For weeks now, the member states have been arguing about a visa regime for Russian tourists. Countries like Poland and Estonia would have preferred a complete entry ban on vacation travel and shopping trips of Russians to the EU. Now it is clear that a far-reaching travel ban will not happen for the time being. However, foreign ministers have agreed in Prague to suspend visa facilitation for Russians, reports Ella Joyner. And after the talks, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis sees the option of introducing even stricter regulations at the national level.
From Prague to Meseberg: As Europe.Table has learned, the German government wants to continue the 9-euro public transport ticket as a 69-euro ticket. Negotiations with the federal states are already underway. However, there will be no counter-financing through higher taxation of the private use of company cars. Green politicians and Dirk Messner, head of the Federal Environment Agency, were among the critics who had called for the abolition of the “company car privilege” in the run-up to the cabinet meeting. Markus Grabitz has the details.
Digitization in Germany is finally supposed to make progress: “We want to be among the top 10 in Europe, that is our ambition,” said Digital Minister Volker Wissing yesterday in Meseberg. Falk Steiner took a closer look at the German government’s digital strategy – and focused particularly on EU aspects. His conclusion: Although some points such as the Data Act or the Media Freedom Act are mentioned, the European aspect of the strategy is hardly visible. Instead, it is primarily a reflection of the rather chaotic state of German digital policy.
Are all Russians to be punished for the war in Ukraine and, if so, how severely? For weeks, Baltic and Nordic states in particular have been pressing for a “visa ban” for Russian tourists. Germany, France and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell rejected this on moral and tactical grounds.
Now it is clear: There will be no far-reaching entry ban for the time being. At the meeting of foreign ministers in Prague, a compromise was reached: The visa facilitation deal, which has been in place since 2007, is to be suspended altogether, according to Borrell. Russians were coming to Europe for vacations as if there was no war in Ukraine, he said. “This cannot continue.” Until now, the deal has only been suspended for business people, government officials and diplomats.
This step will make visa applications for Russians more expensive and time-consuming. For example, the basic fixed visa fee of €35 will be discontinued, and the standard processing time of ten calendar days after receipt of the application will also no longer apply. Borrell believes this will reduce the number of new visas, but it’s not a blanket stop of issuance. “We don’t want to cut ourselves from those Russians who are against the war in Ukraine,” he said.
What is still unclear is how the EU plans to deal with the estimated 10 to 12 million currently valid Schengen visas for Russians. The EU Commission is to draft proposals on this in the coming weeks.
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, about one million Russian citizens have entered the EU, according to EU border agency Frontex. Most of them came via Finland and Estonia.
After Wednesday’s meeting, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis believes the way is clear to introduce significantly stricter restrictions. Even before the meeting, he made it clear that his country could refuse entry to Russian tourists. “It was acknowledged that we have a possibility to look for national or regional solutions on how to ensure that our national security issues are being met on the border.” Now, Lithuania will discuss further steps with Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland.
It was not clear whether there would actually be a green light for such a step. As expected, Germany and France again expressed concern at the meeting that critical civil society in Russia would be locked out of Europe. French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna suggested, “to distinguish between those who started the war, first of all the Russian president, his entourage and all those who support his military efforts, and on the other hand Russian citizens, artists, students, journalists.”
States that share a border with Russia see things differently. “I do not take seriously the argument that by visiting Europe, Russians will learn a lot how to change their country. They have had 30 years of visits,” said Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs.
For some, this is not about ordinary Russians, but about the elite, said Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra. “While people-to-people contacts are important, now we see primarily rich Russians coming to Europe for shopping.”
In general, each Member State has the right to refuse entry. For example, Lithuania or Estonia could refuse entry to a Russian woman with a visa issued in Italy on the grounds of security concerns.
As of today, Finland will limit the number of tourist visas issued to Russian citizens to one-tenth of the previous number. “We hope that other member states will take similar decisions,” Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto said.
Germany issued 15,000 Schengen visas and 11,000 national visas to Russians between January and mid-August, according to government sources. This was down from 30,000 per month in 2019. with dpa
The German government wants to convert the expired 9-Euro-Ticket into a 69-Euro-Ticket and is currently negotiating with the federal states. Europe.Table learned this from government circles on the fringes of the cabinet meeting in Meseberg. It is said that there will be no offset financing of the costs for the local transport ticket via higher taxation of the private use of company cars.
However, it is not ruled out that the lump-sum taxation of the non-cash benefit for owners of company cars will be discontinued. Users of company cars would then be forced to keep a mileage log and deduct the non-cash benefit of using the company car for each private trip.
According to the industry association VDA, a total of 978,000 company cars were tax-deductible in 2021. In most cases, lump-sum taxation was chosen. This means that the owner must pay tax on one percent of the list price of his company car each month as part of his wage and income tax.
On top of this, taxes are levied at 0.03 percent of the list price per kilometer of travel to the workplace. Thus, the original price of a vehicle is depreciated over a period of five years. These rules apply to vehicles with internal combustion engines. Battery electric vehicles as well as internal combustion vehicles with an additional battery drive receive tax benefits. EVs up to a price of €60,000 are taxed at 0.25 percent per month. For hybrid cars and higher-priced EVs, 0.5 percent of the list price is taxed each month as a non-cash benefit.
Green Party leader Omid Nouripour, the head of the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Dirk Messner, economic expert Veronika Grimm and environmental lobbyists had called for the abolition of the “company car privilege” before the Cabinet meeting. “The reform of the company car privilege is overdue,” said Nouripour. Two-thirds of the “privileged company cars” are vehicles with more than 200 hp.
Messner said, “It’s a climate-damaging subsidy because the low lump-sum taxation of company cars encourages private use of company cars as a mode of transportation, even though there are eco-friendly alternatives.”
The VDA disagrees. It says the lump-sum taxation is not a subsidy. “The value of private use determined at a flat rate of one percent of the total list price realistically reflects the average share of total costs attributable to purely private travel,” said a spokeswoman for the industry association. High-court rulings by the Federal Fiscal Court (BFH) upheld the one percent lump-sum taxation in 2012 and 2005, she added.
In 2021, the share of company cars among new car registrations in Germany was 42.2 percent. 29 percent of company cars were electric or hybrid vehicles. 28 percent were conventional gasoline-powered vehicles. VDA President Hildegard Müller said, “Company cars are a very important driver for having modern, safe and clean cars on the roads.” Because it is attractive for companies and employees to regularly purchase new vehicles, they enter the market a few years later as used cars. “A big advantage for all consumers and climate protection: New models are more economical and efficient than the previous ones.”
Company car owners often also receive a fuel card from their employer, which they can use to refuel their cars free of charge across the EU, even for private travel. The use of fuel cards is also covered by lump-sum taxation.
Similar regulations apply to the private use of company cars in many EU countries. The taxation of income falls within the jurisdiction of member states.
Markus Ferber (CSU), a member of the Transport Committee in the European Parliament, calls the debate in Germany “about an alleged company car privilege” an “ideologically motivated envy debate that came from the same corner as the ban on internal combustion vehicles.” The tax situation for company cars is ultimately not a “good deal” for most users, but at least it saves work when it comes to tax returns.
His colleague Ismail Ertug (SPD) says: “In general, I see the option of also being able to use a company car for private purposes as positive.” However, taxation should be measured against the carbon footprint: A tax incentive for electric and hydrogen-powered vehicles would also make used cars with alternative drives cheaper.
Federal Minister of Digital Affairs, Volker Wissing (FDP), and his cabinet colleagues are focusing on a policy of small steps: Wissing wants to lead Germany into the TOP 10 of the EU’s DESI ranking. DESI is a controversial measurement of the digitization degree of EU members, and the composition and weighting of its indicators are changed regularly – but the fact that Germany does not have a high ranking has multiple reasons.
One of them is the lack of a government-provided secure digital identity. The eIDAS regulation is undergoing revision. The European Parliament is currently discussing how European identity solutions could look like, which are supposed to build bridges between the identity solutions offered in different member states. Although the German ID card and the German electronic residence permit are already technically and legally compatible with the eIDAS framework, the e-government applications of member states have only limited eIDAS-compatible usability so far.
What the digital strategy contains as a guideline for the Data Act is rather fuzzy. The aim is to promote “innovation-oriented data law for fair data access and fair data use. In addition, the German government wants to “make improvements for SMEs and consumers in particular, create incentives for collecting and sharing data, and facilitate switching between cloud service providers.” Most people would probably have a hard time arguing against these goals. But the general approach of the Council, for which the Czech Council Presidency submitted a first major proposal in July, is likely to be more specific here.
In areas where progress has been made at the EU level some time ago, the German government’s commitment is once again underlined: The Health Data Space is still planned, of course secure, transnational and in a way that facilitates research.
Not even existing, and yet already included in the digital strategy: A German position on the Commission’s proposal for the Media Freedom Act, which is expected for mid-September. The plan is to “advocate the independence and non-governmental character of the media in the negotiations on the European Media Freedom Act, including in the context of European regulation of digital transformation processes and guidelines for the media market.”
There is bad news in the digital strategy for Web3 and DLT money enthusiasts: The governing coalition of the German government basically wants to take a pro-innovation and crypto-token-friendly approach. Differing statements by FDP leader Christian Lindner would probably have caused surprised faces. At the same time, however, it is stated: “We are committed to European supervision in the crypto sector to promote uniform standards within Europe, also taking sustainability aspects into account.” Or to put it another way: At least the classic blockchain is based on energy wastage and should no longer happen in Europe in this form – but this is regulated by electricity prices for the time being anyway.
A major task for several German ministries will be digital sovereignty: The goal is to achieve greater independence in key technologies – and, if possible, to do so in a European alliance. There is no shortage of digitalization buzzwords here: artificial intelligence, microelectronics, 5G/6G mobile communications standards, automated and autonomous systems, robotics, quantum computing and cybersecurity – everything is to become more sovereign.
Both the IPCEI Microelectronics and the Chips Act, as well as the subsidy programs of the EU Horizon research funding program called Key Digital Technologies Partnership, are expected to provide money for it. But how? That remains the authors’ secret. In this context, supply chains also play a role in the digital strategy: They are to be better monitored in the future – and dependencies identified. Not further outlined, but mentioned: A strategy for international digital policy. Just what exactly does it have to do with the EU’s global gateway initiative or similar measures? Remains to be seen.
So what does the digital strategy have in store for Europe? Not much in the way of specifics, but no opposing positions either. After all, there is one thing the strategy is not: A digital policy guide for what can be expected from the German government in the upcoming European debates.
Only at the very end of the document, below the defense policy digital projects, is a paragraph entitled “International Affairs: In the geopolitical race, “Germany and Europe are particularly challenged” to “offer a people-centric digital policy with European standards for shaping digitization”.
People-centered, value-based, innovation-promoting regulation is needed to ensure secure, non-discriminatory and self-determined digital technologies. But apart from the commitment to support various measures and forums, such as the TTC or the Global Gateway Initiative, almost none of this is backed by concrete measures.
From a European policy perspective, the digital strategy is one thing above all: A reflection of the poor state of digital policy in Germany, where warm words are used to conceal competence conflicts and discord. Europe is likely to take note of this impression of the German government with interest: The so-called digital strategy has hardly made it easier to reach quick agreements on concrete projects.
German companies are urging policymakers to provide better protection against cyberattacks. In a representative survey commissioned by the digital association Bitkom, almost all participating companies (98 percent) stated that they would welcome greater commitment to increased EU-wide cooperation on cybersecurity. Almost as many are voicing demands that politics should take stronger action against foreign cyberattacks. And three-quarters think policymakers should expand investigative capabilities to help solve cyberattacks.
The European Commission’s work program for 2022 includes the plan to present a proposal for a European legal act on cybersecurity before the end of this fall. The aim is to define common standards for cybersecurity products. The EU is also planning a space-based secure communications system (Secure Connectivity). The system is intended to provide highly secure connectivity and communications for government and commercial services based on quantum encryption technologies.
The Bitkom survey shows the gravity of the situation. It shows that the German economy suffers annual damage of around €203 billion from the theft of IT equipment and data, espionage and sabotage. Although the damage is somewhat lower than in the record year 2021 with €223 billion, it has almost doubled compared to 2018/2019. At the same time, concerns about the consequences of such cyberattacks are growing. Almost half (45 percent) of the companies surveyed fear that cyberattacks could threaten the survival of their business – a year ago, the figure was just 9 percent.
Virtually all companies in Germany are affected. 84 percent of companies reported that they had suffered a cyberattack in the past year. An additional 9 percent assume that this was the case. Attacks from Russia and China have increased dramatically recently. 43 percent of affected companies have identified at least one attack from China (2021: 30 percent). 36 percent have identified origins in Russia (2021: 23 percent). “At the same time, attackers are acting more and more professionally. For the first time, organized crime and gangs are at the top of the ranking of perpetrators,” reports Bitkom. vis
Volker Wissing, Germany’s Federal Minister for Digital Affairs and Transport, is certainly no digital native. But as a state minister in Rhineland-Palatinate, the now 52-year-old has already had many brushes with digital issues in business, transport, agriculture and viticulture – from broadband expansion and new data usage options in traffic to data models in the agricultural sector.
The fact that the state level differs significantly from the federal level is something that Wissing has had to learn in his first few months in office. Wissing presents himself as a man of factual politics who thinks little of the usual power play at the federal level. However, it is precisely in factual politics that he currently has to deliver – and the digital strategy is another test for him in this regard.
The FDP, which is repeatedly seen as having digital competence in opinion polls, grasped the issue during coalition negotiations – and no one else was ready to put up a fight. The chancellor himself is no expert in this field, and it was not particularly difficult for him to pass it up. Since taking office, Wissing has shown demonstrative confidence in his ability to tackle the many problems of German digital politics. His experience as a state minister, being close to practical digitization problems, should help.
EU issues play a key role in both transport and digital policy. At the end of May, Volker Wissing ventured to the Republica conference in Berlin. It is often its well-informed audience that has embarrassed several top politicians in the past. Wissing did not shine, but he was able to communicate that the topic is close to his heart, and there are positions the liberal party is not willing to give up. For example, on the EU issue of chat control, encryption and net neutrality. Wissing, who often seems somewhat prim, passed the test on the open stage.
But the real test for Wissing is yet to come. Instead of a ministry of progress, Wissing took over a ministry of problems. Whether it’s autobahn bridges, railways, air traffic, energy prices or inland waterways, the ministry’s responsibilities are crumbling all over the place. Wissing himself realized this only after a while. When he took office, he was not aware of how dilapidated many of his new responsibilities actually are.
He diligently works his way into individual areas, if they have personal priority for him – for example when it comes to railroad construction sites and contra-rail signaling. But there is no shortage of problems, and the minister cannot be everywhere at the same time: Managing grievances instead of ministerial organization is the order of the day for the time being.
The reorganization of digital policy, which was supposed to be coordinated in the Chancellor’s Office under Merkel, also turned out to be a huge mess. For months, the new ministers and state secretaries argued about responsibilities and posts. In the end, the result was a more complex construct instead of a leaner one.
Capabilities and responsibilities are hardly in harmony with each other – and Wissing’s house, which is supposed to bind the many actors together, is not a primus inter pares: There are hardly any opportunities to exercise control, each body has a say. And there is little talk of the digital budget originally envisioned in the coalition agreement, which was also supposed to serve as an instrument of control and discipline – even if it were to happen, it would still not be an instrument that Wissing would be allowed to manage.
The minister himself has long since stopped radiating confidence. There are no quick solutions in sight in many areas, but further crises are very much in the cards. And Wissing is not a man of big messages or abstract visions. “Staying close to people’s needs” is one of Wissing’s favorite slogans.
In the discussion about Germany’s 9-euro public transport ticket, for example, which is actually an absurdity from a classical liberal perspective, he found his communicative bridge. The state chairman of the Rhineland-Palatinate FDP quickly highlighted the problem that annoys many citizens: The fragmented nature of individual transport associations with all their incompatibilities. “Addressing structural changes” is another one of his favorite phrases, without specifying exactly what they should look like. The vague apparently seems less dangerous to him in the Berlin cosmos.
Volker Wissing is a modest and sober realist. That is what makes the former minister of viticulture tick. So far, however, his style has borne barely any fruit. The FDP is faring badly in the polls. Wissing’s ministry may discuss problems, but it can’t force solutions.
In transport policy, he has to show consideration for the Greens and the SPD. Even at the draft stage, the digital strategy was criticized from outside as lacking in ambition. Whether in transportation or digital policy, his house also still seems a long way from its claim to be a coalition of progress – the title of the coalition agreement that Wissing helped negotiate as secretary general of the FDP. Falk Steiner
For weeks now, the member states have been arguing about a visa regime for Russian tourists. Countries like Poland and Estonia would have preferred a complete entry ban on vacation travel and shopping trips of Russians to the EU. Now it is clear that a far-reaching travel ban will not happen for the time being. However, foreign ministers have agreed in Prague to suspend visa facilitation for Russians, reports Ella Joyner. And after the talks, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis sees the option of introducing even stricter regulations at the national level.
From Prague to Meseberg: As Europe.Table has learned, the German government wants to continue the 9-euro public transport ticket as a 69-euro ticket. Negotiations with the federal states are already underway. However, there will be no counter-financing through higher taxation of the private use of company cars. Green politicians and Dirk Messner, head of the Federal Environment Agency, were among the critics who had called for the abolition of the “company car privilege” in the run-up to the cabinet meeting. Markus Grabitz has the details.
Digitization in Germany is finally supposed to make progress: “We want to be among the top 10 in Europe, that is our ambition,” said Digital Minister Volker Wissing yesterday in Meseberg. Falk Steiner took a closer look at the German government’s digital strategy – and focused particularly on EU aspects. His conclusion: Although some points such as the Data Act or the Media Freedom Act are mentioned, the European aspect of the strategy is hardly visible. Instead, it is primarily a reflection of the rather chaotic state of German digital policy.
Are all Russians to be punished for the war in Ukraine and, if so, how severely? For weeks, Baltic and Nordic states in particular have been pressing for a “visa ban” for Russian tourists. Germany, France and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell rejected this on moral and tactical grounds.
Now it is clear: There will be no far-reaching entry ban for the time being. At the meeting of foreign ministers in Prague, a compromise was reached: The visa facilitation deal, which has been in place since 2007, is to be suspended altogether, according to Borrell. Russians were coming to Europe for vacations as if there was no war in Ukraine, he said. “This cannot continue.” Until now, the deal has only been suspended for business people, government officials and diplomats.
This step will make visa applications for Russians more expensive and time-consuming. For example, the basic fixed visa fee of €35 will be discontinued, and the standard processing time of ten calendar days after receipt of the application will also no longer apply. Borrell believes this will reduce the number of new visas, but it’s not a blanket stop of issuance. “We don’t want to cut ourselves from those Russians who are against the war in Ukraine,” he said.
What is still unclear is how the EU plans to deal with the estimated 10 to 12 million currently valid Schengen visas for Russians. The EU Commission is to draft proposals on this in the coming weeks.
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, about one million Russian citizens have entered the EU, according to EU border agency Frontex. Most of them came via Finland and Estonia.
After Wednesday’s meeting, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis believes the way is clear to introduce significantly stricter restrictions. Even before the meeting, he made it clear that his country could refuse entry to Russian tourists. “It was acknowledged that we have a possibility to look for national or regional solutions on how to ensure that our national security issues are being met on the border.” Now, Lithuania will discuss further steps with Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland.
It was not clear whether there would actually be a green light for such a step. As expected, Germany and France again expressed concern at the meeting that critical civil society in Russia would be locked out of Europe. French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna suggested, “to distinguish between those who started the war, first of all the Russian president, his entourage and all those who support his military efforts, and on the other hand Russian citizens, artists, students, journalists.”
States that share a border with Russia see things differently. “I do not take seriously the argument that by visiting Europe, Russians will learn a lot how to change their country. They have had 30 years of visits,” said Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs.
For some, this is not about ordinary Russians, but about the elite, said Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra. “While people-to-people contacts are important, now we see primarily rich Russians coming to Europe for shopping.”
In general, each Member State has the right to refuse entry. For example, Lithuania or Estonia could refuse entry to a Russian woman with a visa issued in Italy on the grounds of security concerns.
As of today, Finland will limit the number of tourist visas issued to Russian citizens to one-tenth of the previous number. “We hope that other member states will take similar decisions,” Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto said.
Germany issued 15,000 Schengen visas and 11,000 national visas to Russians between January and mid-August, according to government sources. This was down from 30,000 per month in 2019. with dpa
The German government wants to convert the expired 9-Euro-Ticket into a 69-Euro-Ticket and is currently negotiating with the federal states. Europe.Table learned this from government circles on the fringes of the cabinet meeting in Meseberg. It is said that there will be no offset financing of the costs for the local transport ticket via higher taxation of the private use of company cars.
However, it is not ruled out that the lump-sum taxation of the non-cash benefit for owners of company cars will be discontinued. Users of company cars would then be forced to keep a mileage log and deduct the non-cash benefit of using the company car for each private trip.
According to the industry association VDA, a total of 978,000 company cars were tax-deductible in 2021. In most cases, lump-sum taxation was chosen. This means that the owner must pay tax on one percent of the list price of his company car each month as part of his wage and income tax.
On top of this, taxes are levied at 0.03 percent of the list price per kilometer of travel to the workplace. Thus, the original price of a vehicle is depreciated over a period of five years. These rules apply to vehicles with internal combustion engines. Battery electric vehicles as well as internal combustion vehicles with an additional battery drive receive tax benefits. EVs up to a price of €60,000 are taxed at 0.25 percent per month. For hybrid cars and higher-priced EVs, 0.5 percent of the list price is taxed each month as a non-cash benefit.
Green Party leader Omid Nouripour, the head of the Federal Environment Agency (UBA), Dirk Messner, economic expert Veronika Grimm and environmental lobbyists had called for the abolition of the “company car privilege” before the Cabinet meeting. “The reform of the company car privilege is overdue,” said Nouripour. Two-thirds of the “privileged company cars” are vehicles with more than 200 hp.
Messner said, “It’s a climate-damaging subsidy because the low lump-sum taxation of company cars encourages private use of company cars as a mode of transportation, even though there are eco-friendly alternatives.”
The VDA disagrees. It says the lump-sum taxation is not a subsidy. “The value of private use determined at a flat rate of one percent of the total list price realistically reflects the average share of total costs attributable to purely private travel,” said a spokeswoman for the industry association. High-court rulings by the Federal Fiscal Court (BFH) upheld the one percent lump-sum taxation in 2012 and 2005, she added.
In 2021, the share of company cars among new car registrations in Germany was 42.2 percent. 29 percent of company cars were electric or hybrid vehicles. 28 percent were conventional gasoline-powered vehicles. VDA President Hildegard Müller said, “Company cars are a very important driver for having modern, safe and clean cars on the roads.” Because it is attractive for companies and employees to regularly purchase new vehicles, they enter the market a few years later as used cars. “A big advantage for all consumers and climate protection: New models are more economical and efficient than the previous ones.”
Company car owners often also receive a fuel card from their employer, which they can use to refuel their cars free of charge across the EU, even for private travel. The use of fuel cards is also covered by lump-sum taxation.
Similar regulations apply to the private use of company cars in many EU countries. The taxation of income falls within the jurisdiction of member states.
Markus Ferber (CSU), a member of the Transport Committee in the European Parliament, calls the debate in Germany “about an alleged company car privilege” an “ideologically motivated envy debate that came from the same corner as the ban on internal combustion vehicles.” The tax situation for company cars is ultimately not a “good deal” for most users, but at least it saves work when it comes to tax returns.
His colleague Ismail Ertug (SPD) says: “In general, I see the option of also being able to use a company car for private purposes as positive.” However, taxation should be measured against the carbon footprint: A tax incentive for electric and hydrogen-powered vehicles would also make used cars with alternative drives cheaper.
Federal Minister of Digital Affairs, Volker Wissing (FDP), and his cabinet colleagues are focusing on a policy of small steps: Wissing wants to lead Germany into the TOP 10 of the EU’s DESI ranking. DESI is a controversial measurement of the digitization degree of EU members, and the composition and weighting of its indicators are changed regularly – but the fact that Germany does not have a high ranking has multiple reasons.
One of them is the lack of a government-provided secure digital identity. The eIDAS regulation is undergoing revision. The European Parliament is currently discussing how European identity solutions could look like, which are supposed to build bridges between the identity solutions offered in different member states. Although the German ID card and the German electronic residence permit are already technically and legally compatible with the eIDAS framework, the e-government applications of member states have only limited eIDAS-compatible usability so far.
What the digital strategy contains as a guideline for the Data Act is rather fuzzy. The aim is to promote “innovation-oriented data law for fair data access and fair data use. In addition, the German government wants to “make improvements for SMEs and consumers in particular, create incentives for collecting and sharing data, and facilitate switching between cloud service providers.” Most people would probably have a hard time arguing against these goals. But the general approach of the Council, for which the Czech Council Presidency submitted a first major proposal in July, is likely to be more specific here.
In areas where progress has been made at the EU level some time ago, the German government’s commitment is once again underlined: The Health Data Space is still planned, of course secure, transnational and in a way that facilitates research.
Not even existing, and yet already included in the digital strategy: A German position on the Commission’s proposal for the Media Freedom Act, which is expected for mid-September. The plan is to “advocate the independence and non-governmental character of the media in the negotiations on the European Media Freedom Act, including in the context of European regulation of digital transformation processes and guidelines for the media market.”
There is bad news in the digital strategy for Web3 and DLT money enthusiasts: The governing coalition of the German government basically wants to take a pro-innovation and crypto-token-friendly approach. Differing statements by FDP leader Christian Lindner would probably have caused surprised faces. At the same time, however, it is stated: “We are committed to European supervision in the crypto sector to promote uniform standards within Europe, also taking sustainability aspects into account.” Or to put it another way: At least the classic blockchain is based on energy wastage and should no longer happen in Europe in this form – but this is regulated by electricity prices for the time being anyway.
A major task for several German ministries will be digital sovereignty: The goal is to achieve greater independence in key technologies – and, if possible, to do so in a European alliance. There is no shortage of digitalization buzzwords here: artificial intelligence, microelectronics, 5G/6G mobile communications standards, automated and autonomous systems, robotics, quantum computing and cybersecurity – everything is to become more sovereign.
Both the IPCEI Microelectronics and the Chips Act, as well as the subsidy programs of the EU Horizon research funding program called Key Digital Technologies Partnership, are expected to provide money for it. But how? That remains the authors’ secret. In this context, supply chains also play a role in the digital strategy: They are to be better monitored in the future – and dependencies identified. Not further outlined, but mentioned: A strategy for international digital policy. Just what exactly does it have to do with the EU’s global gateway initiative or similar measures? Remains to be seen.
So what does the digital strategy have in store for Europe? Not much in the way of specifics, but no opposing positions either. After all, there is one thing the strategy is not: A digital policy guide for what can be expected from the German government in the upcoming European debates.
Only at the very end of the document, below the defense policy digital projects, is a paragraph entitled “International Affairs: In the geopolitical race, “Germany and Europe are particularly challenged” to “offer a people-centric digital policy with European standards for shaping digitization”.
People-centered, value-based, innovation-promoting regulation is needed to ensure secure, non-discriminatory and self-determined digital technologies. But apart from the commitment to support various measures and forums, such as the TTC or the Global Gateway Initiative, almost none of this is backed by concrete measures.
From a European policy perspective, the digital strategy is one thing above all: A reflection of the poor state of digital policy in Germany, where warm words are used to conceal competence conflicts and discord. Europe is likely to take note of this impression of the German government with interest: The so-called digital strategy has hardly made it easier to reach quick agreements on concrete projects.
German companies are urging policymakers to provide better protection against cyberattacks. In a representative survey commissioned by the digital association Bitkom, almost all participating companies (98 percent) stated that they would welcome greater commitment to increased EU-wide cooperation on cybersecurity. Almost as many are voicing demands that politics should take stronger action against foreign cyberattacks. And three-quarters think policymakers should expand investigative capabilities to help solve cyberattacks.
The European Commission’s work program for 2022 includes the plan to present a proposal for a European legal act on cybersecurity before the end of this fall. The aim is to define common standards for cybersecurity products. The EU is also planning a space-based secure communications system (Secure Connectivity). The system is intended to provide highly secure connectivity and communications for government and commercial services based on quantum encryption technologies.
The Bitkom survey shows the gravity of the situation. It shows that the German economy suffers annual damage of around €203 billion from the theft of IT equipment and data, espionage and sabotage. Although the damage is somewhat lower than in the record year 2021 with €223 billion, it has almost doubled compared to 2018/2019. At the same time, concerns about the consequences of such cyberattacks are growing. Almost half (45 percent) of the companies surveyed fear that cyberattacks could threaten the survival of their business – a year ago, the figure was just 9 percent.
Virtually all companies in Germany are affected. 84 percent of companies reported that they had suffered a cyberattack in the past year. An additional 9 percent assume that this was the case. Attacks from Russia and China have increased dramatically recently. 43 percent of affected companies have identified at least one attack from China (2021: 30 percent). 36 percent have identified origins in Russia (2021: 23 percent). “At the same time, attackers are acting more and more professionally. For the first time, organized crime and gangs are at the top of the ranking of perpetrators,” reports Bitkom. vis
Volker Wissing, Germany’s Federal Minister for Digital Affairs and Transport, is certainly no digital native. But as a state minister in Rhineland-Palatinate, the now 52-year-old has already had many brushes with digital issues in business, transport, agriculture and viticulture – from broadband expansion and new data usage options in traffic to data models in the agricultural sector.
The fact that the state level differs significantly from the federal level is something that Wissing has had to learn in his first few months in office. Wissing presents himself as a man of factual politics who thinks little of the usual power play at the federal level. However, it is precisely in factual politics that he currently has to deliver – and the digital strategy is another test for him in this regard.
The FDP, which is repeatedly seen as having digital competence in opinion polls, grasped the issue during coalition negotiations – and no one else was ready to put up a fight. The chancellor himself is no expert in this field, and it was not particularly difficult for him to pass it up. Since taking office, Wissing has shown demonstrative confidence in his ability to tackle the many problems of German digital politics. His experience as a state minister, being close to practical digitization problems, should help.
EU issues play a key role in both transport and digital policy. At the end of May, Volker Wissing ventured to the Republica conference in Berlin. It is often its well-informed audience that has embarrassed several top politicians in the past. Wissing did not shine, but he was able to communicate that the topic is close to his heart, and there are positions the liberal party is not willing to give up. For example, on the EU issue of chat control, encryption and net neutrality. Wissing, who often seems somewhat prim, passed the test on the open stage.
But the real test for Wissing is yet to come. Instead of a ministry of progress, Wissing took over a ministry of problems. Whether it’s autobahn bridges, railways, air traffic, energy prices or inland waterways, the ministry’s responsibilities are crumbling all over the place. Wissing himself realized this only after a while. When he took office, he was not aware of how dilapidated many of his new responsibilities actually are.
He diligently works his way into individual areas, if they have personal priority for him – for example when it comes to railroad construction sites and contra-rail signaling. But there is no shortage of problems, and the minister cannot be everywhere at the same time: Managing grievances instead of ministerial organization is the order of the day for the time being.
The reorganization of digital policy, which was supposed to be coordinated in the Chancellor’s Office under Merkel, also turned out to be a huge mess. For months, the new ministers and state secretaries argued about responsibilities and posts. In the end, the result was a more complex construct instead of a leaner one.
Capabilities and responsibilities are hardly in harmony with each other – and Wissing’s house, which is supposed to bind the many actors together, is not a primus inter pares: There are hardly any opportunities to exercise control, each body has a say. And there is little talk of the digital budget originally envisioned in the coalition agreement, which was also supposed to serve as an instrument of control and discipline – even if it were to happen, it would still not be an instrument that Wissing would be allowed to manage.
The minister himself has long since stopped radiating confidence. There are no quick solutions in sight in many areas, but further crises are very much in the cards. And Wissing is not a man of big messages or abstract visions. “Staying close to people’s needs” is one of Wissing’s favorite slogans.
In the discussion about Germany’s 9-euro public transport ticket, for example, which is actually an absurdity from a classical liberal perspective, he found his communicative bridge. The state chairman of the Rhineland-Palatinate FDP quickly highlighted the problem that annoys many citizens: The fragmented nature of individual transport associations with all their incompatibilities. “Addressing structural changes” is another one of his favorite phrases, without specifying exactly what they should look like. The vague apparently seems less dangerous to him in the Berlin cosmos.
Volker Wissing is a modest and sober realist. That is what makes the former minister of viticulture tick. So far, however, his style has borne barely any fruit. The FDP is faring badly in the polls. Wissing’s ministry may discuss problems, but it can’t force solutions.
In transport policy, he has to show consideration for the Greens and the SPD. Even at the draft stage, the digital strategy was criticized from outside as lacking in ambition. Whether in transportation or digital policy, his house also still seems a long way from its claim to be a coalition of progress – the title of the coalition agreement that Wissing helped negotiate as secretary general of the FDP. Falk Steiner
