The images from Lützerath protests not only weigh heavily on German politics, but also on Germany’s global climate image. On the one hand promoting coal and clearing protests, in some cases by force, on the other hand pleading for more ambition at COP conferences? This is seen as hypocrisy. Germany is still stuck in the 20th century, says Richard Klein of the Stockholm Environment Institute. According to Klein, Germany lacks a coherent strategy for climate action and the energy transition.
That would also help with the next COP host. The United Arab Emirates has appointed Sultan Ahmed Al-Jaber, head of the government-owned oil company, as COP president. He attempts to strike a balance between fossil fuels and climate action and wants to decarbonize oil and gas – in other words, save climate action and his country’s business model, as Bernhard Pötter reports. Can this work?
Big green promises are also associated with carbon dioxide removal technologies. So far, however, they remove very little CO2 from the air. The authors of a first global CDR stocktaking say: Policymakers need to create the conditions for new technologies to grow very quickly. But so far, many governments seem clueless.
Starting today, you will also find charts in our new “Climate In Numbers” category. We look forward to receiving your criticism, tips and suggestions about our new category and in general.
Mr. Klein, do the images from Lützerath have any impact on Germany’s position in global climate policy?
Yes, definitely. In general, the world has an impression of Germany’s climate action that is not as good as Germany would like it to be. This began with the VW scandal and the emission fraud and continued with ongoing debates about the lack of a speed limit and, in general, the completely failed transport policy from a climate action perspective. Abroad, there is the perception that Germany says all the right things and certainly supports other countries financially in doing the right things, but has major problems at home developing and implementing the right policies itself.
What is the effect of the current images of the police hauling away climate activists?
I don’t think the prevailing perception is that these images are the result of an unfortunate government constellation that may change with the next elections. Rather, many people abroad see the clearing of Lützerath and sticking to the expansion of Garzweiler as something fundamental: Germany is doing everything it can to maintain a status quo that is stuck in the 20th century. This comes as a shock to many because Germany has long benefited from a leadership role in technical excellence, inventiveness and progress that has made it one of the most technologically advanced countries. Another shock for many abroad is that there is also a polarization in Germany between people who are stuck in the 20th century and those who want to arrive in the 21st century.
The images from Lützerath are making waves around the world. What do they mean for Germany’s negotiating position on the climate stage? Will the negotiators at the next COP tell Foreign Minister Baerbock: You say a lot here, but at home, you’re digging for lignite?
Germany is certainly not alone in that regard. The UK, home of COP26, is also opening a new coal mine. The general opinion is that Europeans say the right things, but do something different. That’s duplicity, many also say: hypocrisy. The negotiators are aware of this, of course. The instrument that the Europeans still have is support for climate action through finance and know-how transfer. But that is also changing. Germany cannot buy its way out of its climate action dilemma.
What does that mean?
The German dilemma gives emerging countries like Indonesia, South Africa or Pakistan very good arguments to counter German demands. They can now say: We need much more aid because you can see in your own countries how difficult this transformation is. Even in view of the flood disaster in the Ahr Valley in 2021, many asked why it is only the developing countries that actually have to submit climate change adaptation plans to the UN. They have a point. How can Germany advise other countries on how to adapt to climate change if its own country lacks proper risk awareness and concrete plans?
Germany strongly supported the rights of Egyptian civil society at COP27 and even risked a diplomatic dispute with Egypt over the issue. Now the German government is cracking down on climate activists and civil society in its own country. How does that look on the international stage?
It does not look good, speaking of hypocrisy. Many countries, including Egypt, will officially say: This is an internal matter – also in order to use this argument to prevent further intervention by the Germans. But when, for example, Germany once again comments on the situation of civil society, they will have these examples at hand to justify the suppression of their own opposition – even if it has a completely different dimension. And there are more subtle and diplomatic ways to rub Germany’s nose in it. The fact that the OECD is now sending election observers to Berlin for the elections is one such way.
What does Lützerath mean for the German negotiators at COP28 in Dubai?
Behind closed doors, there is certainly a sentiment that Germany should get its own affairs in order first before telling others what to do. In energy policy, but also in how the police treat civil society. The lectures from Germany and other Europeans are tolerated because they come with a lot of money. But the United Arab Emirates, the COP28 hosts, do not need German or European money. They won’t care much what the Germans say. What the UAE wants is an agreement that advances the UN process and makes them look good as hosts. They have to balance the interests of countries that want to do more and do it faster, like Germany, with countries that want to do it more slowly, like Saudi Arabia. Egypt was more receptive to pressure from Europe and the United States.
So Germany’s position in Dubai is weaker regardless?
The negotiators know that it was not the Foreign Office that cleared Lützerath. When Baerbock and Morgan talk behind closed doors, that is understood. The question is: Who can use this, and how in public, to put pressure on Germany? And with Lützerath, Germany has given ammunition to those who try to slow down the climate process to gain more for themselves and less for the climate in negotiations.
If the German government were to ask you for advice on how to deal with these images: What would you say?
I would advise them to announce a coherent government strategy on climate policy and the energy transition. Above all, it needs to be made clear internationally how Germany wants to move forward: That the country wants to get on an actual climate path – despite briefly generating more coal-fired power due to the war, despite the new LNG terminals, and finally also through real measures in the transport sector. Such an overall strategy would be urgently needed. With it, Germany would have to make clear how it wants to arrive in the 21st century when it comes to energy, transport and industrial policy. And a symbol of this would be to end the Germans’ incredible love affair with the car. It’s like the obsession with firearms in the USA: They stand for freedom, ownership, self-confidence and independence, have a big lobby and a traditionally strong position. It’s a bit like that in Germany with cars.
Richard Klein is head of the International Climate Risk and Adaptation Group at the think tank Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). He is a specialist in adaptation and international climate policy, professor of geography at Linköping University and lives in Bonn.
Worldwide, mankind currently emits more than 41 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year. If other greenhouse gases are included, the volume rises to around 50 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents. At the same time – and this is an initial estimate – around two billion metric tons of carbon dioxide are removed from the atmosphere each year. But most of this is the result of reforestation. New technologies contribute only two million tons to carbon removal.
These numbers come from the recently published State of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) report. It is the first scientific CDR stocktaking. More are to follow at regular intervals. The report shows that new types of CDR methods such as BECCS, biochar or direct air capture are still in their infancy – and how urgent it would be to scale them up.
Because in order to meet the Paris climate targets, the world requires CDR on a large scale. All the scenarios from the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, which are reasonably likely to limit global warming to two degrees or less, include CDR. And almost all 1.5-degree scenarios assume net negative emissions. The more global greenhouse gas emissions rise, the greater the need becomes. Serious climate action must therefore achieve both: Rapidly and radically cutting emissions and quickly advancing CDR methods now.
But politicians do not have a plan for this. The report also shows this. In the current climate action plans, which focus on the year 2030, and the long-term strategies of individual countries for the year 2050, “the projected amounts for CO2 removals are only slightly larger” than the amounts realized today, says Jan Minx, a climate scientist at the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC). Minx co-authored the CDR report. According to the report, none of the long-term strategies includes a target quantifying what role CDR should play in the future.
In conclusion, the researchers see a “considerable gap” between the amounts of CDR that would be needed to achieve the Paris climate targets and the concrete CDR plans of governments for the year 2030. Even with ambitious climate action, which the world is “miles away from,” this gap will not close anytime soon, Minx criticizes. “This is especially true for innovative methods like BECCS and direct air capture.”
The report estimates that in the extreme case, i.e. under weak climate action, the demand for these new processes in 2030 could be up to 4,000 times higher than the actual capabilities. The next ten years are crucial, Minx says. But innovation takes time – and a reliable regulatory framework that makes rapid advancement possible in the first place.
Oliver Geden, climate researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and another author of the CDR report, formulates concrete demands on the German government. It must develop a CDR strategy:
There are other important details, such as how to deal with carbon dioxide that is taken out of the atmosphere but not permanently stored. “Governments need to say publicly: How much CDR do they want to do? With what methods? Who is responsible? Who pays?” says Geden. “That should be the aspiration, for every country, every government, every company that says we want to achieve net zero. Those who don’t have an answer to that, their net zero goal can’t really be taken seriously.”
Sultan Ahmed Al-Jaber, the president-designate of COP28 in Dubai, has grand visions: “There is no other way to really address our climate challenge. We need to make transformational progress,” he said during his first speech as the future head of the next climate conference. He said it was important to be honest; on the path of the Paris climate agreement, global emissions would have to fall by 43 percent by 2030 – “we are way off track.” He wants to achieve progress on emissions reductions, adaptation, climate finance and loss and damage, Al-Jaber said last week at a meeting in Abu Dhabi.
Al-Jaber is a busy man. He is also his country’s minister of industry, heads the state-owned oil company ADNOC, and runs Masdar, which is building a model eco-city. Now the sultan is also the climate envoy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He presents his country as a regional pioneer in climate action. According to Al-Jaber, the United Arab Emirates – a monarchy with a parliament – has:
Ahmed Al-Jaber spoke at an Atlantic Council event in Abu Dhabi. Its chair, Frederick Kempe, defended him against criticism from environmental activists, saying that it was precisely because of his “rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels,” that made him the ideal choice for COP president.
EU Climate Commissioner Frans Timmermans also praised Al-Jaber as being “ideally placed to play a leading role in this huge, huge transition.” He has “been leading the charge to also take the oil and gas industry into a sustainable world.” Timmermans believes the financial resources to shape the COP and transform the industry are readily available in the UAE. The country’s sovereign wealth funds would be well-stocked from oil and gas revenues. Of the world’s 20 largest funds, four are owned by the Emirates.
International environmental organizations took offense at Al-Jaber’s appointment. Greenpeace spoke of a “dangerous precedent” that undermined trust in COP. The Climate Action Network (CAN) called for Al-Jaber’s resignation from his post as head of the oil company ADNOC. Some climate activists have long called for representatives of the fossil fuel industries to be excluded from the UN process. At COP27 in Egypt, more than 600 lobby representatives had been accredited, primarily from the gas industry.
The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) gave the Emirates a poor climate rating: Overall, the monarchy’s climate goals and measures are “highly inadequate,” according to a comprehensive analysis. The NDCs, for example, envisage the country’s emissions remaining at around 2021 levels by 2030, while planned measures would more likely suggest an increase of around 30 percent above 2010 levels. Despite major expansion plans for renewables, the report says the country’s energy strategy would rely heavily on oil and gas and thus be incompatible with the UAE’s goal of reaching net zero by 2050. On the “fair share” of climate change performance, the CAT even gives the Emirates the worst rating: “Critically insufficient.”
“The Emirates see themselves geographically and politically as a mediator between Europe, Africa and Asia,” says Eckart Woertz, director of the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies. The country would continue to rely on its wealth from oil and gas, but would also develop its renewable potential in parallel. It is no surprise that Al-Jaber speaks of “fossil fuels with the smallest carbon footprint”. This is because oil and gas from the Gulf region are relatively easy and cheap to extract and have a comparatively small CO2 footprint. Al-Jaber also talks about the “decarbonization” of the oil and gas sector – without providing any details.
“The Emirates, like the Saudis, are betting that they will be among the last oil producers and will be able to run this business for a long time,” Woertz said. After all, the UAE is also building large chemical plants to process oil, including in the plastics industry. In addition, the Emirates are betting on hydrogen, which they produce from their natural gas. This process involves capturing and harnessing carbon dioxide – primarily to maintain reservoir pressure in oil fields for better exploitation. In the future, the country could also produce hydrogen from renewables.
The Emirates themselves “still have a huge ecological footprint,” according to Woertz. “Economic growth matters most there, that is not a degrowth mentality.” Apart from the politically praised flagship eco-project Masdar City, which is expected to house about 50,000 people in 2030, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have a combined population of about five million. In both cities, “real estate development is taking place without much regard for sustainability.”
Like many countries in the Persian Gulf, the UAE has high per capita carbon emissions of around 22 metric tons per year. However, the figure has fallen significantly since 1970 from 80 tons. With around 0.1 percent of the world’s population, the wealthy country currently contributes around half a percent to global greenhouse gas emissions each year.
Preparations for COP have been very professional so far, according to international observers. The team around Al-Jaber is staffed with many experts from Europe, Australia and Africa. The country reportedly maintains direct contact with all major and important players and also African states. Al-Jaber is considered a man who “thinks in visions” and is enthusiastic about technical solutions. The country has “a lot of money and tremendous self-confidence,” and the organization of the COP so far has been excellent. “The conference will not lack food or drink, unlike in Egypt,” says one expert.
The battle for climate-relevant future technologies markets is in full swing – and Asia is often ahead. Large parts of the production capacity for green tech in most sectors are located in China or the Asia-Pacific region. China alone controls more than half of the manufacturing in almost all key sectors.
China’s weak economic data for 2022 substantiate the suspicion that the country could soon reach the peak of its CO2 emissions. The Chinese economy grew by just three percent last year, and there was even a decline in economic output in particularly emissions-intensive industries, according to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Originally, the People’s Republic had targeted growth of 5.5 percent.
The following industrial data are particularly relevant to China’s carbon emissions:
According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in Helsinki, these figures indicate a decline in CO2 emissions in 2022. Emissions already fell between Q3 2021 and Q2 2022 in each case. A weakening real estate sector and the COVID-19 pandemic are responsible for this.
China’s population also declined for the first time in 60 years, according to official data. It shows that the People’s Republic now has a population of just 1.412 billion – a decline of 850,000 people. The birth rate fell to its lowest level since record keeping. The mortality rate rose to its highest level since 1976. nib
Climate protests are on the rise around the world in the wake of the climate crisis. The Washington-based think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has now released a Climate Protest Tracker. The interactive Internet tool can be used to track where climate protests took place around the world in 2022 – and what the consequences were.
The researchers recorded around two dozen climate protests in 41 countries for the past year. Many of the protests came from civil society and called for stricter climate policies. But some protests sought to achieve the opposite: In New Zealand, for example, farmers demonstrated against a tax on the climate-damaging gas methane.
Many protests, like the Fridays For Future movement or the Scientist Rebellion, are active in different countries and across national borders. At the latest since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, climate protests are also increasingly taking on a geopolitical dimension. kul
Germany and France’s support for the implementation of the European Green Deal is indispensable – and unequivocal. This is particularly evident in the fact that the climate component of the pact was adopted at the end of 2022. The aim is to bring it into line with the 55 percent emissions reduction target by 2030.
But will that be enough? The energy crisis is putting pressure on all EU countries. A lot of money was spent to tackle the Covid pandemic. Now governments have to keep their expenses in check – and simultaneously find solutions for the current economic, social and ecological crises.
The European project and the cohesion of the Union are threatened by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. While the pandemic has strengthened European solidarity, and Germany and France are working together to revive the economy, the risks of divergence remain numerous. Going at it alone must not be an option.
The EU quickly passed emergency measures after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and developed a strategy to get through the winter, adjust its energy mix, and skim off excess profits. Member states provided aid to businesses and households. But many measures were aimed in different directions.
Of course, each country has sovereignty in finding solutions to the social problems posed by this crisis. The French energy price shield was particularly massive, protecting households from the sharpest price surges. But it was not sufficiently focused on the poorest households, it was not accompanied by accelerated support for investment in energy-saving devices, and it protected businesses more than households.
Germany, for its part, is accused of using its own aid program to organize a kind of competitive devaluation by lowering domestic energy prices to support its industry. There seems to be no coordination between the two countries.
The race for economic crisis aid, which could soon turn into a race for new green investments, is a cause for concern for other member states. Their national coffers are not well filled. There is a great risk that this kind of crisis management will lead to growing economic egoism on the continent. It is only partially averted at present by solidarity mechanisms around joint debt such as “NextGenerationEU“.
Under these harmful political conditions, the EU cannot refrain from considering new forms of joint debt. France is making proposals on this, while Germany is seen as more reluctant. Both should deepen their dialogue on this matter – in transparency toward the other member states, especially during the Franco-German Council of Ministers, which will celebrate 60 years of friendship and pragmatic compromises around the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty next Sunday.
Should we return to the macroeconomic orthodoxy of the past? Given the amounts that the United States or China put on the table, it is reasonable that European players are not the last to allow state aid as well. Even more so if they appear necessary to support the green transformation of the industry.
What is not sufficiently discussed, however, is the distribution of state aid paid by the member states to the companies. Statistics from the EU Commission on contributions within the temporary crisis framework speak a clear language: More than half is paid by Germany to its companies. 24 percent by France to its own economic actors. And the rest is shared between the other 25 member states!
This is something that needs to be addressed. The players and member states that are more reticent about state aid and committed to free competition must be heard. The European response to the American and Chinese plans must be built together with them. Otherwise, there is a risk of exacerbating economic imbalances within the single market. A joint approach is needed to develop and support the green industry.
What about trade policy? Germany and France have finally agreed on how to integrate climate action into trade policy. But for the EU’s trading partners in the Global South, especially in Africa, there are also risks. In the race for state aid between the major economic powers of Asia, Europe and the USA, they could be pushed out of the markets.
Although promises are made that their interests will be taken into account when sourcing green gas or hydrogen from them, this does hardly conceal the individual strategies pursued by the member states, especially by Germany. European actors do not show African partners that they recognized the harmful effects of other large, uncoordinated economic decisions on their potential for economic development. This will also be very dangerous for the European project.
Be it in joint debt policy, government subsidies for climate-friendly transformation or energy-related trade policy: If Germany and France, the EU’s two economic heavyweights, do not want to jeopardize its cohesion, they must coordinate their efforts better.
Sébastian Treyer is the executive director of the Paris-based sustainability think tank IDDRI. Nicolas Berghmans is IDDRI’s leading European affairs, energy and climate expert.
Markus Krebber is one of Germany’s most sought-after business leaders. The RWE chief has to transform one of the country’s largest energy suppliers from a coal giant into a renewable provider – while politicians and industry worry about energy security. His company is currently under fire once again: The clearance of Lützerath is generating negative publicity.
In the past few days, not much has been heard from Markus Krebber. The 49-year-old economist has not publicly commented on the protests in Lützerath and the partly violent clearance. From a PR perspective, this is understandable. Krebber has been at the helm of RWE since May 2021 and wants to be seen as the doer of the energy transition, transforming the energy giant with billions in investments. Images of police officers in front of RWE coal excavators are not helping.
Krebber, a native of Kleve, has had an exhausting few months. Last year, Russia’s attack on Ukraine turned Germany’s energy supply upside down. Many certainties wavered: Electricity rates spiked, and there was talk of blackouts and the de-industrialization of Germany.
Yet everything is supposed to get better and, above all, greener. RWE wants to invest at least 50 billion euros in renewables by 2030, 15 billion of which will be invested in Germany. The company is now the world’s second-largest operator of offshore wind farms. Krebber assured that the large profits from rising electricity prices will also be fully reinvested. Overall, carbon emissions from RWE power plants fell from a good 130 million metric tons (2017) to just under 81 million metric tons (2021).
But then the Ukraine war hit. In the summer of 2022, Krebber demanded that in order to save gas, coal-fired power plants had to be reconnected to the grid “as quickly as possible.” In the end, three lignite-fired piles were reactivated. A step backward? Krebber defends this move. He says he is proud of the company. RWE would help become independent of Russian gas, he said. The additional emissions would be absorbed in the medium term by EU emissions trading and thus reduced elsewhere, says Krebber. This is a view shared by climate economist Ottmar Edenhofer.
Krebber dismisses any criticism of RWE in interviews and points to politics. The energy transition is being delayed by the slow expansion of the power grids and lengthy approval procedures, he says. And if RWE wanted to shut down all fossil-fuel power plants within two years, the German Federal Network Agency would forbid it in the interests of energy security.
Krebber is a sought-after man for the German government. Between mid-December 2021 and September 2022, he held 28 private meetings with politicians in Berlin, as a minor interpellation by the Left Party showed. Discussion topics have ranged from LNG, Germany’s coal supply, the EU’s taxonomy for green investments and hydrogen infrastructure.
Even though RWE is pouring billions into renewables, things are still far from green. RWE is too “sluggish and slow” in the energy transition, according to Claudia Kemfert of the German Institute for Economic Research. Lignite and hard coal are still the group’s largest electricity suppliers. According to some studies, RWE is the largest carbon emitter in Germany and/or Europe. The company is responsible for 0.5 percent of the global historic carbon emissions, one study found. This also earned the group a lawsuit from Peruvian small farmer Saúl Luciano Lliuya – which has regularly brought the company negative headlines for the past seven years.
According to analysts, RWE would “immediately give away the coal business for nil, even though there are profits attached to it,” as Guido Hoymann of Bankhaus Metzler told Tagesschau.de. He believes coal is a drag on the company’s bottom line and scares off green investors. RWE itself reports that renewables and energy trading accounted for far more of the company’s profit in the first nine months of 2022 than coal. And before the Ukraine crisis, there was even talk that the German state might take over the coal business altogether.
Markus Krebber can probably do the math. Before joining RWE, he gained over a decade of professional experience at McKinsey and Commerzbank. In November 2012, he moved to RWE’s finance division. Krebber, who grew up in Emmerich, has roots in the Rhine-Ruhr region, studied economics in Duisburg and Pennsylvania and earned his doctorate at Humboldt University. He has five children and is considered an art aficionado. Nico Beckert
The images from Lützerath protests not only weigh heavily on German politics, but also on Germany’s global climate image. On the one hand promoting coal and clearing protests, in some cases by force, on the other hand pleading for more ambition at COP conferences? This is seen as hypocrisy. Germany is still stuck in the 20th century, says Richard Klein of the Stockholm Environment Institute. According to Klein, Germany lacks a coherent strategy for climate action and the energy transition.
That would also help with the next COP host. The United Arab Emirates has appointed Sultan Ahmed Al-Jaber, head of the government-owned oil company, as COP president. He attempts to strike a balance between fossil fuels and climate action and wants to decarbonize oil and gas – in other words, save climate action and his country’s business model, as Bernhard Pötter reports. Can this work?
Big green promises are also associated with carbon dioxide removal technologies. So far, however, they remove very little CO2 from the air. The authors of a first global CDR stocktaking say: Policymakers need to create the conditions for new technologies to grow very quickly. But so far, many governments seem clueless.
Starting today, you will also find charts in our new “Climate In Numbers” category. We look forward to receiving your criticism, tips and suggestions about our new category and in general.
Mr. Klein, do the images from Lützerath have any impact on Germany’s position in global climate policy?
Yes, definitely. In general, the world has an impression of Germany’s climate action that is not as good as Germany would like it to be. This began with the VW scandal and the emission fraud and continued with ongoing debates about the lack of a speed limit and, in general, the completely failed transport policy from a climate action perspective. Abroad, there is the perception that Germany says all the right things and certainly supports other countries financially in doing the right things, but has major problems at home developing and implementing the right policies itself.
What is the effect of the current images of the police hauling away climate activists?
I don’t think the prevailing perception is that these images are the result of an unfortunate government constellation that may change with the next elections. Rather, many people abroad see the clearing of Lützerath and sticking to the expansion of Garzweiler as something fundamental: Germany is doing everything it can to maintain a status quo that is stuck in the 20th century. This comes as a shock to many because Germany has long benefited from a leadership role in technical excellence, inventiveness and progress that has made it one of the most technologically advanced countries. Another shock for many abroad is that there is also a polarization in Germany between people who are stuck in the 20th century and those who want to arrive in the 21st century.
The images from Lützerath are making waves around the world. What do they mean for Germany’s negotiating position on the climate stage? Will the negotiators at the next COP tell Foreign Minister Baerbock: You say a lot here, but at home, you’re digging for lignite?
Germany is certainly not alone in that regard. The UK, home of COP26, is also opening a new coal mine. The general opinion is that Europeans say the right things, but do something different. That’s duplicity, many also say: hypocrisy. The negotiators are aware of this, of course. The instrument that the Europeans still have is support for climate action through finance and know-how transfer. But that is also changing. Germany cannot buy its way out of its climate action dilemma.
What does that mean?
The German dilemma gives emerging countries like Indonesia, South Africa or Pakistan very good arguments to counter German demands. They can now say: We need much more aid because you can see in your own countries how difficult this transformation is. Even in view of the flood disaster in the Ahr Valley in 2021, many asked why it is only the developing countries that actually have to submit climate change adaptation plans to the UN. They have a point. How can Germany advise other countries on how to adapt to climate change if its own country lacks proper risk awareness and concrete plans?
Germany strongly supported the rights of Egyptian civil society at COP27 and even risked a diplomatic dispute with Egypt over the issue. Now the German government is cracking down on climate activists and civil society in its own country. How does that look on the international stage?
It does not look good, speaking of hypocrisy. Many countries, including Egypt, will officially say: This is an internal matter – also in order to use this argument to prevent further intervention by the Germans. But when, for example, Germany once again comments on the situation of civil society, they will have these examples at hand to justify the suppression of their own opposition – even if it has a completely different dimension. And there are more subtle and diplomatic ways to rub Germany’s nose in it. The fact that the OECD is now sending election observers to Berlin for the elections is one such way.
What does Lützerath mean for the German negotiators at COP28 in Dubai?
Behind closed doors, there is certainly a sentiment that Germany should get its own affairs in order first before telling others what to do. In energy policy, but also in how the police treat civil society. The lectures from Germany and other Europeans are tolerated because they come with a lot of money. But the United Arab Emirates, the COP28 hosts, do not need German or European money. They won’t care much what the Germans say. What the UAE wants is an agreement that advances the UN process and makes them look good as hosts. They have to balance the interests of countries that want to do more and do it faster, like Germany, with countries that want to do it more slowly, like Saudi Arabia. Egypt was more receptive to pressure from Europe and the United States.
So Germany’s position in Dubai is weaker regardless?
The negotiators know that it was not the Foreign Office that cleared Lützerath. When Baerbock and Morgan talk behind closed doors, that is understood. The question is: Who can use this, and how in public, to put pressure on Germany? And with Lützerath, Germany has given ammunition to those who try to slow down the climate process to gain more for themselves and less for the climate in negotiations.
If the German government were to ask you for advice on how to deal with these images: What would you say?
I would advise them to announce a coherent government strategy on climate policy and the energy transition. Above all, it needs to be made clear internationally how Germany wants to move forward: That the country wants to get on an actual climate path – despite briefly generating more coal-fired power due to the war, despite the new LNG terminals, and finally also through real measures in the transport sector. Such an overall strategy would be urgently needed. With it, Germany would have to make clear how it wants to arrive in the 21st century when it comes to energy, transport and industrial policy. And a symbol of this would be to end the Germans’ incredible love affair with the car. It’s like the obsession with firearms in the USA: They stand for freedom, ownership, self-confidence and independence, have a big lobby and a traditionally strong position. It’s a bit like that in Germany with cars.
Richard Klein is head of the International Climate Risk and Adaptation Group at the think tank Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). He is a specialist in adaptation and international climate policy, professor of geography at Linköping University and lives in Bonn.
Worldwide, mankind currently emits more than 41 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide per year. If other greenhouse gases are included, the volume rises to around 50 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents. At the same time – and this is an initial estimate – around two billion metric tons of carbon dioxide are removed from the atmosphere each year. But most of this is the result of reforestation. New technologies contribute only two million tons to carbon removal.
These numbers come from the recently published State of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) report. It is the first scientific CDR stocktaking. More are to follow at regular intervals. The report shows that new types of CDR methods such as BECCS, biochar or direct air capture are still in their infancy – and how urgent it would be to scale them up.
Because in order to meet the Paris climate targets, the world requires CDR on a large scale. All the scenarios from the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, which are reasonably likely to limit global warming to two degrees or less, include CDR. And almost all 1.5-degree scenarios assume net negative emissions. The more global greenhouse gas emissions rise, the greater the need becomes. Serious climate action must therefore achieve both: Rapidly and radically cutting emissions and quickly advancing CDR methods now.
But politicians do not have a plan for this. The report also shows this. In the current climate action plans, which focus on the year 2030, and the long-term strategies of individual countries for the year 2050, “the projected amounts for CO2 removals are only slightly larger” than the amounts realized today, says Jan Minx, a climate scientist at the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC). Minx co-authored the CDR report. According to the report, none of the long-term strategies includes a target quantifying what role CDR should play in the future.
In conclusion, the researchers see a “considerable gap” between the amounts of CDR that would be needed to achieve the Paris climate targets and the concrete CDR plans of governments for the year 2030. Even with ambitious climate action, which the world is “miles away from,” this gap will not close anytime soon, Minx criticizes. “This is especially true for innovative methods like BECCS and direct air capture.”
The report estimates that in the extreme case, i.e. under weak climate action, the demand for these new processes in 2030 could be up to 4,000 times higher than the actual capabilities. The next ten years are crucial, Minx says. But innovation takes time – and a reliable regulatory framework that makes rapid advancement possible in the first place.
Oliver Geden, climate researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and another author of the CDR report, formulates concrete demands on the German government. It must develop a CDR strategy:
There are other important details, such as how to deal with carbon dioxide that is taken out of the atmosphere but not permanently stored. “Governments need to say publicly: How much CDR do they want to do? With what methods? Who is responsible? Who pays?” says Geden. “That should be the aspiration, for every country, every government, every company that says we want to achieve net zero. Those who don’t have an answer to that, their net zero goal can’t really be taken seriously.”
Sultan Ahmed Al-Jaber, the president-designate of COP28 in Dubai, has grand visions: “There is no other way to really address our climate challenge. We need to make transformational progress,” he said during his first speech as the future head of the next climate conference. He said it was important to be honest; on the path of the Paris climate agreement, global emissions would have to fall by 43 percent by 2030 – “we are way off track.” He wants to achieve progress on emissions reductions, adaptation, climate finance and loss and damage, Al-Jaber said last week at a meeting in Abu Dhabi.
Al-Jaber is a busy man. He is also his country’s minister of industry, heads the state-owned oil company ADNOC, and runs Masdar, which is building a model eco-city. Now the sultan is also the climate envoy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). He presents his country as a regional pioneer in climate action. According to Al-Jaber, the United Arab Emirates – a monarchy with a parliament – has:
Ahmed Al-Jaber spoke at an Atlantic Council event in Abu Dhabi. Its chair, Frederick Kempe, defended him against criticism from environmental activists, saying that it was precisely because of his “rich background in both renewables and fossil fuels,” that made him the ideal choice for COP president.
EU Climate Commissioner Frans Timmermans also praised Al-Jaber as being “ideally placed to play a leading role in this huge, huge transition.” He has “been leading the charge to also take the oil and gas industry into a sustainable world.” Timmermans believes the financial resources to shape the COP and transform the industry are readily available in the UAE. The country’s sovereign wealth funds would be well-stocked from oil and gas revenues. Of the world’s 20 largest funds, four are owned by the Emirates.
International environmental organizations took offense at Al-Jaber’s appointment. Greenpeace spoke of a “dangerous precedent” that undermined trust in COP. The Climate Action Network (CAN) called for Al-Jaber’s resignation from his post as head of the oil company ADNOC. Some climate activists have long called for representatives of the fossil fuel industries to be excluded from the UN process. At COP27 in Egypt, more than 600 lobby representatives had been accredited, primarily from the gas industry.
The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) gave the Emirates a poor climate rating: Overall, the monarchy’s climate goals and measures are “highly inadequate,” according to a comprehensive analysis. The NDCs, for example, envisage the country’s emissions remaining at around 2021 levels by 2030, while planned measures would more likely suggest an increase of around 30 percent above 2010 levels. Despite major expansion plans for renewables, the report says the country’s energy strategy would rely heavily on oil and gas and thus be incompatible with the UAE’s goal of reaching net zero by 2050. On the “fair share” of climate change performance, the CAT even gives the Emirates the worst rating: “Critically insufficient.”
“The Emirates see themselves geographically and politically as a mediator between Europe, Africa and Asia,” says Eckart Woertz, director of the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies. The country would continue to rely on its wealth from oil and gas, but would also develop its renewable potential in parallel. It is no surprise that Al-Jaber speaks of “fossil fuels with the smallest carbon footprint”. This is because oil and gas from the Gulf region are relatively easy and cheap to extract and have a comparatively small CO2 footprint. Al-Jaber also talks about the “decarbonization” of the oil and gas sector – without providing any details.
“The Emirates, like the Saudis, are betting that they will be among the last oil producers and will be able to run this business for a long time,” Woertz said. After all, the UAE is also building large chemical plants to process oil, including in the plastics industry. In addition, the Emirates are betting on hydrogen, which they produce from their natural gas. This process involves capturing and harnessing carbon dioxide – primarily to maintain reservoir pressure in oil fields for better exploitation. In the future, the country could also produce hydrogen from renewables.
The Emirates themselves “still have a huge ecological footprint,” according to Woertz. “Economic growth matters most there, that is not a degrowth mentality.” Apart from the politically praised flagship eco-project Masdar City, which is expected to house about 50,000 people in 2030, Dubai and Abu Dhabi have a combined population of about five million. In both cities, “real estate development is taking place without much regard for sustainability.”
Like many countries in the Persian Gulf, the UAE has high per capita carbon emissions of around 22 metric tons per year. However, the figure has fallen significantly since 1970 from 80 tons. With around 0.1 percent of the world’s population, the wealthy country currently contributes around half a percent to global greenhouse gas emissions each year.
Preparations for COP have been very professional so far, according to international observers. The team around Al-Jaber is staffed with many experts from Europe, Australia and Africa. The country reportedly maintains direct contact with all major and important players and also African states. Al-Jaber is considered a man who “thinks in visions” and is enthusiastic about technical solutions. The country has “a lot of money and tremendous self-confidence,” and the organization of the COP so far has been excellent. “The conference will not lack food or drink, unlike in Egypt,” says one expert.
The battle for climate-relevant future technologies markets is in full swing – and Asia is often ahead. Large parts of the production capacity for green tech in most sectors are located in China or the Asia-Pacific region. China alone controls more than half of the manufacturing in almost all key sectors.
China’s weak economic data for 2022 substantiate the suspicion that the country could soon reach the peak of its CO2 emissions. The Chinese economy grew by just three percent last year, and there was even a decline in economic output in particularly emissions-intensive industries, according to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics. Originally, the People’s Republic had targeted growth of 5.5 percent.
The following industrial data are particularly relevant to China’s carbon emissions:
According to Lauri Myllyvirta, China expert at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air in Helsinki, these figures indicate a decline in CO2 emissions in 2022. Emissions already fell between Q3 2021 and Q2 2022 in each case. A weakening real estate sector and the COVID-19 pandemic are responsible for this.
China’s population also declined for the first time in 60 years, according to official data. It shows that the People’s Republic now has a population of just 1.412 billion – a decline of 850,000 people. The birth rate fell to its lowest level since record keeping. The mortality rate rose to its highest level since 1976. nib
Climate protests are on the rise around the world in the wake of the climate crisis. The Washington-based think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has now released a Climate Protest Tracker. The interactive Internet tool can be used to track where climate protests took place around the world in 2022 – and what the consequences were.
The researchers recorded around two dozen climate protests in 41 countries for the past year. Many of the protests came from civil society and called for stricter climate policies. But some protests sought to achieve the opposite: In New Zealand, for example, farmers demonstrated against a tax on the climate-damaging gas methane.
Many protests, like the Fridays For Future movement or the Scientist Rebellion, are active in different countries and across national borders. At the latest since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, climate protests are also increasingly taking on a geopolitical dimension. kul
Germany and France’s support for the implementation of the European Green Deal is indispensable – and unequivocal. This is particularly evident in the fact that the climate component of the pact was adopted at the end of 2022. The aim is to bring it into line with the 55 percent emissions reduction target by 2030.
But will that be enough? The energy crisis is putting pressure on all EU countries. A lot of money was spent to tackle the Covid pandemic. Now governments have to keep their expenses in check – and simultaneously find solutions for the current economic, social and ecological crises.
The European project and the cohesion of the Union are threatened by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. While the pandemic has strengthened European solidarity, and Germany and France are working together to revive the economy, the risks of divergence remain numerous. Going at it alone must not be an option.
The EU quickly passed emergency measures after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and developed a strategy to get through the winter, adjust its energy mix, and skim off excess profits. Member states provided aid to businesses and households. But many measures were aimed in different directions.
Of course, each country has sovereignty in finding solutions to the social problems posed by this crisis. The French energy price shield was particularly massive, protecting households from the sharpest price surges. But it was not sufficiently focused on the poorest households, it was not accompanied by accelerated support for investment in energy-saving devices, and it protected businesses more than households.
Germany, for its part, is accused of using its own aid program to organize a kind of competitive devaluation by lowering domestic energy prices to support its industry. There seems to be no coordination between the two countries.
The race for economic crisis aid, which could soon turn into a race for new green investments, is a cause for concern for other member states. Their national coffers are not well filled. There is a great risk that this kind of crisis management will lead to growing economic egoism on the continent. It is only partially averted at present by solidarity mechanisms around joint debt such as “NextGenerationEU“.
Under these harmful political conditions, the EU cannot refrain from considering new forms of joint debt. France is making proposals on this, while Germany is seen as more reluctant. Both should deepen their dialogue on this matter – in transparency toward the other member states, especially during the Franco-German Council of Ministers, which will celebrate 60 years of friendship and pragmatic compromises around the anniversary of the Élysée Treaty next Sunday.
Should we return to the macroeconomic orthodoxy of the past? Given the amounts that the United States or China put on the table, it is reasonable that European players are not the last to allow state aid as well. Even more so if they appear necessary to support the green transformation of the industry.
What is not sufficiently discussed, however, is the distribution of state aid paid by the member states to the companies. Statistics from the EU Commission on contributions within the temporary crisis framework speak a clear language: More than half is paid by Germany to its companies. 24 percent by France to its own economic actors. And the rest is shared between the other 25 member states!
This is something that needs to be addressed. The players and member states that are more reticent about state aid and committed to free competition must be heard. The European response to the American and Chinese plans must be built together with them. Otherwise, there is a risk of exacerbating economic imbalances within the single market. A joint approach is needed to develop and support the green industry.
What about trade policy? Germany and France have finally agreed on how to integrate climate action into trade policy. But for the EU’s trading partners in the Global South, especially in Africa, there are also risks. In the race for state aid between the major economic powers of Asia, Europe and the USA, they could be pushed out of the markets.
Although promises are made that their interests will be taken into account when sourcing green gas or hydrogen from them, this does hardly conceal the individual strategies pursued by the member states, especially by Germany. European actors do not show African partners that they recognized the harmful effects of other large, uncoordinated economic decisions on their potential for economic development. This will also be very dangerous for the European project.
Be it in joint debt policy, government subsidies for climate-friendly transformation or energy-related trade policy: If Germany and France, the EU’s two economic heavyweights, do not want to jeopardize its cohesion, they must coordinate their efforts better.
Sébastian Treyer is the executive director of the Paris-based sustainability think tank IDDRI. Nicolas Berghmans is IDDRI’s leading European affairs, energy and climate expert.
Markus Krebber is one of Germany’s most sought-after business leaders. The RWE chief has to transform one of the country’s largest energy suppliers from a coal giant into a renewable provider – while politicians and industry worry about energy security. His company is currently under fire once again: The clearance of Lützerath is generating negative publicity.
In the past few days, not much has been heard from Markus Krebber. The 49-year-old economist has not publicly commented on the protests in Lützerath and the partly violent clearance. From a PR perspective, this is understandable. Krebber has been at the helm of RWE since May 2021 and wants to be seen as the doer of the energy transition, transforming the energy giant with billions in investments. Images of police officers in front of RWE coal excavators are not helping.
Krebber, a native of Kleve, has had an exhausting few months. Last year, Russia’s attack on Ukraine turned Germany’s energy supply upside down. Many certainties wavered: Electricity rates spiked, and there was talk of blackouts and the de-industrialization of Germany.
Yet everything is supposed to get better and, above all, greener. RWE wants to invest at least 50 billion euros in renewables by 2030, 15 billion of which will be invested in Germany. The company is now the world’s second-largest operator of offshore wind farms. Krebber assured that the large profits from rising electricity prices will also be fully reinvested. Overall, carbon emissions from RWE power plants fell from a good 130 million metric tons (2017) to just under 81 million metric tons (2021).
But then the Ukraine war hit. In the summer of 2022, Krebber demanded that in order to save gas, coal-fired power plants had to be reconnected to the grid “as quickly as possible.” In the end, three lignite-fired piles were reactivated. A step backward? Krebber defends this move. He says he is proud of the company. RWE would help become independent of Russian gas, he said. The additional emissions would be absorbed in the medium term by EU emissions trading and thus reduced elsewhere, says Krebber. This is a view shared by climate economist Ottmar Edenhofer.
Krebber dismisses any criticism of RWE in interviews and points to politics. The energy transition is being delayed by the slow expansion of the power grids and lengthy approval procedures, he says. And if RWE wanted to shut down all fossil-fuel power plants within two years, the German Federal Network Agency would forbid it in the interests of energy security.
Krebber is a sought-after man for the German government. Between mid-December 2021 and September 2022, he held 28 private meetings with politicians in Berlin, as a minor interpellation by the Left Party showed. Discussion topics have ranged from LNG, Germany’s coal supply, the EU’s taxonomy for green investments and hydrogen infrastructure.
Even though RWE is pouring billions into renewables, things are still far from green. RWE is too “sluggish and slow” in the energy transition, according to Claudia Kemfert of the German Institute for Economic Research. Lignite and hard coal are still the group’s largest electricity suppliers. According to some studies, RWE is the largest carbon emitter in Germany and/or Europe. The company is responsible for 0.5 percent of the global historic carbon emissions, one study found. This also earned the group a lawsuit from Peruvian small farmer Saúl Luciano Lliuya – which has regularly brought the company negative headlines for the past seven years.
According to analysts, RWE would “immediately give away the coal business for nil, even though there are profits attached to it,” as Guido Hoymann of Bankhaus Metzler told Tagesschau.de. He believes coal is a drag on the company’s bottom line and scares off green investors. RWE itself reports that renewables and energy trading accounted for far more of the company’s profit in the first nine months of 2022 than coal. And before the Ukraine crisis, there was even talk that the German state might take over the coal business altogether.
Markus Krebber can probably do the math. Before joining RWE, he gained over a decade of professional experience at McKinsey and Commerzbank. In November 2012, he moved to RWE’s finance division. Krebber, who grew up in Emmerich, has roots in the Rhine-Ruhr region, studied economics in Duisburg and Pennsylvania and earned his doctorate at Humboldt University. He has five children and is considered an art aficionado. Nico Beckert
