It will be her first public appearance after pneumonia when the Commission President travels to Berlin today for the meeting of EPP heads of state and government and opposition leaders. At the moment, the negotiators of host Friedrich Merz and Ursula von der Leyen are still working on the paper that the CDU candidate for Chancellor wants to present. We have an early draft from Jan. 8, 2025.
According to reports, three topics are currently on the agenda: Deregulation, strengthening the capital market with the diagnosis that there are too few large banks, as well as the push to adapt merger law in the EU to the changed global economic conditions. When it comes to company mergers, the EU antitrust watchdogs should also have an eye on enabling players from the EU to stand up to companies from China and the USA.
The fact that work on the paper is taking so long is an indication of how difficult it is to obtain agreement. The Commission President must be prepared to implement the “disruptive” reduction in reporting obligations “in one or two” specific EU laws – see today’s News.
The heads of state and government must be prepared to raise their hands for the projects in the chamber of states. The test case of deforestation-free supply chains had failed to secure this support from national governments. As the member states did not cooperate, it was only possible to postpone the controversial law by twelve months.
So it will be interesting to see whether and how the top leaders of the Christian Democrats come together today and tomorrow. Have a good day!
The Commission wants to enable faster approval of infrastructure for heat, hydrogen, and carbon dioxide. To this end, regulations from the Renewable Energy Directive and an emergency regulation for renewable energies and power lines are to be extended to these areas. At least that is what it says in Commission documents for a meeting with industry representatives on Jan. 14 on the initial key points of the Clean Industrial Deal, parts of which Table.Briefings was able to view.
The announcement is in line with ideas from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. At the beginning of the year, he wrote to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asking her to take action in several areas in order to strengthen European competitiveness – including by accelerating planning for heating networks, heat generators, and hydrogen infrastructure.
In the energy sector, the Commission also wants to expand the procurement of sustainable fuels through the European Hydrogen Bank. According to the Commission documents, this European Hydrogen Bank is to become a “Sustainable Fuels Bank.” It is unclear whether this should only facilitate the transportation of energy sources and stimulate more stages of the value chain, or whether it should also be extended to biofuels. Synthetic fuels are generally easier to transport than pure hydrogen. There are actually already established incentive mechanisms and sufficient customers for biofuels.
The Commission also wants to remove regulatory obstacles for e-fuels. Examples mentioned in the presentation include networks, for example through “standardization” and a “28th regime for PCIs” (projects of common interest). Standardization plays a role in the cross-border transport of gases, for example.
Projects of common interest are pan-European infrastructure corridors. So far, there are regulations for electricity, natural gas, oil, hydrogen, and CO2. The “28th regime” refers to a common European framework in various policy areas that exists in parallel to national regulations and which market participants can opt for voluntarily.
The term “CfDs” also appears among the buzzwords for alternative fuels. To date, these contracts for difference have primarily been an instrument for the promotion of green electricity and nuclear energy. The most recent reform of the internal electricity market regulation ensured that contracts for difference do not lead to over-subsidization of the electricity generated. If the promotion of other energy sources were to be switched to CfDs, this would mean alignment with common competition rules.
Under the heading “affordability of energy“, the document mentions, among other things, the “incentive of long-term contracts/PPAs.” The Commission wants to persuade the European Investment Bank (EIB) to secure PPAs with guarantees, according to industry sources. In the case of long-term power purchase agreements between producers and consumers, primarily from industry, there is a risk that one of the contractual partners may become insolvent during the term of the agreement.
The Commission is also striving for a “strategy to minimize overall system costs” in the energy sector. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has already made this clear to the EU Parliament. The issue of “lower taxes and charges” will primarily depend on the conclusion of the negotiations on the Energy Tax Directive, which was not concluded in the last legislative period.
For two other ideas, the Commission will rely on cooperation with the member states. One of them is to “demonstrate to member states the importance of supporting IPCEIs in the most innovative and strategic areas such as affordable electric vehicles made in Europe and the circular economy.” The IPCEI (Important Projects of Common European Interest) funding instrument serves to develop European production capacities. Selected projects benefit from funding and easier approvals. In e-mobility, there are currently only IPCEIs for batteries; there is not yet a separate IPCEI for the circular economy.
The second point is the increased promotion of projects for strategic raw materials. As an example, the document mentions “tax incentives for buyers to sign long-term purchase agreements.” However, tax policy is largely the responsibility of the member states.
The Commission is expected to present its full communication on the Clean Industrial Deal on Feb. 26. Commission Vice-President Teresa Ribera spoke about priorities at the Bruegel think tank on Thursday: Energy efficiency must be at the top of the list so that companies can save costs. However, further electrification must come right after that in order to reduce fossil fuels. According to Ribera, the industrial policy demands from the Antwerp Declaration, which company bosses from various sectors sent to the Commission at the beginning of 2024, should also be taken into account. With Lukas Knigge
Nervousness is mounting ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration on Monday: those responsible in Brussels are assuming that the new US president will immediately announce higher tariffs, forcing the Europeans to react. However, the EU Commission, member states, and the European Parliament are in the dark as to what exactly Trump will announce, according to reports in Brussels.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen intends to seek talks with the new President shortly after the inauguration. However, hardly any high-ranking representatives from Europe will be attending the ceremony in Washington on Monday afternoon local time in order to avoid having to sit in the stands as claqueurs. The German government, for example, is sending its ambassador. However, representatives of several far-right parties will also be attending.
Some member states, such as Denmark in view of Trump’s advances regarding Greenland, are urging Brussels to exercise restraint. According to diplomats, they do not want to add fuel to the fire unnecessarily or anticipate concrete steps by Trump.
During the election campaign, Trump had threatened to impose a ten to 20 percent surcharge on all imports. To avert this, the Republican demanded that the Europeans would have to buy large quantities of oil and gas from the USA in order to balance the bilateral trade balance.
The Europeans are very interested in a deal to avert a trade conflict with consequences for the already weakening industry. Mercedes-Benz boss Ola Källenius, President of the umbrella organization ACEA, called for a “grand bargain” with the USA in a letter. Commission President von der Leyen had already held out the prospect of importing more American LNG as part of a deal. However, this is actually a matter for the mostly private energy companies.
Hungarian European Affairs Minister János Bóka is banking on a deal: “I think the tariffs are not an end in itself for Trump,” he told Table.Briefings. In order to rebalance economic relations, “US investments in key sectors in Europe is also something that should be on the table,” Bóka demands – these could be a “game changer.” In addition to energy, he also mentions infrastructure, mobility, and information technology as possible sectors.
The tone and nature of transatlantic relations would change, said Bóka. However, this would not only entail risks, but “also a lot of potential.” Budapest has a more positive outlook on the new Trump administration than most other capitals: the right-wing conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is expecting a tailwind from Trump and his allies such as X owner Elon Musk.
Trump’s comments on the war in Ukraine and NATO caused great unrest. At a meeting near Brussels on Feb. 3, the heads of state and government want to discuss how Europe can reduce its dependence on the protecting power. According to diplomats, the aim is an open strategic discussion without the fixed framework of a regular EU summit.
It will be about shaping the future European security architecture, says Bóka. The EU must decide whether it wants to play an independent role and what resources it needs to do so. The discussion is at an early stage and there is “no obvious consensus on any of these elements so far,” said Bóka, who is also Prime Minister Orbán’s EU sherpa.
There is disagreement, for example, on the question of how much the EU states should rely on arms suppliers from the USA and other third countries. Hungary and others are insisting on strengthening the European defense industry in order to reduce dependencies. Poland and the Baltic states, on the other hand, are resisting a fixation on “Made in Europe.” Poland, for example, buys on a large scale from South Korea, which can deliver faster than Europeans and Americans.
Others, such as the Netherlands and Germany, do not want to block the way for licensed production of US armaments. This week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte explicitly warned against excluding arms companies from third countries and erecting new barriers between the allies. Transatlantic cooperation in arms production makes Europe and the USA stronger.
Bóka admits that European manufacturers alone will not be able to meet the demand for military equipment in the next ten or 15 years. Nevertheless, the European states should “be brave enough to make the big leap forward” and build a European defense industry. This would be at the heart of Europe’s strategic autonomy.
The EU is currently still experimenting within the small framework of the European Defense Industrial Plan (EDIP), which has a volume of EUR 1.5 billion. What is needed is a coordinated planning and development program at EU level, which must be built up step by step. However, this is only realistic in the next multiannual financial framework from 2028 to 2034.
The EU Commission is currently drawing up a white paper to weigh up the options for financing defense requirements. Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius estimates the gap at around EUR 500 billion. Bóka considers this to be premature: “Instead of throwing huge numbers around, I think we should start with the planning phase and see what our level of ambition is and how we see Europe’s contribution to meeting these defense industrial needs.” There are still very different views on which responsibilities the member states should retain and which the EU should take on. Budapest is critical of a new EU debt program to finance defense requirements.
According to Bóka, Europe’s strategic interests must also be more clearly defined in order to work together more closely on defense. So far, however, it has often been Hungary that has prevented unity in the Council with its veto, particularly with regard to sanctions against Russia or China. Before Trump takes office, Budapest also does not want to decide whether it will agree to the extension of economic sanctions due at the end of January.
At the hearings in the US Senate, US Treasury Secretary-designate Scott Bessent argued in favor of tightening sanctions against Russian oil companies. However, Orbán is clearly speculating that Trump will withdraw the US trade restrictions against Moscow. According to Bóka, it is “undeniable” that the Western sanctions are having an impact on the Russian economy. However, it is doubtful whether they will promote the end of the military conflict in Ukraine and whether they are worth the price Europe is paying for them. The new proposals to phase out imports of Russian LNG were also viewed critically in view of the high energy prices, said the minister.
The Fidesz government is hoping to soon gain new allies for its course. The looming formation of a government in Austria under FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl is an important step, according to Bóka, who hopes for further election victories by right-wing forces in the Czech Republic, for example. “This is only the beginning of the road that will result in a complete restructuring of the political landscape in Europe.”
Germany’s ability to act is crucial for Europe’s future – and the two are inextricably linked. Our country has lost a great deal of influence because, for a long time, it only managed European policy instead of actively shaping it.
At the same time, 80% of Germans consider membership in the EU to be very important. Furthermore, the majority see more advantages than disadvantages in the EU, and among young people, the figure is as high as 70%. This is impressively confirmed by a Forsa survey commissioned by the European Movement Germany (EBD).
However, according to the survey, the majority do not understand how the EU works. Of those who say they are interested in political events at European level, 48% say that a lot is unclear to them.
There is an obvious lack of European policy education and a corresponding public discourse – not only among the population, educational institutions, and the media, but apparently also at government level. The departments in Berlin often act inconsistently and without a pronounced European focus. Even for experts in editorial offices and academia, it often remains unclear what position Germany is taking. The consequence: stagnation and a lack of strategic leadership impetus.
Germany’s European policy has been criticized for years. The term “German Vote” not only describes Germany’s frequent abstentions in the Council of Ministers, but also the lack of communication and the inefficiency of Europe’s largest economy in the EU legislative process.
The German government often fails to formulate clear positions at an early stage – an omission that isolates Germany, weakens its influence, and impairs Europe’s ability to act as a whole.
The process is well known: Instructions from Berlin often reach Brussels too late or not at all. In a system based on early alliances, Germany loses valuable influence and becomes an unpredictable partner. The list is getting longer and longer – from the use of glyphosate to e-fuels and the European Supply Chain Directive. This fuels mistrust among other member states and makes decision-making more difficult.
An internal analysis conducted by Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels in 2023 clearly shows that taking a position early on can secure opportunities to shape and influence policy. The EU ambassador’s analysis makes it clear that contradictory signals and late changes damage Germany’s reputation and make alliances more difficult.
Small member states in particular are looking to Germany for strategic leadership. The leading associations of the European Movement Germany are also aware of the shortcomings. They called for a stronger strategic European positioning ahead of the 2024 European elections. This demand strengthens the reliability of EU policy and Germany’s credibility in the legislative process.
The problem also lies in the structures: German-European coordination is inefficient. Responsibilities are divided between ministries and departmental egotisms paralyze strategic action.
Since the early days of European integration, responsibility for European policy has been more or less divided between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office. However, instead of adapting to today’s reality, an inefficient network of responsibilities and committees has developed that hinders strategic action. For purely historical reasons, the German government’s coordination of Europe incomprehensibly does not include the Council of Europe, which defines the foundations for democracy and the rule of law and thus forms the integration landscape of a liberal Europe.
It is high time for a reform of Germany’s European coordination. The European Movement Germany developed concrete proposals for this at an early stage:
The challenges – from the climate crisis to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and EU reform to ensure the enlargement of the EU – require a proactive and responsible European policy.
The “German Vote” must no longer be synonymous with stagnation and inefficiency. Germany must become aware of its responsibility for Europe as a constitutional state objective and finally develop a strategic plan for Europe. The future of Europe is at stake – and with it the future of Germany.
It will be her first public appearance after pneumonia when the Commission President travels to Berlin today for the meeting of EPP heads of state and government and opposition leaders. At the moment, the negotiators of host Friedrich Merz and Ursula von der Leyen are still working on the paper that the CDU candidate for Chancellor wants to present. We have an early draft from Jan. 8, 2025.
According to reports, three topics are currently on the agenda: Deregulation, strengthening the capital market with the diagnosis that there are too few large banks, as well as the push to adapt merger law in the EU to the changed global economic conditions. When it comes to company mergers, the EU antitrust watchdogs should also have an eye on enabling players from the EU to stand up to companies from China and the USA.
The fact that work on the paper is taking so long is an indication of how difficult it is to obtain agreement. The Commission President must be prepared to implement the “disruptive” reduction in reporting obligations “in one or two” specific EU laws – see today’s News.
The heads of state and government must be prepared to raise their hands for the projects in the chamber of states. The test case of deforestation-free supply chains had failed to secure this support from national governments. As the member states did not cooperate, it was only possible to postpone the controversial law by twelve months.
So it will be interesting to see whether and how the top leaders of the Christian Democrats come together today and tomorrow. Have a good day!
The Commission wants to enable faster approval of infrastructure for heat, hydrogen, and carbon dioxide. To this end, regulations from the Renewable Energy Directive and an emergency regulation for renewable energies and power lines are to be extended to these areas. At least that is what it says in Commission documents for a meeting with industry representatives on Jan. 14 on the initial key points of the Clean Industrial Deal, parts of which Table.Briefings was able to view.
The announcement is in line with ideas from German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. At the beginning of the year, he wrote to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asking her to take action in several areas in order to strengthen European competitiveness – including by accelerating planning for heating networks, heat generators, and hydrogen infrastructure.
In the energy sector, the Commission also wants to expand the procurement of sustainable fuels through the European Hydrogen Bank. According to the Commission documents, this European Hydrogen Bank is to become a “Sustainable Fuels Bank.” It is unclear whether this should only facilitate the transportation of energy sources and stimulate more stages of the value chain, or whether it should also be extended to biofuels. Synthetic fuels are generally easier to transport than pure hydrogen. There are actually already established incentive mechanisms and sufficient customers for biofuels.
The Commission also wants to remove regulatory obstacles for e-fuels. Examples mentioned in the presentation include networks, for example through “standardization” and a “28th regime for PCIs” (projects of common interest). Standardization plays a role in the cross-border transport of gases, for example.
Projects of common interest are pan-European infrastructure corridors. So far, there are regulations for electricity, natural gas, oil, hydrogen, and CO2. The “28th regime” refers to a common European framework in various policy areas that exists in parallel to national regulations and which market participants can opt for voluntarily.
The term “CfDs” also appears among the buzzwords for alternative fuels. To date, these contracts for difference have primarily been an instrument for the promotion of green electricity and nuclear energy. The most recent reform of the internal electricity market regulation ensured that contracts for difference do not lead to over-subsidization of the electricity generated. If the promotion of other energy sources were to be switched to CfDs, this would mean alignment with common competition rules.
Under the heading “affordability of energy“, the document mentions, among other things, the “incentive of long-term contracts/PPAs.” The Commission wants to persuade the European Investment Bank (EIB) to secure PPAs with guarantees, according to industry sources. In the case of long-term power purchase agreements between producers and consumers, primarily from industry, there is a risk that one of the contractual partners may become insolvent during the term of the agreement.
The Commission is also striving for a “strategy to minimize overall system costs” in the energy sector. Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has already made this clear to the EU Parliament. The issue of “lower taxes and charges” will primarily depend on the conclusion of the negotiations on the Energy Tax Directive, which was not concluded in the last legislative period.
For two other ideas, the Commission will rely on cooperation with the member states. One of them is to “demonstrate to member states the importance of supporting IPCEIs in the most innovative and strategic areas such as affordable electric vehicles made in Europe and the circular economy.” The IPCEI (Important Projects of Common European Interest) funding instrument serves to develop European production capacities. Selected projects benefit from funding and easier approvals. In e-mobility, there are currently only IPCEIs for batteries; there is not yet a separate IPCEI for the circular economy.
The second point is the increased promotion of projects for strategic raw materials. As an example, the document mentions “tax incentives for buyers to sign long-term purchase agreements.” However, tax policy is largely the responsibility of the member states.
The Commission is expected to present its full communication on the Clean Industrial Deal on Feb. 26. Commission Vice-President Teresa Ribera spoke about priorities at the Bruegel think tank on Thursday: Energy efficiency must be at the top of the list so that companies can save costs. However, further electrification must come right after that in order to reduce fossil fuels. According to Ribera, the industrial policy demands from the Antwerp Declaration, which company bosses from various sectors sent to the Commission at the beginning of 2024, should also be taken into account. With Lukas Knigge
Nervousness is mounting ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration on Monday: those responsible in Brussels are assuming that the new US president will immediately announce higher tariffs, forcing the Europeans to react. However, the EU Commission, member states, and the European Parliament are in the dark as to what exactly Trump will announce, according to reports in Brussels.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen intends to seek talks with the new President shortly after the inauguration. However, hardly any high-ranking representatives from Europe will be attending the ceremony in Washington on Monday afternoon local time in order to avoid having to sit in the stands as claqueurs. The German government, for example, is sending its ambassador. However, representatives of several far-right parties will also be attending.
Some member states, such as Denmark in view of Trump’s advances regarding Greenland, are urging Brussels to exercise restraint. According to diplomats, they do not want to add fuel to the fire unnecessarily or anticipate concrete steps by Trump.
During the election campaign, Trump had threatened to impose a ten to 20 percent surcharge on all imports. To avert this, the Republican demanded that the Europeans would have to buy large quantities of oil and gas from the USA in order to balance the bilateral trade balance.
The Europeans are very interested in a deal to avert a trade conflict with consequences for the already weakening industry. Mercedes-Benz boss Ola Källenius, President of the umbrella organization ACEA, called for a “grand bargain” with the USA in a letter. Commission President von der Leyen had already held out the prospect of importing more American LNG as part of a deal. However, this is actually a matter for the mostly private energy companies.
Hungarian European Affairs Minister János Bóka is banking on a deal: “I think the tariffs are not an end in itself for Trump,” he told Table.Briefings. In order to rebalance economic relations, “US investments in key sectors in Europe is also something that should be on the table,” Bóka demands – these could be a “game changer.” In addition to energy, he also mentions infrastructure, mobility, and information technology as possible sectors.
The tone and nature of transatlantic relations would change, said Bóka. However, this would not only entail risks, but “also a lot of potential.” Budapest has a more positive outlook on the new Trump administration than most other capitals: the right-wing conservative Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is expecting a tailwind from Trump and his allies such as X owner Elon Musk.
Trump’s comments on the war in Ukraine and NATO caused great unrest. At a meeting near Brussels on Feb. 3, the heads of state and government want to discuss how Europe can reduce its dependence on the protecting power. According to diplomats, the aim is an open strategic discussion without the fixed framework of a regular EU summit.
It will be about shaping the future European security architecture, says Bóka. The EU must decide whether it wants to play an independent role and what resources it needs to do so. The discussion is at an early stage and there is “no obvious consensus on any of these elements so far,” said Bóka, who is also Prime Minister Orbán’s EU sherpa.
There is disagreement, for example, on the question of how much the EU states should rely on arms suppliers from the USA and other third countries. Hungary and others are insisting on strengthening the European defense industry in order to reduce dependencies. Poland and the Baltic states, on the other hand, are resisting a fixation on “Made in Europe.” Poland, for example, buys on a large scale from South Korea, which can deliver faster than Europeans and Americans.
Others, such as the Netherlands and Germany, do not want to block the way for licensed production of US armaments. This week, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte explicitly warned against excluding arms companies from third countries and erecting new barriers between the allies. Transatlantic cooperation in arms production makes Europe and the USA stronger.
Bóka admits that European manufacturers alone will not be able to meet the demand for military equipment in the next ten or 15 years. Nevertheless, the European states should “be brave enough to make the big leap forward” and build a European defense industry. This would be at the heart of Europe’s strategic autonomy.
The EU is currently still experimenting within the small framework of the European Defense Industrial Plan (EDIP), which has a volume of EUR 1.5 billion. What is needed is a coordinated planning and development program at EU level, which must be built up step by step. However, this is only realistic in the next multiannual financial framework from 2028 to 2034.
The EU Commission is currently drawing up a white paper to weigh up the options for financing defense requirements. Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius estimates the gap at around EUR 500 billion. Bóka considers this to be premature: “Instead of throwing huge numbers around, I think we should start with the planning phase and see what our level of ambition is and how we see Europe’s contribution to meeting these defense industrial needs.” There are still very different views on which responsibilities the member states should retain and which the EU should take on. Budapest is critical of a new EU debt program to finance defense requirements.
According to Bóka, Europe’s strategic interests must also be more clearly defined in order to work together more closely on defense. So far, however, it has often been Hungary that has prevented unity in the Council with its veto, particularly with regard to sanctions against Russia or China. Before Trump takes office, Budapest also does not want to decide whether it will agree to the extension of economic sanctions due at the end of January.
At the hearings in the US Senate, US Treasury Secretary-designate Scott Bessent argued in favor of tightening sanctions against Russian oil companies. However, Orbán is clearly speculating that Trump will withdraw the US trade restrictions against Moscow. According to Bóka, it is “undeniable” that the Western sanctions are having an impact on the Russian economy. However, it is doubtful whether they will promote the end of the military conflict in Ukraine and whether they are worth the price Europe is paying for them. The new proposals to phase out imports of Russian LNG were also viewed critically in view of the high energy prices, said the minister.
The Fidesz government is hoping to soon gain new allies for its course. The looming formation of a government in Austria under FPÖ leader Herbert Kickl is an important step, according to Bóka, who hopes for further election victories by right-wing forces in the Czech Republic, for example. “This is only the beginning of the road that will result in a complete restructuring of the political landscape in Europe.”
Germany’s ability to act is crucial for Europe’s future – and the two are inextricably linked. Our country has lost a great deal of influence because, for a long time, it only managed European policy instead of actively shaping it.
At the same time, 80% of Germans consider membership in the EU to be very important. Furthermore, the majority see more advantages than disadvantages in the EU, and among young people, the figure is as high as 70%. This is impressively confirmed by a Forsa survey commissioned by the European Movement Germany (EBD).
However, according to the survey, the majority do not understand how the EU works. Of those who say they are interested in political events at European level, 48% say that a lot is unclear to them.
There is an obvious lack of European policy education and a corresponding public discourse – not only among the population, educational institutions, and the media, but apparently also at government level. The departments in Berlin often act inconsistently and without a pronounced European focus. Even for experts in editorial offices and academia, it often remains unclear what position Germany is taking. The consequence: stagnation and a lack of strategic leadership impetus.
Germany’s European policy has been criticized for years. The term “German Vote” not only describes Germany’s frequent abstentions in the Council of Ministers, but also the lack of communication and the inefficiency of Europe’s largest economy in the EU legislative process.
The German government often fails to formulate clear positions at an early stage – an omission that isolates Germany, weakens its influence, and impairs Europe’s ability to act as a whole.
The process is well known: Instructions from Berlin often reach Brussels too late or not at all. In a system based on early alliances, Germany loses valuable influence and becomes an unpredictable partner. The list is getting longer and longer – from the use of glyphosate to e-fuels and the European Supply Chain Directive. This fuels mistrust among other member states and makes decision-making more difficult.
An internal analysis conducted by Germany’s Permanent Representation in Brussels in 2023 clearly shows that taking a position early on can secure opportunities to shape and influence policy. The EU ambassador’s analysis makes it clear that contradictory signals and late changes damage Germany’s reputation and make alliances more difficult.
Small member states in particular are looking to Germany for strategic leadership. The leading associations of the European Movement Germany are also aware of the shortcomings. They called for a stronger strategic European positioning ahead of the 2024 European elections. This demand strengthens the reliability of EU policy and Germany’s credibility in the legislative process.
The problem also lies in the structures: German-European coordination is inefficient. Responsibilities are divided between ministries and departmental egotisms paralyze strategic action.
Since the early days of European integration, responsibility for European policy has been more or less divided between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Federal Foreign Office. However, instead of adapting to today’s reality, an inefficient network of responsibilities and committees has developed that hinders strategic action. For purely historical reasons, the German government’s coordination of Europe incomprehensibly does not include the Council of Europe, which defines the foundations for democracy and the rule of law and thus forms the integration landscape of a liberal Europe.
It is high time for a reform of Germany’s European coordination. The European Movement Germany developed concrete proposals for this at an early stage:
The challenges – from the climate crisis to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and EU reform to ensure the enlargement of the EU – require a proactive and responsible European policy.
The “German Vote” must no longer be synonymous with stagnation and inefficiency. Germany must become aware of its responsibility for Europe as a constitutional state objective and finally develop a strategic plan for Europe. The future of Europe is at stake – and with it the future of Germany.
