Who will succeed Werner Hoyer at the helm of the European Investment Bank (EIB)? The search picked up speed over the weekend, as the Spanish government officially announced the candidacy of its current Economy Minister, Nadia Calviño.
The proposal comes as no surprise; the name Calviño was already on the table. But new elections had to be held in Spain first. Nadia Calviño, who has no party affiliation, has been a minister since 2018 and First Deputy Prime Minister in Pedro Sánchez’s cabinet since 2021. Previously, she worked for 12 years in senior positions at the EU Commission.
“My candidacy shows that the Spanish government is committed to strengthening European institutions and also wants to strengthen the role of our country in international organizations,” the 54-year-old told Spanish news channel RTVE over the weekend.
The EIB’s leadership could thus for the first time go to a woman. Calviño is now competing with EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was nominated by the Danish government at the end of June. Former Italian Finance Minister Daniele Franco and current EIB Vice-Presidents Teresa Czerwińska (Poland) and Thomas Östros (Sweden) are also in the running. But they are given little chance alongside the two top candidates.
There is not much time left to find a timely successor to Hoyer, whose second term expires at the end of the year. The appropriate candidate is to be appointed in mid-September. This requires a qualified majority of EU member states. In October, the EIB’s Board of Directors must then formally adopt the decision.
Have a good start to the week!
The EU Commission is looking into possible exemptions from the ban on gas and oil-only heating systems from 2029. “There may be certain situations where the installation of alternatives to gas boilers could be difficult and/or very expensive, which is why the Commission is discussing possible exemptions,” Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson wrote in a response published Friday to a parliamentary question from German MEP Engin Eroglu (Freie Wähler).
The background is the revision of an implementing act for the Ecodesign Directive. According to a Commission draft, increased efficiency requirements would apply to heating systems in the future. This would make it illegal to install new gas-only and oil-only heating systems from September 2029.
In June, the Commission had already consulted stakeholders to identify technical or building-specific situations “where stand-alone boilers remain difficult or impossible to replace – with the intention of proposing possible exemptions in the revised regulation,” Energy Commissioner Simson now writes to Eroglu, who is also Deputy Federal Chairman of Freie Wähler.
Simson, however, does not indicate at any point in her response that the Commission intended to abandon the ban completely. “The Commission assumes that heat pumps will be the most cost-effective solution in the EU by 2030,” the politician writes. She said the planned regulation is open to technology and gas can also continue to be used as a fuel, for example, in combined appliances that also use solar heat, in gas heat pumps or in micro-CHP units that generate electricity and heat from gas at the same time.
The Commission has also not found any significant impact of the planned rule on real estate prices or the EU banking system, Simson writes. In his question, Eroglu had expressed concern that the value of buildings could fall as a result of the planned ban. He said this could potentially also affect the protection of home loans and thus the entire banking system.
The Commission would be in line with the German government with exemption rules from the gas heating ban. “Germany cannot support a regulation for conventional space heating and boilers that does not allow exceptions in certain situations,” the German government had already written to the Commission.
Berlin had cited several facts from an early draft of the Building Energy Act as reasons for exemption, such as for older homeowners or for a transitional period in the event of a total loss of the boiler. Heating with hydrogen, biomethane and wood should also be made possible beyond 2029.
Mr. Wiegand, your time at the EEAS is coming to an end after a good twelve years. You have worked for the EU for over 30 years. What is your personal assessment of EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations?
In the past, issues and challenges in the vast Asia-Pacific region, as well as the opportunities there, were only recognized by experts, who acknowledged them as an important area of foreign, security and economic policy. Or by people who were trading with or investing in the region. The same goes for global challenges like climate, energy and the environment. This has changed: Europe has realized that it needs to be a global player and that very important issues are decided in the region that affect us directly and are of great significance for our global cohesion.
What did that mean specifically for your Asia department?
I am pleased that we have significantly expanded our China policy in these years. But we also have a clear India policy, relations with Japan and Korea have a new quality, we managed to establish a strategic partnership with ASEAN, and developed a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Europe has become far more active in all major policy areas. And our member states individually see it that way too. The best example is Germany’s recent China strategy and its National Security Strategy. Europe has matured to not only think globally, but also to position itself and act globally.
The idea that the EU considers itself a geopolitical player and would also like to establish itself as such has been firmly emphasized, especially in recent years under EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Do you think efforts have been sufficient in this respect? What can the EU do even better?
When Jean-Claude Juncker became president, he said: “I will be President of a political European Commission.” That already raised a lot of eyebrows at the time. Then Ursula von der Leyen came and said: “I will be President of a geopolitical European Commission.” I think that precisely expresses the direction in which Europe must now position itself. We have to see things in a global context and be able to act with long-term impact.
And what’s not going so well?
One problem is that our complicated European decision-making structures and the way we reach results together are built on the will for intra-European integration, which has successfully overcome the legacy of countless European wars, civil wars and dictatorships, with the tools the founding fathers of the EU have given us. However, we must now position ourselves to act swiftly, with long-term effect and a global perspective. We need to address the challenges of multipolar competition. And the European Union, which is per definition a multilateral union, may not be able to act in this as quickly and consistently as nation states do. This will be an important challenge to consider in the coming years and hopefully lead to changes in our institutional structure and decision-making, at the latest, when the next round of enlargement takes place.
How do you look back on relations with China?
We have become more realistic in our analyses. Not only do we see the countless opportunities that our companies, including many citizens, have been able to seize with China’s rapid economic development over the past decades. The decisive change in the EU’s relationship with China occurred in 2019. Here, China was categorized as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. In the meantime, we have also seen that you often have to be able to differentiate accordingly also in an individual policy area. The European Council has repeatedly confirmed this triad, most recently in June this year. It is a federal element to bring all our member states together. And it is essential that we stand behind it and can identify with it, even if one member state perhaps places emphasis more in one direction and the other in another.
What was the specific impact of the division?
We were able to initiate or pass a whole series of concrete legislative projects. For example, from the International Procurement Instrument to inbound investment screening, the Due Diligence Act for Supply Chains or the Anti-Coercion Instrument. All such concrete steps position Europe better also in the competition with China in terms of reciprocity and level playing field, utilizing the capabilities of the EU’s internal market rule-making and trade policy.
However, nothing came of the CAI on the partner side.
I won’t sugar coat that this was a significant setback. The fact that China considered it necessary to respond to targeted EU sanctions against four individuals and a company in Xinjiang for human rights violations with massive, unfounded and disproportionate counter-sanctions against EU decision-makers was, of course, highly counterproductive. But with that, the last illusion of some that everything can be resolved through cooperation also vanished. I believe we have now reached a very realistic assessment.
What do you think are the defining points that will shape the future relationship with China?
Firstly, how China positions itself towards Russia. We expect much more from a permanent UN Security Council member to help end Russia’s war against Ukraine in accordance with the UN Charter. Secondly, we have Europe’s important positioning on Taiwan: to maintain the status quo and not escalate tensions. We are in a critical and very intensive exchange with the Chinese side over this: everything must be done to preserve peace and stability in this region, which is so important for Europe, for the world. And thirdly, the point that Mrs von der Leyen emphasized in her speech in March and during her visit to Beijing in April: de-risking yes and not economic decoupling, meaning the conscious reduction of one-sided, critical dependencies, and thus vulnerabilities. China holds a quasi monopoly on an increasing number of important raw materials and products. Here, companies will, of course, have to make an important contribution of diversification of their own.
You can read the second part of the interview in tomorrow’s issue.
Gunnar Wiegand was Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS) from January 2016 to August 2023. Previously, he was Deputy Head for the Europe and Central Asia Division and Director of the Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia and OSCE Division at EEAS. Prior to joining EEAS, Wiegand held various positions related to external relations and trade policy at the European Commission since 1990.
Wiegand will become Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, after the summer break. He will be part of the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.
Almost all digital services working with large amounts of data have a high potential for value creation through AI. Europe must tackle three challenges to not be left behind in AI development.
The intelligence of an AI is partly determined by its technology but above all by the quantity and quality of the data it is trained and operated with. Europe is already lagging far behind when it comes to data. Most Europeans’ data is owned by American tech giants and increasingly by Chinese platforms like TikTok. This pattern is now continuing with AI technology: While Americans and Chinese are shaping the markets, Europe is watching, discussing and trying to regulate instead of shaping.
With its current interpretation in the direction of data economy, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does not meet the requirements of data-intensive AI applications. The GDPR and the new data law emerging in the EU do not just aim at protecting consumers, which is currently often misunderstood, but also to leverage the additional benefits of the use of personal data. Those who want to protect consumers through ever new hurdles from their data being used are unfortunately also protecting them from the positive potential of AI. A separate data ecosystem based on European values will emerge here if companies no longer feel committed only to data economy, but also to value-creating data use.
The recent product launches by Microsoft and Google made visible what is possible with AI as long as data and copyright protection play a secondary role. Without clarified GDPR compliance, AI systems outside Europe are fed and trained with the data of European citizens. What’s more, personal data becomes the property of foreign AI providers and is not protected from being played out to other users.
For European and German companies, the use of AI platforms based in the USA or China is only a limited possibility. Even five years after the launch of the GDPR, there is still a lack of international agreements with which data of European users can be securely stored and processed outside the EU. The supposedly “new” data protection agreement between the EU and the US will not give companies legal certainty for using US AI.
The ECJ has clarified that the practice of US intelligence agencies is incompatible with European values. There is little point in hoping that this assessment will change. Therefore, the demand can only be: Any company that uses the data of European citizens for its services must store this data exclusively on servers in Europe.
To become independent of non-European providers, it is also necessary to develop our own competitive AI applications “made in Europe.” Open standards are crucial for this. These promote competitiveness by facilitating market access for small and medium-sized enterprises and startups and creating transparency. They also allow companies to enter into partnerships to increase their clout. Without these partnerships, Europe will not be able to offer anything comparable to the dominant platforms in the field of AI.
It is not enough to pass an EU law in lengthy negotiations, provide it with transition periods, and then implement it bureaucratically. All reform efforts bounced off the GDPR for almost five years until new rules for improved enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases were finally promised recently. When the AI Act comes into force at the end of the transition period in 2026, it will no longer be up to date. The current trilogue negotiations must thus urgently define the rules for regular updates. A panel of experts from politics, business and science should ensure real-time monitoring to prevent a divergence between regulation and reality.
The race to add value to AI follows the formula: AI times data times implementation speed divided by regulation. If there is no rapid turnaround in the four parameters, Europe will lose out in AI development, as it has already done with Big Data, platforms and operating systems. The clock is ticking, and it has never run as fast as in the AI age.
Who will succeed Werner Hoyer at the helm of the European Investment Bank (EIB)? The search picked up speed over the weekend, as the Spanish government officially announced the candidacy of its current Economy Minister, Nadia Calviño.
The proposal comes as no surprise; the name Calviño was already on the table. But new elections had to be held in Spain first. Nadia Calviño, who has no party affiliation, has been a minister since 2018 and First Deputy Prime Minister in Pedro Sánchez’s cabinet since 2021. Previously, she worked for 12 years in senior positions at the EU Commission.
“My candidacy shows that the Spanish government is committed to strengthening European institutions and also wants to strengthen the role of our country in international organizations,” the 54-year-old told Spanish news channel RTVE over the weekend.
The EIB’s leadership could thus for the first time go to a woman. Calviño is now competing with EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, who was nominated by the Danish government at the end of June. Former Italian Finance Minister Daniele Franco and current EIB Vice-Presidents Teresa Czerwińska (Poland) and Thomas Östros (Sweden) are also in the running. But they are given little chance alongside the two top candidates.
There is not much time left to find a timely successor to Hoyer, whose second term expires at the end of the year. The appropriate candidate is to be appointed in mid-September. This requires a qualified majority of EU member states. In October, the EIB’s Board of Directors must then formally adopt the decision.
Have a good start to the week!
The EU Commission is looking into possible exemptions from the ban on gas and oil-only heating systems from 2029. “There may be certain situations where the installation of alternatives to gas boilers could be difficult and/or very expensive, which is why the Commission is discussing possible exemptions,” Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson wrote in a response published Friday to a parliamentary question from German MEP Engin Eroglu (Freie Wähler).
The background is the revision of an implementing act for the Ecodesign Directive. According to a Commission draft, increased efficiency requirements would apply to heating systems in the future. This would make it illegal to install new gas-only and oil-only heating systems from September 2029.
In June, the Commission had already consulted stakeholders to identify technical or building-specific situations “where stand-alone boilers remain difficult or impossible to replace – with the intention of proposing possible exemptions in the revised regulation,” Energy Commissioner Simson now writes to Eroglu, who is also Deputy Federal Chairman of Freie Wähler.
Simson, however, does not indicate at any point in her response that the Commission intended to abandon the ban completely. “The Commission assumes that heat pumps will be the most cost-effective solution in the EU by 2030,” the politician writes. She said the planned regulation is open to technology and gas can also continue to be used as a fuel, for example, in combined appliances that also use solar heat, in gas heat pumps or in micro-CHP units that generate electricity and heat from gas at the same time.
The Commission has also not found any significant impact of the planned rule on real estate prices or the EU banking system, Simson writes. In his question, Eroglu had expressed concern that the value of buildings could fall as a result of the planned ban. He said this could potentially also affect the protection of home loans and thus the entire banking system.
The Commission would be in line with the German government with exemption rules from the gas heating ban. “Germany cannot support a regulation for conventional space heating and boilers that does not allow exceptions in certain situations,” the German government had already written to the Commission.
Berlin had cited several facts from an early draft of the Building Energy Act as reasons for exemption, such as for older homeowners or for a transitional period in the event of a total loss of the boiler. Heating with hydrogen, biomethane and wood should also be made possible beyond 2029.
Mr. Wiegand, your time at the EEAS is coming to an end after a good twelve years. You have worked for the EU for over 30 years. What is your personal assessment of EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations?
In the past, issues and challenges in the vast Asia-Pacific region, as well as the opportunities there, were only recognized by experts, who acknowledged them as an important area of foreign, security and economic policy. Or by people who were trading with or investing in the region. The same goes for global challenges like climate, energy and the environment. This has changed: Europe has realized that it needs to be a global player and that very important issues are decided in the region that affect us directly and are of great significance for our global cohesion.
What did that mean specifically for your Asia department?
I am pleased that we have significantly expanded our China policy in these years. But we also have a clear India policy, relations with Japan and Korea have a new quality, we managed to establish a strategic partnership with ASEAN, and developed a strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Europe has become far more active in all major policy areas. And our member states individually see it that way too. The best example is Germany’s recent China strategy and its National Security Strategy. Europe has matured to not only think globally, but also to position itself and act globally.
The idea that the EU considers itself a geopolitical player and would also like to establish itself as such has been firmly emphasized, especially in recent years under EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Do you think efforts have been sufficient in this respect? What can the EU do even better?
When Jean-Claude Juncker became president, he said: “I will be President of a political European Commission.” That already raised a lot of eyebrows at the time. Then Ursula von der Leyen came and said: “I will be President of a geopolitical European Commission.” I think that precisely expresses the direction in which Europe must now position itself. We have to see things in a global context and be able to act with long-term impact.
And what’s not going so well?
One problem is that our complicated European decision-making structures and the way we reach results together are built on the will for intra-European integration, which has successfully overcome the legacy of countless European wars, civil wars and dictatorships, with the tools the founding fathers of the EU have given us. However, we must now position ourselves to act swiftly, with long-term effect and a global perspective. We need to address the challenges of multipolar competition. And the European Union, which is per definition a multilateral union, may not be able to act in this as quickly and consistently as nation states do. This will be an important challenge to consider in the coming years and hopefully lead to changes in our institutional structure and decision-making, at the latest, when the next round of enlargement takes place.
How do you look back on relations with China?
We have become more realistic in our analyses. Not only do we see the countless opportunities that our companies, including many citizens, have been able to seize with China’s rapid economic development over the past decades. The decisive change in the EU’s relationship with China occurred in 2019. Here, China was categorized as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival. In the meantime, we have also seen that you often have to be able to differentiate accordingly also in an individual policy area. The European Council has repeatedly confirmed this triad, most recently in June this year. It is a federal element to bring all our member states together. And it is essential that we stand behind it and can identify with it, even if one member state perhaps places emphasis more in one direction and the other in another.
What was the specific impact of the division?
We were able to initiate or pass a whole series of concrete legislative projects. For example, from the International Procurement Instrument to inbound investment screening, the Due Diligence Act for Supply Chains or the Anti-Coercion Instrument. All such concrete steps position Europe better also in the competition with China in terms of reciprocity and level playing field, utilizing the capabilities of the EU’s internal market rule-making and trade policy.
However, nothing came of the CAI on the partner side.
I won’t sugar coat that this was a significant setback. The fact that China considered it necessary to respond to targeted EU sanctions against four individuals and a company in Xinjiang for human rights violations with massive, unfounded and disproportionate counter-sanctions against EU decision-makers was, of course, highly counterproductive. But with that, the last illusion of some that everything can be resolved through cooperation also vanished. I believe we have now reached a very realistic assessment.
What do you think are the defining points that will shape the future relationship with China?
Firstly, how China positions itself towards Russia. We expect much more from a permanent UN Security Council member to help end Russia’s war against Ukraine in accordance with the UN Charter. Secondly, we have Europe’s important positioning on Taiwan: to maintain the status quo and not escalate tensions. We are in a critical and very intensive exchange with the Chinese side over this: everything must be done to preserve peace and stability in this region, which is so important for Europe, for the world. And thirdly, the point that Mrs von der Leyen emphasized in her speech in March and during her visit to Beijing in April: de-risking yes and not economic decoupling, meaning the conscious reduction of one-sided, critical dependencies, and thus vulnerabilities. China holds a quasi monopoly on an increasing number of important raw materials and products. Here, companies will, of course, have to make an important contribution of diversification of their own.
You can read the second part of the interview in tomorrow’s issue.
Gunnar Wiegand was Head of the Asia Department at the European External Action Service (EEAS) from January 2016 to August 2023. Previously, he was Deputy Head for the Europe and Central Asia Division and Director of the Russia, Eastern Partnership, Central Asia and OSCE Division at EEAS. Prior to joining EEAS, Wiegand held various positions related to external relations and trade policy at the European Commission since 1990.
Wiegand will become Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, after the summer break. He will be part of the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.
Almost all digital services working with large amounts of data have a high potential for value creation through AI. Europe must tackle three challenges to not be left behind in AI development.
The intelligence of an AI is partly determined by its technology but above all by the quantity and quality of the data it is trained and operated with. Europe is already lagging far behind when it comes to data. Most Europeans’ data is owned by American tech giants and increasingly by Chinese platforms like TikTok. This pattern is now continuing with AI technology: While Americans and Chinese are shaping the markets, Europe is watching, discussing and trying to regulate instead of shaping.
With its current interpretation in the direction of data economy, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does not meet the requirements of data-intensive AI applications. The GDPR and the new data law emerging in the EU do not just aim at protecting consumers, which is currently often misunderstood, but also to leverage the additional benefits of the use of personal data. Those who want to protect consumers through ever new hurdles from their data being used are unfortunately also protecting them from the positive potential of AI. A separate data ecosystem based on European values will emerge here if companies no longer feel committed only to data economy, but also to value-creating data use.
The recent product launches by Microsoft and Google made visible what is possible with AI as long as data and copyright protection play a secondary role. Without clarified GDPR compliance, AI systems outside Europe are fed and trained with the data of European citizens. What’s more, personal data becomes the property of foreign AI providers and is not protected from being played out to other users.
For European and German companies, the use of AI platforms based in the USA or China is only a limited possibility. Even five years after the launch of the GDPR, there is still a lack of international agreements with which data of European users can be securely stored and processed outside the EU. The supposedly “new” data protection agreement between the EU and the US will not give companies legal certainty for using US AI.
The ECJ has clarified that the practice of US intelligence agencies is incompatible with European values. There is little point in hoping that this assessment will change. Therefore, the demand can only be: Any company that uses the data of European citizens for its services must store this data exclusively on servers in Europe.
To become independent of non-European providers, it is also necessary to develop our own competitive AI applications “made in Europe.” Open standards are crucial for this. These promote competitiveness by facilitating market access for small and medium-sized enterprises and startups and creating transparency. They also allow companies to enter into partnerships to increase their clout. Without these partnerships, Europe will not be able to offer anything comparable to the dominant platforms in the field of AI.
It is not enough to pass an EU law in lengthy negotiations, provide it with transition periods, and then implement it bureaucratically. All reform efforts bounced off the GDPR for almost five years until new rules for improved enforcement of the GDPR in cross-border cases were finally promised recently. When the AI Act comes into force at the end of the transition period in 2026, it will no longer be up to date. The current trilogue negotiations must thus urgently define the rules for regular updates. A panel of experts from politics, business and science should ensure real-time monitoring to prevent a divergence between regulation and reality.
The race to add value to AI follows the formula: AI times data times implementation speed divided by regulation. If there is no rapid turnaround in the four parameters, Europe will lose out in AI development, as it has already done with Big Data, platforms and operating systems. The clock is ticking, and it has never run as fast as in the AI age.
