Rarely has the interest in an election in Spain been as great outside the country as it is this time. It is not yet possible to predict what consequences it will have in the country. However, the consequences for European policy can be outlined in three points:
My colleague Isabel Cuesta Camacho analyzes whether and how the stalemate in the Spanish Parliament could be resolved in her Feature of the day after.
I hope you have a wonderful day!
Spain is facing a difficult time forming a government. Both the right-wing and left-wing parties will find it difficult to form the alliances needed for a parliamentary majority of 176 seats. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the People’s Party (PP) and winner of the elections, has worse prospects of becoming prime minister than his rival Pedro Sánchez (PSOE).
The Socialist could secure office again if he gives in to the demands of separatist parties. Junts per Catalunya, the party of MEP Carles Puigdemont, who has been on the run from Spanish justice for five years, could be the key to Sánchez’s re-election. A coalition between the major parties, PP and PSOE, on the other hand, seems out of the question.
At a meeting of his party’s executive committee on Monday, Sánchez said yesterday that he does not expect a blockade or a repeat of the elections. He apparently believes that he has a good chance of forming a governing alliance.
Together with the left-wing alliance Sumar (31 seats), the PSOE (122 seats) has 153 seats. If the previous coalition partners add the seats of their nationalist allies from the current legislative period, they would have 167 deputies. These include seven deputies from the Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC), six from the Basque EH Bildu and one from the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). They would need the five deputies from the PNV (Plan Nacional Vasco) to defeat a possible center-right bloc consisting of 171 deputies from the PP (136), Vox (33), UPN (1) and Coalición Canaria (1).
To achieve an absolute majority of 176 seats, Sánchez would therefore need the seven deputies from Puigdemont’s Junts party. On Monday, the relevant public prosecutor’s office asked the Supreme Court judge to again order the arrest of Puigdemont and former Catalan minister Antoni Comín. Previously, the European Court of Justice had lifted their immunity.
Junts top candidate Miriam Nogueras made it clear, however, that she would impose conditions: “We will not make Pedro Sánchez president if we get nothing in return“, she said. “Our priority is Catalonia, not the governability of the Spanish state.” For his part, Gabriel Rufián, president of the ERC, urged Basque and Catalan separatists to demand a “high” price for another Sánchez term. “Separatism can be the decisive factor”, he said.
The PP made strong gains in these elections, from 89 deputies in 2019 to 136 now, but party leader Feijóo fell short of the 145-150 seat result predicted in polls. Fear of Vox’s participation in government apparently helped PSOE and Sumar mobilize their supporters.
In 2019, the three right-wing parties PP, Vox and Ciudadanos still had a combined total of 151 seats. Ciudadanos did not even run on Sunday after its devastating defeat in the regional elections in May, and Vox also lost significant ground compared to 2019.
Since Feijóo became president of the PP in April 2022, he has succeeded in giving the party a significant boost. But he is having a hard time finding alliance partners. “Since this morning I have been in contact with various political forces to form a stable government”, he said after talks with UPN, Coalición Canaria, PNV and Vox.
Until there is a new government, Sánchez will remain acting head of government and thus also responsible for the EU Council presidency. The final vote count will be conducted from now until July 31 by the provincial electoral boards, where votes from abroad will also be counted. The new Parliament and Senate will be constituted on Aug. 17.
In the days following the start of the new legislative period, King Felipe VI will invite the leaders of the parliamentary groups to consultations at the Zarzuela Palace and ask them who they think has the most support for forming a government. Until now, the leader of the largest party has always been tasked with forming a government, though this time it could be different because of the lack of majority options for Feijóo. If a candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round of voting, he is sworn in as prime minister. In a second ballot, 48 hours later, a simple majority of yes votes will suffice.
Already battered by the war, the collapsed grain deal is hitting export-dependent Ukrainian agriculture to the core. “Our industry is slowly running out of money”, says Alex Lissitsa, head of the IMC agribusiness group, who now expects falling prices for Ukrainian grain and rising logistics costs. “The proceeds from the sale of winter wheat do not even cover production costs.” Russia, on the other hand – also a global grain exporter – finds itself in the comfortable position of being able to export wheat on the world market at higher prices.
The United Nations as well as China criticized Putin for suspending the agreement. They fear famine, especially in Africa. The leadership in Beijing explicitly called on Putin to allow exports of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea again. Putin justifies the halt of the agreement by saying that only a small part of the harvest exports would benefit poor countries in the rest of the world anyway. Russia has no interest in allowing Ukrainian grain to enter the world market, says Tobias Heidland, director of international development at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, in an interview with Africa.Table. This is a deal Putin wants to make himself, he says, and he wants to profit diplomatically from the food and fertilizer crisis.
After the end of the grain agreement, both countries declared that ships calling at each other’s ports were potential carriers of military cargo. Currently, it looks as if Putin is also harming himself. Significantly fewer ships are calling at Russian ports. Nevertheless, Putin says Russia is ready to replace Ukrainian grain supplies in view of a bumper harvest. Should Ukraine’s and Russia’s wheat exports be affected over a longer period of time, this would lead to a massive supply deficit on the world market, analyzes stockbroker Kaack Terminhandel.
Currently, wheat, rapeseed and barley are being threshed in Ukraine. “No one knows if we will even be able to sell our harvest this year”, says Lissitsa. Ukrainian agriculture provides up to 70 percent of the country’s export revenue, she adds. “The Russians are targeting our economy with this.”
The entrepreneur doubts whether goods will still be transported via the Black Sea port of Odessa this season. Due to the Russian bombardment, it is too risky for shipping companies to send their ships there. Wheat and corn worth about €10 million were stored on the Black Sea with no prospect of being sold. “We urgently need the money to sow winter wheat in September”, Lissitsa said. In addition, storage capacity is needed from October for harvesting corn, soybeans and sunflower seeds.
Now the EU wants to increase capacity on alternative routes. These include transports via rivers, with freight trains or trucks. Since the so-called Solidarity Lanes started in May 2022, 41 million tons of grain, oils and other agricultural products have been exported from Ukraine via the alternative routes. In the case of grain, this accounts for 60 percent, and 40 percent of all exported grain, in turn, was shipped thanks to the Black Sea initiative. This is shown by new data from the EU Commission.
Regarding the transport route via the Danube to the Romanian port of Constanza, agribusinesswoman Lissitsa is not very optimistic: “Colleagues who own grain terminals on the Danube expect low water in the coming summer months.”
Complications also remain at the western border with Poland and Hungary. Until Sept. 15, the EU is only allowing the transit of four agricultural products (wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower seeds) through five Eastern European EU member states. In addition to Poland and Hungary, this also affects Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. So far, these states have stuck to an import ban. Poland’s head of government Mateusz Morawiecki said that the aim is to continue to prevent destabilization of the market.
However, the Solidarity Lanes are not only important for exports, they are the only routes for importing aid. The EU is developing better connections between Poland and Ukraine and between Romania and the Republic of Moldova; in addition to roads, rail connections are also involved. According to the EU Commission, a total of over €1 billion has been invested in the solidarity transport program.
However, the infrastructure programs cannot be implemented quickly. In addition, there are other difficulties, such as the lack of grain wagons in Europe. Rivers also cannot be dredged quickly to allow the use of larger transport ships, and the number of trucks, truck drivers and road capacity is also limited. So Russia is blocking Ukraine’s most effective export opportunity and cutting Ukraine off from about $8 billion to $9 billion in revenue, while Russian exporters can get higher prices and Russia can generate higher revenue as a result.
Due to a lack of liquidity and export opportunities, it is possible that even less winter wheat will be sown in Ukraine this year and correspondingly even less grain will be harvested the following year. In 2022, according to the Ministry of Agriculture in Kyiv, the grain harvest has collapsed from 86 million to 50 million tons, reports the German Agricultural Trade Association (DAH). Similar volumes are expected this year, it says.
Ukrainian farmers are switching to sunflowers and soybeans. Although this reduces yields, it also requires half the storage and transport capacity, says DAH Managing Director Martin Courbier. “As a short-term measure, the total permissible truck weight for cross-border transports should be raised”, he demands.
Whether the grain agreement can be reactivated or renegotiated – opinions differ. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said even before the official announcement from Moscow for the end of the agreement that the initiative was “history”. German circles close to the government are also rather skeptical that there will be a continuation.
In the statement, Moscow did not rule out the possibility of a future for the Black Sea Initiative. However, since the announced end, the Russian army has been systematically destroying the port of Odessa – one of the initiative’s three Ukrainian export ports.
Economic analyst Alexandra Prokopenko, who is now researching at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin after leaving Russia in 2022, does not see the final end for the agreement yet, pointing to Russian President Putin’s dependence on Turkey. Putin will meet Erdogan in August and will certainly talk about the grain agreement, she writes.
Before the meeting with Erdoğan, the Russia-Africa Economic Forum will take place in St. Petersburg this week, and the BRICS meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, less than four weeks later. Putin will use these meetings to blame Ukraine and the West for the end of the Grain Deal, German diplomats suspect. At the same time, they say, this is also an opportunity for him to perhaps present himself as a benefactor and offer African states his own help. After all, Russia reaped record harvests last year.
Read the full analysis in German at Agrifood.Table.
Mr. Lambsdorff, Russia recently expelled dozens of German diplomats and had to close three consulates. But there is the fact that you will now start as German ambassador in Moscow in a few days – is that nevertheless a positive sign for German-Russian relations?
Germany and Russia have maintained diplomatic relations with each other even in the most difficult times, because that brings with it a stabilization of certain channels of communication. And these are particularly important when tensions are as they are at the moment. In this respect, you can see this as a positive sign.
Are there still good channels of communication? There are discussions about excluding Russia from the OSCE, for example. This would make direct talks even rarer.
It is simply important to understand each other even in a difficult situation, to analyze each other’s policies and to inform the government at home about them. As far as membership in international organizations is concerned, there are very different views. Personally, I believe that it is important to maintain certain forums where representatives of Russia also have their place. But that other countries may see it differently, I can understand.
What can the German government do to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible?
At present, together with our allies in the European Union and NATO, we must continue to help Ukraine in its legitimate right to self-defense, with the aim of getting Russia to back down from its military aggression. This is also seen as such by everyone in the broad democratic center, and the Union, as the largest opposition force, supports this.
What do you think it means that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will not be traveling to the BRICS meeting in South Africa after all?
I cannot speculate on President Putin’s motives. But we know from statements by the South African government that it was an extremely delicate situation in their eyes. And the very fact that they uphold the Rome Statute there shows that the rules-based order is having an effect where it still works. And we as Germans have every interest in defending precisely this rule-based order, in supporting it and, where it has been violated, in restoring it. This is absolutely central for us as a deeply integrated European, globally export-oriented country with limited military resources.
At the end of June, four Armenian soldiers were killed in an attack by Azerbaijani troops – right on the ceasefire line in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the government in Baku, this was in response to Armenian shelling. The escalation coincided with a sign of hope: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had just met in Washington, D.C., with his counterparts from Armenia and Azerbaijan for peace talks.
This continues a pattern that has been familiar for some time in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: significant progress at the highest level is regularly accompanied by escalations – obviously in order to build up pressure.
The German government in Berlin could work to change that. For example, by ensuring that the EU mission in Armenia (EUMA), which was set up at the beginning of the year and is led by Federal Police Officer Markus Ritter, finally not only reaches the planned deployment strength, but also receives the necessary equipment to implement all patrols as planned. Currently, vehicles of the EU mission are still in operation in Georgia and Armenia.
Pressure could also be exerted on the part of EU diplomacy in Brussels on the heads of government of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to resume the thread of negotiations from Washington. After all, hopes remain high internationally for a breakthrough in negotiations this year: the EU alone has mediated five meetings between the leaders of the two countries since 2022.
In May, Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan acknowledged for the first time that Karabakh was Azerbaijani territory. In doing so, he removed one of the central points of contention in the conflict. However, his demand for international security guarantees for the Armenian population of the enclave led to clear opposition from Baku.
This is a matter for the EU, which has played a surprisingly central role since last year. But it can only live up to its responsibility for further rapprochement between the parties to the conflict by continuing to press for negotiations.
Since February, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMA) with its 100 unarmed personnel has played an important role in this. The mandate runs until 2025 – EUMA is headquartered in Yeghegndsor, with field offices in Kapan, Goris, Jermuk, Martuni and Ijevan.
In addition to regular patrols along the border – albeit exclusively on Armenian territory – the mission is tasked with establishing local communication channels and de-escalation mechanisms between the conflict parties. It also supports efforts to demarcate the border and trilateral talks with representatives of the EU, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Armenian government in Yerevan hopes that the mission’s presence in the border area alone could reduce the number of incidents and, despite its manageable size, act as a kind of protective umbrella. The Azerbaijani leadership in Baku, on the other hand, has repeatedly complained about the mission – and sees it as a potentially disruptive element for the dialogue process. To avoid tensions, EUMA leadership and the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Georgia, Toivo Klaar, regularly inform Baku in advance about planned routes for observation missions.
Although the mission has not yet reached full operational capability, it is already demonstrating a presence at key points along the border – and sometimes taking high-level EU visitors on patrol, a proven way to maintain member states’ commitment.
Germany is currently making the largest personnel contribution to the mission. Not only does it provide the head of mission, but also about 15 percent of the EUMA personnel – by far the largest national contingent of all EU member states. Berlin is perceived as neutral – unlike Paris, which has a reputation in Baku for acting on behalf of the large Armenian community in France. The German government should use this weight to further strengthen the peace process, which has begun so hopefully after Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinjans recognized Azerbaijan’s claim to Karabakh in May.
Rarely has the interest in an election in Spain been as great outside the country as it is this time. It is not yet possible to predict what consequences it will have in the country. However, the consequences for European policy can be outlined in three points:
My colleague Isabel Cuesta Camacho analyzes whether and how the stalemate in the Spanish Parliament could be resolved in her Feature of the day after.
I hope you have a wonderful day!
Spain is facing a difficult time forming a government. Both the right-wing and left-wing parties will find it difficult to form the alliances needed for a parliamentary majority of 176 seats. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the People’s Party (PP) and winner of the elections, has worse prospects of becoming prime minister than his rival Pedro Sánchez (PSOE).
The Socialist could secure office again if he gives in to the demands of separatist parties. Junts per Catalunya, the party of MEP Carles Puigdemont, who has been on the run from Spanish justice for five years, could be the key to Sánchez’s re-election. A coalition between the major parties, PP and PSOE, on the other hand, seems out of the question.
At a meeting of his party’s executive committee on Monday, Sánchez said yesterday that he does not expect a blockade or a repeat of the elections. He apparently believes that he has a good chance of forming a governing alliance.
Together with the left-wing alliance Sumar (31 seats), the PSOE (122 seats) has 153 seats. If the previous coalition partners add the seats of their nationalist allies from the current legislative period, they would have 167 deputies. These include seven deputies from the Esquerra Republicana per Catalunya (ERC), six from the Basque EH Bildu and one from the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). They would need the five deputies from the PNV (Plan Nacional Vasco) to defeat a possible center-right bloc consisting of 171 deputies from the PP (136), Vox (33), UPN (1) and Coalición Canaria (1).
To achieve an absolute majority of 176 seats, Sánchez would therefore need the seven deputies from Puigdemont’s Junts party. On Monday, the relevant public prosecutor’s office asked the Supreme Court judge to again order the arrest of Puigdemont and former Catalan minister Antoni Comín. Previously, the European Court of Justice had lifted their immunity.
Junts top candidate Miriam Nogueras made it clear, however, that she would impose conditions: “We will not make Pedro Sánchez president if we get nothing in return“, she said. “Our priority is Catalonia, not the governability of the Spanish state.” For his part, Gabriel Rufián, president of the ERC, urged Basque and Catalan separatists to demand a “high” price for another Sánchez term. “Separatism can be the decisive factor”, he said.
The PP made strong gains in these elections, from 89 deputies in 2019 to 136 now, but party leader Feijóo fell short of the 145-150 seat result predicted in polls. Fear of Vox’s participation in government apparently helped PSOE and Sumar mobilize their supporters.
In 2019, the three right-wing parties PP, Vox and Ciudadanos still had a combined total of 151 seats. Ciudadanos did not even run on Sunday after its devastating defeat in the regional elections in May, and Vox also lost significant ground compared to 2019.
Since Feijóo became president of the PP in April 2022, he has succeeded in giving the party a significant boost. But he is having a hard time finding alliance partners. “Since this morning I have been in contact with various political forces to form a stable government”, he said after talks with UPN, Coalición Canaria, PNV and Vox.
Until there is a new government, Sánchez will remain acting head of government and thus also responsible for the EU Council presidency. The final vote count will be conducted from now until July 31 by the provincial electoral boards, where votes from abroad will also be counted. The new Parliament and Senate will be constituted on Aug. 17.
In the days following the start of the new legislative period, King Felipe VI will invite the leaders of the parliamentary groups to consultations at the Zarzuela Palace and ask them who they think has the most support for forming a government. Until now, the leader of the largest party has always been tasked with forming a government, though this time it could be different because of the lack of majority options for Feijóo. If a candidate receives an absolute majority in the first round of voting, he is sworn in as prime minister. In a second ballot, 48 hours later, a simple majority of yes votes will suffice.
Already battered by the war, the collapsed grain deal is hitting export-dependent Ukrainian agriculture to the core. “Our industry is slowly running out of money”, says Alex Lissitsa, head of the IMC agribusiness group, who now expects falling prices for Ukrainian grain and rising logistics costs. “The proceeds from the sale of winter wheat do not even cover production costs.” Russia, on the other hand – also a global grain exporter – finds itself in the comfortable position of being able to export wheat on the world market at higher prices.
The United Nations as well as China criticized Putin for suspending the agreement. They fear famine, especially in Africa. The leadership in Beijing explicitly called on Putin to allow exports of Ukrainian grain via the Black Sea again. Putin justifies the halt of the agreement by saying that only a small part of the harvest exports would benefit poor countries in the rest of the world anyway. Russia has no interest in allowing Ukrainian grain to enter the world market, says Tobias Heidland, director of international development at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, in an interview with Africa.Table. This is a deal Putin wants to make himself, he says, and he wants to profit diplomatically from the food and fertilizer crisis.
After the end of the grain agreement, both countries declared that ships calling at each other’s ports were potential carriers of military cargo. Currently, it looks as if Putin is also harming himself. Significantly fewer ships are calling at Russian ports. Nevertheless, Putin says Russia is ready to replace Ukrainian grain supplies in view of a bumper harvest. Should Ukraine’s and Russia’s wheat exports be affected over a longer period of time, this would lead to a massive supply deficit on the world market, analyzes stockbroker Kaack Terminhandel.
Currently, wheat, rapeseed and barley are being threshed in Ukraine. “No one knows if we will even be able to sell our harvest this year”, says Lissitsa. Ukrainian agriculture provides up to 70 percent of the country’s export revenue, she adds. “The Russians are targeting our economy with this.”
The entrepreneur doubts whether goods will still be transported via the Black Sea port of Odessa this season. Due to the Russian bombardment, it is too risky for shipping companies to send their ships there. Wheat and corn worth about €10 million were stored on the Black Sea with no prospect of being sold. “We urgently need the money to sow winter wheat in September”, Lissitsa said. In addition, storage capacity is needed from October for harvesting corn, soybeans and sunflower seeds.
Now the EU wants to increase capacity on alternative routes. These include transports via rivers, with freight trains or trucks. Since the so-called Solidarity Lanes started in May 2022, 41 million tons of grain, oils and other agricultural products have been exported from Ukraine via the alternative routes. In the case of grain, this accounts for 60 percent, and 40 percent of all exported grain, in turn, was shipped thanks to the Black Sea initiative. This is shown by new data from the EU Commission.
Regarding the transport route via the Danube to the Romanian port of Constanza, agribusinesswoman Lissitsa is not very optimistic: “Colleagues who own grain terminals on the Danube expect low water in the coming summer months.”
Complications also remain at the western border with Poland and Hungary. Until Sept. 15, the EU is only allowing the transit of four agricultural products (wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower seeds) through five Eastern European EU member states. In addition to Poland and Hungary, this also affects Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. So far, these states have stuck to an import ban. Poland’s head of government Mateusz Morawiecki said that the aim is to continue to prevent destabilization of the market.
However, the Solidarity Lanes are not only important for exports, they are the only routes for importing aid. The EU is developing better connections between Poland and Ukraine and between Romania and the Republic of Moldova; in addition to roads, rail connections are also involved. According to the EU Commission, a total of over €1 billion has been invested in the solidarity transport program.
However, the infrastructure programs cannot be implemented quickly. In addition, there are other difficulties, such as the lack of grain wagons in Europe. Rivers also cannot be dredged quickly to allow the use of larger transport ships, and the number of trucks, truck drivers and road capacity is also limited. So Russia is blocking Ukraine’s most effective export opportunity and cutting Ukraine off from about $8 billion to $9 billion in revenue, while Russian exporters can get higher prices and Russia can generate higher revenue as a result.
Due to a lack of liquidity and export opportunities, it is possible that even less winter wheat will be sown in Ukraine this year and correspondingly even less grain will be harvested the following year. In 2022, according to the Ministry of Agriculture in Kyiv, the grain harvest has collapsed from 86 million to 50 million tons, reports the German Agricultural Trade Association (DAH). Similar volumes are expected this year, it says.
Ukrainian farmers are switching to sunflowers and soybeans. Although this reduces yields, it also requires half the storage and transport capacity, says DAH Managing Director Martin Courbier. “As a short-term measure, the total permissible truck weight for cross-border transports should be raised”, he demands.
Whether the grain agreement can be reactivated or renegotiated – opinions differ. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said even before the official announcement from Moscow for the end of the agreement that the initiative was “history”. German circles close to the government are also rather skeptical that there will be a continuation.
In the statement, Moscow did not rule out the possibility of a future for the Black Sea Initiative. However, since the announced end, the Russian army has been systematically destroying the port of Odessa – one of the initiative’s three Ukrainian export ports.
Economic analyst Alexandra Prokopenko, who is now researching at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin after leaving Russia in 2022, does not see the final end for the agreement yet, pointing to Russian President Putin’s dependence on Turkey. Putin will meet Erdogan in August and will certainly talk about the grain agreement, she writes.
Before the meeting with Erdoğan, the Russia-Africa Economic Forum will take place in St. Petersburg this week, and the BRICS meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, less than four weeks later. Putin will use these meetings to blame Ukraine and the West for the end of the Grain Deal, German diplomats suspect. At the same time, they say, this is also an opportunity for him to perhaps present himself as a benefactor and offer African states his own help. After all, Russia reaped record harvests last year.
Read the full analysis in German at Agrifood.Table.
Mr. Lambsdorff, Russia recently expelled dozens of German diplomats and had to close three consulates. But there is the fact that you will now start as German ambassador in Moscow in a few days – is that nevertheless a positive sign for German-Russian relations?
Germany and Russia have maintained diplomatic relations with each other even in the most difficult times, because that brings with it a stabilization of certain channels of communication. And these are particularly important when tensions are as they are at the moment. In this respect, you can see this as a positive sign.
Are there still good channels of communication? There are discussions about excluding Russia from the OSCE, for example. This would make direct talks even rarer.
It is simply important to understand each other even in a difficult situation, to analyze each other’s policies and to inform the government at home about them. As far as membership in international organizations is concerned, there are very different views. Personally, I believe that it is important to maintain certain forums where representatives of Russia also have their place. But that other countries may see it differently, I can understand.
What can the German government do to end the war in Ukraine as quickly as possible?
At present, together with our allies in the European Union and NATO, we must continue to help Ukraine in its legitimate right to self-defense, with the aim of getting Russia to back down from its military aggression. This is also seen as such by everyone in the broad democratic center, and the Union, as the largest opposition force, supports this.
What do you think it means that Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will not be traveling to the BRICS meeting in South Africa after all?
I cannot speculate on President Putin’s motives. But we know from statements by the South African government that it was an extremely delicate situation in their eyes. And the very fact that they uphold the Rome Statute there shows that the rules-based order is having an effect where it still works. And we as Germans have every interest in defending precisely this rule-based order, in supporting it and, where it has been violated, in restoring it. This is absolutely central for us as a deeply integrated European, globally export-oriented country with limited military resources.
At the end of June, four Armenian soldiers were killed in an attack by Azerbaijani troops – right on the ceasefire line in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to the government in Baku, this was in response to Armenian shelling. The escalation coincided with a sign of hope: US Secretary of State Antony Blinken had just met in Washington, D.C., with his counterparts from Armenia and Azerbaijan for peace talks.
This continues a pattern that has been familiar for some time in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh: significant progress at the highest level is regularly accompanied by escalations – obviously in order to build up pressure.
The German government in Berlin could work to change that. For example, by ensuring that the EU mission in Armenia (EUMA), which was set up at the beginning of the year and is led by Federal Police Officer Markus Ritter, finally not only reaches the planned deployment strength, but also receives the necessary equipment to implement all patrols as planned. Currently, vehicles of the EU mission are still in operation in Georgia and Armenia.
Pressure could also be exerted on the part of EU diplomacy in Brussels on the heads of government of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, to resume the thread of negotiations from Washington. After all, hopes remain high internationally for a breakthrough in negotiations this year: the EU alone has mediated five meetings between the leaders of the two countries since 2022.
In May, Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinyan acknowledged for the first time that Karabakh was Azerbaijani territory. In doing so, he removed one of the central points of contention in the conflict. However, his demand for international security guarantees for the Armenian population of the enclave led to clear opposition from Baku.
This is a matter for the EU, which has played a surprisingly central role since last year. But it can only live up to its responsibility for further rapprochement between the parties to the conflict by continuing to press for negotiations.
Since February, the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMA) with its 100 unarmed personnel has played an important role in this. The mandate runs until 2025 – EUMA is headquartered in Yeghegndsor, with field offices in Kapan, Goris, Jermuk, Martuni and Ijevan.
In addition to regular patrols along the border – albeit exclusively on Armenian territory – the mission is tasked with establishing local communication channels and de-escalation mechanisms between the conflict parties. It also supports efforts to demarcate the border and trilateral talks with representatives of the EU, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Armenian government in Yerevan hopes that the mission’s presence in the border area alone could reduce the number of incidents and, despite its manageable size, act as a kind of protective umbrella. The Azerbaijani leadership in Baku, on the other hand, has repeatedly complained about the mission – and sees it as a potentially disruptive element for the dialogue process. To avoid tensions, EUMA leadership and the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Georgia, Toivo Klaar, regularly inform Baku in advance about planned routes for observation missions.
Although the mission has not yet reached full operational capability, it is already demonstrating a presence at key points along the border – and sometimes taking high-level EU visitors on patrol, a proven way to maintain member states’ commitment.
Germany is currently making the largest personnel contribution to the mission. Not only does it provide the head of mission, but also about 15 percent of the EUMA personnel – by far the largest national contingent of all EU member states. Berlin is perceived as neutral – unlike Paris, which has a reputation in Baku for acting on behalf of the large Armenian community in France. The German government should use this weight to further strengthen the peace process, which has begun so hopefully after Armenia’s Prime Minister Pashinjans recognized Azerbaijan’s claim to Karabakh in May.
