The new EU Commissioners took office on Sunday, with Foreign Affairs Commissioner Kaja Kallas and the new Council President António Costa also making an exclamation mark with their trip to Kyiv. At the start, however, it was still unclear to some extent how the newcomers would appoint their closest staff.
The delay is not only due to the wrangling in the European Parliament over the confirmation of the 26 Commissioners. Some personnel matters were still awaiting the approval of Ursula von der Leyen’s head of cabinet Björn Seibert. He wanted to deal with this at the weekend.
It is becoming apparent that German EU officials will fill a number of influential posts in the cabinets. There are likely to be at least four German cabinet heads, including Bernd Biervert (for Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič) and Andreas Schwarz (Research Commissioner Ekaterina Sachariewa) in addition to Seibert. Michael Hager continues to head the cabinet of Economic Affairs Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis; a change had been on the cards in the meantime.
There will also be several deputy heads of cabinet with a German passport. In the case of Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné, it will be the Franco-German Estelle Göger, in the case of Roxana Mînzatu probably the previous Head of Unit Max Uebe, and in the case of Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath Joachim Herrmann, who already served under his predecessor Didier Reynders. According to our information, Julia Lemke, a German EU official, will also be joining the cabinet of Teresa Ribera, the first Vice-President responsible for climate and competition. Valvanera Ulargui from Spain will be responsible for climate policy.
Costa also brings at least one German into his team: Albrecht Morgenstern, a long-standing civil servant in the Federal Chancellery, becomes deputy economic policy advisor and thus deputy to the Dane Jakob Wegener Friis.
I wish you a good start to the week!
Mr. Pisani-Ferry, the budget dispute in France is unsettling the markets. Do you think it can be resolved?
JPF: Absolutely. The question is: at what cost? The concessions Prime Minister Barnier has already made to Marine Le Pen amount to at least €3 billion. The real issue is the price of the National Rally’s abstention in the confidence vote. If the cost is too high, it might not be a better solution than the government’s outright fall, which could lead to Barnier’s reappointment with a different cabinet.
How concerned are you about potential market turmoil in the event of a no-confidence vote?
We’re living in precarious times. Bond yields are high…
They’ve reached levels comparable to Greek bonds at their peak.
Yes, but that doesn’t mean much. They’re still much lower than Italy’s. While a crisis isn’t imminent, we’re in an uncomfortable situation.
Could the market reaction serve as a disciplinary factor for political actors like Marine Le Pen?
Yes, but it cuts both ways. It also gives the National Rally more leverage to pressure the government. If Barnier wants to avoid his government’s collapse, he may have to make further concessions to Le Pen. However, the market might interpret too many compromises as a lack of consensus on fiscal consolidation in the country – that even the limited consolidation the government envisions isn’t supportable.
How do you interpret the National Rally and Marine Le Pen’s interests in these negotiations? Are they aiming for a compromise or more interested in bringing down the government?
Ultimately, they’re more interested in finding a compromise because they’re not yet prepared to govern or contest a presidential election. There’s also uncertainty surrounding Marine Le Pen’s eligibility. But they need to extract a price from Barnier to show their electorate they’re fighting for them.
The French budget might be the first real test for the EU’s new fiscal rules. What would you recommend to the European Commission?
They should strike a balance between being firm in enforcing the rules and allowing some adjustments. They’ve basically endorsed the initial draft budget presented by Barnier. There might be room for limited tax cuts or spending overruns, but these need to be constrained. Everyone’s credibility is on the line here.
What are your thoughts on the German debate about the debt brake?
Germany is grappling with its own fiscal rules, not the European ones. It’s sensible to seek flexibility within the rules to address priorities like defense spending or the green transition. We’re in an exceptional situation. I understand that Friedrich Merz has shown some openness to amending the rule. That would be welcome because the existing rule is too strict and has hindered Germany’s ability to meet its defense obligations or invest in the green transition. But any adjustment must preserve the rule’s disciplinary function.
In a new report, you argue that meeting the investment needed for the EU to reach its 2030 climate goals is a huge challenge. Do the EU’s fiscal rules allow enough space for governments to provide the necessary investment?
We’re soon going to face a double constraint: limited EU funds as the Recovery and Resilience Facility ends in 2026, and national fiscal rules that don’t provide sufficient room for green investments in several countries. If we don’t address this, we risk derailing the transition.
Why is that?
The transition is also costly for public budgets. Many households and SMEs face cash constraints and need public support to finance their investments in the transition. The risk is that without additional leeway for governments or the EU, we won’t be on track to meet our 2030 objectives. Delaying renovations or retrofitting private buildings is one thing, but derailing investments in renewables or delaying the uptake of electric vehicles would be very detrimental. It would mean wasted manufacturing capacities.
The uptake of EVs has slowed across Europe; the battery startup Northvolt has filed for insolvency protection, and steelmaker ThyssenKrupp is cutting thousands of jobs. Given these risks, how much public money should be invested in this transition?
It varies by country, but overall, we’re talking about 0.5% to 1% of GDP per year – a multiyear investment. There are always ways to substitute public spending with regulation, but that shifts the burden to the private sector. The question is whether the private sector can afford this investment. If not, a lack of fiscal space risks derailing the transition.
In Germany, some in the CDU and FDP argue that the market should dictate the transition’s progress, relying mainly on the ETS.
Again, the question is whether companies can absorb the carbon price. Some are very profitable and can, but for others, the cost is too high.
What should governments do to facilitate this transition?
Clarity of objectives and stability of targets are most important.
So, no backtracking on the ban of combustion engines by 2035?
I don’t think that would be wise. Some car manufacturers can afford to invest in both EVs and internal combustion engines. Whatever decision was made – it was made. Companies have started shifting investments from ICEs to EVs.
But they might need to revert because consumers aren’t buying EVs as expected.
Consumers aren’t buying because they’re too expensive. In France, purchasing an EV or retrofitting a home by replacing a gas boiler with a heat pump can represent a year’s income for a middle-class household. That’s significant, and many of these households are already in debt. They won’t buy. I think the risk of derailing the transition is increasing.
So you believe governments should subsidize households purchasing EVs or heat pumps?
Yes, for households that otherwise can’t afford them. But in France, the hard constraint is the national budget. In other countries, the constraint might be the European fiscal rules. These constraints should be relaxed to help the EV market take off.
If you were in Piotr Serafin’s shoes, the new Budget Commissioner, how would you design the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)?
Back in 2003, I participated in the Sapir Report, which criticized the EU budget for being a historical relic – it hasn’t changed much since. One lesson from the recovery plan is that much can be achieved by making transfers conditional on performance indicators at the national level.
That’s the idea Ursula von der Leyen is proposing.
I think it’s a good idea.
The summit meeting of the five Scandinavian and three Baltic states – known as NB-8 – was a first: For the first time in NB-8 history, a Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, was invited to the talks on security in the Baltic Sea region and long-term support for Ukraine, which took place on Wednesday in Harpsund, Sweden.
The Pole used the forum to propose joint patrols in the Baltic waters given Russian hybrid warfare. “There are signs that the Russians have at least been involved in serious sabotage activities in Poland,” said Tusk. “I think it will be better for all of us if we have full control over our territorial waters.” His suggestion fell on receptive ears after the damage to the fiber optic cables, presumably by the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3.
The invitation from the Nordic countries to the Polish Prime Minister is evidence of Poland’s growing importance on the international stage. 35 years after the fall of communism, the country of 37 million inhabitants is becoming one of the most important foreign policy players in Europe. While France and Germany are struggling with government crises and economic stagnation and lack strong international leadership, Poland is stepping into the gap and building new alliances in northern Europe. With their help, the country, which will take over the EU Council Presidency on Jan. 1, 2025, could push through its agenda more effectively.
The rapprochement with the north is also an expression of Poland’s disappointment with Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s hesitant approach to military support for Ukraine, and the inability to significantly increase security spending and boost arms production are met with criticism and a lack of understanding.
Following Chancellor Scholz’s visit to Poland in the summer, relations have cooled further. Tusk had long hoped that Scholz would understand the “magnitude of the challenges” posed to Europe by Russian aggression, according to sources close to the Prime Minister. However, he met an accountant who talks about a turning point but does not do much.
Most recently, Tusk taunted Germany with regard to the defense budget: two percent of GDP for defense is reasonable for any country. Poland has doubled its spending on security to 4.2 percent of GDP since the Russian attack on Ukraine. Germany wants to just reach the two percent mark this year.
Poland maintains balanced partnerships with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. In addition, all countries in the region agree on most political issues: They see Russia as an existential threat and want to strengthen their defense and security. They advocate a massive restriction of migration and – like Finland – are prepared to suspend the right of asylum on their eastern borders. They want to maintain strong transatlantic relations at all costs, but at the same time improve the competitiveness of European economies.
The drifting apart of the three Visegrad states Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which have long been cornerstones of Polish regional policy, is also forcing Poland to take a north-northeast course. Ever since Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turned out to be Vladimir Putin’s closest ally and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico stopped supporting Ukraine, the dialog has fallen silent.
Of course, domestic politics also play a role in the change – a president will be elected in Poland in May 2025. The candidate of the citizens’ coalition must win if Tusk wants to push through his reforms. Tusk, who has been labeled “Berlin’s agent” by the national populists, wants to offer little surface for attack.
Poland’s rise is appreciated in most EU countries. Not so in Germany, where until recently jokes were made about Polish car thieves, and the “Polish economy” was used as a synonym for chaos. “Poland feels underestimated in Germany,” says Janusz Reiter, Poland’s former ambassador to Germany.
Tusk wants to secure Poland an influence that does justice to the country, its economic potential, and its size. Since the Russian invasion, Poland has been a frontline state through which almost all military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine is routed. This geopolitical situation makes Warsaw an important, even indispensable partner in Europe. This has long been understood in Scandinavia and the Baltic states, but in Germany, it is repeatedly forgotten: Chancellor Scholz had invited the heads of government of the UK and France to US President Joe Biden’s farewell visit to Berlin – Tusk had to stay at home.
The new EU Council President António Costa has promised Ukraine rapid progress in the EU accession process. They will work together to open at least two areas of accession negotiations in the first half of next year, said the former Portuguese Prime Minister on the fringes of talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv. Together with chief diplomat Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Costa traveled to Ukraine at the beginning of his term of office.
Costa said that gradual integration was already beginning in various policy areas, such as roaming for low-cost cell phone use abroad. He also assured Ukraine of further EU financial aid and determined work on the 15th package of Russia sanctions. From next year onwards, €1.5 billion per month in support would be provided from the proceeds of Russia’s frozen assets in the EU, he said. In addition, further sanctions will increase the pressure on the Russian economy and weaken Russia’s ability to wage war.
The European Union officially opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, which is under attack from Russia, at the beginning of the summer. How long they will last and whether they can even be brought to a successful conclusion remains to be seen.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kallas believes it is conceivable that soldiers from member states could at some point secure a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. “I think we really shouldn’t rule anything out,” said the former Estonian Prime Minister in Kyiv. This would also be good for strategic reasons. According to Kallas, the soldiers for this could, for example, come from countries that have already expressed their openness to talks about sending troops in the past. These include France and the Baltic states, for example. dpa
The geopolitical tensions at the start of the new EU Commission cannot be overlooked: Russia’s imperialist war against Ukraine, China’s increasingly aggressive stance, and the uncertainties surrounding Donald Trump’s return to the White House are shaping the global agenda. In this field of tension, we must prevent Germany’s economic weakness from becoming a security policy Achilles’ heel for the whole of Europe and threatening our European way of life.
The focus should be on three priorities:
The economic success of Germany and Europe will depend on how resolutely we reduce bureaucratic hurdles. Almost 65% of reporting obligations originate in Brussels – particularly at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises. A binding reduction path for regulations is long overdue, instead of ill-conceived regulations such as the EU Supply Chain Directive, which reduces our competitiveness through an excessive bureaucratic burden.
This is just as little regulatory efficiency as planned regulation on climate protection. Instead of sector-specific regulations such as CO2 fleet limits, the Energy Efficiency Directive, and the Industrial Emissions Directive, we need a functioning European emissions trading system.
In order to reduce the dangerous dependencies on China, free trade agreements such as the one with the Mercosur states, but also with India and Indonesia, must finally become a reality. At the same time, we must not stifle third countries with regulations and should refrain from moralizing. In our cooperation with the new US government, we should strengthen the EU Commission’s backing for negotiations. Proactive offers need to be made quickly. In this way, we can also achieve our goals, for example sectoral agreements, such as on rare earths. This type of diversification from China is also in Trump’s interests.
Fiscal stability gives us the room for maneuver we need to react to shocks and defend our freedom and security. The reformed Stability and Growth Pact negotiated by Christian Lindner offers a blueprint for this, which must be consistently implemented by the new Commission.
The next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 must focus our EU spending on investing in the future – in what protects and benefits us. Competitiveness, innovation, and security should take priority. Instead of relying on Eurobonds with veto players like Hungary at the table, we need to reallocate unused funds from existing EU pots and untangle the jungle of funding programs. Protection against the misuse of EU funds and compliance with the rule of law must remain conditions for the disbursement of EU funds.
The new Commission has already sent out important signals for the credibility of European defense capabilities, for example with the establishment of the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine or the appointment of a Defense Commissioner. We are also enabling further investment in security by expanding the financing options of the European Investment Bank. With an adapted EU taxonomy, it can serve as a lever for mobilizing private capital.
Our security also depends on gaining new partners. To achieve this, the new Commission must regain lost credibility in the accession process. This means honest offers and more frequent qualified majority decisions in order to initiate new phases of talks in the accession process. The merit-based approach to full membership must be maintained because EU membership does not come at a discount. However, the EU must also show geostrategically important partners such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova what it has to offer in contrast to the imperial ambitions of Beijing and Moscow.
Ultimately, we must not stand in our own way, but the new EU Commission must strengthen Europe by making the lives of Europeans freer, simpler, and safer. In the new geopolitical situation, this can only be achieved through a resolute economic turnaround, effective use of EU funds, and investment in our security.
The new EU Commissioners took office on Sunday, with Foreign Affairs Commissioner Kaja Kallas and the new Council President António Costa also making an exclamation mark with their trip to Kyiv. At the start, however, it was still unclear to some extent how the newcomers would appoint their closest staff.
The delay is not only due to the wrangling in the European Parliament over the confirmation of the 26 Commissioners. Some personnel matters were still awaiting the approval of Ursula von der Leyen’s head of cabinet Björn Seibert. He wanted to deal with this at the weekend.
It is becoming apparent that German EU officials will fill a number of influential posts in the cabinets. There are likely to be at least four German cabinet heads, including Bernd Biervert (for Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič) and Andreas Schwarz (Research Commissioner Ekaterina Sachariewa) in addition to Seibert. Michael Hager continues to head the cabinet of Economic Affairs Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis; a change had been on the cards in the meantime.
There will also be several deputy heads of cabinet with a German passport. In the case of Vice-President Stéphane Séjourné, it will be the Franco-German Estelle Göger, in the case of Roxana Mînzatu probably the previous Head of Unit Max Uebe, and in the case of Justice Commissioner Michael McGrath Joachim Herrmann, who already served under his predecessor Didier Reynders. According to our information, Julia Lemke, a German EU official, will also be joining the cabinet of Teresa Ribera, the first Vice-President responsible for climate and competition. Valvanera Ulargui from Spain will be responsible for climate policy.
Costa also brings at least one German into his team: Albrecht Morgenstern, a long-standing civil servant in the Federal Chancellery, becomes deputy economic policy advisor and thus deputy to the Dane Jakob Wegener Friis.
I wish you a good start to the week!
Mr. Pisani-Ferry, the budget dispute in France is unsettling the markets. Do you think it can be resolved?
JPF: Absolutely. The question is: at what cost? The concessions Prime Minister Barnier has already made to Marine Le Pen amount to at least €3 billion. The real issue is the price of the National Rally’s abstention in the confidence vote. If the cost is too high, it might not be a better solution than the government’s outright fall, which could lead to Barnier’s reappointment with a different cabinet.
How concerned are you about potential market turmoil in the event of a no-confidence vote?
We’re living in precarious times. Bond yields are high…
They’ve reached levels comparable to Greek bonds at their peak.
Yes, but that doesn’t mean much. They’re still much lower than Italy’s. While a crisis isn’t imminent, we’re in an uncomfortable situation.
Could the market reaction serve as a disciplinary factor for political actors like Marine Le Pen?
Yes, but it cuts both ways. It also gives the National Rally more leverage to pressure the government. If Barnier wants to avoid his government’s collapse, he may have to make further concessions to Le Pen. However, the market might interpret too many compromises as a lack of consensus on fiscal consolidation in the country – that even the limited consolidation the government envisions isn’t supportable.
How do you interpret the National Rally and Marine Le Pen’s interests in these negotiations? Are they aiming for a compromise or more interested in bringing down the government?
Ultimately, they’re more interested in finding a compromise because they’re not yet prepared to govern or contest a presidential election. There’s also uncertainty surrounding Marine Le Pen’s eligibility. But they need to extract a price from Barnier to show their electorate they’re fighting for them.
The French budget might be the first real test for the EU’s new fiscal rules. What would you recommend to the European Commission?
They should strike a balance between being firm in enforcing the rules and allowing some adjustments. They’ve basically endorsed the initial draft budget presented by Barnier. There might be room for limited tax cuts or spending overruns, but these need to be constrained. Everyone’s credibility is on the line here.
What are your thoughts on the German debate about the debt brake?
Germany is grappling with its own fiscal rules, not the European ones. It’s sensible to seek flexibility within the rules to address priorities like defense spending or the green transition. We’re in an exceptional situation. I understand that Friedrich Merz has shown some openness to amending the rule. That would be welcome because the existing rule is too strict and has hindered Germany’s ability to meet its defense obligations or invest in the green transition. But any adjustment must preserve the rule’s disciplinary function.
In a new report, you argue that meeting the investment needed for the EU to reach its 2030 climate goals is a huge challenge. Do the EU’s fiscal rules allow enough space for governments to provide the necessary investment?
We’re soon going to face a double constraint: limited EU funds as the Recovery and Resilience Facility ends in 2026, and national fiscal rules that don’t provide sufficient room for green investments in several countries. If we don’t address this, we risk derailing the transition.
Why is that?
The transition is also costly for public budgets. Many households and SMEs face cash constraints and need public support to finance their investments in the transition. The risk is that without additional leeway for governments or the EU, we won’t be on track to meet our 2030 objectives. Delaying renovations or retrofitting private buildings is one thing, but derailing investments in renewables or delaying the uptake of electric vehicles would be very detrimental. It would mean wasted manufacturing capacities.
The uptake of EVs has slowed across Europe; the battery startup Northvolt has filed for insolvency protection, and steelmaker ThyssenKrupp is cutting thousands of jobs. Given these risks, how much public money should be invested in this transition?
It varies by country, but overall, we’re talking about 0.5% to 1% of GDP per year – a multiyear investment. There are always ways to substitute public spending with regulation, but that shifts the burden to the private sector. The question is whether the private sector can afford this investment. If not, a lack of fiscal space risks derailing the transition.
In Germany, some in the CDU and FDP argue that the market should dictate the transition’s progress, relying mainly on the ETS.
Again, the question is whether companies can absorb the carbon price. Some are very profitable and can, but for others, the cost is too high.
What should governments do to facilitate this transition?
Clarity of objectives and stability of targets are most important.
So, no backtracking on the ban of combustion engines by 2035?
I don’t think that would be wise. Some car manufacturers can afford to invest in both EVs and internal combustion engines. Whatever decision was made – it was made. Companies have started shifting investments from ICEs to EVs.
But they might need to revert because consumers aren’t buying EVs as expected.
Consumers aren’t buying because they’re too expensive. In France, purchasing an EV or retrofitting a home by replacing a gas boiler with a heat pump can represent a year’s income for a middle-class household. That’s significant, and many of these households are already in debt. They won’t buy. I think the risk of derailing the transition is increasing.
So you believe governments should subsidize households purchasing EVs or heat pumps?
Yes, for households that otherwise can’t afford them. But in France, the hard constraint is the national budget. In other countries, the constraint might be the European fiscal rules. These constraints should be relaxed to help the EV market take off.
If you were in Piotr Serafin’s shoes, the new Budget Commissioner, how would you design the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)?
Back in 2003, I participated in the Sapir Report, which criticized the EU budget for being a historical relic – it hasn’t changed much since. One lesson from the recovery plan is that much can be achieved by making transfers conditional on performance indicators at the national level.
That’s the idea Ursula von der Leyen is proposing.
I think it’s a good idea.
The summit meeting of the five Scandinavian and three Baltic states – known as NB-8 – was a first: For the first time in NB-8 history, a Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, was invited to the talks on security in the Baltic Sea region and long-term support for Ukraine, which took place on Wednesday in Harpsund, Sweden.
The Pole used the forum to propose joint patrols in the Baltic waters given Russian hybrid warfare. “There are signs that the Russians have at least been involved in serious sabotage activities in Poland,” said Tusk. “I think it will be better for all of us if we have full control over our territorial waters.” His suggestion fell on receptive ears after the damage to the fiber optic cables, presumably by the Chinese ship Yi Peng 3.
The invitation from the Nordic countries to the Polish Prime Minister is evidence of Poland’s growing importance on the international stage. 35 years after the fall of communism, the country of 37 million inhabitants is becoming one of the most important foreign policy players in Europe. While France and Germany are struggling with government crises and economic stagnation and lack strong international leadership, Poland is stepping into the gap and building new alliances in northern Europe. With their help, the country, which will take over the EU Council Presidency on Jan. 1, 2025, could push through its agenda more effectively.
The rapprochement with the north is also an expression of Poland’s disappointment with Germany. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s hesitant approach to military support for Ukraine, and the inability to significantly increase security spending and boost arms production are met with criticism and a lack of understanding.
Following Chancellor Scholz’s visit to Poland in the summer, relations have cooled further. Tusk had long hoped that Scholz would understand the “magnitude of the challenges” posed to Europe by Russian aggression, according to sources close to the Prime Minister. However, he met an accountant who talks about a turning point but does not do much.
Most recently, Tusk taunted Germany with regard to the defense budget: two percent of GDP for defense is reasonable for any country. Poland has doubled its spending on security to 4.2 percent of GDP since the Russian attack on Ukraine. Germany wants to just reach the two percent mark this year.
Poland maintains balanced partnerships with the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. In addition, all countries in the region agree on most political issues: They see Russia as an existential threat and want to strengthen their defense and security. They advocate a massive restriction of migration and – like Finland – are prepared to suspend the right of asylum on their eastern borders. They want to maintain strong transatlantic relations at all costs, but at the same time improve the competitiveness of European economies.
The drifting apart of the three Visegrad states Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, which have long been cornerstones of Polish regional policy, is also forcing Poland to take a north-northeast course. Ever since Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán turned out to be Vladimir Putin’s closest ally and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico stopped supporting Ukraine, the dialog has fallen silent.
Of course, domestic politics also play a role in the change – a president will be elected in Poland in May 2025. The candidate of the citizens’ coalition must win if Tusk wants to push through his reforms. Tusk, who has been labeled “Berlin’s agent” by the national populists, wants to offer little surface for attack.
Poland’s rise is appreciated in most EU countries. Not so in Germany, where until recently jokes were made about Polish car thieves, and the “Polish economy” was used as a synonym for chaos. “Poland feels underestimated in Germany,” says Janusz Reiter, Poland’s former ambassador to Germany.
Tusk wants to secure Poland an influence that does justice to the country, its economic potential, and its size. Since the Russian invasion, Poland has been a frontline state through which almost all military and humanitarian aid for Ukraine is routed. This geopolitical situation makes Warsaw an important, even indispensable partner in Europe. This has long been understood in Scandinavia and the Baltic states, but in Germany, it is repeatedly forgotten: Chancellor Scholz had invited the heads of government of the UK and France to US President Joe Biden’s farewell visit to Berlin – Tusk had to stay at home.
The new EU Council President António Costa has promised Ukraine rapid progress in the EU accession process. They will work together to open at least two areas of accession negotiations in the first half of next year, said the former Portuguese Prime Minister on the fringes of talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Kyiv. Together with chief diplomat Kaja Kallas and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Costa traveled to Ukraine at the beginning of his term of office.
Costa said that gradual integration was already beginning in various policy areas, such as roaming for low-cost cell phone use abroad. He also assured Ukraine of further EU financial aid and determined work on the 15th package of Russia sanctions. From next year onwards, €1.5 billion per month in support would be provided from the proceeds of Russia’s frozen assets in the EU, he said. In addition, further sanctions will increase the pressure on the Russian economy and weaken Russia’s ability to wage war.
The European Union officially opened accession negotiations with Ukraine, which is under attack from Russia, at the beginning of the summer. How long they will last and whether they can even be brought to a successful conclusion remains to be seen.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kallas believes it is conceivable that soldiers from member states could at some point secure a possible ceasefire in Ukraine. “I think we really shouldn’t rule anything out,” said the former Estonian Prime Minister in Kyiv. This would also be good for strategic reasons. According to Kallas, the soldiers for this could, for example, come from countries that have already expressed their openness to talks about sending troops in the past. These include France and the Baltic states, for example. dpa
The geopolitical tensions at the start of the new EU Commission cannot be overlooked: Russia’s imperialist war against Ukraine, China’s increasingly aggressive stance, and the uncertainties surrounding Donald Trump’s return to the White House are shaping the global agenda. In this field of tension, we must prevent Germany’s economic weakness from becoming a security policy Achilles’ heel for the whole of Europe and threatening our European way of life.
The focus should be on three priorities:
The economic success of Germany and Europe will depend on how resolutely we reduce bureaucratic hurdles. Almost 65% of reporting obligations originate in Brussels – particularly at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises. A binding reduction path for regulations is long overdue, instead of ill-conceived regulations such as the EU Supply Chain Directive, which reduces our competitiveness through an excessive bureaucratic burden.
This is just as little regulatory efficiency as planned regulation on climate protection. Instead of sector-specific regulations such as CO2 fleet limits, the Energy Efficiency Directive, and the Industrial Emissions Directive, we need a functioning European emissions trading system.
In order to reduce the dangerous dependencies on China, free trade agreements such as the one with the Mercosur states, but also with India and Indonesia, must finally become a reality. At the same time, we must not stifle third countries with regulations and should refrain from moralizing. In our cooperation with the new US government, we should strengthen the EU Commission’s backing for negotiations. Proactive offers need to be made quickly. In this way, we can also achieve our goals, for example sectoral agreements, such as on rare earths. This type of diversification from China is also in Trump’s interests.
Fiscal stability gives us the room for maneuver we need to react to shocks and defend our freedom and security. The reformed Stability and Growth Pact negotiated by Christian Lindner offers a blueprint for this, which must be consistently implemented by the new Commission.
The next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034 must focus our EU spending on investing in the future – in what protects and benefits us. Competitiveness, innovation, and security should take priority. Instead of relying on Eurobonds with veto players like Hungary at the table, we need to reallocate unused funds from existing EU pots and untangle the jungle of funding programs. Protection against the misuse of EU funds and compliance with the rule of law must remain conditions for the disbursement of EU funds.
The new Commission has already sent out important signals for the credibility of European defense capabilities, for example with the establishment of the European Peace Facility to support Ukraine or the appointment of a Defense Commissioner. We are also enabling further investment in security by expanding the financing options of the European Investment Bank. With an adapted EU taxonomy, it can serve as a lever for mobilizing private capital.
Our security also depends on gaining new partners. To achieve this, the new Commission must regain lost credibility in the accession process. This means honest offers and more frequent qualified majority decisions in order to initiate new phases of talks in the accession process. The merit-based approach to full membership must be maintained because EU membership does not come at a discount. However, the EU must also show geostrategically important partners such as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova what it has to offer in contrast to the imperial ambitions of Beijing and Moscow.
Ultimately, we must not stand in our own way, but the new EU Commission must strengthen Europe by making the lives of Europeans freer, simpler, and safer. In the new geopolitical situation, this can only be achieved through a resolute economic turnaround, effective use of EU funds, and investment in our security.
