Today, agriculture will be debated for two hours in the Strasbourg plenary. It’s noteworthy that Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski is not present. Initially, the politician, who was formerly with the Christian Democrats and later joined the national-conservative PiS, was scheduled to speak at the focal debate.
Instead of Wojciechowski, Maroš Šefčovič will now represent the Commission. The official reason for the change is that the European Parliament decided to elevate the debate to the top level. In the first round, the faction leaders speak, followed by the specialists. Therefore, Šefčovič, as executive vice president of the Commission, hierarchically above the agriculture commissioner, must speak. Wojciechowski may perceive the change in the list as an affront. He has repeatedly represented the PiS line in Brussels.
Von der Leyen likely wants to ensure that there are no discordant notes from the Commission in the agriculture debate. She increasingly takes care of the important topic herself. Yesterday, the Commission President surprisingly buried the controversial pesticide regulation SUR in parliament. And she likely ensured that there are no new obligations for farmers in the Commission’s texts on the 2040 climate target. You can read about this in the Features by Lukas Scheid and Manuel Berkel.
Just as the implementation of European climate laws has just begun, the European Commission is now proposing a new climate target for 2040. The effectiveness of the Fit-for-55 package in achieving the 2030 climate goals remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Commission must already think a decade ahead and set the 2040 target, as required by the EU Climate Law.
However, some members of the European Parliament criticize that industry and people should not be subjected to further “coercion and bans”, as CDU/CSU group leader Daniel Caspary commented on the EU climate target for 2040. But even his party voted for the Climate Law, which obliged the Commission to present a climate target for 2040 shortly after the Global Stocktake, completed in December at COP28 in Dubai.
The Commission has no choice. However, support for climate measures appears to be waning shortly before the EU elections. This is reflected not least in the EPP’s calls for less regulation in the environmental sector. The temptation to oppose further measures is strong, especially amid the pressure from protesting farmers.
Yet, the current proposal falls at the lower end of the EU Climate Advisory Board’s recommendation, which suggested a target of 90 to 95 percent. This has drawn criticism, especially from Green members of Parliament. “Not particularly courageous,” says Michael Bloss. He criticizes, in particular, that CCS should also be used to avoid emissions from fossil fuels rather than just in the heavily carbonized industrial sectors.
The Commission defends these plans by citing unavoidable residual emissions from oil combustion in the maritime sector and gas for heating and industrial purposes. The clear goal that the EU pursued at COP28, to end the combustion of fossil fuels as soon as possible, is only partially reflected in the proposal now presented. Approximately 10 percent of captured emissions in 2040 and even in 2050 are expected to come from the combustion of fossil fuels, according to the Commission’s Industrial Carbon Management Strategy.
In addition to the existing instruments aimed at achieving a 55 percent reduction in CO2 by 2030, further measures will be introduced for the 2040 climate target. These include:
However, on Monday, the Commission rejected aid for the European solar industry, which fears cheaper imports from China. The Commission’s stance thus also contains contradictions.
Germanwatch, an environmental and development organization, also highlights this aspect. On one hand, it praised the Commission for intending to continue the existing legal framework of EU climate policy. It also acknowledged the aim to make the green transition socially equitable, indicating an understanding in Brussels that “climate action and social justice need to be considered together for success”, as stated.
However, Lutz Weischer, head of the Berlin office of Germanwatch, criticizes this proposal as “conservative” and “barely the absolute minimum of what is necessary”. He also notes the absence of an end date for fossil fuels, which would demonstrate that the EU takes the groundbreaking decisions of the Dubai World Climate Summit seriously. The plans for international engagement in climate policy are also disappointingly lacking in ambition.
Although the Commission acknowledges that agriculture can play an important role, specifics remain vague. In a previous version of the proposal, the agricultural sector was much more strongly obligated and identified as one of the key sectors for CO2 reduction. However, in the final proposal, there is no mention of this. “Under pressure from industry and lobby groups that do not represent the entire agricultural sector, the Commission has excluded agriculture from the equation,” laments the Brussels-based environmental NGO European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
The 90 percent target itself represents only a minimal increase in ambition. According to Commission forecasts, with the continuation of the measures outlined in the Fit-for-55 package for 2030, Europe would already achieve an 88 percent reduction in emissions by 2040. Whether the EU will maintain its role as a global climate leader remains uncertain.
As this proposal is not a legislative one, the debate now begins on an informal level. Parliament and member states are not required to develop their own positions, but they could still do so, and some are already doing it. The corresponding legislative package is not expected until early 2025 – during the term of the next EU Commission. This makes it a campaign issue for the European elections in June.
As a guiding star that all climate laws orient themselves around, Green Party Member of Parliament Michael Bloss has described the EU Commission’s communication on the 2040 climate target. Concrete legislative proposals for individual economic sectors, such as the increase in wind, solar, and hydrogen targets in the Renewable Energy Directive, are still pending. However, the consequences of decarbonization by 90 percent instead of 55 percent for various sectors can already be well deduced from today’s overall package.
Firstly, there is the comprehensive impact assessment of the Commission’s proposal. A target of minus 90 percent greenhouse gases lies exactly between scenarios two and three from the hundreds of pages of the Impact Assessment.
The differences lie primarily in the increased use of synthetic fuels (e-fuels) and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The Commission also released its own strategy on Carbon Management on Tuesday, which is particularly important for industry and agriculture – and not least for the upcoming strategy of the German federal government on the same subject.
According to the EU paper, by 2030, 7,300 km of CO2 transport pipelines and shipping routes need to be established. By 2050, the network is expected to grow to 19,000 km. The Commission estimates that 16 billion euros in investments will be necessary. An extensive presentation of a possible CO2 transport network is included in an analysis released by the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) on Tuesday. In none of the scenarios are CO2 storage facilities on the German mainland necessary.
The Commission’s goal is a European market for carbon dioxide. Particularly interesting for the many smaller industrial plants in Germany is that the Commission intends to develop special solutions for facilities outside industrial clusters to “strengthen their bargaining power against infrastructure operators”, enabling them to connect to the network.
The Commission plans to start work on several laws by 2024: a dedicated regulatory package similar to the Gas Internal Market Package and a basis for network planning. Where possible, existing gas pipelines and storage facilities should also be converted – where green gases like hydrogen are given explicit priority.
Similar to hydrogen and natural gas, there will also be a new platform by early 2026 to bring providers, users and storage operators together in the future CO2 market. At the same time, there will be an investment atlas for storage projects. The first storage capacities should be available before 2030. By June of this year, EU member states must provide an overview of storage options in their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs).
According to the Commission’s analysis, the costs of CO2 capture vary considerably – ranging from 13 to 103 euros per ton – excluding transportation and storage. The price for CO2 futures in 2030 is currently around 77 euros, meaning that a large portion of projects could already be economically viable. As a consequence, the Commission will assess next year whether the traditional project funding, for example, for cement manufacturers, can be replaced by market-based support.
CCS is also expected to play a role in the energy sector. As hinted at in drafts, the Commission no longer aims to completely eliminate natural gas from the electricity supply by 2040. Instead, it only expects renewables and nuclear energy to generate over 90 percent of electricity: “The remaining ten percent will be offset by negative emissions or equipped with low-carbon solutions, including the use of Carbon Capture and Storage.”
Just a few years ago, CCS for gas or even coal-fired power plants was considered politically dead. However, even the current coalition government is keeping this backdoor open in its power plant strategy and has deferred the decision on this technology to its own Carbon Management Strategy.
The EU Commission expects electric mobility to gain momentum. According to the impact assessment, by 2040, internal combustion engines will account for only 26 percent of the car fleet. Ten years later, only residual inventories of two percent are expected. Accordingly, the share of battery-electric cars will be 57 percent in 2040, rising to 79 percent by 2050.
Surprisingly, hybrid cars may persist longer than expected; the Commission expects them to account for eleven percent of the fleet by 2040: “This suggests that this technology will play an important role in moving away from fossil fuels. However, by 2050, the share of plug-in hybrids will decrease to five percent.”
The role of e-fuels and biofuels for the rapidly declining number of internal combustion engine cars is not clearly addressed in the impact assessment. While the consumption of e-fuels is expected to steeply increase in scenarios with high CO2 reduction, a large part of it is directed towards maritime and aviation transport and the tanks of trucks.
The Commission did not release exact numbers for passenger cars on Tuesday. However, they can be estimated from a bar chart (Figure 68). According to this, e-fuels will cover just over ten percent of the energy consumption of passenger cars in 2040. By 2050, the share will decrease significantly, with the lion’s share being electricity for EVs and hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles.
Member states and the European Parliament have politically agreed on the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). The law is intended to be Europe’s response to the US Inflation Reduction Act and to improve the conditions for manufacturers of a range of climate-friendly technologies. This will supplement the regulatory agenda of the European Green Deal with a business case for the first time, said Christian Ehler (CDU), the rapporteur for the European Parliament. However, the Council and Parliament still need to formally approve the agreement.
The NZIA includes several facilitations for investors looking to build production capacities for net-zero technologies:
European manufacturers in a long list of sectors, which almost entirely corresponds to the European Parliament’s proposal, are set to benefit from these advantages. Ehler also ensured that their suppliers, such as those in the basic materials industry or mechanical engineering, are included. The list includes uncontroversial areas such as solar, wind, and heat pumps, as well as politically sensitive ones like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear technologies. However, member states can decide whether to also support nuclear projects.
Additionally, member states can classify planned factories as “strategic projects” if they consider them particularly important for resilience and competitiveness. This can also include investments in the decarbonization of energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminum or cement.
Unlike the US Inflation Reduction Act, the EU counterpart is not accompanied by massive financial resources. Ehler wanted to obligate member states to allocate 20 percent of their national revenues from the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) to support net-zero projects. However, governments only agreed to include this in a non-binding recital. Nevertheless, this opens the discussion on how member states use their ETS revenues, said Ehler.
The green industries are unlikely to benefit financially from the increase in the EU financial framework either. The newly proposed investment platform, STEP, hardly allocates any fresh funds for this purpose. Especially Germany insisted on providing only 1.5 billion euros instead of the intended additional ten billion euros for funds like InvestEU, which are reserved for the European Defence Fund.
The NZIA receives approval from the wind industry even without fresh funding. “The problem lies less in money than in speed,” says Wolfram Axthelm, Managing Director of the German Wind Energy Association. Investors are ready, but often despair “at hyper-complex and overly lengthy approval procedures“. A central point of contact, especially in Germany, is key to meeting the deadlines.
Catrin Schiffer, an expert at the Federation of German Industries (BDI), takes a more skeptical view of the legislative proposal. “The NZIA does little to expedite projects in Germany.” The approval deadlines here are significantly shorter at six or seven months, well below the new EU requirements. There are already central contact points for companies, such as the federal emission control authorities.
“The problem in Germany is different: Deadlines are often not met because the procedures have been overloaded with requirements,” says Schiffer. As a result, approval procedures take an average of six months longer than stipulated in the Federal Immission Control Act. However, the federal government understands that action is needed here.
Nearly two years after presenting its proposal for a regulation on sustainable pesticide use (SUR), the EU Commission is withdrawing the project, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced before the European Parliament this Tuesday morning. “The proposal has polarized,” admitted the CDU politician. Parliament had already voted against the SUR in November, and there is “no further progress in the Council“, said von der Leyen. However, the Belgian Presidency of the Council had, at least officially, continued to work on the issue and reportedly learned of the Commission’s withdrawal shortly before the announcement on Tuesday morning.
The goal of “reducing the risks of chemical pesticide use” still remains, von der Leyen stressed. The Commission “could” present a new, “much more mature proposal” later. This means that a new proposal would be the project of the next Commission, possibly again under the leadership of von der Leyen, who has not officially announced her candidacy yet. The proposal would thus come after the conclusion of the strategic dialogue for the future of agriculture, which von der Leyen opened in January and is expected to provide recommendations by summer. Von der Leyen emphasized the need for an “intensive dialogue” as a basis for a new proposal.
In this context, von der Leyen’s retreat seems like an admission of fault. The original proposal had been criticized as “poorly crafted” repeatedly, not only by the agricultural sector and von der Leyen’s own political family, the EPP, but also by Green Federal Agriculture Minister Cem Özdemir. Points such as a total ban on pesticides in sensitive areas were almost unanimously criticized, even by the Green rapporteur of the Parliament, Sarah Wiener, who removed this from her draft report, which was otherwise much more ambitious than the Commission’s proposal. Many member states and associations felt blindsided, resulting in little goodwill during the negotiations.
The rejection of the SUR is the latest in a series of concessions following the current farmer protests in many European countries, including Brussels. Last week, the Commission had already proposed relaxations in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and von der Leyen had promised a proposal for bureaucracy reduction in agriculture before the end of the month. Pressure on Brussels to make additional concessions is particularly strong from Paris. There, Prime Minister Gabriel Attal announced the postponement and revision of the French pesticide reduction plan last week.
While the retreat regarding the SUR sends a clear signal to protesting farmers, it is unlikely to change much in practice. With Parliament’s rejection and simultaneous vote against further work on the dossier, the project had already reached a deadlock and would likely not have been adopted, at least in this legislative term.
However, the Commission is now paving the way for the preparation of a new proposal. It will likely take several years before this proposal is developed and negotiated. There is no guarantee that the next Commission will address this sensitive issue again.
There is sharp criticism of the withdrawal of the proposal from the European Greens. Co-chair Philipp Lambert described the move as “absurd” and said it “comes at the expense of the Green Deal” in a press conference. There is praise from the EPP. Peter Liese (CDU), the environmental spokesperson for the EPP, explicitly thanked von der Leyen. This “clear break” is the “right signal” for agriculture, he said. FDP MEP and Parliament Vice President Jan-Christoph Oetjen also welcomed the end of the legislative proposal. Reduction targets should now be “developed together with agriculture.”
Negotiators from the European Parliament and member states reached an agreement on changes to the EU’s medium-term financial framework (MFF) on Tuesday evening. The outcome closely follows the compromise reached by heads of state and government in the European Council. The Parliament had demanded significantly higher additional spending but was unable to prevail.
The following additional expenditures are planned until the end of the financial period in 2027:
Some of the funds do not need to be provided by member states but will be redirected from other EU sources, a demand particularly pushed by the German government. The co-rapporteur for the European Parliament, Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR), regretted that this also tapped into the Horizon Europe research program. This cannot be “the way to secure growth and jobs in our part of the world,” he said.
The Parliament was able to partially protect EU programs like Erasmus+ from cuts that might be necessary due to rising interest costs for the Next Generation EU investment program. However, the structure found could lead to “annual tough negotiations and further cuts”, criticized Green MEP Rasmus Andresen. tho
Today, agriculture will be debated for two hours in the Strasbourg plenary. It’s noteworthy that Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski is not present. Initially, the politician, who was formerly with the Christian Democrats and later joined the national-conservative PiS, was scheduled to speak at the focal debate.
Instead of Wojciechowski, Maroš Šefčovič will now represent the Commission. The official reason for the change is that the European Parliament decided to elevate the debate to the top level. In the first round, the faction leaders speak, followed by the specialists. Therefore, Šefčovič, as executive vice president of the Commission, hierarchically above the agriculture commissioner, must speak. Wojciechowski may perceive the change in the list as an affront. He has repeatedly represented the PiS line in Brussels.
Von der Leyen likely wants to ensure that there are no discordant notes from the Commission in the agriculture debate. She increasingly takes care of the important topic herself. Yesterday, the Commission President surprisingly buried the controversial pesticide regulation SUR in parliament. And she likely ensured that there are no new obligations for farmers in the Commission’s texts on the 2040 climate target. You can read about this in the Features by Lukas Scheid and Manuel Berkel.
Just as the implementation of European climate laws has just begun, the European Commission is now proposing a new climate target for 2040. The effectiveness of the Fit-for-55 package in achieving the 2030 climate goals remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the Commission must already think a decade ahead and set the 2040 target, as required by the EU Climate Law.
However, some members of the European Parliament criticize that industry and people should not be subjected to further “coercion and bans”, as CDU/CSU group leader Daniel Caspary commented on the EU climate target for 2040. But even his party voted for the Climate Law, which obliged the Commission to present a climate target for 2040 shortly after the Global Stocktake, completed in December at COP28 in Dubai.
The Commission has no choice. However, support for climate measures appears to be waning shortly before the EU elections. This is reflected not least in the EPP’s calls for less regulation in the environmental sector. The temptation to oppose further measures is strong, especially amid the pressure from protesting farmers.
Yet, the current proposal falls at the lower end of the EU Climate Advisory Board’s recommendation, which suggested a target of 90 to 95 percent. This has drawn criticism, especially from Green members of Parliament. “Not particularly courageous,” says Michael Bloss. He criticizes, in particular, that CCS should also be used to avoid emissions from fossil fuels rather than just in the heavily carbonized industrial sectors.
The Commission defends these plans by citing unavoidable residual emissions from oil combustion in the maritime sector and gas for heating and industrial purposes. The clear goal that the EU pursued at COP28, to end the combustion of fossil fuels as soon as possible, is only partially reflected in the proposal now presented. Approximately 10 percent of captured emissions in 2040 and even in 2050 are expected to come from the combustion of fossil fuels, according to the Commission’s Industrial Carbon Management Strategy.
In addition to the existing instruments aimed at achieving a 55 percent reduction in CO2 by 2030, further measures will be introduced for the 2040 climate target. These include:
However, on Monday, the Commission rejected aid for the European solar industry, which fears cheaper imports from China. The Commission’s stance thus also contains contradictions.
Germanwatch, an environmental and development organization, also highlights this aspect. On one hand, it praised the Commission for intending to continue the existing legal framework of EU climate policy. It also acknowledged the aim to make the green transition socially equitable, indicating an understanding in Brussels that “climate action and social justice need to be considered together for success”, as stated.
However, Lutz Weischer, head of the Berlin office of Germanwatch, criticizes this proposal as “conservative” and “barely the absolute minimum of what is necessary”. He also notes the absence of an end date for fossil fuels, which would demonstrate that the EU takes the groundbreaking decisions of the Dubai World Climate Summit seriously. The plans for international engagement in climate policy are also disappointingly lacking in ambition.
Although the Commission acknowledges that agriculture can play an important role, specifics remain vague. In a previous version of the proposal, the agricultural sector was much more strongly obligated and identified as one of the key sectors for CO2 reduction. However, in the final proposal, there is no mention of this. “Under pressure from industry and lobby groups that do not represent the entire agricultural sector, the Commission has excluded agriculture from the equation,” laments the Brussels-based environmental NGO European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
The 90 percent target itself represents only a minimal increase in ambition. According to Commission forecasts, with the continuation of the measures outlined in the Fit-for-55 package for 2030, Europe would already achieve an 88 percent reduction in emissions by 2040. Whether the EU will maintain its role as a global climate leader remains uncertain.
As this proposal is not a legislative one, the debate now begins on an informal level. Parliament and member states are not required to develop their own positions, but they could still do so, and some are already doing it. The corresponding legislative package is not expected until early 2025 – during the term of the next EU Commission. This makes it a campaign issue for the European elections in June.
As a guiding star that all climate laws orient themselves around, Green Party Member of Parliament Michael Bloss has described the EU Commission’s communication on the 2040 climate target. Concrete legislative proposals for individual economic sectors, such as the increase in wind, solar, and hydrogen targets in the Renewable Energy Directive, are still pending. However, the consequences of decarbonization by 90 percent instead of 55 percent for various sectors can already be well deduced from today’s overall package.
Firstly, there is the comprehensive impact assessment of the Commission’s proposal. A target of minus 90 percent greenhouse gases lies exactly between scenarios two and three from the hundreds of pages of the Impact Assessment.
The differences lie primarily in the increased use of synthetic fuels (e-fuels) and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The Commission also released its own strategy on Carbon Management on Tuesday, which is particularly important for industry and agriculture – and not least for the upcoming strategy of the German federal government on the same subject.
According to the EU paper, by 2030, 7,300 km of CO2 transport pipelines and shipping routes need to be established. By 2050, the network is expected to grow to 19,000 km. The Commission estimates that 16 billion euros in investments will be necessary. An extensive presentation of a possible CO2 transport network is included in an analysis released by the EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) on Tuesday. In none of the scenarios are CO2 storage facilities on the German mainland necessary.
The Commission’s goal is a European market for carbon dioxide. Particularly interesting for the many smaller industrial plants in Germany is that the Commission intends to develop special solutions for facilities outside industrial clusters to “strengthen their bargaining power against infrastructure operators”, enabling them to connect to the network.
The Commission plans to start work on several laws by 2024: a dedicated regulatory package similar to the Gas Internal Market Package and a basis for network planning. Where possible, existing gas pipelines and storage facilities should also be converted – where green gases like hydrogen are given explicit priority.
Similar to hydrogen and natural gas, there will also be a new platform by early 2026 to bring providers, users and storage operators together in the future CO2 market. At the same time, there will be an investment atlas for storage projects. The first storage capacities should be available before 2030. By June of this year, EU member states must provide an overview of storage options in their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs).
According to the Commission’s analysis, the costs of CO2 capture vary considerably – ranging from 13 to 103 euros per ton – excluding transportation and storage. The price for CO2 futures in 2030 is currently around 77 euros, meaning that a large portion of projects could already be economically viable. As a consequence, the Commission will assess next year whether the traditional project funding, for example, for cement manufacturers, can be replaced by market-based support.
CCS is also expected to play a role in the energy sector. As hinted at in drafts, the Commission no longer aims to completely eliminate natural gas from the electricity supply by 2040. Instead, it only expects renewables and nuclear energy to generate over 90 percent of electricity: “The remaining ten percent will be offset by negative emissions or equipped with low-carbon solutions, including the use of Carbon Capture and Storage.”
Just a few years ago, CCS for gas or even coal-fired power plants was considered politically dead. However, even the current coalition government is keeping this backdoor open in its power plant strategy and has deferred the decision on this technology to its own Carbon Management Strategy.
The EU Commission expects electric mobility to gain momentum. According to the impact assessment, by 2040, internal combustion engines will account for only 26 percent of the car fleet. Ten years later, only residual inventories of two percent are expected. Accordingly, the share of battery-electric cars will be 57 percent in 2040, rising to 79 percent by 2050.
Surprisingly, hybrid cars may persist longer than expected; the Commission expects them to account for eleven percent of the fleet by 2040: “This suggests that this technology will play an important role in moving away from fossil fuels. However, by 2050, the share of plug-in hybrids will decrease to five percent.”
The role of e-fuels and biofuels for the rapidly declining number of internal combustion engine cars is not clearly addressed in the impact assessment. While the consumption of e-fuels is expected to steeply increase in scenarios with high CO2 reduction, a large part of it is directed towards maritime and aviation transport and the tanks of trucks.
The Commission did not release exact numbers for passenger cars on Tuesday. However, they can be estimated from a bar chart (Figure 68). According to this, e-fuels will cover just over ten percent of the energy consumption of passenger cars in 2040. By 2050, the share will decrease significantly, with the lion’s share being electricity for EVs and hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles.
Member states and the European Parliament have politically agreed on the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA). The law is intended to be Europe’s response to the US Inflation Reduction Act and to improve the conditions for manufacturers of a range of climate-friendly technologies. This will supplement the regulatory agenda of the European Green Deal with a business case for the first time, said Christian Ehler (CDU), the rapporteur for the European Parliament. However, the Council and Parliament still need to formally approve the agreement.
The NZIA includes several facilitations for investors looking to build production capacities for net-zero technologies:
European manufacturers in a long list of sectors, which almost entirely corresponds to the European Parliament’s proposal, are set to benefit from these advantages. Ehler also ensured that their suppliers, such as those in the basic materials industry or mechanical engineering, are included. The list includes uncontroversial areas such as solar, wind, and heat pumps, as well as politically sensitive ones like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear technologies. However, member states can decide whether to also support nuclear projects.
Additionally, member states can classify planned factories as “strategic projects” if they consider them particularly important for resilience and competitiveness. This can also include investments in the decarbonization of energy-intensive industries such as steel, aluminum or cement.
Unlike the US Inflation Reduction Act, the EU counterpart is not accompanied by massive financial resources. Ehler wanted to obligate member states to allocate 20 percent of their national revenues from the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) to support net-zero projects. However, governments only agreed to include this in a non-binding recital. Nevertheless, this opens the discussion on how member states use their ETS revenues, said Ehler.
The green industries are unlikely to benefit financially from the increase in the EU financial framework either. The newly proposed investment platform, STEP, hardly allocates any fresh funds for this purpose. Especially Germany insisted on providing only 1.5 billion euros instead of the intended additional ten billion euros for funds like InvestEU, which are reserved for the European Defence Fund.
The NZIA receives approval from the wind industry even without fresh funding. “The problem lies less in money than in speed,” says Wolfram Axthelm, Managing Director of the German Wind Energy Association. Investors are ready, but often despair “at hyper-complex and overly lengthy approval procedures“. A central point of contact, especially in Germany, is key to meeting the deadlines.
Catrin Schiffer, an expert at the Federation of German Industries (BDI), takes a more skeptical view of the legislative proposal. “The NZIA does little to expedite projects in Germany.” The approval deadlines here are significantly shorter at six or seven months, well below the new EU requirements. There are already central contact points for companies, such as the federal emission control authorities.
“The problem in Germany is different: Deadlines are often not met because the procedures have been overloaded with requirements,” says Schiffer. As a result, approval procedures take an average of six months longer than stipulated in the Federal Immission Control Act. However, the federal government understands that action is needed here.
Nearly two years after presenting its proposal for a regulation on sustainable pesticide use (SUR), the EU Commission is withdrawing the project, as Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced before the European Parliament this Tuesday morning. “The proposal has polarized,” admitted the CDU politician. Parliament had already voted against the SUR in November, and there is “no further progress in the Council“, said von der Leyen. However, the Belgian Presidency of the Council had, at least officially, continued to work on the issue and reportedly learned of the Commission’s withdrawal shortly before the announcement on Tuesday morning.
The goal of “reducing the risks of chemical pesticide use” still remains, von der Leyen stressed. The Commission “could” present a new, “much more mature proposal” later. This means that a new proposal would be the project of the next Commission, possibly again under the leadership of von der Leyen, who has not officially announced her candidacy yet. The proposal would thus come after the conclusion of the strategic dialogue for the future of agriculture, which von der Leyen opened in January and is expected to provide recommendations by summer. Von der Leyen emphasized the need for an “intensive dialogue” as a basis for a new proposal.
In this context, von der Leyen’s retreat seems like an admission of fault. The original proposal had been criticized as “poorly crafted” repeatedly, not only by the agricultural sector and von der Leyen’s own political family, the EPP, but also by Green Federal Agriculture Minister Cem Özdemir. Points such as a total ban on pesticides in sensitive areas were almost unanimously criticized, even by the Green rapporteur of the Parliament, Sarah Wiener, who removed this from her draft report, which was otherwise much more ambitious than the Commission’s proposal. Many member states and associations felt blindsided, resulting in little goodwill during the negotiations.
The rejection of the SUR is the latest in a series of concessions following the current farmer protests in many European countries, including Brussels. Last week, the Commission had already proposed relaxations in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and von der Leyen had promised a proposal for bureaucracy reduction in agriculture before the end of the month. Pressure on Brussels to make additional concessions is particularly strong from Paris. There, Prime Minister Gabriel Attal announced the postponement and revision of the French pesticide reduction plan last week.
While the retreat regarding the SUR sends a clear signal to protesting farmers, it is unlikely to change much in practice. With Parliament’s rejection and simultaneous vote against further work on the dossier, the project had already reached a deadlock and would likely not have been adopted, at least in this legislative term.
However, the Commission is now paving the way for the preparation of a new proposal. It will likely take several years before this proposal is developed and negotiated. There is no guarantee that the next Commission will address this sensitive issue again.
There is sharp criticism of the withdrawal of the proposal from the European Greens. Co-chair Philipp Lambert described the move as “absurd” and said it “comes at the expense of the Green Deal” in a press conference. There is praise from the EPP. Peter Liese (CDU), the environmental spokesperson for the EPP, explicitly thanked von der Leyen. This “clear break” is the “right signal” for agriculture, he said. FDP MEP and Parliament Vice President Jan-Christoph Oetjen also welcomed the end of the legislative proposal. Reduction targets should now be “developed together with agriculture.”
Negotiators from the European Parliament and member states reached an agreement on changes to the EU’s medium-term financial framework (MFF) on Tuesday evening. The outcome closely follows the compromise reached by heads of state and government in the European Council. The Parliament had demanded significantly higher additional spending but was unable to prevail.
The following additional expenditures are planned until the end of the financial period in 2027:
Some of the funds do not need to be provided by member states but will be redirected from other EU sources, a demand particularly pushed by the German government. The co-rapporteur for the European Parliament, Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR), regretted that this also tapped into the Horizon Europe research program. This cannot be “the way to secure growth and jobs in our part of the world,” he said.
The Parliament was able to partially protect EU programs like Erasmus+ from cuts that might be necessary due to rising interest costs for the Next Generation EU investment program. However, the structure found could lead to “annual tough negotiations and further cuts”, criticized Green MEP Rasmus Andresen. tho
