China is (once again) moving to the center of political discussions today. The seventh German-Chinese government consultations are taking place in Berlin, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Premier Li Qiang as well as numerous ministers. In Brussels, the EU Commission is simultaneously presenting its strategy paper on economic security. Although the strategy does not explicitly target Beijing, it implicitly does – after all, Europe is now dependent on the People’s Republic for many critical raw materials and technologies.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wants to reduce these risks without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Europe should remain open to trade and investment, the Commission says, but should protect itself better in limited areas of military and intelligence relevance. This includes restrictive third-party access to key technologies (such as in the semiconductor sector) as well as to corresponding research projects or joint ventures. By the end of the year, the Commission also intends to propose a new instrument: a control regime for security-related investments by European companies in third countries.
All of this is part of the second of three pillars of the strategy, which comes under the heading “protection”. The first pillar emphasizes the need to strengthen the EU’s resilience and competitiveness, especially in chips and green technologies. The third pillar focuses on partnerships with like-minded countries and how these should be shaped in concrete terms, within the framework of the G7 and beyond.
Von der Leyen is thus trying to find a middle ground between countries like France, which insist on European sovereignty, and countries that are concerned about free trade. After all, the strategy paper will only be the start of the discussion. At next week’s EU summit, Olaf Scholz and Co. want to take it further.
I wish you an interesting read!
At the last Energy Council under the Swedish presidency, the EU energy ministers were only able to agree on parts of the reform package for the electricity market on Monday. They achieved a general orientation for the market transparency regulation REMIT and a provisional political agreement for the electricity market directive. This was announced by Sweden’s Minister Ebba Busch after long negotiations.
However, the most important part, the Electricity Market Regulation, still needs to be negotiated by the Permanent Representatives. Sweden wants to find a compromise at the last minute, but there are only three Coreper meetings left until June 28.
With the agreement on the directive, electricity customers would have a prospect of a wider choice of supply contracts, said Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson. The text also regulates energy sharing, hedging transactions for electricity suppliers, and the regulation of end customer prices during energy crises. The core of the reform package is still politically controversial.
The most important point in the Electricity Market Regulation, according to Ebba Busch, is the Contracts for Difference (CfDs). This support instrument is actually mainly intended for the expansion of renewable energies, but France also wants to include existing nuclear power plants. “For EDF, this would be like a check for €120 billion”, said Luxembourg’s Green Energy Minister Claude Turmes with reference to the French electricity producer.
There must also be competition for the best business models in the electricity market, by which Turmes obviously meant alternative production from renewable energies. State-subsidized electricity prices also favor France’s industry.
Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck also warned of market distortions, which is not without irony, as he himself is aiming for a – albeit narrowly defined – industrial electricity price. It was mainly Germany that led the opposition to France’s funding wishes and prevented an agreement, a source from the council reported yesterday.
Habeck mentioned two possible solutions. Either revenues from the CfDs for existing power plants would have to flow into the general state budget at high electricity prices. The second possible solution is hidden behind the word “proportionality”, one of the most commonly used terms in the public part of the meeting. It apparently means that there should not be a guaranteed price for the entire electricity production of an existing power plant, but only for a share that corresponds to the ratio of costs for the extension of operation and those of the initial investment.
In any case, no unambiguous formulation for an agreement could be found anymore, Ebba Busch summarized the ministerial-level consultations. Simson made it clear that no CfD-funded power plant would be forced to sell electricity below its production costs. However, each case would have to be examined by the Commission in terms of state aid law.
Busch and France’s Energy Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher agreed that Europe needed new electricity generation capacities – which is also connected with the second point of contention that the Permanent Representatives still have to resolve.
Just a few days ago, the Council Presidency proposed extending the deadline for state capacity payments to existing coal-fired power plants from mid-2025 to the end of 2028. Poland’s Energy Minister Anna Moskwa appealed to the other member states because of the possible shutdown of Polish coal-fired power plants: “If one of us is in danger, we are all in danger.”
Several states, however, reject more state money for coal-fired power plants. Habeck said that separate funding for coal-fired power plants would not be compatible with either national or European climate targets. There must be other ways to solve the problem.
However, Commissioner Simson indicated a willingness to compromise: one or some member states may have problems with their power plant capacities, but deviations from the CO2 limits for capacity mechanisms should remain the exception. Simson also said the Commission was already working to speed up the review process for capacity mechanisms. The Commission is pushing the issue as quickly as possible. This meets a demand of the Council.
Busch justified a concession towards Poland by the special situation as a transit country for electricity deliveries to the East. Because of the Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, Ukraine has asked for EU electricity supplies of two gigawatts, but at present only one gigawatt can be delivered, Busch said. Additional electricity could only be provided by the community of states if its own electricity system was appropriately designed.
The Commission also informed the member states about the prospects for supply security next winter. The Commission no longer writes about a looming gas shortage in a nine-page report, but rather suggests the possibility of rising gas prices again. Literally, it says the markets could “come under pressure” if several risks materialize. The Commission counts:
The Commission also presented updated figures on new liquefied gas terminals. By 2024, 45 billion cubic meters (bcm) of new LNG capacities are expected in the EU, after 25 bcm have already been added since 2022.
Emmanuel Macron seemed somewhat defiant when he announced the resolutions of the conference on European air defense that he had organized. Belgium will be part of the German-French-Spanish armament project Future Combat Air System (FCAS) as an observer in the future, France’s President announced last night in Paris. In addition, he and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have decided to deploy the ground-based air defense system Samp/T in Ukraine. It is already being used in the country.
As a “very nice example of sovereign European cooperation”, Macron finally praised the declaration of intent signed with Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, and Estonia for the joint procurement of Mistral missiles.
Macron had invited the EU defense ministers to Paris at the Globsec Forum in Bratislava at the end of May to discuss a common European air defense in the French capital. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who ended up traveling to Paris – originally, State Secretary Benedikt Zimmer was supposed to represent him – must have felt addressed by Macron. At the conference, which was partly held on the sidelines of the air show in Le Bourget and partly in the Hôtel des Invalides near Napoleon’s tomb in Paris, were ministers and secretaries of state from 20 European countries.
The frequently mentioned accusation from France: Germany prefers to buy from the USA instead of strengthening the European arms industry. “Why are we too often forced to buy from the USA?”, Macron asked and answered himself: “Because the Americans have standardized much more than we have. And because they subsidize their industry.” Europe needs to focus more on its own industry to become sustainably independent.
That this is sometimes seen differently in the Bendlerblock in Berlin is one of the reasons why the “deep friendship” with France, as invoked in the National Security Strategy adopted by the Federal Cabinet last week, has developed cracks – at least with regard to notions of a common European defense strategy.
French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu should have visited Berlin last Monday to discuss the stalled German-French tank project Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) with Pistorius. However, the appointment was missing from the minister’s weekly schedule sent out by the French Ministry of Defense.
The reason Pistorius confirmed his participation in Paris at the last moment is likely due to the irritation caused by the European Sky Shield Initiative (Essi), initiated by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022, in Paris. The Essi founding agreement signed last October by Germany and 14 other states, including the nuclear power Great Britain, was later joined by Denmark and Sweden – France, Italy and Poland are not included.
The initiative is intended to help close existing gaps in the current NATO shield for Europe. The signatories also hope for lower costs through joint procurement of defense systems of short, medium, and long-range to protect their airspace from enemy drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The project also sends a political signal and ensures improved interoperability, writes the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The German-French dispute over Essi is essentially about how Europe can operate more independently from US influence, both in terms of defense and economic sustainability. This is a question that extends beyond just the military and affects the balance of geopolitical power as a whole.
June 21-23, 2023; Hanover (Germany)
VWS, Conference Climate Related Systemic Risks: Lessons Learned from Covid-19
The Volkswagen Foundation (VWS) is hosting a conference to discuss various topics related to systemic risk, such as impacts of climate extremes, critical infrastructures, and transport chains. What lessons can be learned from the systemic risk awareness gained by COVID-19? INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-23, 2023; Amsterdam (Netherlands)
VVM, Symposium 9th International Symposium on Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases
The network of environmental professionals’ (VVM) symposium aims to discuss the general picture and results in the field of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and to identify potential game changers with decision makers, industry, the financial sector, NGOs, and international organizations. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-23, 2023; Halle (Germany)
IAMO, Conference IAMO Forum 2023
The Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO) is bringing together representatives from research, civil society, agribusiness and policy to discuss international trade and global food security with particular focus on the growing importance of geopolitics. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-22, 2023; Florence (Italy)
EUI, Workshop Future Electricity Tariffs
The European University Institute (EUI) is hosting an academic workshop regarding the most recent insights and research on the design of electricity tariffs. INFO
June 21, 2023; 10-11:30 a.m., online
EUI, Discussion Carbon capture and storage – capturing the momentum
The European University Institute (EUI) will debate the momentum of carbon capture use and storage (CCUS) following the Commission’s commitment to issuing a CCUS Strategy later this year and explore what should be included in the Strategy. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21, 2023; 5 p.m., ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands)
eit Food, conference Farming in the Netherlands – what’s next?
The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) brings together farmers, policymakers, science journalists, and consumer researchers to collectively explore what steps need to be taken to achieve a green transition and how to shape the future of farming in the Netherlands. INFO
June 22-23, 2023; Florence (Italy)/online
EUI, Conference Florence Digitalisation Summer Conference
This conference organized by the European University Institute (EUI) and the OECD is gathering academics, practitioners, officials from public authorities and industry representatives to discuss the obstacles and challenges in international data flows with a particular focus on the economic challenges and how data sharing may be reconciled with data protection. INFO & REGISTRATION
In the Data Act negotiations, a change in the definition of data to be shared is emerging that is alarming the industry. Previously, the proposed legislation stated that only raw data would be covered. Raw data is the data generated by networked products.
In the version currently under discussion, a compromise proposal by the Swedish Council Presidency, the term raw data is no longer listed in the legal text, but only in the legally non-binding recitals.
Therefore, the industry assumes that processed data should also fall within the scope of the law. Massive resistance is forming against this. The industry is demanding that the German and French governments get directly involved in the negotiations with their respective data strategies in order to prevent the worst from happening.
Car manufacturers fear that this could render their efforts in areas such as connected driving obsolete. They have invested large sums in developing business models for vehicle and user data. Processed data would also be used to develop product improvements, for example. Sharing this data with third parties allows conclusions to be drawn about internal development expertise. The companies’ intellectual property is thus at risk. There are also threats to the cybersecurity of connected products. If the industry has to hand over processed data, there is no incentive to make these investments.
The industry that manufactures Internet-enabled products is currently lobbying behind the scenes in Brussels for a return to the original wording. In letters from industry associations obtained by Table.Media, they state: If EU lawmakers enforce the exchange of processed data, the industry in Europe would no longer be competitive with companies in China and the US.
Actually, the trilogue on the Data Act is scheduled to conclude on June 27. But in view of the dispute over the definition of the data to be shared, there are massive doubts about the schedule. mgr/vis
Member states agreed last Friday on a compromise that accommodates French interests in nuclear energy without reopening negotiations on the Renewable Energy Directive. The Permanent Representatives Committee of the member dtates added an additional recital.
Earlier during the meeting, the European Commission had distributed a statement saying: “The Commission recognizes that fossil-free energy sources other than renewables contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 for those member states that choose them.” So, without mentioning it, the Commission recognizes the role of nuclear power in achieving Europe’s decarbonization goals.
This had been a French request, says France’s Energy Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher in a statement to the press. Nuclear energy was recognized as useful for decarbonizing hydrogen production. “This is historic”, the minister’s office said, adding that this recognition “will be binding for the European Commission in all future discussions” on the issue.
Markus Pieper (EPP), rapporteur of the European Parliament and parliamentary director of the CDU/CSU group, welcomed the agreement. “The recital added at the last minute seems to have been necessary for majority building in the Council”, he commented. As a Parliament, “we would nevertheless have liked to have done without it“, but the parliament will not oppose further procedure in the interest of a rapid expansion of renewable energies. “The negotiating team of the European Parliament is united in this respect”, Pieper said.
The Industry and Energy Committee (ITRE) will vote on the trilogue result on June 28. The plenary vote is scheduled for September. cst
The EU battery industry may not be able to meet demand beyond 2025. As a result, there is a risk that the EU will either miss its 2035 CO2 targets or would have to meet this target through imported batteries or electric cars, which would harm the European industry. This is the conclusion of a special report published yesterday by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), which evaluated the EU’s strategic action plan for batteries.
The EU Commission had indeed taken measures for most parts of the Battery Action Plan. Among other things, the Battery Regulation was recently adopted. However, it will still take several years before the individual new requirements for strengthening the European battery value chains come into force.
The report identifies four major problems:
The auditors warn of two scenarios in the event that battery production capacity in the EU does not grow as planned. It could happen that the EU bans the sale of new gasoline and diesel cars only after 2035. This would mean that the climate targets would not be met. In the second scenario, there would have to be a heavy reliance on batteries and electric vehicles from third countries to meet the EU climate targets. This would be to the detriment of the European automotive industry and its employees.
Almost one in five new cars registered in the EU in 2021 had electric drives, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers Association. In addition, the sale of new gasoline and diesel cars is to be banned from 2035. Therefore, batteries are of great strategic importance for the EU – and important to achieve climate targets, the Court’s report says. leo/dpa
The smaller German parties in the European Parliament are resisting the introduction of a blocking clause in the European elections, as decided in the Bundestag. “We demand democratic participation”, said MEP Manuela Ripa of the ÖDP in Berlin on Monday. On top of that, the blocking clause is unconstitutional, she added. Volt MEP Damian Boeselager spoke of abuse of power by the larger parties and called the procedure anti-democratic.
568 members of the Bundestag voted last Thursday in favor of a bill proposed by the German government to ratify a 2018 EU requirement. A two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat is also needed for the law to come into force. The state chamber is expected to consider the bill on July 7. The planned blocking clause, ranging from two to five percent, is part of an electoral law reform at EU level. Only Germany, Spain and Cyprus still have to agree.
The declared aim of the reform is to prevent a fragmentation of the European Parliament in order to keep it functional. Currently, there is no threshold clause for elections to the European Parliament in Germany. Until 2009, the five-percent hurdle also applied here. However, in 2011 and 2014, the German Constitutional Court ruled that blocking clauses in European elections were incompatible with the German constitution. Because of this starting position, two-thirds majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat are required for implementation.
There are currently 14 German parties in the EP. Most recently, about 0.5 percent of the votes were enough to win a seat. The Pirates, the Animal Welfare Party, the Family Party, the ÖDP and the Volt won seats. Freie Wähler and Die Partei each have two representatives. If the planned electoral law had already applied in the last European election, the first five parties would not have been represented in the EP, according to the calculation of Anne Herpertz, national chairwoman of the Pirate Party. Thus, 1.7 million votes (4.5 percent of the electorate) would have been ignored.
“This is a serious encroachment on electoral equality and equal opportunity“, Herpertz said. Thus, diversity in parliament would be curtailed, debates would be narrowed, and opportunities for criticism and control would be limited vis-à-vis the major parties. The risk that a smaller party would fail the threshold could cause voters to vote for larger parties sooner, she said. She also pointed out that Patrick Breyer (Pirates) and Damian Boeselager (Volt) together had handled more reports than the five FDP MEPs in the EP combined.
Boeselager said he had not heard a single substantive argument justifying the change in electoral law. This is because the vast majority of the smaller parties have joined one of the seven groups in the EP, so there can be no question of fragmentation. Since the EP does not carry the government, as does the Bundestag, for example, the constitutional justification at the European level also fails.
It is possible that the threshold clause will also fail at the third attempt before the Federal Constitutional Court. Should this not be the case, it would only come into effect for the 2029 European elections. In addition, the EP has made another attempt to change the electoral law in 2022. vis
Kenya is to be allowed to import its agricultural products into the European Union duty-free on a permanent basis in the future. Both sides signed a trade agreement on Monday in which, in return, tariffs for European goods to Kenya are to fall. Kenya is Africa’s seventh-largest economy and a major exporter of such products as tea, coffee, fruit, vegetables and flowers. President William Ruto said Monday at the signing ceremony in Nairobi that the agreement should also stimulate investment and manufacturing.
In Berlin, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Svenja Schulze said the agreement created a stable basis for economic relations. Kenya is a geopolitically important partner and a reliable ally in the fight against climate change. For the first time, compliance with the Paris climate agreement is an essential part of a trade agreement with a developing country. “Kenya and the EU are thus sending a signal that trade must not be at the expense of environmental protection, labor standards or human rights”, Schulze said.
According to the ministry, the EU exported more than €2 billion worth of goods to Kenya in 2022, and €1.26 billion in the opposite direction. Previously, the EU had granted Kenya transitional duty-free and quota-free market access, but now this applies permanently. In exchange, the country is opening its market to EU imports gradually over a 25-year period. “In the process, Kenya can completely exempt particularly sensitive products such as tomatoes, wheat flour and textiles from tariff relief, thus permanently protecting them from discounted imports from the EU”, the ministry said.
The agreement also contains a comprehensive chapter on sustainability. In addition to the usual provisions on labor standards and multilateral environmental agreements, it also includes gender equality, forest protection and biodiversity.
According to both sides, the negotiation of the agreement took just seven months, making it one of the fastest ever in the EU. The agreement is now to be submitted to the parliaments of both sides for ratification. rtr
German industry is demanding much more speed from Chancellor Olaf Scholz in driving forward the restructuring of the economy and securing the competitiveness of the location. “Germany is falling behind”, criticized Siegfried Russwurm, president of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), in Berlin on Monday. He said the economy would stagnate in 2023, with improvement not in sight until 2024 at the earliest. In addition, investment behavior is clearly pointing downward.
At Industry Day, the influential BDI demanded permanently competitive electricity prices, lower taxes and faster planning and approval procedures from the government. SPD politician Scholz promised that the course was being set for significantly more electricity from renewable sources such as wind and solar. Minister for Finance Christian Lindner held out the prospect of at least minor tax relief.
Competitiveness is suffering from the sharp rise in energy costs, Russwurm said. A solution for a few years – such as the proposed industrial electricity price, which is controversial within the government – is not enough. Scholz had spoken during the election campaign of an electricity price of four cents, from which we are now miles away. “The many state-induced burdens such as taxes, surcharges and grid fees must be reduced.”
Scholz reiterated the goal of sourcing 80 percent of electricity from renewables in 2030. To achieve this, capacities would have to be expanded drastically. All the groundwork for this would have to be laid this year or at the beginning of 2024. Lindner stressed that one should not be too selective. Red hydrogen produced from nuclear power could also help the industry become more climate-friendly during a transition phase. Lindner reiterated his opposition to the industrial electricity price proposed by the SPD and the Greens, i.e. new subsidies to lower electricity prices.
According to the BDI, more and more companies, right down to the SME level, are considering moving parts of their operations out of Germany. “We need better tax conditions for investments at our locations – and we need them now, not at some point in the future”, Russwurm demanded. Lindner outlined, however, that a major tax reform was not feasible within the coalition. An expansion of tax-based research funding is planned for this year, he said. In addition, an investment premium is being worked on. rtr
In the first half of the 1990s, my main task as Secretary General of the European People’s Party was to make the EPP the strongest political force in European elections for the first time. By integrating new partner parties on the basis of the Athens Program, this goal was achieved in the 1999 European elections and the basis was laid for the EPP’s dominance in the European Union for the next quarter century. Its position as the strongest political force was the basis for the Commission presidencies of José Manuel Durão Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker and Ursula von der Leyen.
The EPP expanded in two directions at once, absorbing parts of the liberal and conservative spectrum in Europe. It followed the model of German Christian democracy, which had formed after World War II as a union of Catholics and Protestants and therefore had to integrate both the Catholic Christian social and the Protestant conservative and liberal traditions.
In practice, the liberal, conservative and Christian Democratic traditions successfully complemented each other in the enlarged EPP. Traditional Christian Democratic concepts of balance in a plural society, such as social market economy, personalism, federalism, subsidiarity and sustainability, harmonize with the conservative impulse to preserve as well as the liberal idea of freedom.
But attitudes toward European integration became the hard dividing line. The British Conservatives became increasingly nationalistic and left the joint group in 2009 – a prelude to Brexit. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s hate campaign against Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and his undermining of democratic diversity at home made this relationship impossible – as did his increasing advances toward Russian President Vladimir Putin and Marine Le Pen of France’s Rassemblement National.
The real dividing line in practice between parties of the extended center and the right is therefore not Christian Democratic or conservative, but European or nationalist. Within the nationalist camp, there is also a hard dividing line: pro-Russian and fundamental EU system opposition on the extreme right, and orientation toward the US, combined with Euroskepticism in the more moderate camp resulted in the formation of two factions in the European Parliament.
The extreme right can therefore be described as a double system opposition – against transatlantic partnership and against European integration. The post-1945 political order, with democracy, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the press, pluralism, transatlantic partnership and European integration as its core elements, has more than proven its value and is therefore what Christian Democrats and conservatives want to preserve.
Challenging this order, after almost 80 years, can no longer be considered conservative, but is reactionary and oriented toward pre-World War II concepts: authoritarian and illiberal.
This nationalism promises protection through isolation. This is how Donald Trump won over coal and steel workers in his first run for US president. It’s why Marine Le Pen is elected in the old communist heartland of northern France. It’s how British ex-Prime Minister Boris Johnson won over Labour Party strongholds in the north of England. It is social-nationalism.
The stability of the political order in the European Union depends on the moderation of extreme forces toward the political center and should therefore be welcomed and supported. The Greek communist Syriza party has taken responsibility for a European future for Greece in the financial crisis after fierce internal wrangling. The left-wing Irish Sinn Féin, historically closely associated with the violent terrorism of the IRA, is increasingly moderating in preparation for assuming government responsibility.
The modern Spanish Partido Popular emerged from the post-Francist Alianza Popular in the early 1990s through a merger with smaller Christian Democratic and liberal parties. Acceptance of the post-1945 order, including European integration, was the precondition. The Italian head of government, Giorgia Meloni, seems to want to follow a similar path after decades of Italy’s permanent crisis, thus stabilizing her country in the European Union.
The European continent today is structured according to two principles: Empires in the east as an expression of Russian imperial and colonial ambitions, and the European Union in the west and center as a union of states and peoples that protects on the basis of equality and the rule of law. No wonder Ukraine and Moldova are desperate to join the European Union as a safe haven.
Russia is trying to reintroduce the rules of the game of aggressive imperial order of the 19th century in the Europe of the 21st century. For many states in Central and Eastern Europe, the European Union is therefore the guarantee of the existence of their threatened nation-state.
For all 27 member states, the European Union enables functions and mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution that they could not have on their own. The European Union is the necessary complement to the nation-state, as even the British are belatedly realizing. Together we can defend our values and interests in an increasingly conflict-ridden world. The European Union is our daily modus vivendi and operandi.
Officially, everyone involved is happy with Intel’s decision to stick with the planned construction of the chip factory in Magdeburg. Saxony-Anhalt is pleased about new jobs and Olaf Scholz about an economic policy success. Even Union faction vice-president Jens Spahn has nothing to complain about: The investment is important “for the region and our technological sovereignty”, he told Table.Media.
The company itself is probably also delighted – because in return for the higher total investment, which according to Intel will rise from €17 to over €30 billion, the government subsidies will also be increased – from €6.8 to €9.9 billion. Intel apparently achieved this by threatening to relocate the project to another country.
Not only Intel negotiated hard, but also Christian Lindner: The Minister had already announced days ago that there was no money in the budget for additional subsidies. According to information from government circles, Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck must therefore access funds outside the budget, which he can dispose of relatively freely: The Climate and Transformation Fund, which is primarily fed by revenue from CO2 trading.
This is problematic not only because the chip factory has little to do with the climate, but also because the funds will be lacking for other projects – at least in the medium to long term. Among other things, they are earmarked to help homeowners switch to climate-friendly heating systems and support industry conversion to hydrogen. Malte Kreutzfeldt
China is (once again) moving to the center of political discussions today. The seventh German-Chinese government consultations are taking place in Berlin, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Premier Li Qiang as well as numerous ministers. In Brussels, the EU Commission is simultaneously presenting its strategy paper on economic security. Although the strategy does not explicitly target Beijing, it implicitly does – after all, Europe is now dependent on the People’s Republic for many critical raw materials and technologies.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wants to reduce these risks without throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Europe should remain open to trade and investment, the Commission says, but should protect itself better in limited areas of military and intelligence relevance. This includes restrictive third-party access to key technologies (such as in the semiconductor sector) as well as to corresponding research projects or joint ventures. By the end of the year, the Commission also intends to propose a new instrument: a control regime for security-related investments by European companies in third countries.
All of this is part of the second of three pillars of the strategy, which comes under the heading “protection”. The first pillar emphasizes the need to strengthen the EU’s resilience and competitiveness, especially in chips and green technologies. The third pillar focuses on partnerships with like-minded countries and how these should be shaped in concrete terms, within the framework of the G7 and beyond.
Von der Leyen is thus trying to find a middle ground between countries like France, which insist on European sovereignty, and countries that are concerned about free trade. After all, the strategy paper will only be the start of the discussion. At next week’s EU summit, Olaf Scholz and Co. want to take it further.
I wish you an interesting read!
At the last Energy Council under the Swedish presidency, the EU energy ministers were only able to agree on parts of the reform package for the electricity market on Monday. They achieved a general orientation for the market transparency regulation REMIT and a provisional political agreement for the electricity market directive. This was announced by Sweden’s Minister Ebba Busch after long negotiations.
However, the most important part, the Electricity Market Regulation, still needs to be negotiated by the Permanent Representatives. Sweden wants to find a compromise at the last minute, but there are only three Coreper meetings left until June 28.
With the agreement on the directive, electricity customers would have a prospect of a wider choice of supply contracts, said Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson. The text also regulates energy sharing, hedging transactions for electricity suppliers, and the regulation of end customer prices during energy crises. The core of the reform package is still politically controversial.
The most important point in the Electricity Market Regulation, according to Ebba Busch, is the Contracts for Difference (CfDs). This support instrument is actually mainly intended for the expansion of renewable energies, but France also wants to include existing nuclear power plants. “For EDF, this would be like a check for €120 billion”, said Luxembourg’s Green Energy Minister Claude Turmes with reference to the French electricity producer.
There must also be competition for the best business models in the electricity market, by which Turmes obviously meant alternative production from renewable energies. State-subsidized electricity prices also favor France’s industry.
Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck also warned of market distortions, which is not without irony, as he himself is aiming for a – albeit narrowly defined – industrial electricity price. It was mainly Germany that led the opposition to France’s funding wishes and prevented an agreement, a source from the council reported yesterday.
Habeck mentioned two possible solutions. Either revenues from the CfDs for existing power plants would have to flow into the general state budget at high electricity prices. The second possible solution is hidden behind the word “proportionality”, one of the most commonly used terms in the public part of the meeting. It apparently means that there should not be a guaranteed price for the entire electricity production of an existing power plant, but only for a share that corresponds to the ratio of costs for the extension of operation and those of the initial investment.
In any case, no unambiguous formulation for an agreement could be found anymore, Ebba Busch summarized the ministerial-level consultations. Simson made it clear that no CfD-funded power plant would be forced to sell electricity below its production costs. However, each case would have to be examined by the Commission in terms of state aid law.
Busch and France’s Energy Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher agreed that Europe needed new electricity generation capacities – which is also connected with the second point of contention that the Permanent Representatives still have to resolve.
Just a few days ago, the Council Presidency proposed extending the deadline for state capacity payments to existing coal-fired power plants from mid-2025 to the end of 2028. Poland’s Energy Minister Anna Moskwa appealed to the other member states because of the possible shutdown of Polish coal-fired power plants: “If one of us is in danger, we are all in danger.”
Several states, however, reject more state money for coal-fired power plants. Habeck said that separate funding for coal-fired power plants would not be compatible with either national or European climate targets. There must be other ways to solve the problem.
However, Commissioner Simson indicated a willingness to compromise: one or some member states may have problems with their power plant capacities, but deviations from the CO2 limits for capacity mechanisms should remain the exception. Simson also said the Commission was already working to speed up the review process for capacity mechanisms. The Commission is pushing the issue as quickly as possible. This meets a demand of the Council.
Busch justified a concession towards Poland by the special situation as a transit country for electricity deliveries to the East. Because of the Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, Ukraine has asked for EU electricity supplies of two gigawatts, but at present only one gigawatt can be delivered, Busch said. Additional electricity could only be provided by the community of states if its own electricity system was appropriately designed.
The Commission also informed the member states about the prospects for supply security next winter. The Commission no longer writes about a looming gas shortage in a nine-page report, but rather suggests the possibility of rising gas prices again. Literally, it says the markets could “come under pressure” if several risks materialize. The Commission counts:
The Commission also presented updated figures on new liquefied gas terminals. By 2024, 45 billion cubic meters (bcm) of new LNG capacities are expected in the EU, after 25 bcm have already been added since 2022.
Emmanuel Macron seemed somewhat defiant when he announced the resolutions of the conference on European air defense that he had organized. Belgium will be part of the German-French-Spanish armament project Future Combat Air System (FCAS) as an observer in the future, France’s President announced last night in Paris. In addition, he and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have decided to deploy the ground-based air defense system Samp/T in Ukraine. It is already being used in the country.
As a “very nice example of sovereign European cooperation”, Macron finally praised the declaration of intent signed with Belgium, Cyprus, Hungary, and Estonia for the joint procurement of Mistral missiles.
Macron had invited the EU defense ministers to Paris at the Globsec Forum in Bratislava at the end of May to discuss a common European air defense in the French capital. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who ended up traveling to Paris – originally, State Secretary Benedikt Zimmer was supposed to represent him – must have felt addressed by Macron. At the conference, which was partly held on the sidelines of the air show in Le Bourget and partly in the Hôtel des Invalides near Napoleon’s tomb in Paris, were ministers and secretaries of state from 20 European countries.
The frequently mentioned accusation from France: Germany prefers to buy from the USA instead of strengthening the European arms industry. “Why are we too often forced to buy from the USA?”, Macron asked and answered himself: “Because the Americans have standardized much more than we have. And because they subsidize their industry.” Europe needs to focus more on its own industry to become sustainably independent.
That this is sometimes seen differently in the Bendlerblock in Berlin is one of the reasons why the “deep friendship” with France, as invoked in the National Security Strategy adopted by the Federal Cabinet last week, has developed cracks – at least with regard to notions of a common European defense strategy.
French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu should have visited Berlin last Monday to discuss the stalled German-French tank project Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) with Pistorius. However, the appointment was missing from the minister’s weekly schedule sent out by the French Ministry of Defense.
The reason Pistorius confirmed his participation in Paris at the last moment is likely due to the irritation caused by the European Sky Shield Initiative (Essi), initiated by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz in 2022, in Paris. The Essi founding agreement signed last October by Germany and 14 other states, including the nuclear power Great Britain, was later joined by Denmark and Sweden – France, Italy and Poland are not included.
The initiative is intended to help close existing gaps in the current NATO shield for Europe. The signatories also hope for lower costs through joint procurement of defense systems of short, medium, and long-range to protect their airspace from enemy drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The project also sends a political signal and ensures improved interoperability, writes the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The German-French dispute over Essi is essentially about how Europe can operate more independently from US influence, both in terms of defense and economic sustainability. This is a question that extends beyond just the military and affects the balance of geopolitical power as a whole.
June 21-23, 2023; Hanover (Germany)
VWS, Conference Climate Related Systemic Risks: Lessons Learned from Covid-19
The Volkswagen Foundation (VWS) is hosting a conference to discuss various topics related to systemic risk, such as impacts of climate extremes, critical infrastructures, and transport chains. What lessons can be learned from the systemic risk awareness gained by COVID-19? INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-23, 2023; Amsterdam (Netherlands)
VVM, Symposium 9th International Symposium on Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases
The network of environmental professionals’ (VVM) symposium aims to discuss the general picture and results in the field of non-CO2 greenhouse gases and to identify potential game changers with decision makers, industry, the financial sector, NGOs, and international organizations. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-23, 2023; Halle (Germany)
IAMO, Conference IAMO Forum 2023
The Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO) is bringing together representatives from research, civil society, agribusiness and policy to discuss international trade and global food security with particular focus on the growing importance of geopolitics. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21-22, 2023; Florence (Italy)
EUI, Workshop Future Electricity Tariffs
The European University Institute (EUI) is hosting an academic workshop regarding the most recent insights and research on the design of electricity tariffs. INFO
June 21, 2023; 10-11:30 a.m., online
EUI, Discussion Carbon capture and storage – capturing the momentum
The European University Institute (EUI) will debate the momentum of carbon capture use and storage (CCUS) following the Commission’s commitment to issuing a CCUS Strategy later this year and explore what should be included in the Strategy. INFO & REGISTRATION
June 21, 2023; 5 p.m., ‘s-Hertogenbosch (Netherlands)
eit Food, conference Farming in the Netherlands – what’s next?
The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) brings together farmers, policymakers, science journalists, and consumer researchers to collectively explore what steps need to be taken to achieve a green transition and how to shape the future of farming in the Netherlands. INFO
June 22-23, 2023; Florence (Italy)/online
EUI, Conference Florence Digitalisation Summer Conference
This conference organized by the European University Institute (EUI) and the OECD is gathering academics, practitioners, officials from public authorities and industry representatives to discuss the obstacles and challenges in international data flows with a particular focus on the economic challenges and how data sharing may be reconciled with data protection. INFO & REGISTRATION
In the Data Act negotiations, a change in the definition of data to be shared is emerging that is alarming the industry. Previously, the proposed legislation stated that only raw data would be covered. Raw data is the data generated by networked products.
In the version currently under discussion, a compromise proposal by the Swedish Council Presidency, the term raw data is no longer listed in the legal text, but only in the legally non-binding recitals.
Therefore, the industry assumes that processed data should also fall within the scope of the law. Massive resistance is forming against this. The industry is demanding that the German and French governments get directly involved in the negotiations with their respective data strategies in order to prevent the worst from happening.
Car manufacturers fear that this could render their efforts in areas such as connected driving obsolete. They have invested large sums in developing business models for vehicle and user data. Processed data would also be used to develop product improvements, for example. Sharing this data with third parties allows conclusions to be drawn about internal development expertise. The companies’ intellectual property is thus at risk. There are also threats to the cybersecurity of connected products. If the industry has to hand over processed data, there is no incentive to make these investments.
The industry that manufactures Internet-enabled products is currently lobbying behind the scenes in Brussels for a return to the original wording. In letters from industry associations obtained by Table.Media, they state: If EU lawmakers enforce the exchange of processed data, the industry in Europe would no longer be competitive with companies in China and the US.
Actually, the trilogue on the Data Act is scheduled to conclude on June 27. But in view of the dispute over the definition of the data to be shared, there are massive doubts about the schedule. mgr/vis
Member states agreed last Friday on a compromise that accommodates French interests in nuclear energy without reopening negotiations on the Renewable Energy Directive. The Permanent Representatives Committee of the member dtates added an additional recital.
Earlier during the meeting, the European Commission had distributed a statement saying: “The Commission recognizes that fossil-free energy sources other than renewables contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 for those member states that choose them.” So, without mentioning it, the Commission recognizes the role of nuclear power in achieving Europe’s decarbonization goals.
This had been a French request, says France’s Energy Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher in a statement to the press. Nuclear energy was recognized as useful for decarbonizing hydrogen production. “This is historic”, the minister’s office said, adding that this recognition “will be binding for the European Commission in all future discussions” on the issue.
Markus Pieper (EPP), rapporteur of the European Parliament and parliamentary director of the CDU/CSU group, welcomed the agreement. “The recital added at the last minute seems to have been necessary for majority building in the Council”, he commented. As a Parliament, “we would nevertheless have liked to have done without it“, but the parliament will not oppose further procedure in the interest of a rapid expansion of renewable energies. “The negotiating team of the European Parliament is united in this respect”, Pieper said.
The Industry and Energy Committee (ITRE) will vote on the trilogue result on June 28. The plenary vote is scheduled for September. cst
The EU battery industry may not be able to meet demand beyond 2025. As a result, there is a risk that the EU will either miss its 2035 CO2 targets or would have to meet this target through imported batteries or electric cars, which would harm the European industry. This is the conclusion of a special report published yesterday by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), which evaluated the EU’s strategic action plan for batteries.
The EU Commission had indeed taken measures for most parts of the Battery Action Plan. Among other things, the Battery Regulation was recently adopted. However, it will still take several years before the individual new requirements for strengthening the European battery value chains come into force.
The report identifies four major problems:
The auditors warn of two scenarios in the event that battery production capacity in the EU does not grow as planned. It could happen that the EU bans the sale of new gasoline and diesel cars only after 2035. This would mean that the climate targets would not be met. In the second scenario, there would have to be a heavy reliance on batteries and electric vehicles from third countries to meet the EU climate targets. This would be to the detriment of the European automotive industry and its employees.
Almost one in five new cars registered in the EU in 2021 had electric drives, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers Association. In addition, the sale of new gasoline and diesel cars is to be banned from 2035. Therefore, batteries are of great strategic importance for the EU – and important to achieve climate targets, the Court’s report says. leo/dpa
The smaller German parties in the European Parliament are resisting the introduction of a blocking clause in the European elections, as decided in the Bundestag. “We demand democratic participation”, said MEP Manuela Ripa of the ÖDP in Berlin on Monday. On top of that, the blocking clause is unconstitutional, she added. Volt MEP Damian Boeselager spoke of abuse of power by the larger parties and called the procedure anti-democratic.
568 members of the Bundestag voted last Thursday in favor of a bill proposed by the German government to ratify a 2018 EU requirement. A two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat is also needed for the law to come into force. The state chamber is expected to consider the bill on July 7. The planned blocking clause, ranging from two to five percent, is part of an electoral law reform at EU level. Only Germany, Spain and Cyprus still have to agree.
The declared aim of the reform is to prevent a fragmentation of the European Parliament in order to keep it functional. Currently, there is no threshold clause for elections to the European Parliament in Germany. Until 2009, the five-percent hurdle also applied here. However, in 2011 and 2014, the German Constitutional Court ruled that blocking clauses in European elections were incompatible with the German constitution. Because of this starting position, two-thirds majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat are required for implementation.
There are currently 14 German parties in the EP. Most recently, about 0.5 percent of the votes were enough to win a seat. The Pirates, the Animal Welfare Party, the Family Party, the ÖDP and the Volt won seats. Freie Wähler and Die Partei each have two representatives. If the planned electoral law had already applied in the last European election, the first five parties would not have been represented in the EP, according to the calculation of Anne Herpertz, national chairwoman of the Pirate Party. Thus, 1.7 million votes (4.5 percent of the electorate) would have been ignored.
“This is a serious encroachment on electoral equality and equal opportunity“, Herpertz said. Thus, diversity in parliament would be curtailed, debates would be narrowed, and opportunities for criticism and control would be limited vis-à-vis the major parties. The risk that a smaller party would fail the threshold could cause voters to vote for larger parties sooner, she said. She also pointed out that Patrick Breyer (Pirates) and Damian Boeselager (Volt) together had handled more reports than the five FDP MEPs in the EP combined.
Boeselager said he had not heard a single substantive argument justifying the change in electoral law. This is because the vast majority of the smaller parties have joined one of the seven groups in the EP, so there can be no question of fragmentation. Since the EP does not carry the government, as does the Bundestag, for example, the constitutional justification at the European level also fails.
It is possible that the threshold clause will also fail at the third attempt before the Federal Constitutional Court. Should this not be the case, it would only come into effect for the 2029 European elections. In addition, the EP has made another attempt to change the electoral law in 2022. vis
Kenya is to be allowed to import its agricultural products into the European Union duty-free on a permanent basis in the future. Both sides signed a trade agreement on Monday in which, in return, tariffs for European goods to Kenya are to fall. Kenya is Africa’s seventh-largest economy and a major exporter of such products as tea, coffee, fruit, vegetables and flowers. President William Ruto said Monday at the signing ceremony in Nairobi that the agreement should also stimulate investment and manufacturing.
In Berlin, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Svenja Schulze said the agreement created a stable basis for economic relations. Kenya is a geopolitically important partner and a reliable ally in the fight against climate change. For the first time, compliance with the Paris climate agreement is an essential part of a trade agreement with a developing country. “Kenya and the EU are thus sending a signal that trade must not be at the expense of environmental protection, labor standards or human rights”, Schulze said.
According to the ministry, the EU exported more than €2 billion worth of goods to Kenya in 2022, and €1.26 billion in the opposite direction. Previously, the EU had granted Kenya transitional duty-free and quota-free market access, but now this applies permanently. In exchange, the country is opening its market to EU imports gradually over a 25-year period. “In the process, Kenya can completely exempt particularly sensitive products such as tomatoes, wheat flour and textiles from tariff relief, thus permanently protecting them from discounted imports from the EU”, the ministry said.
The agreement also contains a comprehensive chapter on sustainability. In addition to the usual provisions on labor standards and multilateral environmental agreements, it also includes gender equality, forest protection and biodiversity.
According to both sides, the negotiation of the agreement took just seven months, making it one of the fastest ever in the EU. The agreement is now to be submitted to the parliaments of both sides for ratification. rtr
German industry is demanding much more speed from Chancellor Olaf Scholz in driving forward the restructuring of the economy and securing the competitiveness of the location. “Germany is falling behind”, criticized Siegfried Russwurm, president of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), in Berlin on Monday. He said the economy would stagnate in 2023, with improvement not in sight until 2024 at the earliest. In addition, investment behavior is clearly pointing downward.
At Industry Day, the influential BDI demanded permanently competitive electricity prices, lower taxes and faster planning and approval procedures from the government. SPD politician Scholz promised that the course was being set for significantly more electricity from renewable sources such as wind and solar. Minister for Finance Christian Lindner held out the prospect of at least minor tax relief.
Competitiveness is suffering from the sharp rise in energy costs, Russwurm said. A solution for a few years – such as the proposed industrial electricity price, which is controversial within the government – is not enough. Scholz had spoken during the election campaign of an electricity price of four cents, from which we are now miles away. “The many state-induced burdens such as taxes, surcharges and grid fees must be reduced.”
Scholz reiterated the goal of sourcing 80 percent of electricity from renewables in 2030. To achieve this, capacities would have to be expanded drastically. All the groundwork for this would have to be laid this year or at the beginning of 2024. Lindner stressed that one should not be too selective. Red hydrogen produced from nuclear power could also help the industry become more climate-friendly during a transition phase. Lindner reiterated his opposition to the industrial electricity price proposed by the SPD and the Greens, i.e. new subsidies to lower electricity prices.
According to the BDI, more and more companies, right down to the SME level, are considering moving parts of their operations out of Germany. “We need better tax conditions for investments at our locations – and we need them now, not at some point in the future”, Russwurm demanded. Lindner outlined, however, that a major tax reform was not feasible within the coalition. An expansion of tax-based research funding is planned for this year, he said. In addition, an investment premium is being worked on. rtr
In the first half of the 1990s, my main task as Secretary General of the European People’s Party was to make the EPP the strongest political force in European elections for the first time. By integrating new partner parties on the basis of the Athens Program, this goal was achieved in the 1999 European elections and the basis was laid for the EPP’s dominance in the European Union for the next quarter century. Its position as the strongest political force was the basis for the Commission presidencies of José Manuel Durão Barroso, Jean-Claude Juncker and Ursula von der Leyen.
The EPP expanded in two directions at once, absorbing parts of the liberal and conservative spectrum in Europe. It followed the model of German Christian democracy, which had formed after World War II as a union of Catholics and Protestants and therefore had to integrate both the Catholic Christian social and the Protestant conservative and liberal traditions.
In practice, the liberal, conservative and Christian Democratic traditions successfully complemented each other in the enlarged EPP. Traditional Christian Democratic concepts of balance in a plural society, such as social market economy, personalism, federalism, subsidiarity and sustainability, harmonize with the conservative impulse to preserve as well as the liberal idea of freedom.
But attitudes toward European integration became the hard dividing line. The British Conservatives became increasingly nationalistic and left the joint group in 2009 – a prelude to Brexit. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s hate campaign against Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and his undermining of democratic diversity at home made this relationship impossible – as did his increasing advances toward Russian President Vladimir Putin and Marine Le Pen of France’s Rassemblement National.
The real dividing line in practice between parties of the extended center and the right is therefore not Christian Democratic or conservative, but European or nationalist. Within the nationalist camp, there is also a hard dividing line: pro-Russian and fundamental EU system opposition on the extreme right, and orientation toward the US, combined with Euroskepticism in the more moderate camp resulted in the formation of two factions in the European Parliament.
The extreme right can therefore be described as a double system opposition – against transatlantic partnership and against European integration. The post-1945 political order, with democracy, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the press, pluralism, transatlantic partnership and European integration as its core elements, has more than proven its value and is therefore what Christian Democrats and conservatives want to preserve.
Challenging this order, after almost 80 years, can no longer be considered conservative, but is reactionary and oriented toward pre-World War II concepts: authoritarian and illiberal.
This nationalism promises protection through isolation. This is how Donald Trump won over coal and steel workers in his first run for US president. It’s why Marine Le Pen is elected in the old communist heartland of northern France. It’s how British ex-Prime Minister Boris Johnson won over Labour Party strongholds in the north of England. It is social-nationalism.
The stability of the political order in the European Union depends on the moderation of extreme forces toward the political center and should therefore be welcomed and supported. The Greek communist Syriza party has taken responsibility for a European future for Greece in the financial crisis after fierce internal wrangling. The left-wing Irish Sinn Féin, historically closely associated with the violent terrorism of the IRA, is increasingly moderating in preparation for assuming government responsibility.
The modern Spanish Partido Popular emerged from the post-Francist Alianza Popular in the early 1990s through a merger with smaller Christian Democratic and liberal parties. Acceptance of the post-1945 order, including European integration, was the precondition. The Italian head of government, Giorgia Meloni, seems to want to follow a similar path after decades of Italy’s permanent crisis, thus stabilizing her country in the European Union.
The European continent today is structured according to two principles: Empires in the east as an expression of Russian imperial and colonial ambitions, and the European Union in the west and center as a union of states and peoples that protects on the basis of equality and the rule of law. No wonder Ukraine and Moldova are desperate to join the European Union as a safe haven.
Russia is trying to reintroduce the rules of the game of aggressive imperial order of the 19th century in the Europe of the 21st century. For many states in Central and Eastern Europe, the European Union is therefore the guarantee of the existence of their threatened nation-state.
For all 27 member states, the European Union enables functions and mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution that they could not have on their own. The European Union is the necessary complement to the nation-state, as even the British are belatedly realizing. Together we can defend our values and interests in an increasingly conflict-ridden world. The European Union is our daily modus vivendi and operandi.
Officially, everyone involved is happy with Intel’s decision to stick with the planned construction of the chip factory in Magdeburg. Saxony-Anhalt is pleased about new jobs and Olaf Scholz about an economic policy success. Even Union faction vice-president Jens Spahn has nothing to complain about: The investment is important “for the region and our technological sovereignty”, he told Table.Media.
The company itself is probably also delighted – because in return for the higher total investment, which according to Intel will rise from €17 to over €30 billion, the government subsidies will also be increased – from €6.8 to €9.9 billion. Intel apparently achieved this by threatening to relocate the project to another country.
Not only Intel negotiated hard, but also Christian Lindner: The Minister had already announced days ago that there was no money in the budget for additional subsidies. According to information from government circles, Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck must therefore access funds outside the budget, which he can dispose of relatively freely: The Climate and Transformation Fund, which is primarily fed by revenue from CO2 trading.
This is problematic not only because the chip factory has little to do with the climate, but also because the funds will be lacking for other projects – at least in the medium to long term. Among other things, they are earmarked to help homeowners switch to climate-friendly heating systems and support industry conversion to hydrogen. Malte Kreutzfeldt