It is only about 200 kilometers from Bonn to Brussels. Until Sunday, negotiators, observers and journalists at the Bonn Climate Conference are keeping at least one eye on the EU capital. Starting today, Europeans are voting for a new EU Parliament, which will, in turn, decide on the next EU Commission.
The last European election in 2019 was also dubbed a climate election. Shortly after her appointment, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented her Green Deal – a plan to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent. Five years later, the initial excitement over ambitious climate action plans has given way to a degree of disillusionment. Criticism of disruptive measures is growing, as are concerns about the impact of climate policy on competitiveness and prosperity.
For some, this election is about saving the Green Deal, defending it against criticism and further expanding it. Others, like the AfD, outright reject scientific findings on climate change and the Paris Agreement. Lisa Kuner has examined the positions of the far-right and analyzed how the AfD has already delayed the energy transition at the local and state levels. Could this soon be the case at the EU level as well?
We also look at the climate policy tasks in the next legislature. Who decides when on the 2040 climate target, how will the EU-NDC for 2035 be determined, and when will there be an agreement on the next climate action package?
Enjoy our election special with these and other topics. And if you haven’t already, make sure to vote!
All texts on the 2024 European elections can be found here. You can follow our continuously updated news blog here.
Immediately after the election, the member states will once again deal with the most controversial dossier of the Green Deal. The Belgian Council Presidency is making one more attempt to get the renaturation law over the finishing line after all. At the Environment Council on June 17, the member states are to hold a final vote. Parliament has already formally waved the trilogue result through, so all that is missing is the approval of the ministers.
Just a few days later, climate action should have been high on the agenda again – at the EU summit on June 27-28. There, the heads of state and government will agree on the strategic agenda – i.e. the direction and goals of the EU member states for the next five years. It was debated whether the member states would agree on their own position on the EU’s 2040 climate target at this point. In all likelihood, they will not, as unanimity is required. The member states have not yet been able to agree on the Commission’s proposal of a 90 percent reduction in CO2 compared to 1990, nor on a lower target or a target corridor.
The German government does not yet have a united position on the EU’s 2040 climate target either, although Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) demonstratively backed the Commission’s proposal at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in Berlin at the end of April. Insiders from Brussels report that the upcoming Hungarian Council Presidency wants to put the issue on the table at the EU summit in December.
By spring 2025 at the latest, the EU member states will also have to submit their climate target for 2035 (NDC) to the United Nations. In theory, a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers is sufficient for this. In EU logic, however, a target for 2040 must first be set, from which the target for 2035 emerges, which further complicates the process. In the weeks and months following the European elections, the focus will, therefore, be more on the more fundamental climate policy lines than on regulatory activities.
Unless the new Commission gives in to pressure from the EPP and reintroduces the CO2 fleet limits for cars from the Fit for 55 package in order to reverse the phase-out of combustion engines. This is not particularly likely as long as Ursula von der Leyen remains in office. Nevertheless, the remaining German Christian Democrats, in particular, are serious about their desire to be able to continue allowing new combustion engines after 2035.
The Hungarian Council Presidency, which is not very well-versed in climate policy, will be very cautious in the second half of the year. On the one hand, because no new proposals are expected from the Commission. Secondly, because it will not set its priorities in climate policy.
A new legislative package to implement the climate target is not planned until 2026. Unlike the Fit for 55 package for the 2030 climate target, it will contain fewer new measures, but rather align existing measures with the potential increase in ambition. For example, the European Emissions Trading System for Energy and Industry (ETS 1) could be extended to other industrial sectors. The focus is on the agricultural and food sectors. Solutions are also needed for the integration of natural carbon sinks (carbon farming) and technical CO2 removal (direct air capture), which will play a role in the 2040 climate target.
Some of these measures are likely to be implemented as part of the regular legislative revisions due in 2026 or 2027. These include the ETS and the carbon border adjustment mechanism CBAM, but also the Common Agricultural Policy. Initial proposals for the CAP after 2027 are expected in the coming year.
The question of how to finance the energy and industrial turnaround will also arise in the coming years. The pandemic recovery fund expires at the end of 2026 and public funds will also be kept tighter again due to the new EU debt rules. A central concern of the EU Commission and some member state governments is therefore the deepening of the Capital Markets Union. This should ensure that European companies have easier access to funding to invest in their growth.
However, national hurdles could continue to stand in the way of this goal. Even if the Capital Markets Union comes to fruition, there is no guarantee that the additional capital will flow into climate-friendly measures. The EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period from 2028 to 2034 offers another opportunity for more funding. The first proposal for this is due in mid-2025. With János Ammann
Following a possible increase in votes for the AfD in the European elections, the party’s influence on climate policy will also rise. In Europe, but especially in the eastern German state and local elections this year, the party, which is partly far-right, can significantly slow down the energy transition at the local level. This is also the declared goal of the AfD, which is the only party in the Bundestag that outright rejects scientific findings on climate change and the Paris Climate Agreement.
The AfD makes its positions on climate and energy policy clear in its European election program:
Many of these positions are adopted from the so-called European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE). This registered association is known for denying human-caused climate change and has connections to the American Heartland Institute. Michael Limburg, vice-chairman of EIKE, was at times an employee of AfD Bundestag member Karsten Hilse.
The party generally opposes the expansion of renewables, often arguing that they do not provide energy security. Wind energy is a particular thorn in their side, but solar panels are also seen as taking up valuable farmland. Sometimes the AfD pits nature conservation against climate action: Biodiversity or the protection of certain birds are particularly important to them when they can prevent the expansion of wind farms.
On current election posters you can also read “Nature conservation is homeland protection” and Hilse says: “Climate action and nature conservation are diametrically opposed”, for nature conservation renewable energy plants would have to be dismantled.
Karsten Hilse, the AfD’s climate policy spokesperson, stated in a Bundestag speech at the end of last year that the influence of “human-caused CO2 emissions” on the climate is an unproven hypothesis. Emission reductions have no effect on the climate, he claimed, but lead to a loss of prosperity. In another speech, he referred to the building energy law as “climate ideology”.
In response to a query from Table.Briefings, Hilse said that data worldwide showed “neither an increase in extreme weather events like heavy rain nor droughts”. Extreme “weather phenomena” have always existed. He claims that in warmer periods, “flora and fauna thrived, and human development was positive”. For him, it’s clear: The climate cannot be protected, only adapted to. An AfD-led government also wants to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement.
How the AfD shapes climate policy and slows down the energy transition without being part of the government was demonstrated in Thuringia in December 2023: With the FDP and CDU, the AfD voted to change the forest law, thereby also opposing a rapid expansion of wind energy. Experts believe that a passage in the law complicates the construction of wind farms: “Reforestation should not take place on areas designated for agricultural use,” it states. This could make it difficult, if not impossible, to build wind farms in forest areas.
With its extreme, anti-scientific position on climate and energy, the AfD differentiates itself from other right-wing populist parties in Europe, explains Axel Salheiser. He is the scientific director of the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society in Jena and researches right-wing populism in the context of global ecological crises. “This is a purely ideological position,” says the scientist. Many AfD politicians probably do not believe these theses themselves.
The party strategically builds its argumentation against an alleged “top-down policy”. Conspiracy theories also appear – climate policy, it is said, wants to promote the “Great Reset”, the replacement of the population. Another narrative is that climate policy pointlessly destroys prosperity. The “so-called energy transition” leads “to the highest energy prices in the world, making people’s lives more expensive and forcing industry to either shut down or move abroad,” claimed Karsten Hilse.
The party mainly formulates protest in climate policy: against the building energy law, climate diplomacy at conferences or the EU Green Deal. “The AfD jumps on every protest against wind turbines,” says Anika Taschke from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. This further fuels the already controversial topic and polarizes society.
Democratic parties rely on a “firewall” in dealing with the AfD, excluding any form of cooperation and collaboration with the party. However, an analysis by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation already counted 121 cases of cooperation with the party at the municipal level in East Germany at the beginning of the year. The most common form was joint votes with the party. According to the study, the CDU cooperated most frequently with the right-wing populists, but cooperation from all other parties was also noted.
Climate and energy policy are not the party’s focus, but there are still some cases where they act. Some examples:
All previously published texts of the series “Between Provocation and Protest – The Strategies of the AfD” can be found here.
It is only about 200 kilometers from Bonn to Brussels. Until Sunday, negotiators, observers and journalists at the Bonn Climate Conference are keeping at least one eye on the EU capital. Starting today, Europeans are voting for a new EU Parliament, which will, in turn, decide on the next EU Commission.
The last European election in 2019 was also dubbed a climate election. Shortly after her appointment, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented her Green Deal – a plan to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent. Five years later, the initial excitement over ambitious climate action plans has given way to a degree of disillusionment. Criticism of disruptive measures is growing, as are concerns about the impact of climate policy on competitiveness and prosperity.
For some, this election is about saving the Green Deal, defending it against criticism and further expanding it. Others, like the AfD, outright reject scientific findings on climate change and the Paris Agreement. Lisa Kuner has examined the positions of the far-right and analyzed how the AfD has already delayed the energy transition at the local and state levels. Could this soon be the case at the EU level as well?
We also look at the climate policy tasks in the next legislature. Who decides when on the 2040 climate target, how will the EU-NDC for 2035 be determined, and when will there be an agreement on the next climate action package?
Enjoy our election special with these and other topics. And if you haven’t already, make sure to vote!
All texts on the 2024 European elections can be found here. You can follow our continuously updated news blog here.
Immediately after the election, the member states will once again deal with the most controversial dossier of the Green Deal. The Belgian Council Presidency is making one more attempt to get the renaturation law over the finishing line after all. At the Environment Council on June 17, the member states are to hold a final vote. Parliament has already formally waved the trilogue result through, so all that is missing is the approval of the ministers.
Just a few days later, climate action should have been high on the agenda again – at the EU summit on June 27-28. There, the heads of state and government will agree on the strategic agenda – i.e. the direction and goals of the EU member states for the next five years. It was debated whether the member states would agree on their own position on the EU’s 2040 climate target at this point. In all likelihood, they will not, as unanimity is required. The member states have not yet been able to agree on the Commission’s proposal of a 90 percent reduction in CO2 compared to 1990, nor on a lower target or a target corridor.
The German government does not yet have a united position on the EU’s 2040 climate target either, although Minister Annalena Baerbock (Greens) demonstratively backed the Commission’s proposal at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in Berlin at the end of April. Insiders from Brussels report that the upcoming Hungarian Council Presidency wants to put the issue on the table at the EU summit in December.
By spring 2025 at the latest, the EU member states will also have to submit their climate target for 2035 (NDC) to the United Nations. In theory, a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers is sufficient for this. In EU logic, however, a target for 2040 must first be set, from which the target for 2035 emerges, which further complicates the process. In the weeks and months following the European elections, the focus will, therefore, be more on the more fundamental climate policy lines than on regulatory activities.
Unless the new Commission gives in to pressure from the EPP and reintroduces the CO2 fleet limits for cars from the Fit for 55 package in order to reverse the phase-out of combustion engines. This is not particularly likely as long as Ursula von der Leyen remains in office. Nevertheless, the remaining German Christian Democrats, in particular, are serious about their desire to be able to continue allowing new combustion engines after 2035.
The Hungarian Council Presidency, which is not very well-versed in climate policy, will be very cautious in the second half of the year. On the one hand, because no new proposals are expected from the Commission. Secondly, because it will not set its priorities in climate policy.
A new legislative package to implement the climate target is not planned until 2026. Unlike the Fit for 55 package for the 2030 climate target, it will contain fewer new measures, but rather align existing measures with the potential increase in ambition. For example, the European Emissions Trading System for Energy and Industry (ETS 1) could be extended to other industrial sectors. The focus is on the agricultural and food sectors. Solutions are also needed for the integration of natural carbon sinks (carbon farming) and technical CO2 removal (direct air capture), which will play a role in the 2040 climate target.
Some of these measures are likely to be implemented as part of the regular legislative revisions due in 2026 or 2027. These include the ETS and the carbon border adjustment mechanism CBAM, but also the Common Agricultural Policy. Initial proposals for the CAP after 2027 are expected in the coming year.
The question of how to finance the energy and industrial turnaround will also arise in the coming years. The pandemic recovery fund expires at the end of 2026 and public funds will also be kept tighter again due to the new EU debt rules. A central concern of the EU Commission and some member state governments is therefore the deepening of the Capital Markets Union. This should ensure that European companies have easier access to funding to invest in their growth.
However, national hurdles could continue to stand in the way of this goal. Even if the Capital Markets Union comes to fruition, there is no guarantee that the additional capital will flow into climate-friendly measures. The EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period from 2028 to 2034 offers another opportunity for more funding. The first proposal for this is due in mid-2025. With János Ammann
Following a possible increase in votes for the AfD in the European elections, the party’s influence on climate policy will also rise. In Europe, but especially in the eastern German state and local elections this year, the party, which is partly far-right, can significantly slow down the energy transition at the local level. This is also the declared goal of the AfD, which is the only party in the Bundestag that outright rejects scientific findings on climate change and the Paris Climate Agreement.
The AfD makes its positions on climate and energy policy clear in its European election program:
Many of these positions are adopted from the so-called European Institute for Climate and Energy (EIKE). This registered association is known for denying human-caused climate change and has connections to the American Heartland Institute. Michael Limburg, vice-chairman of EIKE, was at times an employee of AfD Bundestag member Karsten Hilse.
The party generally opposes the expansion of renewables, often arguing that they do not provide energy security. Wind energy is a particular thorn in their side, but solar panels are also seen as taking up valuable farmland. Sometimes the AfD pits nature conservation against climate action: Biodiversity or the protection of certain birds are particularly important to them when they can prevent the expansion of wind farms.
On current election posters you can also read “Nature conservation is homeland protection” and Hilse says: “Climate action and nature conservation are diametrically opposed”, for nature conservation renewable energy plants would have to be dismantled.
Karsten Hilse, the AfD’s climate policy spokesperson, stated in a Bundestag speech at the end of last year that the influence of “human-caused CO2 emissions” on the climate is an unproven hypothesis. Emission reductions have no effect on the climate, he claimed, but lead to a loss of prosperity. In another speech, he referred to the building energy law as “climate ideology”.
In response to a query from Table.Briefings, Hilse said that data worldwide showed “neither an increase in extreme weather events like heavy rain nor droughts”. Extreme “weather phenomena” have always existed. He claims that in warmer periods, “flora and fauna thrived, and human development was positive”. For him, it’s clear: The climate cannot be protected, only adapted to. An AfD-led government also wants to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement.
How the AfD shapes climate policy and slows down the energy transition without being part of the government was demonstrated in Thuringia in December 2023: With the FDP and CDU, the AfD voted to change the forest law, thereby also opposing a rapid expansion of wind energy. Experts believe that a passage in the law complicates the construction of wind farms: “Reforestation should not take place on areas designated for agricultural use,” it states. This could make it difficult, if not impossible, to build wind farms in forest areas.
With its extreme, anti-scientific position on climate and energy, the AfD differentiates itself from other right-wing populist parties in Europe, explains Axel Salheiser. He is the scientific director of the Institute for Democracy and Civil Society in Jena and researches right-wing populism in the context of global ecological crises. “This is a purely ideological position,” says the scientist. Many AfD politicians probably do not believe these theses themselves.
The party strategically builds its argumentation against an alleged “top-down policy”. Conspiracy theories also appear – climate policy, it is said, wants to promote the “Great Reset”, the replacement of the population. Another narrative is that climate policy pointlessly destroys prosperity. The “so-called energy transition” leads “to the highest energy prices in the world, making people’s lives more expensive and forcing industry to either shut down or move abroad,” claimed Karsten Hilse.
The party mainly formulates protest in climate policy: against the building energy law, climate diplomacy at conferences or the EU Green Deal. “The AfD jumps on every protest against wind turbines,” says Anika Taschke from the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. This further fuels the already controversial topic and polarizes society.
Democratic parties rely on a “firewall” in dealing with the AfD, excluding any form of cooperation and collaboration with the party. However, an analysis by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation already counted 121 cases of cooperation with the party at the municipal level in East Germany at the beginning of the year. The most common form was joint votes with the party. According to the study, the CDU cooperated most frequently with the right-wing populists, but cooperation from all other parties was also noted.
Climate and energy policy are not the party’s focus, but there are still some cases where they act. Some examples:
All previously published texts of the series “Between Provocation and Protest – The Strategies of the AfD” can be found here.
