The dispute over the crisis regulation in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) continues. After Germany, as expected, cleared the way for a compromise, Italy reacted with skepticism. Germany had changed the legal text, more time was needed for the examination, it was said after a meeting of EU interior ministers in Brussels.
Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi “requested time to examine the contents of this proposal in more detail, including from a legal point of view”, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said in Berlin. According to Italian media, Piantedosi left the Brussels meeting early and traveled back to Rome. A formal decision was therefore not reached.
The Spanish presidency and the EU Commission nevertheless expressed optimism. “There are no major obstacles left, the formal vote will follow in the next few days”, said Interior Commissioner Ylva Johansson. Spain’s Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska expressed a similar view, saying that they were very close to reaching an agreement soon. Only a few details remain to be clarified.
According to diplomats, part of the compromise is that a crisis situation is defined more precisely. Berlin also advocated more humane reception conditions for asylum seekers as well as an exemption for families during screening in reception camps. On the last point, however, German Minister for the Interior Nancy Faeser was unable to get her way. Applications for protection of minors and their family members are only to be given preferential consideration.
Nevertheless, Faeser spoke of an “excellently negotiated compromise”. “Although we would still need further changes, we are living up to our responsibility today”, the SPD politician said. She was thus following the line taken by Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) in Berlin on Wednesday. She said the government agreed “that we will not stand in the way of this”.
In the traffic light coalition, the Greens have long had reservations about the crisis mechanism. Minister for Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock warned against undermining the fundamental right to asylum. If it were to be interpreted too broadly, she said, there would also be a risk of Germany being further burdened by asylum seekers who could be turned away in other EU countries that had been hit harder by the crisis.
This danger now seems to have been averted. Faeser said it was important that a member state could not declare a crisis on its own. Rather, this must be decided by the Council with a qualified majority. According to information from government circles in Berlin, this was also stipulated. In Brussels, however, there was no confirmation of this. They said they did not want to jeopardize the political agreement.
A qualified majority is required for a resolution. The German “aye” is a necessary condition for this, but not a sufficient one. If Italy refuses, the days of wrangling are likely to continue. Austria also expressed skepticism. Interior Minister Gerhard Karner said that “in some areas we see that there could be even more attraction”. Hungary and Poland refuse to accept the entire asylum reform.
Just how shaky the compromise is can be seen from the way the Spanish presidency has proceeded. On the one hand, it sought an understanding with the German government. On the other hand, however, it avoided putting the crisis mechanism on the agenda of the Council of Ministers for decision. Instead, the formal decision was to be taken at a special meeting of the Permanent Representatives (Coreper).
This is an unusual procedure. Normally, EU decisions are prepared by Council working groups, then referred to Coreper and finally adopted by the Council. However, some member states refused to put the crisis regulation on the agenda at short notice.
In the end, there were also delays, so a decision is not expected for several days. After that, negotiations with the European Parliament are also to be continued. The MEPs had suspended the trilogue due to the disagreement of the EU states.
The decision-making process was simpler when it came to another controversial issue: the protection status for refugees from Ukraine. The interior ministers agreed to extend protection by one year until March 2025. Previously, temporary protection was to last until early March 2024. However, some states had pushed for a quick extension, with Poland even calling for further guarantees beyond 2025.
However, this would require a change in the EU rules, which currently limit the protected status to a maximum of three years. Faeser called the decision now taken “a good signal”. Grande-Marlaska said: “The extension of the protection status means certainty for the more than four million refugees who have found a safe haven in the EU.” Germany has taken in just over one million Ukrainian refugees.
The recent case of Volkswagen clearly shows how dependent companies are on a functioning IT infrastructure. But it would be far more problematic if communications were disrupted on a much larger scale. That is why the German Federal Ministry of the Interior plans to significantly tighten the regulations for mobile networks, with the support of the German Foreign Office. Only the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport has reservations – debates are in full swing behind the scenes. Nothing less than the implementation of the de-risking approach is at stake – and telecommunications companies are just the start of the debate.
Authorities must already be notified when critical components are used for the first time in the so-called core network – the Federal Ministry of the Interior then has three months to prohibit their use. This regulation of the BSI law was introduced in 2021 and was supposed to provisionally end the debate about Huawei and ZTE, China’s two major component manufacturers.
The US, in particular, warned against using their components, and the EU responded with its so-called 5G toolbox, which member states are encouraged to utilize in order to make their networks more secure: EU countries are supposed to act in unison as far as possible – but internal and external security is not a jointly coordinated area.
German regulations show massive gaps in this respect: They have not worked in practice so far – something that even the Federal Ministry of the Interior indirectly concedes. Since spring this year, it has repeatedly asked Germany’s three largest mobile operators, Telekom, Vodafone and Telefonica, for comment.
So far, the BMI has not actually banned a single component. However, it is not satisfied with either the current regulations or the current degree of dependence on Chinese suppliers. This is why the focus is now being broadened: “The procedural object of these ex-post reviews – in contrast to the ex-ante reviews that have already taken place – are all critical components already in use in the operators’ respective public 5G mobile networks,” a spokeswoman said. It is now being used to assess the situation, followed by new regulations.
There is a lot at stake here: Fear of China on the one side and high costs on the other. Vodafone does not use Huawei hardware in its German core network. Telefonica has also already decided in 2020 to use components made by the Swedish provider Ericsson in its core network. Deutsche Telekom relies on Ericsson and also on the US software provider Avenir.
But BMI apparently also wants to tighten controls in the antenna network RAN. And here, Huawei still plays a significant role. All three providers use Huawei technology – in addition to other manufacturers. “The antenna network has never shown any irregularities from individual manufacturers,” Vodafone said in response to a Table.Media inquiry.
Telefonica and Telekom also emphasize that they have always complied with all the requirements and relied on multi-vendor strategies to avoid one-sided dependencies. They are backed by the German Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs, which points to the high security standards already in place.
Network operators warn of the consequences of a ban considered in government circles for 2026. Deutsche Telekom, for example, believes this is completely unrealistic: “In view of approval procedures, available capacities at alternative suppliers, available capacities at construction companies, and the continued expansion of mobile communications desired by customers and politicians, a target date of 2026 for the RAN replacement is unrealistic.”
And Telefonica warns: “Should there be an exclusion of components, a sufficiently long period must be granted for their replacement. This is essential to maintain network quality and performance.” How many antennas and related components would actually have to be replaced if Chinese providers were banned from the network under government control remains unclear. According to industry estimates, there are about 25,000 sites, usually with three antennas and associated technology.
That is why Telefonica plans to “examine claims for damages against the Federal Republic of Germany in case of a retroactively required conversion of the network.” In addition, it would also have these prohibitions reviewed by the courts, if deemed adequate. According to Norbert Roettgen, foreign policy politician for the German Christian Democratic Union, the providers have only themselves to blame, saying that it has been clear for years what was coming: “These warnings have been ignored.”
In that case, the providers would be left to bear the costs. He also sees government aid in the restructuring process critically: “I see no reason why the taxpayer should now have to pay for the greed of certain companies that, in full awareness, have opted for low prices instead of security.”
The impact of a Huawei ban can currently be observed in Portugal. By making amendments to technical security regulations, the Portuguese government has imposed a de facto ban from the perspective of the Chinese provider – in response, Huawei filed a lawsuit in Lisbon on August 31 against the security committee of the supervisory authority. Meanwhile, companies from the People’s Republic hold stakes in important Portuguese companies – as the fourth-largest foreign investor.
Portuguese newspapers reported that China threatened retaliatory measures. The effect is different in the United Kingdom: Where Chinese providers are forced out of networks, the 5G network rollout progresses relatively slowly. The required replacement of Huawei products is not easy to obtain and expensive.
This is also something that German providers warn of. If RAN elements had to be replaced across the board, it would also impair rollout capacities elsewhere. In this case, entire mast networks would have to be temporarily disconnected from the grid. “It is not clear to us why German mobile communications customers, who benefit from one of the best 5G networks in Europe, should be forced to accept significant quality drops by the BMI,” Telekom says.
And Vodafone stresses that “a way must be found that optimally protects Germany’s digital infrastructure, but does not come at the expense of millions of smartphone users.” The Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport emphasizes that a balanced solution must be found: “Nationwide coverage with stable, fast and affordable mobile Internet remains ensured, that network operators retain control of their networks and that no dependencies arise” must be considered.
One next step could be: The antennas remain untouched for the time being – but the underlying technology of the antenna network would have to be replaced by 2026. This would not be in the interests of the German providers either, but it could be a simpler compromise and at least somewhat more cost-effective.
Other sectors are also closely following the debate about Chinese providers in telecommunications companies. For example, Germany’s national railroad company Deutsche Bahn, part of the critical infrastructure, plans to build its 5G network, including Huawei technology. Among other things, the network is intended to replace the GSM-R railroad radio system.
Deutsche Bahn puts such projects out to tender – and as a publicly owned company, it is obliged to take the lowest bid. “The fact that Deutsche Bahn, as a 100-percent property of the federal government and under the supervision of members of the federal government, wants to build its IP network with Chinese components is scandalous in my view,” Roettgen criticizes. “No lessons have been learned here from the 5G debate.”
Although Deutsche Bahn is subject to critical infrastructure regulations, it is exempt from the special rules for telecommunications networks, which are intended to eliminate Chinese providers from the network. This applies at the European level, as a Commission spokeswoman confirmed in response to a question from Table.Media: While campus networks could be highly relevant, “such networks are not subject to the EU telecommunications framework.” And in Germany, too, there is no effective legal framework yet. That’s because, in its “current version, it applies exclusively to public 5G mobile networks,” according to the BMI. And so-called campus networks, such as those used by Deutsche Bahn, are not considered public.
However, the Federal Ministry of the Interior intends to make many more changes with the KRITIS Umbrella Act: Critical components could be more strictly regulated in all systems in the future – from special screws, chips, and campus networks to entire plants.
A spokesperson for the German Association of Local Public Utilities (VKU) says: “The VKU does currently not have any data that would indicate any major dependence of local public utilities on Chinese manufacturers or suppliers.” However, they are not entirely sure: “Dependencies in certain areas cannot be ruled out, for example, in fiber optics due to the relatively small number of suppliers of active components.” Not even operators are often aware of how much China has invested in critical infrastructure in Germany.
So, the actual debate about practical de-risking has only just begun. Norbert Roettgen believes it is high time for this to happen. He warns: “In the event of conflict, China will use every opportunity to exert influence on the German government for its own interests.”
Ms. Paulus, do you think an agreement can be reached before the end of this term?
At the opening trilogue, both the Council and the Parliament expressed their intention to have a result if possible before the climate conference (COP 28) in December. After all, we as the European Union helped to launch the Global Methane Pledge in Glasgow. It would then be good, of course, if two years later we actually had at least some legislation in place. Even if, admittedly, it addresses the smaller part of the emissions. But I also said in the trilogue that quality goes before speed. Because it doesn’t help anyone if we introduce a weak law.
How confident are you in finding a compromise before COP 28?
My goal is to find a middle ground that on the one hand addresses the concerns of some countries, but on the other hand results in an effective reduction of methane emissions. It would be of very great importance to get an agreement before COP 28. First, the EU is the world’s largest market for gas. If this economic area sets targets, then of course it will have an impact on the whole world – if we manage to include imports in the law. We would be the first economic area to actually put these standards into law.
On which points do the positions of the European Parliament and the Council diverge most?
I see three major points: ambition level, general reduction target, and methane import into the EU.
What about the ambition level?
There, Parliament is much more ambitious in terms of finding and repairing leaks, that is, in terms of the frequencies with which leaks have to be found and repaired. We have short deadlines in Parliament’s position, while the Council sometimes has long deadlines. We will have to find a middle ground there.
And with the reduction target?
On the one hand, Parliament wants a general reduction target for methane across all sectors. The Council does not want that at all, and the Commission has also said that it lacks data. I think it would be strange not to set a target when we have formulated a reduction target of 30 percent in the Global Pledge. Then other countries could also say that we don’t have any data yet and therefore aren’t doing anything.
How are the discussions going when it comes to imports?
The Parliament wants to extend the targets to our imports, because 80 percent of methane emissions in the energy sector take place outside European borders. Here, the Council brings the issue of security of supply onto the agenda. I would remind you of the International Energy Agency, which says that 80 percent of emissions can be avoided because gas that does not escape can also be sold.
And we see that countries like Norway and Nigeria already have legislation in place. The United States will impose a tax on methane emissions starting in 2025. That’s in the Inflation Reduction Act. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is also working on standards right now.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra for the post of Climate Commissioner. The S&D Group has announced a “tough questioning” in the Environment Committee. How do you see the situation?
I am very excited about the hearing on Monday. There is a lot of criticism of Wopke Hoekstra because he comes from Shell. I can understand that. On the other hand, I think that’s what we thought back then when Miguel Arias Cañete became Commissioner. He also came from the oil industry, but he did a good job, we all agree on that. When the Paris Agreement was negotiated, Cañete was one of those who brought it forward. That’s why I don’t want to prejudge and I want to listen to what he has to say. The question is whether he can credibly represent the climate issue, whether he has expertise in this area, or whether he is prepared to acquire it.
The event was organized by the Greens in the European Parliament together with the European Green Party and in cooperation with the Sumar Alliance of the Spanish Minister of Labor Yolanda Díaz. About 300 guests from politics, science and civil society are expected. The content will be about social Europe and a political offensive against the right.
“You can’t separate climate issues from social issues”, said Terry Reintke, co-chair of the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament, speaking to Table.Media ahead of the event. As an example, she cited the “overheated” classrooms this summer, especially in Spain. Or the construction workers who also had to deal with record temperatures.
But why are the Greens always associated with environmental issues and not with social issues? Terry Reintke believes that this has to do primarily with political communication. Political opponents of the Greens are quick to point them to environmental issues, he says. “We’ve always included social issues in our policies.” This weekend’s summit is meant to reinforce that, in a heated political situation where the right is “moving closer to the extreme right” less months before the European elections.
Yolanda Díaz, German Minister Lisa Paus and the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, Petra De Sutter, will talk at the meeting about how they want to combine climate and social policy in their countries. Representatives of the trade unions and civil society will also have their say. One of the central topics is likely to be the European minimum wage. In view of the financial burden of inflation, the minimum wage should enable workers to earn an adequate income and improve the quality of their work, says Reintke.
Currently, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Austria and Sweden are the last five EU countries where incomes are determined solely by collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. There is therefore no minimum wage applicable to all employees in these countries.
Now, since November 2022, an EU directive has set rules that form the framework for the minimum wage, but without obliging the states to introduce this system. The aim is to promote the upward harmonization of minimum wages in Europe. However, their level will continue to be determined by the member states.
Linking climate and social issues has become a highly sensitive political exercise. Just on Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his plans for “ecological planning.” In doing so, he conspicuously emphasized the social aspects – the Yellow Vests movement is still fresh in his memory.
For a long time, the link between climate and social issues was by no means self-evident. In this context, it should be recalled that the “Just Transition”, the socially acceptable transition in favor of employees, does not appear in the operative part of the Paris Agreement. It was merely – and with difficulty – relegated to the preamble.
More than seven years after the agreement was adopted, the Just Transition has been insufficiently addressed in everyday work. In times of inflation and the ever-increasing impact of global warming, the challenge now is to show that transition is not possible without sustainable, high-quality jobs.
The dispute over the crisis regulation in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) continues. After Germany, as expected, cleared the way for a compromise, Italy reacted with skepticism. Germany had changed the legal text, more time was needed for the examination, it was said after a meeting of EU interior ministers in Brussels.
Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi “requested time to examine the contents of this proposal in more detail, including from a legal point of view”, Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani said in Berlin. According to Italian media, Piantedosi left the Brussels meeting early and traveled back to Rome. A formal decision was therefore not reached.
The Spanish presidency and the EU Commission nevertheless expressed optimism. “There are no major obstacles left, the formal vote will follow in the next few days”, said Interior Commissioner Ylva Johansson. Spain’s Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska expressed a similar view, saying that they were very close to reaching an agreement soon. Only a few details remain to be clarified.
According to diplomats, part of the compromise is that a crisis situation is defined more precisely. Berlin also advocated more humane reception conditions for asylum seekers as well as an exemption for families during screening in reception camps. On the last point, however, German Minister for the Interior Nancy Faeser was unable to get her way. Applications for protection of minors and their family members are only to be given preferential consideration.
Nevertheless, Faeser spoke of an “excellently negotiated compromise”. “Although we would still need further changes, we are living up to our responsibility today”, the SPD politician said. She was thus following the line taken by Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) in Berlin on Wednesday. She said the government agreed “that we will not stand in the way of this”.
In the traffic light coalition, the Greens have long had reservations about the crisis mechanism. Minister for Foreign Affairs Annalena Baerbock warned against undermining the fundamental right to asylum. If it were to be interpreted too broadly, she said, there would also be a risk of Germany being further burdened by asylum seekers who could be turned away in other EU countries that had been hit harder by the crisis.
This danger now seems to have been averted. Faeser said it was important that a member state could not declare a crisis on its own. Rather, this must be decided by the Council with a qualified majority. According to information from government circles in Berlin, this was also stipulated. In Brussels, however, there was no confirmation of this. They said they did not want to jeopardize the political agreement.
A qualified majority is required for a resolution. The German “aye” is a necessary condition for this, but not a sufficient one. If Italy refuses, the days of wrangling are likely to continue. Austria also expressed skepticism. Interior Minister Gerhard Karner said that “in some areas we see that there could be even more attraction”. Hungary and Poland refuse to accept the entire asylum reform.
Just how shaky the compromise is can be seen from the way the Spanish presidency has proceeded. On the one hand, it sought an understanding with the German government. On the other hand, however, it avoided putting the crisis mechanism on the agenda of the Council of Ministers for decision. Instead, the formal decision was to be taken at a special meeting of the Permanent Representatives (Coreper).
This is an unusual procedure. Normally, EU decisions are prepared by Council working groups, then referred to Coreper and finally adopted by the Council. However, some member states refused to put the crisis regulation on the agenda at short notice.
In the end, there were also delays, so a decision is not expected for several days. After that, negotiations with the European Parliament are also to be continued. The MEPs had suspended the trilogue due to the disagreement of the EU states.
The decision-making process was simpler when it came to another controversial issue: the protection status for refugees from Ukraine. The interior ministers agreed to extend protection by one year until March 2025. Previously, temporary protection was to last until early March 2024. However, some states had pushed for a quick extension, with Poland even calling for further guarantees beyond 2025.
However, this would require a change in the EU rules, which currently limit the protected status to a maximum of three years. Faeser called the decision now taken “a good signal”. Grande-Marlaska said: “The extension of the protection status means certainty for the more than four million refugees who have found a safe haven in the EU.” Germany has taken in just over one million Ukrainian refugees.
The recent case of Volkswagen clearly shows how dependent companies are on a functioning IT infrastructure. But it would be far more problematic if communications were disrupted on a much larger scale. That is why the German Federal Ministry of the Interior plans to significantly tighten the regulations for mobile networks, with the support of the German Foreign Office. Only the Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport has reservations – debates are in full swing behind the scenes. Nothing less than the implementation of the de-risking approach is at stake – and telecommunications companies are just the start of the debate.
Authorities must already be notified when critical components are used for the first time in the so-called core network – the Federal Ministry of the Interior then has three months to prohibit their use. This regulation of the BSI law was introduced in 2021 and was supposed to provisionally end the debate about Huawei and ZTE, China’s two major component manufacturers.
The US, in particular, warned against using their components, and the EU responded with its so-called 5G toolbox, which member states are encouraged to utilize in order to make their networks more secure: EU countries are supposed to act in unison as far as possible – but internal and external security is not a jointly coordinated area.
German regulations show massive gaps in this respect: They have not worked in practice so far – something that even the Federal Ministry of the Interior indirectly concedes. Since spring this year, it has repeatedly asked Germany’s three largest mobile operators, Telekom, Vodafone and Telefonica, for comment.
So far, the BMI has not actually banned a single component. However, it is not satisfied with either the current regulations or the current degree of dependence on Chinese suppliers. This is why the focus is now being broadened: “The procedural object of these ex-post reviews – in contrast to the ex-ante reviews that have already taken place – are all critical components already in use in the operators’ respective public 5G mobile networks,” a spokeswoman said. It is now being used to assess the situation, followed by new regulations.
There is a lot at stake here: Fear of China on the one side and high costs on the other. Vodafone does not use Huawei hardware in its German core network. Telefonica has also already decided in 2020 to use components made by the Swedish provider Ericsson in its core network. Deutsche Telekom relies on Ericsson and also on the US software provider Avenir.
But BMI apparently also wants to tighten controls in the antenna network RAN. And here, Huawei still plays a significant role. All three providers use Huawei technology – in addition to other manufacturers. “The antenna network has never shown any irregularities from individual manufacturers,” Vodafone said in response to a Table.Media inquiry.
Telefonica and Telekom also emphasize that they have always complied with all the requirements and relied on multi-vendor strategies to avoid one-sided dependencies. They are backed by the German Federal Ministry of Digital Affairs, which points to the high security standards already in place.
Network operators warn of the consequences of a ban considered in government circles for 2026. Deutsche Telekom, for example, believes this is completely unrealistic: “In view of approval procedures, available capacities at alternative suppliers, available capacities at construction companies, and the continued expansion of mobile communications desired by customers and politicians, a target date of 2026 for the RAN replacement is unrealistic.”
And Telefonica warns: “Should there be an exclusion of components, a sufficiently long period must be granted for their replacement. This is essential to maintain network quality and performance.” How many antennas and related components would actually have to be replaced if Chinese providers were banned from the network under government control remains unclear. According to industry estimates, there are about 25,000 sites, usually with three antennas and associated technology.
That is why Telefonica plans to “examine claims for damages against the Federal Republic of Germany in case of a retroactively required conversion of the network.” In addition, it would also have these prohibitions reviewed by the courts, if deemed adequate. According to Norbert Roettgen, foreign policy politician for the German Christian Democratic Union, the providers have only themselves to blame, saying that it has been clear for years what was coming: “These warnings have been ignored.”
In that case, the providers would be left to bear the costs. He also sees government aid in the restructuring process critically: “I see no reason why the taxpayer should now have to pay for the greed of certain companies that, in full awareness, have opted for low prices instead of security.”
The impact of a Huawei ban can currently be observed in Portugal. By making amendments to technical security regulations, the Portuguese government has imposed a de facto ban from the perspective of the Chinese provider – in response, Huawei filed a lawsuit in Lisbon on August 31 against the security committee of the supervisory authority. Meanwhile, companies from the People’s Republic hold stakes in important Portuguese companies – as the fourth-largest foreign investor.
Portuguese newspapers reported that China threatened retaliatory measures. The effect is different in the United Kingdom: Where Chinese providers are forced out of networks, the 5G network rollout progresses relatively slowly. The required replacement of Huawei products is not easy to obtain and expensive.
This is also something that German providers warn of. If RAN elements had to be replaced across the board, it would also impair rollout capacities elsewhere. In this case, entire mast networks would have to be temporarily disconnected from the grid. “It is not clear to us why German mobile communications customers, who benefit from one of the best 5G networks in Europe, should be forced to accept significant quality drops by the BMI,” Telekom says.
And Vodafone stresses that “a way must be found that optimally protects Germany’s digital infrastructure, but does not come at the expense of millions of smartphone users.” The Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport emphasizes that a balanced solution must be found: “Nationwide coverage with stable, fast and affordable mobile Internet remains ensured, that network operators retain control of their networks and that no dependencies arise” must be considered.
One next step could be: The antennas remain untouched for the time being – but the underlying technology of the antenna network would have to be replaced by 2026. This would not be in the interests of the German providers either, but it could be a simpler compromise and at least somewhat more cost-effective.
Other sectors are also closely following the debate about Chinese providers in telecommunications companies. For example, Germany’s national railroad company Deutsche Bahn, part of the critical infrastructure, plans to build its 5G network, including Huawei technology. Among other things, the network is intended to replace the GSM-R railroad radio system.
Deutsche Bahn puts such projects out to tender – and as a publicly owned company, it is obliged to take the lowest bid. “The fact that Deutsche Bahn, as a 100-percent property of the federal government and under the supervision of members of the federal government, wants to build its IP network with Chinese components is scandalous in my view,” Roettgen criticizes. “No lessons have been learned here from the 5G debate.”
Although Deutsche Bahn is subject to critical infrastructure regulations, it is exempt from the special rules for telecommunications networks, which are intended to eliminate Chinese providers from the network. This applies at the European level, as a Commission spokeswoman confirmed in response to a question from Table.Media: While campus networks could be highly relevant, “such networks are not subject to the EU telecommunications framework.” And in Germany, too, there is no effective legal framework yet. That’s because, in its “current version, it applies exclusively to public 5G mobile networks,” according to the BMI. And so-called campus networks, such as those used by Deutsche Bahn, are not considered public.
However, the Federal Ministry of the Interior intends to make many more changes with the KRITIS Umbrella Act: Critical components could be more strictly regulated in all systems in the future – from special screws, chips, and campus networks to entire plants.
A spokesperson for the German Association of Local Public Utilities (VKU) says: “The VKU does currently not have any data that would indicate any major dependence of local public utilities on Chinese manufacturers or suppliers.” However, they are not entirely sure: “Dependencies in certain areas cannot be ruled out, for example, in fiber optics due to the relatively small number of suppliers of active components.” Not even operators are often aware of how much China has invested in critical infrastructure in Germany.
So, the actual debate about practical de-risking has only just begun. Norbert Roettgen believes it is high time for this to happen. He warns: “In the event of conflict, China will use every opportunity to exert influence on the German government for its own interests.”
Ms. Paulus, do you think an agreement can be reached before the end of this term?
At the opening trilogue, both the Council and the Parliament expressed their intention to have a result if possible before the climate conference (COP 28) in December. After all, we as the European Union helped to launch the Global Methane Pledge in Glasgow. It would then be good, of course, if two years later we actually had at least some legislation in place. Even if, admittedly, it addresses the smaller part of the emissions. But I also said in the trilogue that quality goes before speed. Because it doesn’t help anyone if we introduce a weak law.
How confident are you in finding a compromise before COP 28?
My goal is to find a middle ground that on the one hand addresses the concerns of some countries, but on the other hand results in an effective reduction of methane emissions. It would be of very great importance to get an agreement before COP 28. First, the EU is the world’s largest market for gas. If this economic area sets targets, then of course it will have an impact on the whole world – if we manage to include imports in the law. We would be the first economic area to actually put these standards into law.
On which points do the positions of the European Parliament and the Council diverge most?
I see three major points: ambition level, general reduction target, and methane import into the EU.
What about the ambition level?
There, Parliament is much more ambitious in terms of finding and repairing leaks, that is, in terms of the frequencies with which leaks have to be found and repaired. We have short deadlines in Parliament’s position, while the Council sometimes has long deadlines. We will have to find a middle ground there.
And with the reduction target?
On the one hand, Parliament wants a general reduction target for methane across all sectors. The Council does not want that at all, and the Commission has also said that it lacks data. I think it would be strange not to set a target when we have formulated a reduction target of 30 percent in the Global Pledge. Then other countries could also say that we don’t have any data yet and therefore aren’t doing anything.
How are the discussions going when it comes to imports?
The Parliament wants to extend the targets to our imports, because 80 percent of methane emissions in the energy sector take place outside European borders. Here, the Council brings the issue of security of supply onto the agenda. I would remind you of the International Energy Agency, which says that 80 percent of emissions can be avoided because gas that does not escape can also be sold.
And we see that countries like Norway and Nigeria already have legislation in place. The United States will impose a tax on methane emissions starting in 2025. That’s in the Inflation Reduction Act. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is also working on standards right now.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed Dutch Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra for the post of Climate Commissioner. The S&D Group has announced a “tough questioning” in the Environment Committee. How do you see the situation?
I am very excited about the hearing on Monday. There is a lot of criticism of Wopke Hoekstra because he comes from Shell. I can understand that. On the other hand, I think that’s what we thought back then when Miguel Arias Cañete became Commissioner. He also came from the oil industry, but he did a good job, we all agree on that. When the Paris Agreement was negotiated, Cañete was one of those who brought it forward. That’s why I don’t want to prejudge and I want to listen to what he has to say. The question is whether he can credibly represent the climate issue, whether he has expertise in this area, or whether he is prepared to acquire it.
The event was organized by the Greens in the European Parliament together with the European Green Party and in cooperation with the Sumar Alliance of the Spanish Minister of Labor Yolanda Díaz. About 300 guests from politics, science and civil society are expected. The content will be about social Europe and a political offensive against the right.
“You can’t separate climate issues from social issues”, said Terry Reintke, co-chair of the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament, speaking to Table.Media ahead of the event. As an example, she cited the “overheated” classrooms this summer, especially in Spain. Or the construction workers who also had to deal with record temperatures.
But why are the Greens always associated with environmental issues and not with social issues? Terry Reintke believes that this has to do primarily with political communication. Political opponents of the Greens are quick to point them to environmental issues, he says. “We’ve always included social issues in our policies.” This weekend’s summit is meant to reinforce that, in a heated political situation where the right is “moving closer to the extreme right” less months before the European elections.
Yolanda Díaz, German Minister Lisa Paus and the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, Petra De Sutter, will talk at the meeting about how they want to combine climate and social policy in their countries. Representatives of the trade unions and civil society will also have their say. One of the central topics is likely to be the European minimum wage. In view of the financial burden of inflation, the minimum wage should enable workers to earn an adequate income and improve the quality of their work, says Reintke.
Currently, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Austria and Sweden are the last five EU countries where incomes are determined solely by collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. There is therefore no minimum wage applicable to all employees in these countries.
Now, since November 2022, an EU directive has set rules that form the framework for the minimum wage, but without obliging the states to introduce this system. The aim is to promote the upward harmonization of minimum wages in Europe. However, their level will continue to be determined by the member states.
Linking climate and social issues has become a highly sensitive political exercise. Just on Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron presented his plans for “ecological planning.” In doing so, he conspicuously emphasized the social aspects – the Yellow Vests movement is still fresh in his memory.
For a long time, the link between climate and social issues was by no means self-evident. In this context, it should be recalled that the “Just Transition”, the socially acceptable transition in favor of employees, does not appear in the operative part of the Paris Agreement. It was merely – and with difficulty – relegated to the preamble.
More than seven years after the agreement was adopted, the Just Transition has been insufficiently addressed in everyday work. In times of inflation and the ever-increasing impact of global warming, the challenge now is to show that transition is not possible without sustainable, high-quality jobs.
