghanistan. What is also concerning is that there are more and more ICBMs from North Korea, but no dialogue anymore.
What advice would you give your successor?
Above all, I would advise my successor to also think in the medium and long term and prepare things accordingly and not just look at the current situation. I believe that is a significant flaw of our collective decision-making process, in which people keep trying to position themselves in detail on an issue, and then lose sight of the big picture once the member states attempt to find a compromise. This is not only the case when it comes to China.
Has a successor already been chosen?
I can only tell you that the best will be chosen and that the selection process is in full swing.
You can find the first part of the interview here.
Gunnar Wiegand was Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS) from January 2016 to August 2023. Previously, he was Deputy Head for the Europe and Central Asia Division and Director of the Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia and OSCE Division at EEAS. Prior to joining EEAS, Wiegand held various positions related to external relations and trade policy at the European Commission since 1990.
Wiegand will become Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, after the summer break. He will be part of the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.
Hans Christoph Atzpodien knows how to maneuver in what is probably the most disagreeable of all industries – legally, strategically, but above all argumentatively. What he invests his energy in – in preventing an arms export control law, for example – or when he lets it go – vis-à-vis the media, for example.
Atzpodien, who was born in Düren in the Eifel region in 1955 and holds a doctorate in law, has been chief executive of the German Security and Defense Industry Association (BDSV) and its founding member since 2017. Founded in 2009, the lobby association brings together more than 200 German defense companies, including heavyweights such as Airbus Defence, MBDA, Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and Diehl Defence.
Together we are stronger – not least in the face of the German government, which wants to impose stricter legal controls on arms exports before the end of this legislative period. The top representative of an industry that is very dependent on the export business and international cooperation takes a correspondingly critical view of this. “In case of doubt, this instrument is rather detrimental to cooperation”, says the 68-year-old. “European cooperations only work if the customers want the same device. Politicians in the relevant countries must ensure that this is the case and remove all hurdles. These hurdles also include different ideas about arms exports.”
And one is stronger vis-à-vis the EU institutions, which are putting pressure on climate protection. For example, Atzpodien advocates including weapons in the EU’s sustainability taxonomy to signal to investors that it is a sustainable investment opportunity. “Without weapons, there is no readiness for defense and also no peace”, Atzpodien argues. “Security is the mother of all sustainability.”
There is no doubt that Feb. 24, 2022 also marked a turning point for the German defense industry: Weapons deliveries to Ukraine, the equipping of the German armed forces – the security and defense industry has not been in such a bad position in the public eye since then, one might think. But has the industry’s public image really improved as a result?
Atzpodien then goes on to explain where the bad reputation comes from in the first place. It is the German government, for example, that approves arms exports to non-NATO countries, but does not explain to the population why. This then reflects on the industry. Take Algeria, for example: “At the time, we sold frigates there from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. Why did the German government approve that? Because it saw Algeria as a stabilizing factor in the western Mediterranean.”
According to the German government’s political principles, weapons would only be exported from Germany if the federal government had an interest in them in terms of foreign and security policy, explains Atzpodien. “Since we also want to ensure that our products do not fall into the wrong hands, we are absolutely behind it.” The example of Ukraine also shows that it is the German government that decides on exports, not the industry.
In 1982 Atzpodien joined what was then Otto Wolff AG, which later became part of the Thyssen Group. In 2007 he became Chairman of the Executive Board of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). His time at the helm included controversial submarine deals with the Israeli and Egyptian governments. In 2016, Atzpodien was forced to leave TKMS after a multi-billion dollar submarine contract from Australia went to French competitor DCNS.
Has the reputation of the defense industry improved since the start of the war in Ukraine? Atzpodien does not give a direct answer to this question. Media interest has increased, he says, but he is still nowhere near getting a word in edgewise, although he doesn’t try as often as he used to. Lisa-Martina Klein
More than two years ago, the EU Commission presented an action plan for more organic agriculture. The goal was to increase the organic share in food production to 25 percent by 2030. Germany is even more ambitious and wants to reach 30 percent by the same date. My colleague Timo Landenberger and I have put the action plan, its implementation to date and the meaningfulness of the target to the test in the context of food safety in the EU. I can say this much in advance: There are major doubts about the Commission’s plans.
In addition, today you can read the second part of the interview with Gunnar Wiegand, the outgoing Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS). He sees the German-China strategy as a crucial step in the implementation of the European-China policy.
In today’s Heads, we introduce the chief lobbyist of the German arms industry, Hans Christoph Atzpodien. Among other things, he calls for weapons to be included in the EU’s sustainability taxonomy, because: “Without weapons, there is no defense readiness and also no peace.”
I hope you enjoy reading today’s issue and have a great day.
More than two years ago, the EU Commission presented its action plan for the development of organic production. The aim was to increase the production and consumption of organic products and to farm at least 25 percent of agricultural land organically by 2030. At the time, the Commission promised more biodiversity, animal welfare and higher incomes for farmers from its plans.
The Commission explicitly considered the 25 percent target to be feasible. In March 2021, the share of organic agriculture in the EU was only around 9 percent, according to the Commission. However, some member states already had a share of over 25 percent in 2021, while others had only 0.5 percent.
Through information campaigns, surveys and data collection, the Commission wants to boost the consumption of organic products, and through research and innovation, production is to be increased. Whether this will be enough to reach the 25 percent target is questionable. At the current annual rate of increase in organically farmed agricultural land, an EU-wide share of just about 16 percent would be reached in 2030. This means that to reach the EU target, the annual conversion rate would have to almost double and the organically farmed area would have to almost triple compared to today.
Given stagnating sales of organic products due to inflation and increased food prices, such growth seems unrealistic. In surveys, many EU citizens do indicate a high level of interest in organic products. However, purchasing behavior speaks a different language; after all, organic products are generally significantly more expensive.
The high level of ambition of the European organic farming targets becomes even clearer when looking at the example of Germany. The German government has set itself even higher goals and aims to achieve as much as 30 percent organic farming by 2030. 11.2 percent of Germany’s agricultural land is currently farmed organically. The annual conversion rate is currently 3.7 percent, but it would have to exceed twelve percent to reach the target agreed in the coalition agreement.
So the efforts made so far do not seem sufficient. And most national strategic plans for implementing the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are not geared to the goal either. In this context, the Commission had called on member states to integrate the development of national organic agriculture action plans into their CAP strategic plans. The German CAP strategic plan also only provides for the use of new financial scope created by the organic regulations of the CAP also for the expansion of organic farming.
Green agricultural politician and MEP Martin Häusling welcomes the envisaged greening of agriculture, but describes the Commission’s plans to use the CAP’s so-called eco-schemes to support organic farming as a “bag of tricks”. Organic farming is not even allowed to participate in many CAP programs because of general organic support, he says. The Commission claims that direct payments through the CAP’s eco-schemes support conversion and retention of organic farming. Häusling has doubts about that, saying the minimum requirements for eco-schemes and organic farming are not comparable. “A little less pesticide and mineral fertilizer use is absolutely not the same as the soil- and ecosystem-enhancing approach of organic farming.”
The next question is: Does the target of 25 percent organic farming make sense from a food security perspective? The differences in yield between organic and conventional agriculture are sometimes immense. And the EU is aiming for the highest possible degree of self-sufficiency through European agricultural products, which could be hampered by 25 percent organic and the lower yield. That’s why Bernhard Krüsken, secretary general of the German Farmers’ Association (DBV), warns, “In the event of large-scale conversion, it can be assumed that imports of low-priced food from non-European countries would increase even further.” This also applies to organic products, Krüsken said.
Norbert Lins (CDU), chairman of the Agriculture Committee in the EU Parliament, also believes that a complete switch to organic would have a negative impact on self-sufficiency. “We need to move away from the organic or non-organic debate and towards a more realistic agriculture that is even better adapted to the respective location.”
Green Party politician Häusling believes this is an “industry narrative”. “Intensive conventional farming may produce higher yields in the short term, but it leads to dwindling harvests and high social costs in the long term due to soil depletion and overuse of ecosystems.” To be sure, he said, the yield difference between organic and conventional farming averages about 16 percent across all crops. But Häusling argues for a far-reaching change in land use as well as food handling: less grain in the feed trough, more for human consumption, less land for agrofuel production and less food waste.
There is also the question of whether larger quantities of organic products would be bought at all. For Krüsken of the DBV, it is clear that the market will decide. “Should consumers turn to organic products to the appropriate extent, farmers will adapt to consumer behavior.” Currently, however, one sees rather the opposite trend – as with all products that define themselves by regionality or higher standards, says Krüsken. “The inflation debate is driving consumer price orientation.”
Lins argues similarly: “Converting to organic without the appropriate market and customers willing to dig deeper into their pockets for it does nothing for the farmer, nor does it bring us any closer to the 25 percent target.” Häusling, on the other hand, sees the Commission in particular as having a responsibility. There is still a lack of information campaigns and funds for research, he said. Of the €48 million in EU research funds for sustainable agriculture in 2023, only about €28 million would go to organic farming research. “And with the watering can allocation of €290 billion for CAP direct payments alone, largely linked to the number of hectares, I clearly see the EU as having a duty to change course.”
Berlin published its China strategy just a few weeks ago. What impetus did this give Brussels?
The colleagues in Germany have developed a very comprehensive strategy. An important contribution was made here by one of the most important European partners as part of the European positioning on China. It is part of the common EU position towards China and supports and strengthens it by translating the EU strategy into the imperatives and capabilities of a member state. Namely, for the national, state and municipal level, for the official institutions, as well as for universities or companies. For me, this is an essential contribution to strengthening the EU and its policy towards Beijing. It is not a deviation or a new impetus, but the implementation of the European framework. I’m glad that Germany has now done the same, as other member states have done so before.
The European elections are coming up next year. Do you think China will play a role in this and the election campaigns?
Traditionally, foreign and security policy issues are very seldom of decisive importance in elections. I think China plays a more indirect role in this, especially when it comes to the economic links and dependencies between both sides.
Is there an approach for the European elections, and also in general, to do more against Chinese disinformation? Especially on platforms like X, better known as Twitter, these are sprouting without any context or explanations.
In the most recent EEAS report on disinformation, there was a chapter on Chinese support for Russian information manipulation. We deliberately included Chinese publications and actions in social media, given their ever-growing importance. And especially in countries where China is often an efficient amplifier of Russian disinformation. It is important not only to address this diplomatically whenever possible, but also to concretely refute it, including with reactions on social media. We have to actively clarify things here.
You can only clarify when there are facts. This is not possible, for example, in the case of the disappeared Foreign Minister Qin Gang, because his whereabouts are still unclear. The rumor mill is churning. Have you been given more information about this? EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s visit to China had to be postponed because of this.
I have to disappoint you. We were informed at relatively short notice that the visit was no longer feasible. Then the impression was given that it was due to a health-related problem. Which still cannot be entirely ruled out. But we will not comment on this, only the relevant Chinese authorities can do that.
Has a date already been set for the EU-China summit?
The summit is planned to be held this year, but the date has not yet been set.
Do you have a personal highlight of your time as Asia Director of the EEAS?
There are quite a few. But one was certainly: to see how strongly the Union is now willing to expand and proactively engage in a part of the world that is both far away, but more and more closely connected to us. One highlight is that we developed a new EU Indo-Pacific strategy with all member states in 2021, which we then began to fully implement in 2022 despite the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine. This was nowhere as apparent as with the first Ministerial Forum on Indo-Pacific Cooperation in Paris on February 22, just before the start of the Russian invasion. Europe managed to act globally, despite the threat of war in its immediate vicinity.
What other developments do you consider important?
That we have now slowly set the Global Gateway Initiative in the right direction and there are a number of concrete flagship projects driving the green and digital transition and contributing to infrastructure development and connectivity. I could name a lot more, but I think these are pretty good highlights. However, there were also a number of highly negative experiences, such as the military coup in Myanmar or the developments in Afghanistan. What is also concerning is that there are more and more ICBMs from North Korea, but no dialogue anymore.
What advice would you give your successor?
Above all, I would advise my successor to also think in the medium and long term and prepare things accordingly and not just look at the current situation. I believe that is a significant flaw of our collective decision-making process, in which people keep trying to position themselves in detail on an issue, and then lose sight of the big picture once the member states attempt to find a compromise. This is not only the case when it comes to China.
Has a successor already been chosen?
I can only tell you that the best will be chosen and that the selection process is in full swing.
You can find the first part of the interview here.
Gunnar Wiegand was Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS) from January 2016 to August 2023. Previously, he was Deputy Head for the Europe and Central Asia Division and Director of the Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia and OSCE Division at EEAS. Prior to joining EEAS, Wiegand held various positions related to external relations and trade policy at the European Commission since 1990.
Wiegand will become Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, after the summer break. He will be part of the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.
Hans Christoph Atzpodien knows how to maneuver in what is probably the most disagreeable of all industries – legally, strategically, but above all argumentatively. What he invests his energy in – in preventing an arms export control law, for example – or when he lets it go – vis-à-vis the media, for example.
Atzpodien, who was born in Düren in the Eifel region in 1955 and holds a doctorate in law, has been chief executive of the German Security and Defense Industry Association (BDSV) and its founding member since 2017. Founded in 2009, the lobby association brings together more than 200 German defense companies, including heavyweights such as Airbus Defence, MBDA, Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and Diehl Defence.
Together we are stronger – not least in the face of the German government, which wants to impose stricter legal controls on arms exports before the end of this legislative period. The top representative of an industry that is very dependent on the export business and international cooperation takes a correspondingly critical view of this. “In case of doubt, this instrument is rather detrimental to cooperation”, says the 68-year-old. “European cooperations only work if the customers want the same device. Politicians in the relevant countries must ensure that this is the case and remove all hurdles. These hurdles also include different ideas about arms exports.”
And one is stronger vis-à-vis the EU institutions, which are putting pressure on climate protection. For example, Atzpodien advocates including weapons in the EU’s sustainability taxonomy to signal to investors that it is a sustainable investment opportunity. “Without weapons, there is no readiness for defense and also no peace”, Atzpodien argues. “Security is the mother of all sustainability.”
There is no doubt that Feb. 24, 2022 also marked a turning point for the German defense industry: Weapons deliveries to Ukraine, the equipping of the German armed forces – the security and defense industry has not been in such a bad position in the public eye since then, one might think. But has the industry’s public image really improved as a result?
Atzpodien then goes on to explain where the bad reputation comes from in the first place. It is the German government, for example, that approves arms exports to non-NATO countries, but does not explain to the population why. This then reflects on the industry. Take Algeria, for example: “At the time, we sold frigates there from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. Why did the German government approve that? Because it saw Algeria as a stabilizing factor in the western Mediterranean.”
According to the German government’s political principles, weapons would only be exported from Germany if the federal government had an interest in them in terms of foreign and security policy, explains Atzpodien. “Since we also want to ensure that our products do not fall into the wrong hands, we are absolutely behind it.” The example of Ukraine also shows that it is the German government that decides on exports, not the industry.
In 1982 Atzpodien joined what was then Otto Wolff AG, which later became part of the Thyssen Group. In 2007 he became Chairman of the Executive Board of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). His time at the helm included controversial submarine deals with the Israeli and Egyptian governments. In 2016, Atzpodien was forced to leave TKMS after a multi-billion dollar submarine contract from Australia went to French competitor DCNS.
Has the reputation of the defense industry improved since the start of the war in Ukraine? Atzpodien does not give a direct answer to this question. Media interest has increased, he says, but he is still nowhere near getting a word in edgewise, although he doesn’t try as often as he used to. Lisa-Martina Klein
