The heads of state and government of nine European countries plus the heads of the EU and NATO sat together at the Élysée Palace yesterday until late into the evening. They tried to formulate a response to the latest developments, which can hardly be captured by the hackneyed term “turning point.” You can read the results below in our Feature by Stephan Israel.
Those responsible in Europe will try to find out whether the US government is serious about everything it has announced in recent days. Some people are taking heart: Donald Trump’s approach of excluding Europeans and Ukrainians from the peace negotiations with Russia is possibly just an expression of brute negotiating tactics. However, even this argument is treacherous, because his dealings with the (previous) allies of the United States are brute, not with the geopolitical rival and (previous) opponent Russia.
There is much to suggest that the US President no longer knows any guardrails. During his first term in office, he was held back by other US institutions and his own staff. Today, these corrective measures are largely absent. Trump’s instincts – transactional, authoritarian and oblivious to history – are in full effect. His chumminess with Vladimir Putin could be extremely dangerous for European states, and not just for Poles, Balts and Finns in view of hybrid warfare.
The much-cited term “wake-up call” is therefore misplaced. The moment of truth has come for the European Union. Now, in the coming days, weeks and months, it will be decided whether Europe will take its fate into its own hands. Or whether it will surrender to powers that are not well-disposed towards it. We can only hope that the new Federal Government and the new Federal Chancellor have understood the scale of the task. Germany must lead the way together with Paris and Warsaw. And, if necessary, leave behind those member states that are not willing to follow the path of European security policy self-empowerment.
Keir Starmer put his European partners under pressure even before arriving at the mini-summit in Paris: The British government was “ready and willing” to send ground troops to Ukraine to secure a peace deal, the British Prime Minister wrote in a guest article in The Telegraph. Emmanuel Macron had invited selected heads of state and government as well as the heads of the EU and NATO to the mini-summit.
The French President’s aim was to prepare the broadest possible coalition of the willing for strong security guarantees, including peacekeeping troops. However, anyone expecting a clear answer in Paris was disappointed. Apart from the British President, only the French President has so far shown himself willing to send ground troops. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, voiced clear criticism: It was “completely premature and completely the wrong time” to discuss a peacekeeping force.
Instead of unity, the impression after the mini-meeting was one of disunity. Yet time is pressing. Also because the USA is exerting pressure and is currently sounding out with a list of questions what the European allies are prepared to contribute to security guarantees following a peace agreement. Keir Starmer wrote that the UK is ready to take on a leading role here. He is trying to position the UK as a bridge between continental Europe and the USA, according to the Telegraph.
Starmer wants to be the first European head of government to visit Donald Trump in the White House next week. According to British media reports, the coalition of the willing could be organized around the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a multinational expeditionary force led by the UK as the framework nation with the Baltic and Scandinavian nations as well as the Dutch. A peacekeeping force with the JEF at its core and between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers could be stationed in the hinterland as security, while the Ukrainian armed forces would have to hold their positions along the front line.
In an interview with the LCI channel, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot reported on “very concrete talks at various levels” concerning the deployment of troops, particularly from France, the UK and Poland. “We have no plans to send Polish soldiers to Ukraine,” contradicted Head of Government Donald Tusk. Poland would, however, provide logistical and political support to countries that wanted to provide security guarantees for Ukraine in the future. Tusk insisted all the more that the European partners must follow Poland’s example and strengthen their defense capabilities.
The Financial Times reported that Trump wants to offer Russian President Vladimir Putin the option of withdrawing US troops from the Baltic states and possibly further west. Against this backdrop, Donald Tusk said that Europe must be able to compensate for Russia’s military potential. This was the only way to really support Ukraine.
In addition to Tusk and Scholz, the heads of government of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark also traveled to Paris. “I am irritated by these debates,” said the German Chancellor after the meeting, indirectly distancing himself from his British colleague and host Macron. The outcome of peace talks, which have not even begun and whose outcome is completely open, are being discussed over the heads of the Ukrainians. Without the involvement of US troops, the deployment of German troops also appears to be out of the question for Olaf Scholz: “We will not participate in scenarios in which European and American security fall apart, i.e. European soldiers are deployed without full US involvement.”
However, this is exactly what the Trump administration is currently aiming for according to all the statements made in recent days, namely a peacekeeping force without US involvement. Denmark and Sweden are open to the question of peacekeeping troops. First of all, a fair and stable peace in accordance with international law is needed, said Sweden’s Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard. After that, her government would not rule anything out.
The position of Italy and Spain is also unclear: no one is currently considering sending troops to Ukraine, as peace is still a long way off, said Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares. The Dutch right-wing populist and leader of the largest governing party PVV, Geert Wilders, was also critical. Wilders wrote on X that he was against sending Dutch soldiers to Ukraine. The Dutch army is already involved in many missions and must also protect its own territory, he added. The “club of losers” met in Paris, Viktor Orbán’s government spokesperson wrote on X. Trump had marginalized Europe with his peace strategy. The same politicians who had mocked Viktor Orbán’s peace mission were now panicking, they continued.
“I will propose activating the escape clause for defense investments,” said Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last Friday in Munich. “This will allow member states to substantially increase their defense spending.”
The announcement seems to have taken not only the EU member states but also the Commission services by surprise. EU diplomats confirm that no proposal has yet been submitted to the member states. On Monday, the Commission could not yet publicly confirm whether von der Leyen was talking about the general escape clause or the national escape clause. “We will work on the modalities in the coming weeks,” said Economic Affairs Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis on Monday.
In Brussels, however, it is assumed that the Commission is referring to the national escape clause. According to the relevant regulation, the general escape clause requires a “severe economic downturn,” while the national escape clause requires “exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the member state.”
In her speech, von der Leyen announced that the escape clause would be introduced in a “controlled and conditional” manner. However, with the exception of member states in an excessive deficit procedure, the EU debt rules do not provide for a mechanism to introduce such conditions when the national escape clause is used. Lucas Guttenberg of the Bertelsmann Foundation argues that the national escape clause will allow Germany and other less indebted countries (especially in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe) to spend more money.
Federal Finance Minister Jörg Kukies (SPD) reacted cautiously to von der Leyen’s proposal on Monday. “We are still waiting for more concrete details,” he said in Brussels on the sidelines of the Eurogroup meeting. He campaigned for a reform of the EU debt rules, which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had proposed in Munich on Saturday. According to this, defense spending that exceeds the NATO two percent target should be exempted from the fiscal rules for a limited period of time.
“Perhaps we should take this as the new normal, that we also need permanently higher spending, which by definition would be the case with defense spending,” said Kukies in Brussels. The EU must therefore “think about the European debt rules as a whole and act outside the regime of exceptions,” he added.
The BMF also fears that the repeated use of the escape clause will ultimately lead to the EU debt rules simply no longer being applied. However, changing the debt rules is likely to take more time anyway, as Parliament would also have to give its consent.
Von der Leyen’s proposal is also being viewed critically in more indebted member states. Belgium, France and Spain appear to be open to using the escape clause. However, they want to avoid it being seen as an alternative to more Europeanized financing.
“National funding is one of the essential elements, but there are other areas that we need to talk about,” said Spanish Finance Minister Carlos Cuerpo. Defense is “a European public good.” Joint financing must therefore also be part of the solution, said Cuerpo.
Activation of the national escape clause would have to be confirmed by the Council. It can therefore be assumed that Spain, France and other states will try to attach conditions to their approval. The Commission is expected to present more details on the use of the escape clause in its White Paper on the future of European defense on March 19.
After decades of wrangling, the negotiating partners of the EU and the Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) reached a political agreement on a free trade partnership in December 2024. Both the EU Parliament and the EU member states must approve the agreement – but it remains controversial. Critics cite risks for agriculture and the environment.
As controversial as the planned free trade agreement is, it offers both economic and geopolitical benefits, for example in the area of sustainability and strategic securing of raw materials. It also strengthens rules-based trade at a time when the law of the jungle is becoming increasingly prevalent. The EU should therefore support the agreement in order to safeguard its strategic interests with regard to economic security and create a good basis for future cooperation with Mercosur.
Firstly, the agreement offers substantial economic benefits. The removal of trade barriers would benefit European industries as well as economic development in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Germany would benefit greatly from the abolition of tariffs on industrial products in general and on automotive products in particular. For the Mercosur states, the agreement opens up the prospect of some protection from European regulations (e.g. the CO₂ Border Adjustment Mechanism) by providing a rebalancing instrument. At the same time, it ensures that EU standards in trade are not undermined.
A second essential advantage is that the agreement strengthens the EU’s strategic interests in the area of economic security. It improves access to critical raw materials for the energy transition, such as lithium, nickel and copper. This trade partnership thus contributes to securing Europe’s supply of raw materials and reduces dependence on China.
Thirdly, Mercosur includes strong sustainability standards and enshrines the Paris Agreement on climate change as an “essential element.” This gives the EU the option of suspending the trade agreement in part or in full if the Mercosur states fail to meet key obligations under the Paris Agreement.
The agreement also strengthens incentives for the expansion of green industries, for example through a faster reduction of the high Mercosur tariffs on automobiles for electric and hybrid vehicles. It should not be forgotten that without the agreement, the Mercosur states could further deepen their trade relations with China or other economic powers that demand lower environmental and social standards than the EU.
Of course, there are challenges. The control of deforestation remains a sensitive issue. For example, there is no provision for sanctions for environmental violations (no “sanction reinforcement”). The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which prohibits the import of products such as soy, coffee or wood produced on deforested land, could provide a remedy here. In addition, the agreement provides a basis for actively influencing sustainability issues in the Mercosur states in the future – an option that does not exist without the agreement.
European farmers also have concerns, particularly with regard to competitive disadvantages due to low environmental standards in the Mercosur countries. However, low import quotas, gradual adjustments, safeguard clauses and planned compensation are intended to mitigate potential challenges for farmers in European countries.
To summarize: The EU-Mercosur agreement strengthens Europe’s economic security by securing critical sources of raw materials, diversifying trade structures, and promoting sustainable production methods – and it reduces geopolitical dependencies. However, the future of the agreement remains uncertain. It is therefore important to bear this in mind: The benefits outweigh the risks. It is up to the EU to use the agreement to shape important trade relations and political partnerships for the future.
Clara Brandi is a researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and Professor of International Economics at the University of Bonn.
The heads of state and government of nine European countries plus the heads of the EU and NATO sat together at the Élysée Palace yesterday until late into the evening. They tried to formulate a response to the latest developments, which can hardly be captured by the hackneyed term “turning point.” You can read the results below in our Feature by Stephan Israel.
Those responsible in Europe will try to find out whether the US government is serious about everything it has announced in recent days. Some people are taking heart: Donald Trump’s approach of excluding Europeans and Ukrainians from the peace negotiations with Russia is possibly just an expression of brute negotiating tactics. However, even this argument is treacherous, because his dealings with the (previous) allies of the United States are brute, not with the geopolitical rival and (previous) opponent Russia.
There is much to suggest that the US President no longer knows any guardrails. During his first term in office, he was held back by other US institutions and his own staff. Today, these corrective measures are largely absent. Trump’s instincts – transactional, authoritarian and oblivious to history – are in full effect. His chumminess with Vladimir Putin could be extremely dangerous for European states, and not just for Poles, Balts and Finns in view of hybrid warfare.
The much-cited term “wake-up call” is therefore misplaced. The moment of truth has come for the European Union. Now, in the coming days, weeks and months, it will be decided whether Europe will take its fate into its own hands. Or whether it will surrender to powers that are not well-disposed towards it. We can only hope that the new Federal Government and the new Federal Chancellor have understood the scale of the task. Germany must lead the way together with Paris and Warsaw. And, if necessary, leave behind those member states that are not willing to follow the path of European security policy self-empowerment.
Keir Starmer put his European partners under pressure even before arriving at the mini-summit in Paris: The British government was “ready and willing” to send ground troops to Ukraine to secure a peace deal, the British Prime Minister wrote in a guest article in The Telegraph. Emmanuel Macron had invited selected heads of state and government as well as the heads of the EU and NATO to the mini-summit.
The French President’s aim was to prepare the broadest possible coalition of the willing for strong security guarantees, including peacekeeping troops. However, anyone expecting a clear answer in Paris was disappointed. Apart from the British President, only the French President has so far shown himself willing to send ground troops. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, on the other hand, voiced clear criticism: It was “completely premature and completely the wrong time” to discuss a peacekeeping force.
Instead of unity, the impression after the mini-meeting was one of disunity. Yet time is pressing. Also because the USA is exerting pressure and is currently sounding out with a list of questions what the European allies are prepared to contribute to security guarantees following a peace agreement. Keir Starmer wrote that the UK is ready to take on a leading role here. He is trying to position the UK as a bridge between continental Europe and the USA, according to the Telegraph.
Starmer wants to be the first European head of government to visit Donald Trump in the White House next week. According to British media reports, the coalition of the willing could be organized around the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), a multinational expeditionary force led by the UK as the framework nation with the Baltic and Scandinavian nations as well as the Dutch. A peacekeeping force with the JEF at its core and between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers could be stationed in the hinterland as security, while the Ukrainian armed forces would have to hold their positions along the front line.
In an interview with the LCI channel, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot reported on “very concrete talks at various levels” concerning the deployment of troops, particularly from France, the UK and Poland. “We have no plans to send Polish soldiers to Ukraine,” contradicted Head of Government Donald Tusk. Poland would, however, provide logistical and political support to countries that wanted to provide security guarantees for Ukraine in the future. Tusk insisted all the more that the European partners must follow Poland’s example and strengthen their defense capabilities.
The Financial Times reported that Trump wants to offer Russian President Vladimir Putin the option of withdrawing US troops from the Baltic states and possibly further west. Against this backdrop, Donald Tusk said that Europe must be able to compensate for Russia’s military potential. This was the only way to really support Ukraine.
In addition to Tusk and Scholz, the heads of government of Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark also traveled to Paris. “I am irritated by these debates,” said the German Chancellor after the meeting, indirectly distancing himself from his British colleague and host Macron. The outcome of peace talks, which have not even begun and whose outcome is completely open, are being discussed over the heads of the Ukrainians. Without the involvement of US troops, the deployment of German troops also appears to be out of the question for Olaf Scholz: “We will not participate in scenarios in which European and American security fall apart, i.e. European soldiers are deployed without full US involvement.”
However, this is exactly what the Trump administration is currently aiming for according to all the statements made in recent days, namely a peacekeeping force without US involvement. Denmark and Sweden are open to the question of peacekeeping troops. First of all, a fair and stable peace in accordance with international law is needed, said Sweden’s Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard. After that, her government would not rule anything out.
The position of Italy and Spain is also unclear: no one is currently considering sending troops to Ukraine, as peace is still a long way off, said Spain’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares. The Dutch right-wing populist and leader of the largest governing party PVV, Geert Wilders, was also critical. Wilders wrote on X that he was against sending Dutch soldiers to Ukraine. The Dutch army is already involved in many missions and must also protect its own territory, he added. The “club of losers” met in Paris, Viktor Orbán’s government spokesperson wrote on X. Trump had marginalized Europe with his peace strategy. The same politicians who had mocked Viktor Orbán’s peace mission were now panicking, they continued.
“I will propose activating the escape clause for defense investments,” said Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last Friday in Munich. “This will allow member states to substantially increase their defense spending.”
The announcement seems to have taken not only the EU member states but also the Commission services by surprise. EU diplomats confirm that no proposal has yet been submitted to the member states. On Monday, the Commission could not yet publicly confirm whether von der Leyen was talking about the general escape clause or the national escape clause. “We will work on the modalities in the coming weeks,” said Economic Affairs Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis on Monday.
In Brussels, however, it is assumed that the Commission is referring to the national escape clause. According to the relevant regulation, the general escape clause requires a “severe economic downturn,” while the national escape clause requires “exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the member state.”
In her speech, von der Leyen announced that the escape clause would be introduced in a “controlled and conditional” manner. However, with the exception of member states in an excessive deficit procedure, the EU debt rules do not provide for a mechanism to introduce such conditions when the national escape clause is used. Lucas Guttenberg of the Bertelsmann Foundation argues that the national escape clause will allow Germany and other less indebted countries (especially in Northern, Central and Eastern Europe) to spend more money.
Federal Finance Minister Jörg Kukies (SPD) reacted cautiously to von der Leyen’s proposal on Monday. “We are still waiting for more concrete details,” he said in Brussels on the sidelines of the Eurogroup meeting. He campaigned for a reform of the EU debt rules, which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had proposed in Munich on Saturday. According to this, defense spending that exceeds the NATO two percent target should be exempted from the fiscal rules for a limited period of time.
“Perhaps we should take this as the new normal, that we also need permanently higher spending, which by definition would be the case with defense spending,” said Kukies in Brussels. The EU must therefore “think about the European debt rules as a whole and act outside the regime of exceptions,” he added.
The BMF also fears that the repeated use of the escape clause will ultimately lead to the EU debt rules simply no longer being applied. However, changing the debt rules is likely to take more time anyway, as Parliament would also have to give its consent.
Von der Leyen’s proposal is also being viewed critically in more indebted member states. Belgium, France and Spain appear to be open to using the escape clause. However, they want to avoid it being seen as an alternative to more Europeanized financing.
“National funding is one of the essential elements, but there are other areas that we need to talk about,” said Spanish Finance Minister Carlos Cuerpo. Defense is “a European public good.” Joint financing must therefore also be part of the solution, said Cuerpo.
Activation of the national escape clause would have to be confirmed by the Council. It can therefore be assumed that Spain, France and other states will try to attach conditions to their approval. The Commission is expected to present more details on the use of the escape clause in its White Paper on the future of European defense on March 19.
After decades of wrangling, the negotiating partners of the EU and the Mercosur states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) reached a political agreement on a free trade partnership in December 2024. Both the EU Parliament and the EU member states must approve the agreement – but it remains controversial. Critics cite risks for agriculture and the environment.
As controversial as the planned free trade agreement is, it offers both economic and geopolitical benefits, for example in the area of sustainability and strategic securing of raw materials. It also strengthens rules-based trade at a time when the law of the jungle is becoming increasingly prevalent. The EU should therefore support the agreement in order to safeguard its strategic interests with regard to economic security and create a good basis for future cooperation with Mercosur.
Firstly, the agreement offers substantial economic benefits. The removal of trade barriers would benefit European industries as well as economic development in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Germany would benefit greatly from the abolition of tariffs on industrial products in general and on automotive products in particular. For the Mercosur states, the agreement opens up the prospect of some protection from European regulations (e.g. the CO₂ Border Adjustment Mechanism) by providing a rebalancing instrument. At the same time, it ensures that EU standards in trade are not undermined.
A second essential advantage is that the agreement strengthens the EU’s strategic interests in the area of economic security. It improves access to critical raw materials for the energy transition, such as lithium, nickel and copper. This trade partnership thus contributes to securing Europe’s supply of raw materials and reduces dependence on China.
Thirdly, Mercosur includes strong sustainability standards and enshrines the Paris Agreement on climate change as an “essential element.” This gives the EU the option of suspending the trade agreement in part or in full if the Mercosur states fail to meet key obligations under the Paris Agreement.
The agreement also strengthens incentives for the expansion of green industries, for example through a faster reduction of the high Mercosur tariffs on automobiles for electric and hybrid vehicles. It should not be forgotten that without the agreement, the Mercosur states could further deepen their trade relations with China or other economic powers that demand lower environmental and social standards than the EU.
Of course, there are challenges. The control of deforestation remains a sensitive issue. For example, there is no provision for sanctions for environmental violations (no “sanction reinforcement”). The EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which prohibits the import of products such as soy, coffee or wood produced on deforested land, could provide a remedy here. In addition, the agreement provides a basis for actively influencing sustainability issues in the Mercosur states in the future – an option that does not exist without the agreement.
European farmers also have concerns, particularly with regard to competitive disadvantages due to low environmental standards in the Mercosur countries. However, low import quotas, gradual adjustments, safeguard clauses and planned compensation are intended to mitigate potential challenges for farmers in European countries.
To summarize: The EU-Mercosur agreement strengthens Europe’s economic security by securing critical sources of raw materials, diversifying trade structures, and promoting sustainable production methods – and it reduces geopolitical dependencies. However, the future of the agreement remains uncertain. It is therefore important to bear this in mind: The benefits outweigh the risks. It is up to the EU to use the agreement to shape important trade relations and political partnerships for the future.
Clara Brandi is a researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and Professor of International Economics at the University of Bonn.
