On his first visit to Germany as Commissioner for Agriculture, Christophe Hansen is throwing himself into the hustle and bustle of the agricultural and food industry this week. Together with other officials, he is opening the Green Week in Berlin, one of the most important international trade fairs on the subject. The upcoming federal elections are likely to be the focus of attention. However, EU policy will also be discussed. For example, the reduction of bureaucracy, the reform of genetic engineering legislation and the use of biofuels in transport.
Hansen’s agenda also includes a meeting with the Ukrainian Minister of Agriculture Vitaly Koval. In the coming months, Brussels and Kyiv want to agree on longer-term trade facilitations. A first litmus test for Hansen. He must signal to European farmers that he will defend their interests without deviating too far from the Commission’s line and calling solidarity with Ukraine into question.
Have a good and nourishing week!
On Friday and Saturday, CDU leader Friedrich Merz will welcome high-ranking visitors to the Konrad Adenauer House: nine Christian Democrat heads of state and government from the EU member states will travel to Berlin, including Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Finland’s Petteri Orpo, Sweden’s Ulf Kristersson and Ireland’s Simon Harris. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will also attend the closed meeting of the EPP party family, now that she has largely recovered from her severe pneumonia, as will EPP party and group leader Manfred Weber and the opposition leaders from the member parties.
The Christian Democrats want to reach agreements on strategic issues for the coming months. On Monday, Donald Trump will be sworn in as US President, making the issues of European competitiveness and security even more urgent. The round has weight, the EPP is the strongest political force in the EU. It not only provides the Commission President and the largest political group in the European Parliament, without which majorities are hardly possible but currently also eleven of the 27 heads of state and government.
After the Bundestag elections on February 23, there could be twelve. Should Merz become the new Federal Chancellor, the CDU and CSU would occupy three central positions of power in Europe with him, von der Leyen and Weber. So far, the three have largely pulled in the same direction and the trio could effectively drive forward the Union’s political agenda.
For Merz, the meeting also offers a welcome stage in the Bundestag election campaign. The informal meeting was scheduled when the traffic light coalition was still in place, as the EPP emphasizes. However, it will hardly run counter to the Union’s strategy if its candidate for chancellor is able to publicly and effectively hook up with the EPP heads of state and government.
Merz will present a paper for a radical reduction in bureaucracy at the meeting. He is talking about “disruption” and is relying less on the EU Commission, which he considers to be too cumbersome when it comes to regulations. Instead, the EPP heads of state and government should build up the necessary pressure to reduce the burden on companies.
Weber is working on his own paper for the meeting, which formulates the expectations of the Commission in the current mandate. The EPP Group has been compiling a corresponding list of demands for some time, which Weber will use as a collection of materials. The focus is on the topics of competitiveness, security and defense as well as migration.
The closed meeting is a format that Weber established when he also became head of the EPP party family in 2022. The man from Lower Bavaria aims is to publicly present himself as the leader of the European Christian Democrats. Weber wants to be elected head of the EPP party family for a further two years at the end of April in Valencia, in addition to his role as group leader. The CSU politician is not uncontroversial within his own ranks, but no real challenger has yet emerged.
Weber has been building a solid relationship with von der Leyen last year during the European election campaign and in the months that followed. The two talk frequently, according to reports in Brussels. Von der Leyen has responded to criticism from the EPP that her policy was too “green” during her first term of office: She has made the competitiveness of a “clean” industry her priority and wants to improve coordination with the EPP group. Silke Dalton, who will reportedly move from the parliamentary group to the cabinet of Vice-President Henna Virkkunen, is to ensure this, for example.
Von der Leyen now has a close relationship with Merz. The CDU leader supported the top candidate in the European election campaign and seeks to be close to his party colleague. The two speak on the phone roughly every two weeks and the teams also work well together. Merz has great respect for his role as Federal Chancellor, according to the CDU/CSU, and knows that he needs the Commission President as an ally, for example, in dealing with trade warrior Donald Trump.
Merz and Weber, on the other hand, have not had a close relationship to date. “If Merz wants to achieve something in Europe, he doesn’t call Weber,” it is heard from the Union. The 69-year-old either goes directly to von der Leyen, to Daniel Caspary, the head of the CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament, or to individual MPs. He is said to have a personal relationship with foreign policy expert David McAllister or CDA leader Dennis Radtke, for example. In the CSU, Merz largely sticks to party leader Markus Söder and regional group leader Alexander Dobrindt. Neither of them have a particularly good relationship with Weber.
However, Merz and Weber are not far apart in terms of content. But there could be tensions over the question of how the Christian Democrats should deal with the growing radical right. Merz is fighting for a strict demarcation from the AfD, while Weber has recently shown himself to be more flexible. The EPP leader must also keep member parties such as the ÖVP happy, which is heading towards a coalition with the FPÖ. It is quite possible that this topic could overshadow the closed meeting in Berlin. With Stefan Braun, Michael Bröcker
Contrary to an obligation under the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), the German government is still not publishing any data on the location of potential carbon storage sites. The BDI thus believes that the targets for carbon capture and storage (CCS targets) are at risk. By the end of last year, Germany, like all EU states, should have made “data publicly available on all areas where carbon storage sites, including saline aquifers, could be approved on their territory.” This is stated in the NZIA, which the member states adopted in the summer.
The German government let this deadline pass, as confirmed by the Federal Ministry of Economics at the request of Table.Briefings. “Germany has not made such data publicly available because such storage sites could not currently be approved under current law,” a spokesperson said. The current Carbon Dioxide Storage Act (KSpG) does not allow for permits and the amendment to the act (KSpTG) is still in the parliamentary process.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is thus interpreting the NZIA very literally. Criticism comes from NZIA rapporteur Christian Ehler (CDU): “The fact that the BMWK refuses to provide data on possible storage locations on German territory, and does so under a purely bureaucratic pretext, is not only unlawful. It also puts Germany at a disadvantage as a business location compared to all other member states that have published data.” Companies there could already use the data to plan the most cost-effective ways to store their carbon dioxide.
The BDI argues with the long lead times. It takes between seven and ten years to build a carbon storage facility, says Deputy Managing Director Holger Lösch. “Germany and Europe are running out of time if the political target of 50 million tons of annual storage capacity in the EU is to be achieved by 2030. In the race against time, the adoption of the KSpTG and the timely publication of data on the location of carbon storage sites in Germany would have been urgently needed.”
The CDU/CSU is willing to accept the KSpG amendment, confirmed deputy parliamentary group leader Andreas Jung: “We want to pass it in the next session week at the end of January.” Both Olaf Scholz and Robert Habeck wanted to become chancellor. “However, neither of them even managed to get their parties to agree to their own government’s legislation on this issue, which is crucial for the future of climate-neutral industry, before the election.”
The German government also had to send a report to the EU Commission by 30 December, with details of planned projects for carbon storage and use (CCU). This also includes plans for the cross-border transport of carbon dioxide to storage facilities in other EU countries and the decarbonization of industry in general. According to a BMWK spokesperson, the ministry submitted this report to the Commission on time and the Commission is responsible for its publication.
The phenomenon even has its own name: German Vote. The Brussels bubble uses this term to describe the frequent German abstention in the Council of Ministers – but the term stands for even more: for the speechlessness of the largest member state in the European legislative process. The German representative in the Council bodies is often only able to speak out on the matter at a late stage because the positioning in Berlin has not yet been finalized.
All too often, the so-called instruction only arrives in Brussels hours or even minutes before the decisive meeting of the permanent representatives – far too late to be able to organize majorities or vote on requests to speak. And it is not uncommon that no agreement is reached in Berlin so that Germany has to abstain.
Why is that? Germany is governed by coalitions that make decisions by consensus. This is also reflected in European policy: every directive to Brussels, which determines how German representatives are to behave in Council bodies from working level to ministerial level, is agreed by consensus between the departments concerned and the Federal Chancellery. This is interpreted very broadly; normally at least one department from each coalition partner is involved.
The coordination process is laborious and time-consuming: there is literally a struggle at all levels for every word that is to be presented in Brussels. If there is no agreement, there is no instruction. Then the German representative is not allowed to speak – and if there is a vote, she has to abstain. In order to be able to speak at all, a compromise formula is often agreed directly before a meeting. This compromise is then built upon in the next voting round.
As a rule, a German position only develops slowly in the course of the consultation process in the Council, while many other member states have already agreed on their position early on in the process and can begin to organize majorities.
Due to Germany’s large voting weight, this does not mean that the German position, once found, has no influence. And in individual cases, things also work differently: in the reform of EU fiscal rules, for example, the traffic light coalition agreed on a joint position paper very early on and also published it – with the result that Germany prevailed in many areas.
However, this mode of coordination generally means that Germany gives away potential influence because it cannot position itself early enough – if at all. And secondly, this makes Germany a partner that is difficult to predict for everyone else, which makes decision-making in Brussels more difficult overall.
To solve this problem, it seems obvious to introduce a kind of final decision-making authority early on in the process: For example, by the Chancellery, the AA, a new Ministry for Europe or even the relevant specialist department ultimately deciding Germany’s positioning. But these ideas all come to nothing: in fact, this possibility already exists with the chancellor’s authority to issue directives, which Olaf Scholz, for example, used to push through a German “no” to the car tariffs in Brussels.
However, such a final decision is difficult to imagine as a normal mode, as it would mean that a coalition partner would give up its say on an issue that is politically important to it – because this is where the conflicts ultimately arise. As long as Germany is governed by coalitions that decide by consensus, such proposals will not work.
For a more promising approach, it is worth taking a look at our Dutch neighbors. Although very colorful coalitions sometimes govern in the Netherlands, we have not yet heard of a “Dutch Vote”. In fact, according to data from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the Netherlands abstains only about half as often as Germany and is generally considered to be much more powerful in Brussels.
And there is a reason for this: the government has undertaken to present the main features of the government’s position to Parliament six weeks after the publication of a legislative proposal or communication by the Commission and two weeks before each Council meeting, and to publish these.
Such an obligation for an early determination would significantly alleviate the problem of the German Vote, simplify the coordination of directives and thus make Germany’s voice in Brussels stronger and more predictable. To this end, it could be stipulated by law that the Federal Government must submit a coordinated position to the Bundestag six or eight weeks after legislative proposals and also after communications from the Commission with substantial proposals for change, which would also be published. In return, large parts of the government’s current completely ritualized and largely inconsequential reporting obligations to Parliament on every EU project, no matter how small, could be abolished.
If the government does not fulfill its duty or if the positioning is too thin in the opinion of the responsible committee, the ministers involved in the instruction would have to explain themselves publicly in committee – without the possibility of representation by (parliamentary) state secretaries. As a rule, you would want to spare your minister this embarrassment.
Would such a path solve all the problems of German EU coordination? Certainly not all of them. In the case of politically highly controversial dossiers, a late agreement can probably not be avoided. But the chances are good that, at least for the vast majority of dossiers, the obligation to take a joint public position will actually lead to earlier binding agreements on the matter. Especially if this is followed up centrally within the Federal Government by the Chancellery and the coordinating ministries and if the EU Committee and the chairs of the specialist committees take their role in this exercise seriously.
This would not only strengthen the German position in Brussels and the European legislative process – it would also make life easier for hundreds of ministerial officials, who could devote themselves to more productive tasks than endlessly voting on directives. After all, there is enough to do.
On his first visit to Germany as Commissioner for Agriculture, Christophe Hansen is throwing himself into the hustle and bustle of the agricultural and food industry this week. Together with other officials, he is opening the Green Week in Berlin, one of the most important international trade fairs on the subject. The upcoming federal elections are likely to be the focus of attention. However, EU policy will also be discussed. For example, the reduction of bureaucracy, the reform of genetic engineering legislation and the use of biofuels in transport.
Hansen’s agenda also includes a meeting with the Ukrainian Minister of Agriculture Vitaly Koval. In the coming months, Brussels and Kyiv want to agree on longer-term trade facilitations. A first litmus test for Hansen. He must signal to European farmers that he will defend their interests without deviating too far from the Commission’s line and calling solidarity with Ukraine into question.
Have a good and nourishing week!
On Friday and Saturday, CDU leader Friedrich Merz will welcome high-ranking visitors to the Konrad Adenauer House: nine Christian Democrat heads of state and government from the EU member states will travel to Berlin, including Greece’s Kyriakos Mitsotakis, Finland’s Petteri Orpo, Sweden’s Ulf Kristersson and Ireland’s Simon Harris. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will also attend the closed meeting of the EPP party family, now that she has largely recovered from her severe pneumonia, as will EPP party and group leader Manfred Weber and the opposition leaders from the member parties.
The Christian Democrats want to reach agreements on strategic issues for the coming months. On Monday, Donald Trump will be sworn in as US President, making the issues of European competitiveness and security even more urgent. The round has weight, the EPP is the strongest political force in the EU. It not only provides the Commission President and the largest political group in the European Parliament, without which majorities are hardly possible but currently also eleven of the 27 heads of state and government.
After the Bundestag elections on February 23, there could be twelve. Should Merz become the new Federal Chancellor, the CDU and CSU would occupy three central positions of power in Europe with him, von der Leyen and Weber. So far, the three have largely pulled in the same direction and the trio could effectively drive forward the Union’s political agenda.
For Merz, the meeting also offers a welcome stage in the Bundestag election campaign. The informal meeting was scheduled when the traffic light coalition was still in place, as the EPP emphasizes. However, it will hardly run counter to the Union’s strategy if its candidate for chancellor is able to publicly and effectively hook up with the EPP heads of state and government.
Merz will present a paper for a radical reduction in bureaucracy at the meeting. He is talking about “disruption” and is relying less on the EU Commission, which he considers to be too cumbersome when it comes to regulations. Instead, the EPP heads of state and government should build up the necessary pressure to reduce the burden on companies.
Weber is working on his own paper for the meeting, which formulates the expectations of the Commission in the current mandate. The EPP Group has been compiling a corresponding list of demands for some time, which Weber will use as a collection of materials. The focus is on the topics of competitiveness, security and defense as well as migration.
The closed meeting is a format that Weber established when he also became head of the EPP party family in 2022. The man from Lower Bavaria aims is to publicly present himself as the leader of the European Christian Democrats. Weber wants to be elected head of the EPP party family for a further two years at the end of April in Valencia, in addition to his role as group leader. The CSU politician is not uncontroversial within his own ranks, but no real challenger has yet emerged.
Weber has been building a solid relationship with von der Leyen last year during the European election campaign and in the months that followed. The two talk frequently, according to reports in Brussels. Von der Leyen has responded to criticism from the EPP that her policy was too “green” during her first term of office: She has made the competitiveness of a “clean” industry her priority and wants to improve coordination with the EPP group. Silke Dalton, who will reportedly move from the parliamentary group to the cabinet of Vice-President Henna Virkkunen, is to ensure this, for example.
Von der Leyen now has a close relationship with Merz. The CDU leader supported the top candidate in the European election campaign and seeks to be close to his party colleague. The two speak on the phone roughly every two weeks and the teams also work well together. Merz has great respect for his role as Federal Chancellor, according to the CDU/CSU, and knows that he needs the Commission President as an ally, for example, in dealing with trade warrior Donald Trump.
Merz and Weber, on the other hand, have not had a close relationship to date. “If Merz wants to achieve something in Europe, he doesn’t call Weber,” it is heard from the Union. The 69-year-old either goes directly to von der Leyen, to Daniel Caspary, the head of the CDU/CSU group in the European Parliament, or to individual MPs. He is said to have a personal relationship with foreign policy expert David McAllister or CDA leader Dennis Radtke, for example. In the CSU, Merz largely sticks to party leader Markus Söder and regional group leader Alexander Dobrindt. Neither of them have a particularly good relationship with Weber.
However, Merz and Weber are not far apart in terms of content. But there could be tensions over the question of how the Christian Democrats should deal with the growing radical right. Merz is fighting for a strict demarcation from the AfD, while Weber has recently shown himself to be more flexible. The EPP leader must also keep member parties such as the ÖVP happy, which is heading towards a coalition with the FPÖ. It is quite possible that this topic could overshadow the closed meeting in Berlin. With Stefan Braun, Michael Bröcker
Contrary to an obligation under the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), the German government is still not publishing any data on the location of potential carbon storage sites. The BDI thus believes that the targets for carbon capture and storage (CCS targets) are at risk. By the end of last year, Germany, like all EU states, should have made “data publicly available on all areas where carbon storage sites, including saline aquifers, could be approved on their territory.” This is stated in the NZIA, which the member states adopted in the summer.
The German government let this deadline pass, as confirmed by the Federal Ministry of Economics at the request of Table.Briefings. “Germany has not made such data publicly available because such storage sites could not currently be approved under current law,” a spokesperson said. The current Carbon Dioxide Storage Act (KSpG) does not allow for permits and the amendment to the act (KSpTG) is still in the parliamentary process.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs is thus interpreting the NZIA very literally. Criticism comes from NZIA rapporteur Christian Ehler (CDU): “The fact that the BMWK refuses to provide data on possible storage locations on German territory, and does so under a purely bureaucratic pretext, is not only unlawful. It also puts Germany at a disadvantage as a business location compared to all other member states that have published data.” Companies there could already use the data to plan the most cost-effective ways to store their carbon dioxide.
The BDI argues with the long lead times. It takes between seven and ten years to build a carbon storage facility, says Deputy Managing Director Holger Lösch. “Germany and Europe are running out of time if the political target of 50 million tons of annual storage capacity in the EU is to be achieved by 2030. In the race against time, the adoption of the KSpTG and the timely publication of data on the location of carbon storage sites in Germany would have been urgently needed.”
The CDU/CSU is willing to accept the KSpG amendment, confirmed deputy parliamentary group leader Andreas Jung: “We want to pass it in the next session week at the end of January.” Both Olaf Scholz and Robert Habeck wanted to become chancellor. “However, neither of them even managed to get their parties to agree to their own government’s legislation on this issue, which is crucial for the future of climate-neutral industry, before the election.”
The German government also had to send a report to the EU Commission by 30 December, with details of planned projects for carbon storage and use (CCU). This also includes plans for the cross-border transport of carbon dioxide to storage facilities in other EU countries and the decarbonization of industry in general. According to a BMWK spokesperson, the ministry submitted this report to the Commission on time and the Commission is responsible for its publication.
The phenomenon even has its own name: German Vote. The Brussels bubble uses this term to describe the frequent German abstention in the Council of Ministers – but the term stands for even more: for the speechlessness of the largest member state in the European legislative process. The German representative in the Council bodies is often only able to speak out on the matter at a late stage because the positioning in Berlin has not yet been finalized.
All too often, the so-called instruction only arrives in Brussels hours or even minutes before the decisive meeting of the permanent representatives – far too late to be able to organize majorities or vote on requests to speak. And it is not uncommon that no agreement is reached in Berlin so that Germany has to abstain.
Why is that? Germany is governed by coalitions that make decisions by consensus. This is also reflected in European policy: every directive to Brussels, which determines how German representatives are to behave in Council bodies from working level to ministerial level, is agreed by consensus between the departments concerned and the Federal Chancellery. This is interpreted very broadly; normally at least one department from each coalition partner is involved.
The coordination process is laborious and time-consuming: there is literally a struggle at all levels for every word that is to be presented in Brussels. If there is no agreement, there is no instruction. Then the German representative is not allowed to speak – and if there is a vote, she has to abstain. In order to be able to speak at all, a compromise formula is often agreed directly before a meeting. This compromise is then built upon in the next voting round.
As a rule, a German position only develops slowly in the course of the consultation process in the Council, while many other member states have already agreed on their position early on in the process and can begin to organize majorities.
Due to Germany’s large voting weight, this does not mean that the German position, once found, has no influence. And in individual cases, things also work differently: in the reform of EU fiscal rules, for example, the traffic light coalition agreed on a joint position paper very early on and also published it – with the result that Germany prevailed in many areas.
However, this mode of coordination generally means that Germany gives away potential influence because it cannot position itself early enough – if at all. And secondly, this makes Germany a partner that is difficult to predict for everyone else, which makes decision-making in Brussels more difficult overall.
To solve this problem, it seems obvious to introduce a kind of final decision-making authority early on in the process: For example, by the Chancellery, the AA, a new Ministry for Europe or even the relevant specialist department ultimately deciding Germany’s positioning. But these ideas all come to nothing: in fact, this possibility already exists with the chancellor’s authority to issue directives, which Olaf Scholz, for example, used to push through a German “no” to the car tariffs in Brussels.
However, such a final decision is difficult to imagine as a normal mode, as it would mean that a coalition partner would give up its say on an issue that is politically important to it – because this is where the conflicts ultimately arise. As long as Germany is governed by coalitions that decide by consensus, such proposals will not work.
For a more promising approach, it is worth taking a look at our Dutch neighbors. Although very colorful coalitions sometimes govern in the Netherlands, we have not yet heard of a “Dutch Vote”. In fact, according to data from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the Netherlands abstains only about half as often as Germany and is generally considered to be much more powerful in Brussels.
And there is a reason for this: the government has undertaken to present the main features of the government’s position to Parliament six weeks after the publication of a legislative proposal or communication by the Commission and two weeks before each Council meeting, and to publish these.
Such an obligation for an early determination would significantly alleviate the problem of the German Vote, simplify the coordination of directives and thus make Germany’s voice in Brussels stronger and more predictable. To this end, it could be stipulated by law that the Federal Government must submit a coordinated position to the Bundestag six or eight weeks after legislative proposals and also after communications from the Commission with substantial proposals for change, which would also be published. In return, large parts of the government’s current completely ritualized and largely inconsequential reporting obligations to Parliament on every EU project, no matter how small, could be abolished.
If the government does not fulfill its duty or if the positioning is too thin in the opinion of the responsible committee, the ministers involved in the instruction would have to explain themselves publicly in committee – without the possibility of representation by (parliamentary) state secretaries. As a rule, you would want to spare your minister this embarrassment.
Would such a path solve all the problems of German EU coordination? Certainly not all of them. In the case of politically highly controversial dossiers, a late agreement can probably not be avoided. But the chances are good that, at least for the vast majority of dossiers, the obligation to take a joint public position will actually lead to earlier binding agreements on the matter. Especially if this is followed up centrally within the Federal Government by the Chancellery and the coordinating ministries and if the EU Committee and the chairs of the specialist committees take their role in this exercise seriously.
This would not only strengthen the German position in Brussels and the European legislative process – it would also make life easier for hundreds of ministerial officials, who could devote themselves to more productive tasks than endlessly voting on directives. After all, there is enough to do.
