When it comes to climate action, they say that everyone must be involved and no one should be overwhelmed. What the German government has experienced in recent weeks with the dispute over the heating act within its own country is also the guiding principle for the climate policy part of the China strategy, which we are reporting on in this special edition – specifically, it is about demanding action from China without overwhelming it.
No country is more important worldwide than China when it comes to climate action: It emits the most CO2, builds by far the most renewables and floods the rest of the world with solar technology and EVs. It suffers greatly from climate impacts such as droughts and floods and hides behind its official status as a developing country on the world stage.
Against this backdrop, the German government’s China strategy advocates for genuine diplomacy within the framework of climate diplomacy: Clearly stating expectations (rapid CO2 reduction, constructive role in the UN, greener finance) but also keeping the offer of cooperation on an equal footing. This is very much in line with Germany’s interests – because China is not waiting for partners but rather dominates the green markets. It has already surpassed Germany in the expansion of renewables and the EV industry. However, the leadership in Beijing also knows that even China cannot solve the climate crisis on its own.
Therefore, the strategy prominently places cooperation with China in this area at the beginning of the concept: Climate policy, beyond its narrow scope, becomes a door opener or door holder to a regime that increasingly acts autocratically in other areas and confronts the West. Thus, climate policy truly becomes geopolitics: It becomes a means to alleviate the climate crisis while also preparing a climate of cooperation in other areas.
It will now be interesting to see how China responds to these proposals. We at Climate.Table will be closely monitoring this.
When it comes to green technologies such as solar panels and lithium batteries and raw materials for the energy transition, there are “critical dependencies” on China that the People’s Republic has already “instrumentalized” when dealing with other countries, Germany’s China strategy warns. Consequently, it aims to diversify supply chains and strengthen “Europe’s innovative strength and production capacities, including in environmental technologies.”
To this end, the “use of state resources,” i.e., subsidizing investments, is to be simplified. The final version no longer mentions support for an “import ban from regions with particularly severe human rights violations,” as was still the case in an older leak. This could once again fuel the debate over the solar supply chain and allegations of forced labor in the Uyghur province of Xinjiang.
However, the German government cannot be too aggressive when it comes to diversification. Because if China feels threatened, it could retaliate. In January, plans to restrict exports of solar production equipment became public – and according to industry experts, the Chinese government is still discussing how to implement them in practice. And just a few days ago, China restricted gallium and germanium exports. Green industries are only affected minimally, as the two raw materials are only required for a few special solar applications. But the decision is seen as China’s warning signal: “De-risking” could pose new risks to these supply chains.
It already became apparent at the June Sino-German government consultations in Berlin that the German government wants to push China harder regarding international climate policy. “China has a special responsibility for preserving the world’s climate,” the strategy states. “The next time Scholz talks with Xi Jinping, the topic of climate will be on his agenda,” says Lutz Weischer of the environment and development NGO Germanwatch, emphasizing the high importance of the topic in the strategy.
The background: China is currently the largest emitter of CO2 by far. The Chinese climate target of reaching peak emissions by 2030 is incompatible with the Paris climate goals. If all countries were to implement similar unambitious policies, global warming would reach up to three degrees, according to the Climate Action Tracker.
For this reason, the German government wants to “encourage China to set more ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions” in the future. Here, the government voices the clear expectation that China, as the “second-largest economy, will contribute to climate action in line with its capabilities and responsibilities.”
Climate action will become a “focus of bilateral cooperation.” In this context, the government also wants to address the coal phase-out in China. Clear demands or cooperation offers are not included in the strategy and were not decided at the Sino-German government consultations. This is because the issue is sensitive: Coal is vital to China’s energy security. Moreover, the country has a strong coal lobby. The German government also wants to use the climate and transformation dialogue with China to “make industrial processes more climate-friendly, accelerate the energy transition, and facilitate the switch to climate-friendly mobility”.
The strategy warns that China must not use cooperation on climate protection “as a leverage” to advance interests in other areas but does not go into detail.
Furthermore, the German government wants China to participate in the so-called global loss and damage fund, i.e., to provide financial resources for preventing and adapting to the climate crisis in poorer countries. Regarding climate finance, China regularly retreats to the position that, according to the official interpretation, it is a developing country and does not need to participate. China is welcome to join Scholz’s climate club if it has the “appropriate level of climate policy ambition,” the strategy states.
Additionally, China should participate in negotiations on what climate financing should look like after 2025 and contribute to aligning Chinese financial flows with the Paris Agreement. The German government also advocates for China’s involvement in new financing models such as debt-for-nature or debt-for-climate swaps. China is the largest bilateral creditor and could play an important role in these matters.
China regularly argues that, according to its official interpretation, it is a developing country and therefore does not need to participate in climate financing. China is open to joining Scholz’s climate club with “appropriate levels of climate policy ambition”.
However, Weischer also criticizes some blanks in the strategy, such as “the reduction of methane emissions, which are important for meeting the 1.5-degree target. It also hardly mentions concrete measures and opportunities for cooperation on how China’s emissions could be reduced in the short term.”
How the strategy is implemented will now be decisive, Weischer said. “I see many tasks for the German Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, for example, on the dialogue on the coal phase-out or China’s role in climate financing.” The Germanwatch expert calls for new resources to be provided to these ministries in order to breathe life into the strategy.
When it comes to climate action, they say that everyone must be involved and no one should be overwhelmed. What the German government has experienced in recent weeks with the dispute over the heating act within its own country is also the guiding principle for the climate policy part of the China strategy, which we are reporting on in this special edition – specifically, it is about demanding action from China without overwhelming it.
No country is more important worldwide than China when it comes to climate action: It emits the most CO2, builds by far the most renewables and floods the rest of the world with solar technology and EVs. It suffers greatly from climate impacts such as droughts and floods and hides behind its official status as a developing country on the world stage.
Against this backdrop, the German government’s China strategy advocates for genuine diplomacy within the framework of climate diplomacy: Clearly stating expectations (rapid CO2 reduction, constructive role in the UN, greener finance) but also keeping the offer of cooperation on an equal footing. This is very much in line with Germany’s interests – because China is not waiting for partners but rather dominates the green markets. It has already surpassed Germany in the expansion of renewables and the EV industry. However, the leadership in Beijing also knows that even China cannot solve the climate crisis on its own.
Therefore, the strategy prominently places cooperation with China in this area at the beginning of the concept: Climate policy, beyond its narrow scope, becomes a door opener or door holder to a regime that increasingly acts autocratically in other areas and confronts the West. Thus, climate policy truly becomes geopolitics: It becomes a means to alleviate the climate crisis while also preparing a climate of cooperation in other areas.
It will now be interesting to see how China responds to these proposals. We at Climate.Table will be closely monitoring this.
When it comes to green technologies such as solar panels and lithium batteries and raw materials for the energy transition, there are “critical dependencies” on China that the People’s Republic has already “instrumentalized” when dealing with other countries, Germany’s China strategy warns. Consequently, it aims to diversify supply chains and strengthen “Europe’s innovative strength and production capacities, including in environmental technologies.”
To this end, the “use of state resources,” i.e., subsidizing investments, is to be simplified. The final version no longer mentions support for an “import ban from regions with particularly severe human rights violations,” as was still the case in an older leak. This could once again fuel the debate over the solar supply chain and allegations of forced labor in the Uyghur province of Xinjiang.
However, the German government cannot be too aggressive when it comes to diversification. Because if China feels threatened, it could retaliate. In January, plans to restrict exports of solar production equipment became public – and according to industry experts, the Chinese government is still discussing how to implement them in practice. And just a few days ago, China restricted gallium and germanium exports. Green industries are only affected minimally, as the two raw materials are only required for a few special solar applications. But the decision is seen as China’s warning signal: “De-risking” could pose new risks to these supply chains.
It already became apparent at the June Sino-German government consultations in Berlin that the German government wants to push China harder regarding international climate policy. “China has a special responsibility for preserving the world’s climate,” the strategy states. “The next time Scholz talks with Xi Jinping, the topic of climate will be on his agenda,” says Lutz Weischer of the environment and development NGO Germanwatch, emphasizing the high importance of the topic in the strategy.
The background: China is currently the largest emitter of CO2 by far. The Chinese climate target of reaching peak emissions by 2030 is incompatible with the Paris climate goals. If all countries were to implement similar unambitious policies, global warming would reach up to three degrees, according to the Climate Action Tracker.
For this reason, the German government wants to “encourage China to set more ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions” in the future. Here, the government voices the clear expectation that China, as the “second-largest economy, will contribute to climate action in line with its capabilities and responsibilities.”
Climate action will become a “focus of bilateral cooperation.” In this context, the government also wants to address the coal phase-out in China. Clear demands or cooperation offers are not included in the strategy and were not decided at the Sino-German government consultations. This is because the issue is sensitive: Coal is vital to China’s energy security. Moreover, the country has a strong coal lobby. The German government also wants to use the climate and transformation dialogue with China to “make industrial processes more climate-friendly, accelerate the energy transition, and facilitate the switch to climate-friendly mobility”.
The strategy warns that China must not use cooperation on climate protection “as a leverage” to advance interests in other areas but does not go into detail.
Furthermore, the German government wants China to participate in the so-called global loss and damage fund, i.e., to provide financial resources for preventing and adapting to the climate crisis in poorer countries. Regarding climate finance, China regularly retreats to the position that, according to the official interpretation, it is a developing country and does not need to participate. China is welcome to join Scholz’s climate club if it has the “appropriate level of climate policy ambition,” the strategy states.
Additionally, China should participate in negotiations on what climate financing should look like after 2025 and contribute to aligning Chinese financial flows with the Paris Agreement. The German government also advocates for China’s involvement in new financing models such as debt-for-nature or debt-for-climate swaps. China is the largest bilateral creditor and could play an important role in these matters.
China regularly argues that, according to its official interpretation, it is a developing country and therefore does not need to participate in climate financing. China is open to joining Scholz’s climate club with “appropriate levels of climate policy ambition”.
However, Weischer also criticizes some blanks in the strategy, such as “the reduction of methane emissions, which are important for meeting the 1.5-degree target. It also hardly mentions concrete measures and opportunities for cooperation on how China’s emissions could be reduced in the short term.”
How the strategy is implemented will now be decisive, Weischer said. “I see many tasks for the German Foreign Office and the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, for example, on the dialogue on the coal phase-out or China’s role in climate financing.” The Germanwatch expert calls for new resources to be provided to these ministries in order to breathe life into the strategy.
