Is the next German Vote on the horizon? On Tuesday night, the EU Parliament and Council reached an agreement on an import ban for products from forced labor – however, whether the traffic light coalition will support the agreement is highly questionable. According to government circles in Berlin, the FDP has recently raised political concerns. The Federal Ministry of Finance has pointed out that they first want to examine the outcome of the negotiations.
The Free Democrat ministers recently forced the German government to abstain on a whole series of dossiers, the most prominent of which is the Supply Chain Directive CSDDD. However, unlike there or in the case of platform work, the regulation on forced labor will likely find the necessary qualified majority in the Council even without German approval.
Berlin’s position on the Packaging Ordinance, also negotiated on Monday evening, remains to be seen. Before this, the German government had linked its approval to substantive demands. Some points have now been taken into account – for example, several companies can join forces to achieve certain goals together. However, the ministries involved were still evaluating the text agreed in the trilogue yesterday.
“We have no plans to set up an arms depot in Berlaymont,” said EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell. The flippant remark was probably intended to set expectations somewhat straight on Tuesday. Vice-President Margrethe Vestager and Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton were also defensive at the presentation of the European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) and the parallel program with financial incentives (EDIP). The aim was not to call into question the prerogatives of the Member States in terms of defense policy but to promote the industrial base in Europe.
Individual elements were toned down compared to earlier drafts. The option to prioritize orders in the event of a crisis should only be voluntary and in consultation with the defense industry. And a European mechanism modeled on the US Foreign Military Sales procedure (FMS) is now only to be tested as a pilot project.
The aim is to have at least 40 percent of arms purchases made jointly by 2030. And Member States are encouraged to make at least half of their arms purchases within the internal market by the end of the decade, as opposed to 80 percent outside last year. For this turnaround, €1.5 billion from the MFF will initially be available for incentives.
Experts consider the amount to be too small to have an impact given the costs of procurement programs. However, Thierry Breton was confident that additional funds would be found in the next legislative period.
Initial reactions from the arms industry and the capitals were mixed. “It is welcome that the EU Commission is trying to promote joint European procurement and create more predictability for the security and defense industry,” reacted Hans Christoph Atzpodien, Managing Director of the Federal Association of the German Security and Defense Industry (BDSV).
However, the “intervention logic” is unlikely to go down well in some European capitals, warned Atzpodien. Non-transparent planning and intervention options for the Commission could ultimately lead to “confusion” from an industry perspective. In other areas, the proposal does not go far enough, for example, in minimizing bureaucratic hurdles for the industry.
Jean Pie, Secretary General of the Aerospace, Security and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD) in Brussels, gave a positive initial assessment. The success of EDIS and EDIP now depends on the reaction of the member states. Speed and financial resources are essential for the implementation of the strategy.
A French diplomat welcomed the strategy but was skeptical about its implementation in Germany. European procurement has been a core element in the EU since the Strategic Compass at the latest. Most recently, Chancellor Olaf Scholz took a different approach with the European Sky Shield Initiative and the procurement of the US Patriot air defense system.
In Berlin, the BMWK “fundamentally welcomes” the initiative to strengthen the European military capability and defense industry. However, the proposal still needs to be analyzed and evaluated in detail.
The EU Commission’s initiative is “a step in the right direction,” reacted Daniel Caspary, Chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the EU Parliament. The Russian attack on Ukraine and its consequences showed on a daily basis that Europe had neglected its defense capabilities in recent years.
The EU needs increased investment in the defense sector and more European cooperation in order to save resources and money and jointly make strategic decisions, said Hannah Neumann, Green/EFA member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defense in the EU Parliament. However, armaments should not be played off against pensions or the climate. The EU needs additional funding for the upcoming investments. Contribution: Wilhelmine Preußen and Gabriel Bub
Products manufactured using forced labor will no longer be made available on the EU internal market, sold and exported from there. The EU Parliament and Council reached an agreement on the new regulation on Tuesday night. Contrary to the demands of the Parliament and civil society, material compensation for victims of forced labor will not initially be enshrined in law.
In the future, the EU Commission and competent authorities in the member states are to identify products whose supply chain involves people in forced labor. The following criteria are to be taken into account:
The Commission is to collect information on forced labor risks in a database and also take into account reports, for example from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The EU Commission presented the draft law in September 2022. It justifies the initiative with the UN development goal of completely eliminating forced labor by 2030. According to the ILO, around 27.6 million people were forced to work in 2021 – around 12 percent of them children. The majority of them had to work in the private sector; 3.9 million were victims of state-imposed forced labor, presumably in the Chinese region of Xinjiang.
“Finally, no more slave labor in our products,” commented Anna Cavazzini (Greens), the shadow rapporteur in Parliament, after the agreement. According to a report she commissioned in 2021, more than 80 international brand companies benefit directly or indirectly from labor forced on Uyghurs in China.
The still unfinalized EU Supply Chain Act would not cover the marketing and supply of such products on the internal market. The Supply Chain Act does list forced labor as a violation of international agreements and provides for sanctions if companies do not comply with their due diligence obligations. However, it focuses on corporate behavior and does not contain any options for banning such products.
The legal text deals in particular with state-initiated forced labor.
Parliament had originally called for high-risk sectors to be identified in regions with predominantly state-initiated forced labor. This is because in Xinjiang, for example, it is generally impossible to collect the necessary evidence. The wording that has now been found therefore goes some way towards meeting Parliament’s demands.
However, Parliament was unable to push through its demand to enshrine compensation for victims of forced labor in law. According to the agreement, companies should only make voluntary compensation payments. The agreement also contains a review clause for the potential inclusion of a reparation regulation at a later date.
A number of companies and NGOs had urged for effective compensation in a joint statement in February. “Reparation is an important step in human rights due diligence,” it said, referring to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.
The Institute for Human Rights criticizes the lack of a reparation provision. This “harbors the risk that companies will disengage from problematic business partners without any improvement for those affected,” explained Deputy Director Michael Windfuhr. Depending on the situation, restitution could include, for example, the return of withheld identity documents and wages, release from debt bondage and the improvement of working and living conditions. Despite the lack of regulation, Windfuhr described the final agreement as a “decisive step towards ensuring that the EU internal market is not a sales market for products manufactured using forced labor.”
Jörgen Warborn, the shadow rapporteur for the EPP group, particularly praised the measures to support small and medium-sized enterprises. “This includes specific provisions for SMEs, such as a hotline based in their own country, which enables them to receive live support in complying with the regulation,” he explained.
The competent authorities are to be given three years to implement the regulation, after which it will come into force. However, the Council and Parliament must first adopt the outcome of the trilogue negotiations. On March 20, the lead committees for the internal market and international trade will vote first.
It is still unclear whether the law will receive the necessary majority in the Council. Germany had already abstained in the vote on the Council’s negotiating mandate; supporters of the regulation now fear that another abstention by the German government under pressure from the FDP could cause the project to falter, similar to the EU Supply Chain Act. As things stand at present, however, a qualified majority would probably be achieved even without Germany. The Federal Ministry of Finance said that the result still had to be assessed.
The WTO Ministerial Conference ended on Friday night without any results on agriculture. The topics discussed included restricting national subsidies. What do you make of this outcome?
John Clarke: There was not even an agreement or a text committing WTO members to continue negotiations. Several major subsidisers like the US, China and India are content with the status quo and did not want to see progress. So we are back to square one.
What does this mean for the future?
There needs to be a rethink at the WTO. Business as usual clearly does not work. Perhaps there needs to be a new focus on what kind of agricultural reforms will benefit global food security or the environment.
And perhaps there needs to be now an incremental approach beginning with more achievable issues. For example, instead of trying to achieve that countries like Argentina or India no longer impose export restrictions on food, we could at least aim to get the least developed countries exempted.
Above all, there needs to be a rebuilding of trust between Members, without which no negotiations can succeed.
How can this be achieved?
That takes time. Moreover, ambassadors must be empowered again, rather than national ministers “micromanaging” the negotiations or the WTO Directorate-General wanting to control everything. This approach has been successful in the past.
Should the EU assert its interests in international trade more strongly through mirror clauses, as protesting farmers are demanding?
The situation is not black and white. One needs to look on a case-by-case basis at the legality of mirror clauses. In principle, you cannot ban a product because you disagree with the way it is produced, where that production method has no effect on the imported product. The WTO for very good reasons prohibits that kind of approach which can slide quickly into protectionism. As the biggest and most successful agricultural exporter in the world, the EU cannot afford retaliatory measures.
But there are exceptions.
The EU law on deforestation-free supply chains prohibits the import of beef, soy, palm oil and other products if forests are cut down for their production. This can be done without violating WTO law because climate protection is a global good. The use of antibiotics to promote growth is also prohibited for imports because of its risk to global health.
As regards animal welfare, the EU imposes on imported meat equivalent standards as those in the EU on the slaughter and transportation of farm animals. If the EU hopefully bans cage farming soon, the same should apply to the production of imported goods. There is no reason not to do so.
The decisive factor here is that these practices are cruel to animals in the eyes of the European public. If the EU invokes this “public morals” justification of the WTO when banning imports, it must be able to prove this in the event of WTO proceedings. For example, the petition to “End the cage age”, which one million people have signed is good evidence of the public’s objection to such practices.
The EU Commission has banned residues of two insecticides in imported goods, citing species protection as a global good. Could this set a trend?
Perhaps. However, I do not believe that such an approach to pesticide residues or the banning of certain pesticides can be applied systematically, but only on a case-by-case basis. Each time, we would have to ask the question: Does the use of this banned pesticide abroad really affect the environment in Europe, and not just, for example, in Argentina or Ghana?
In my view, the recent ban on the two bee-harmful insecticides is quite near the margin of what is legal.
Would you agree that farmers in the EU are at a disadvantage on international markets because of higher production standards?
I do not believe that there is a systematic problem of unfair competition. Here and there perhaps, but not structurally. Moreover, other countries have the right to have different priorities than we do.
The protesting farmers in the EU have a different view. Do you understand their concern?
We should bear in mind that we are a very successful and competitive trading power in the agricultural sector and that imports already have to meet our food safety and health standards as well as certain animal welfare standards.
That being said, there are cases where producers in other countries have lower standards and therefore have an advantage. But this is not necessarily a negative thing.
Why not?
The strength of the EU lies in high production standards. It’s a fantastic tool for global marketing! I also believe that countries that export to the EU are concerned about their reputation and make an effort to maintain high production standards at least for our market.
How can the EU ensure a level playing field in international agricultural trade?
We need to work together to agree on global standards. Admittedly: that may take time. But if we do not want trade wars, or Europe going it alone, there is no alternative.
In addition, in some areas, we can create incentives for other countries to voluntarily adhere to our standards, which are often the de facto international standard anyway due to the size of our market. This is known as the Brussels effect!
An example?
The EU’s internal ban on the use of hormones and growth promoters in animal husbandry also applies to many of our trade agreements. Our trading partners accept this and implement our rules because that way, they gain access to the European market.
With every primary election that Donald Trump wins, the dark cloud over NATO becomes more threatening. Will the Europeans be able to rely on their strongest ally in the future? What political tactics could they use to best prepare for Trump’s possible return to the White House?
Opinions differ: while some – including the government in Berlin – hope to impress the unpredictable Trump with increased defense spending, Erdoğan, Orbán and Fico would probably happily rush to meet the right-wing populist in Washington. In Poland, the Baltic states and Eastern and Northern Europe, on the other hand, there is a deep concern: would the already fragile consensus on supporting Ukraine continue to hold with Trump?
The Western defense alliance only just survived its first meeting with Donald Trump. On several occasions, he was on the verge of turning his back on what he saw as the “obsolete NATO.” Former President Trump regularly insulted his European partners as free riders and claimed that they owed him money. Trump went it alone with his grandly announced “deals” with North Korea and Russia as well as his “peace initiative” in the Middle East.
He also left the European NATO allies uninvolved in the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan negotiated with the Taliban. The result was a strategic disaster for the West. No, Trump’s credo “Make America Great Again” has not gone down well with NATO.
With the former Dutch head of government Mark Rutte, who is likely to be chosen as the new NATO Secretary General, some Europeans are now hoping to somehow catch Trump. According to Rutte, all they have to do is patiently explain to him that the European allies have spent a lot more money on their defense in recent years and are prepared to take on more responsibility for their own security in the future.
It is doubtful whether the Dutchman, who is also known as the “Trump whisperer,” will be able to get this point across convincingly. After Rutte took over the reins of government in The Hague in 2010, Dutch defense spending continued to plummet for years (in 2015, it stood at 1.13 percent). In the last two years, it has also remained well below two percent.
With a charm offensive, the Europeans will hardly be able to stop Trump from putting NATO under pressure and possibly even causing lasting damage. Why? Firstly, Trump is and remains a man of conviction – a foreign policy isolationist who is fundamentally hostile to multilateral organizations. He believes in “dealmaking among the big players” and not in complicated “consensus-building at 32.”
Secondly, Trump and his supporters have been preparing intensively for a return to the White House, including in terms of defense policy. His MAGA circle has been propagating for some time that Trump would prefer to “put NATO to sleep.” In the future, the Europeans should defend their continent conventionally themselves. Only the nuclear umbrella would be maintained by the USA in Europe.
Thirdly, Trump would have several opportunities to cause concrete damage to NATO. These range from reducing US troop levels in Europe, a US “no show” at important NATO meetings, cutting funding for NATO’s military and civilian budget, to deliberately sowing public doubt about the USA’s loyalty to the alliance. Are the allies prepared for such scenarios? Hardly, because there is no official discussion of this at NATO headquarters.
NATO will certainly not flounder over future financial burden-sharing. The rift that is deepening between the allies concerns fundamental strategic issues: the fate of Ukraine and how to deal with Russia. Trump’s announcement that he wants to quickly make a “deal” with the mafia regime in Moscow after winning the election not only makes the Ukrainians’ blood run cold but also the British, Balts, Poles, Scandinavians and East Central Europeans: in other words, all those who do not want to avoid confrontation with Russia.
For this group of countries (to which I do not count Germany), making the alliance “Trump proof” means keeping their ranks tightly closed against Moscow and making concrete preparations for all eventualities – even without American help if necessary. They already have their weatherproof storm jackets at the ready.
Dr. Stefanie Babst is the former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, strategic advisor and publicist.
Is the next German Vote on the horizon? On Tuesday night, the EU Parliament and Council reached an agreement on an import ban for products from forced labor – however, whether the traffic light coalition will support the agreement is highly questionable. According to government circles in Berlin, the FDP has recently raised political concerns. The Federal Ministry of Finance has pointed out that they first want to examine the outcome of the negotiations.
The Free Democrat ministers recently forced the German government to abstain on a whole series of dossiers, the most prominent of which is the Supply Chain Directive CSDDD. However, unlike there or in the case of platform work, the regulation on forced labor will likely find the necessary qualified majority in the Council even without German approval.
Berlin’s position on the Packaging Ordinance, also negotiated on Monday evening, remains to be seen. Before this, the German government had linked its approval to substantive demands. Some points have now been taken into account – for example, several companies can join forces to achieve certain goals together. However, the ministries involved were still evaluating the text agreed in the trilogue yesterday.
“We have no plans to set up an arms depot in Berlaymont,” said EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell. The flippant remark was probably intended to set expectations somewhat straight on Tuesday. Vice-President Margrethe Vestager and Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton were also defensive at the presentation of the European Defense Industry Strategy (EDIS) and the parallel program with financial incentives (EDIP). The aim was not to call into question the prerogatives of the Member States in terms of defense policy but to promote the industrial base in Europe.
Individual elements were toned down compared to earlier drafts. The option to prioritize orders in the event of a crisis should only be voluntary and in consultation with the defense industry. And a European mechanism modeled on the US Foreign Military Sales procedure (FMS) is now only to be tested as a pilot project.
The aim is to have at least 40 percent of arms purchases made jointly by 2030. And Member States are encouraged to make at least half of their arms purchases within the internal market by the end of the decade, as opposed to 80 percent outside last year. For this turnaround, €1.5 billion from the MFF will initially be available for incentives.
Experts consider the amount to be too small to have an impact given the costs of procurement programs. However, Thierry Breton was confident that additional funds would be found in the next legislative period.
Initial reactions from the arms industry and the capitals were mixed. “It is welcome that the EU Commission is trying to promote joint European procurement and create more predictability for the security and defense industry,” reacted Hans Christoph Atzpodien, Managing Director of the Federal Association of the German Security and Defense Industry (BDSV).
However, the “intervention logic” is unlikely to go down well in some European capitals, warned Atzpodien. Non-transparent planning and intervention options for the Commission could ultimately lead to “confusion” from an industry perspective. In other areas, the proposal does not go far enough, for example, in minimizing bureaucratic hurdles for the industry.
Jean Pie, Secretary General of the Aerospace, Security and Defense Industries Association of Europe (ASD) in Brussels, gave a positive initial assessment. The success of EDIS and EDIP now depends on the reaction of the member states. Speed and financial resources are essential for the implementation of the strategy.
A French diplomat welcomed the strategy but was skeptical about its implementation in Germany. European procurement has been a core element in the EU since the Strategic Compass at the latest. Most recently, Chancellor Olaf Scholz took a different approach with the European Sky Shield Initiative and the procurement of the US Patriot air defense system.
In Berlin, the BMWK “fundamentally welcomes” the initiative to strengthen the European military capability and defense industry. However, the proposal still needs to be analyzed and evaluated in detail.
The EU Commission’s initiative is “a step in the right direction,” reacted Daniel Caspary, Chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the EU Parliament. The Russian attack on Ukraine and its consequences showed on a daily basis that Europe had neglected its defense capabilities in recent years.
The EU needs increased investment in the defense sector and more European cooperation in order to save resources and money and jointly make strategic decisions, said Hannah Neumann, Green/EFA member of the Subcommittee on Security and Defense in the EU Parliament. However, armaments should not be played off against pensions or the climate. The EU needs additional funding for the upcoming investments. Contribution: Wilhelmine Preußen and Gabriel Bub
Products manufactured using forced labor will no longer be made available on the EU internal market, sold and exported from there. The EU Parliament and Council reached an agreement on the new regulation on Tuesday night. Contrary to the demands of the Parliament and civil society, material compensation for victims of forced labor will not initially be enshrined in law.
In the future, the EU Commission and competent authorities in the member states are to identify products whose supply chain involves people in forced labor. The following criteria are to be taken into account:
The Commission is to collect information on forced labor risks in a database and also take into account reports, for example from the International Labor Organization (ILO).
The EU Commission presented the draft law in September 2022. It justifies the initiative with the UN development goal of completely eliminating forced labor by 2030. According to the ILO, around 27.6 million people were forced to work in 2021 – around 12 percent of them children. The majority of them had to work in the private sector; 3.9 million were victims of state-imposed forced labor, presumably in the Chinese region of Xinjiang.
“Finally, no more slave labor in our products,” commented Anna Cavazzini (Greens), the shadow rapporteur in Parliament, after the agreement. According to a report she commissioned in 2021, more than 80 international brand companies benefit directly or indirectly from labor forced on Uyghurs in China.
The still unfinalized EU Supply Chain Act would not cover the marketing and supply of such products on the internal market. The Supply Chain Act does list forced labor as a violation of international agreements and provides for sanctions if companies do not comply with their due diligence obligations. However, it focuses on corporate behavior and does not contain any options for banning such products.
The legal text deals in particular with state-initiated forced labor.
Parliament had originally called for high-risk sectors to be identified in regions with predominantly state-initiated forced labor. This is because in Xinjiang, for example, it is generally impossible to collect the necessary evidence. The wording that has now been found therefore goes some way towards meeting Parliament’s demands.
However, Parliament was unable to push through its demand to enshrine compensation for victims of forced labor in law. According to the agreement, companies should only make voluntary compensation payments. The agreement also contains a review clause for the potential inclusion of a reparation regulation at a later date.
A number of companies and NGOs had urged for effective compensation in a joint statement in February. “Reparation is an important step in human rights due diligence,” it said, referring to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance.
The Institute for Human Rights criticizes the lack of a reparation provision. This “harbors the risk that companies will disengage from problematic business partners without any improvement for those affected,” explained Deputy Director Michael Windfuhr. Depending on the situation, restitution could include, for example, the return of withheld identity documents and wages, release from debt bondage and the improvement of working and living conditions. Despite the lack of regulation, Windfuhr described the final agreement as a “decisive step towards ensuring that the EU internal market is not a sales market for products manufactured using forced labor.”
Jörgen Warborn, the shadow rapporteur for the EPP group, particularly praised the measures to support small and medium-sized enterprises. “This includes specific provisions for SMEs, such as a hotline based in their own country, which enables them to receive live support in complying with the regulation,” he explained.
The competent authorities are to be given three years to implement the regulation, after which it will come into force. However, the Council and Parliament must first adopt the outcome of the trilogue negotiations. On March 20, the lead committees for the internal market and international trade will vote first.
It is still unclear whether the law will receive the necessary majority in the Council. Germany had already abstained in the vote on the Council’s negotiating mandate; supporters of the regulation now fear that another abstention by the German government under pressure from the FDP could cause the project to falter, similar to the EU Supply Chain Act. As things stand at present, however, a qualified majority would probably be achieved even without Germany. The Federal Ministry of Finance said that the result still had to be assessed.
The WTO Ministerial Conference ended on Friday night without any results on agriculture. The topics discussed included restricting national subsidies. What do you make of this outcome?
John Clarke: There was not even an agreement or a text committing WTO members to continue negotiations. Several major subsidisers like the US, China and India are content with the status quo and did not want to see progress. So we are back to square one.
What does this mean for the future?
There needs to be a rethink at the WTO. Business as usual clearly does not work. Perhaps there needs to be a new focus on what kind of agricultural reforms will benefit global food security or the environment.
And perhaps there needs to be now an incremental approach beginning with more achievable issues. For example, instead of trying to achieve that countries like Argentina or India no longer impose export restrictions on food, we could at least aim to get the least developed countries exempted.
Above all, there needs to be a rebuilding of trust between Members, without which no negotiations can succeed.
How can this be achieved?
That takes time. Moreover, ambassadors must be empowered again, rather than national ministers “micromanaging” the negotiations or the WTO Directorate-General wanting to control everything. This approach has been successful in the past.
Should the EU assert its interests in international trade more strongly through mirror clauses, as protesting farmers are demanding?
The situation is not black and white. One needs to look on a case-by-case basis at the legality of mirror clauses. In principle, you cannot ban a product because you disagree with the way it is produced, where that production method has no effect on the imported product. The WTO for very good reasons prohibits that kind of approach which can slide quickly into protectionism. As the biggest and most successful agricultural exporter in the world, the EU cannot afford retaliatory measures.
But there are exceptions.
The EU law on deforestation-free supply chains prohibits the import of beef, soy, palm oil and other products if forests are cut down for their production. This can be done without violating WTO law because climate protection is a global good. The use of antibiotics to promote growth is also prohibited for imports because of its risk to global health.
As regards animal welfare, the EU imposes on imported meat equivalent standards as those in the EU on the slaughter and transportation of farm animals. If the EU hopefully bans cage farming soon, the same should apply to the production of imported goods. There is no reason not to do so.
The decisive factor here is that these practices are cruel to animals in the eyes of the European public. If the EU invokes this “public morals” justification of the WTO when banning imports, it must be able to prove this in the event of WTO proceedings. For example, the petition to “End the cage age”, which one million people have signed is good evidence of the public’s objection to such practices.
The EU Commission has banned residues of two insecticides in imported goods, citing species protection as a global good. Could this set a trend?
Perhaps. However, I do not believe that such an approach to pesticide residues or the banning of certain pesticides can be applied systematically, but only on a case-by-case basis. Each time, we would have to ask the question: Does the use of this banned pesticide abroad really affect the environment in Europe, and not just, for example, in Argentina or Ghana?
In my view, the recent ban on the two bee-harmful insecticides is quite near the margin of what is legal.
Would you agree that farmers in the EU are at a disadvantage on international markets because of higher production standards?
I do not believe that there is a systematic problem of unfair competition. Here and there perhaps, but not structurally. Moreover, other countries have the right to have different priorities than we do.
The protesting farmers in the EU have a different view. Do you understand their concern?
We should bear in mind that we are a very successful and competitive trading power in the agricultural sector and that imports already have to meet our food safety and health standards as well as certain animal welfare standards.
That being said, there are cases where producers in other countries have lower standards and therefore have an advantage. But this is not necessarily a negative thing.
Why not?
The strength of the EU lies in high production standards. It’s a fantastic tool for global marketing! I also believe that countries that export to the EU are concerned about their reputation and make an effort to maintain high production standards at least for our market.
How can the EU ensure a level playing field in international agricultural trade?
We need to work together to agree on global standards. Admittedly: that may take time. But if we do not want trade wars, or Europe going it alone, there is no alternative.
In addition, in some areas, we can create incentives for other countries to voluntarily adhere to our standards, which are often the de facto international standard anyway due to the size of our market. This is known as the Brussels effect!
An example?
The EU’s internal ban on the use of hormones and growth promoters in animal husbandry also applies to many of our trade agreements. Our trading partners accept this and implement our rules because that way, they gain access to the European market.
With every primary election that Donald Trump wins, the dark cloud over NATO becomes more threatening. Will the Europeans be able to rely on their strongest ally in the future? What political tactics could they use to best prepare for Trump’s possible return to the White House?
Opinions differ: while some – including the government in Berlin – hope to impress the unpredictable Trump with increased defense spending, Erdoğan, Orbán and Fico would probably happily rush to meet the right-wing populist in Washington. In Poland, the Baltic states and Eastern and Northern Europe, on the other hand, there is a deep concern: would the already fragile consensus on supporting Ukraine continue to hold with Trump?
The Western defense alliance only just survived its first meeting with Donald Trump. On several occasions, he was on the verge of turning his back on what he saw as the “obsolete NATO.” Former President Trump regularly insulted his European partners as free riders and claimed that they owed him money. Trump went it alone with his grandly announced “deals” with North Korea and Russia as well as his “peace initiative” in the Middle East.
He also left the European NATO allies uninvolved in the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan negotiated with the Taliban. The result was a strategic disaster for the West. No, Trump’s credo “Make America Great Again” has not gone down well with NATO.
With the former Dutch head of government Mark Rutte, who is likely to be chosen as the new NATO Secretary General, some Europeans are now hoping to somehow catch Trump. According to Rutte, all they have to do is patiently explain to him that the European allies have spent a lot more money on their defense in recent years and are prepared to take on more responsibility for their own security in the future.
It is doubtful whether the Dutchman, who is also known as the “Trump whisperer,” will be able to get this point across convincingly. After Rutte took over the reins of government in The Hague in 2010, Dutch defense spending continued to plummet for years (in 2015, it stood at 1.13 percent). In the last two years, it has also remained well below two percent.
With a charm offensive, the Europeans will hardly be able to stop Trump from putting NATO under pressure and possibly even causing lasting damage. Why? Firstly, Trump is and remains a man of conviction – a foreign policy isolationist who is fundamentally hostile to multilateral organizations. He believes in “dealmaking among the big players” and not in complicated “consensus-building at 32.”
Secondly, Trump and his supporters have been preparing intensively for a return to the White House, including in terms of defense policy. His MAGA circle has been propagating for some time that Trump would prefer to “put NATO to sleep.” In the future, the Europeans should defend their continent conventionally themselves. Only the nuclear umbrella would be maintained by the USA in Europe.
Thirdly, Trump would have several opportunities to cause concrete damage to NATO. These range from reducing US troop levels in Europe, a US “no show” at important NATO meetings, cutting funding for NATO’s military and civilian budget, to deliberately sowing public doubt about the USA’s loyalty to the alliance. Are the allies prepared for such scenarios? Hardly, because there is no official discussion of this at NATO headquarters.
NATO will certainly not flounder over future financial burden-sharing. The rift that is deepening between the allies concerns fundamental strategic issues: the fate of Ukraine and how to deal with Russia. Trump’s announcement that he wants to quickly make a “deal” with the mafia regime in Moscow after winning the election not only makes the Ukrainians’ blood run cold but also the British, Balts, Poles, Scandinavians and East Central Europeans: in other words, all those who do not want to avoid confrontation with Russia.
For this group of countries (to which I do not count Germany), making the alliance “Trump proof” means keeping their ranks tightly closed against Moscow and making concrete preparations for all eventualities – even without American help if necessary. They already have their weatherproof storm jackets at the ready.
Dr. Stefanie Babst is the former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, strategic advisor and publicist.
