There was hardly any room to breathe in the TV studios for the Bundestag elections. That’s how big the elephant in the room was – the climate crisis. This crucial issue for the future was barely addressed and rarely questioned when the AfD in particular denied or distorted facts. That’s why Alexandra Endres took a closer look at the role of fake news in this crucial election in this penultimate Climate.Table before the election. Her piece rounds off our series of fact-checks on the election.
But even on the other side of the world, one government is not so precise with the facts when it comes to the climate. New Zealand has presented an NDC – but only the government calls the content “ambitious,” writes our correspondent Marc Daalder. And the municipal utilities in many German cities probably no longer believe in the agreed climate neutrality by 2045 either.
All the more urgent: making the right decisions at the election on Sunday. You have the vote, we provided information for your decision-making. We can do it!
Best regards,
In the election campaign, politicians and parties sometimes deliberately spread false facts about climate policy: AfD, but also parts of the CDU/CSU and FDP criticize renewable energies as expensive subsidy models with abbreviated data and propagate allegedly cheap electricity from nuclear energy or the widespread dismantling of wind turbines. Although distorted representations are not uncommon in election campaigns, experts are warning of a new level: Fake news is being used deliberately to discredit political opponents. And social imbalances in politics make it even easier to spread false reports.
“There is always disinformation in election campaigns,” says Julia Metag, Professor of Communication Science at the University of Münster – in other words, deliberately disseminated misinformation that is intended to influence elections or undermine trust, for example. “Individual false reports do not yet have a major impact,” says Metag. “But as soon as disinformation becomes widespread, it can lead to fundamental uncertainty and a decline in trust in democratic processes. This falls on fertile ground, especially in a polarized society. In the German context, this is what the AfD is currently trying to do.”
The energy transition is currently a particularly “lucrative field” for populists, says Johanna Siebert, who works at the Progressive Center think tank, focusing on anti-democratic influence on climate and environmental policy. “It combines currently pressing issues such as the rising cost of living, the energy crisis, and the transformation to climate neutrality.” This is why the energy transition is constantly being called into question, says Siebert, “for example by Alice Weidel’s call at the AfD party conference to dismantle wind turbines on a large scale.” Another example is the “narrative fueled by the AfD that rising energy prices are due to the expansion of renewables or the nuclear phase-out – which is at least a highly distorted explanation due to the Russian war of aggression and the massive profits of fossil fuel companies in the energy crisis.”
Many examples of false statements in the current election campaign come from the AfD. In her conversation with Elon Musk, party leader Weidel claimed, for example, that nuclear power is CO2-neutral – which is refuted by a Correctiv fact check based on IPCC data, among other things. Weidel also said that Germany is the only industrialized country to have phased out nuclear energy – which is also not true.
The AfD uses the climate issue specifically to denigrate its political opponents, says Joe Düker, who studies right-wing extremist phenomena on the internet at the Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS). Their representatives speak of “climate socialism” and “green enemies of combustion engines” and stir up fears of a supposed “green deindustrialization.” Sometimes established parties adopt the right-wing rhetoric – for example, the CDU when it warns of “(green) deindustrialization“, or the FDP when party leader Christian Lindner conjures up an alleged “climate ideology“. “These are buzzwords that the AfD has been using for a long time to denigrate measures against climate action,” says Düker.
Research has shown that the largest proportion of false information comes “from the right-wing to right-wing conservative spectrum,” says communications researcher Metag. Some actors operate in a gray area: They do not formulate any hard false statements on climate or energy policy, but instead initiate fake debates, such as the CDU/CSU when they want to make heating climate-friendly through supposedly green oil, or the CDU/CSU and FDP when they advocate a renaissance of nuclear power like the AfD.
The aim of misinformation and disinformation is often to stir up uncertainty and thus undermine trust in democracy – and climate policy seems particularly suitable for this. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Mitte study from 2023 already gave indications of this.
However, climate policy also provides its opponents with points of attack, says expert Siebert. The accusation that climate policy is being made for a high-earning minority contains a kernel of truth: “Subsidy programs primarily benefit the higher earners. Those who suffer most from rising CO2 prices are those who already have to turn over every penny.” If populists succeed in combining this sense of injustice with the fear of unaffordably high prices and a broken economy, “then there is a lot of explosive power in it.”
There are ways to counter misinformation: Siebert advocates a more proactive debate on the question of who should be burdened – and relieved – by an effective climate policy. “A fair climate policy should relieve the burden on those at the bottom and make those at the top responsible in order to remove the breeding ground for populist narratives and misinformation,” she says. Düker advises politicians involved in climate action and the energy transition to be objective in the face of vilification – and to use particularly popular media in a targeted manner in order to reach many people.
Metag has four tips for people who want to promote climate policy even in the face of misinformation: Insist on the scientific consensus on climate change and communicate it. Avoid repeating misinformation as much as possible and instead focus on the actual facts. Maintain a dialogue across political differences of opinion in order to counteract the polarizing effect of disinformation. And finally: Talk about the economic, ecological and social facets of climate policy – for example about climate money, the Deutschlandticket, and public transport to reach people with a low household income in particular.
New Zealand’s new climate target for the period up to 2035 (NDC) under the Paris Agreement has drawn sharp criticism from climate activists. The former head of the IEA’s climate department called it “shockingly unambitious” and a former climate ambassador for the country said the government was “not taking the fight against climate change seriously.” The Conservative government, on the other hand, points out that the new NDC shifts significantly fewer climate protection efforts abroad. An analysis by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) concludes that the target is not ambitious enough to meet the 1.5-degree limit.
In contrast to the European Union and a number of other industrialized countries, New Zealand met the Feb. 10 deadline for submitting its climate target. However, New Zealand’s target only envisages reducing emissions by 51 to 55 percent by 2035 compared to 2005 levels. In mathematical terms, this is only one percentage point better than the previous target for 2030, which envisages a 50% reduction in emissions.
Announcing the target, New Zealand’s Minister for Climate Change, Simon Watts, said it was “both ambitious and achievable.” “Achieving this target means we are doing our fair share to reduce the impacts of climate change while enabling New Zealand to be stronger and thrive in the face of climate change,” he said.
CAT, on the other hand, criticizes that the new NDC could even allow higher net emissions compared to the 2030 target and entails greater uncertainties than the previous target.
The right-wing government elected in 2023 has inherited a difficult situation with the previous New Zealand NDC. This is because the plans up to 2030 envisage fulfilling one-third of the existing obligation through domestic measures and two-thirds through reduction measures abroad – probably by purchasing emission credits via Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
Overall, the latest forecasts indicate that New Zealand will need at least 84 million tons of these reduction measures abroad by 2030, at an estimated cost of NZD 3.4 to 19.1 billion (around two to ten billion euros). New Zealand’s emissions in 2022 were 78 million tons, which is higher than those of Switzerland, Ireland or Norway. If the sink function of New Zealand’s forests is taken into account, emissions fall to 59 million tons.
The reason for the heavy use of Article 6 is that more than half of New Zealand’s emissions come from agriculture, a sector for which there are hardly any effective, scalable technologies to reduce climate pollution. Emission reductions of more than 50 percent could therefore be achieved primarily through reforestation, shrinking the sector, or purchasing measures abroad.
From the government’s perspective, the new NDC for 2035 now represents an ambitious commitment as it is to be met entirely domestically. In other words, although the overall figure is not significantly different, the target will result in New Zealand’s domestic emissions falling by a further 24 to 29 percent between 2030 and 2035.
However, the independent Commission on Climate Change has found that more could be done domestically by 2035, namely a reduction of 59 to 63 percent compared to 2005 levels. While the Commission had urged the previous government to go further in reducing emissions, the new government has instead slowed down the pace.
As a result, the government now had little scope for a new NDC. The range of 51 to 55% chosen by the government represents the smallest possible interpretation of the “progression beyond the then current national contribution of the party” called for in the Paris Agreement.
The NDC has been poorly received internationally. Compared to the UK’s target of reducing emissions by 81 percent by 2035 compared to 1990, Switzerland, which has pledged 65 percent, and even the emerging country Brazil, which has committed to a 59 to 67 percent reduction, it seems less ambitious. Andreas Sieber from 350.org said that “the new NDC allows [New Zealand] to do nothing on climate.”
The situation is exacerbated by the accounting the government plans to implement to meet its NDC. The new target continues a long-standing New Zealand practice of gross-to-net accounting – it promises that net emissions in 2035 will be 51 to 55 percent below gross 2005 levels.
New Zealand’s important forestry sector, which acts as a huge CO2 sink, is counted towards achieving the target, but is not included in the baseline. In a net-net calculation, the new target only corresponds to a reduction of around 25 percent compared to the values from 2005 to 2035.
Furthermore, the new target deviates from the budget approach that New Zealand had previously relied on, to the delight of climate scientists. The new target is only a single-year target, which means that emissions can increase between 2031 and 2034 without jeopardizing the 2035 target.
Former New Zealand climate ambassador Kay Harrison had previously spoken out in favor of a target of at least minus 66 percent. “If New Zealand only commits to minus 51 percent when the global average is minus 60 percent, we expect other countries to set targets that make up for our shortfall. Their targets will have to be much higher than ours, and much higher than minus 60 percent,” she said. “It’s as if we’re paying the stake – the bare minimum – to stay in the most dangerous game of our lives. But we’re not serious about winning.”
It’s not just the political firewall against the AfD that seems to be crumbling. The German climate neutrality target for 2045, which is based on the climate ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, is also under fire.
According to its election manifesto, the FDP would like to replace it with the European 2050 climate target. Bavaria’s Minister of Economic Affairs Hubert Aiwanger, who wants to enter the Bundestag with his Free Voters, would like to mothball climate targets altogether, just like the AfD. And Siegfried Russwurm, head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) until the end of 2024, said that “the target years are not set in stone.”
Support is now also growing among municipal utilities for postponing the German climate target to 2050. Over 900 municipal utilities in Germany are responsible for energy, water, mobility and high-speed internet. They are regarded as key players in the energy transition, as they build electricity grids or supply households with district heating on site, i.e. in the regions, cities and municipalities. With their proximity to customers, municipal utilities are crucial for integrating renewables at a local level. “No energy transition without municipal utilities,” says the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW).
But behind closed doors, many in the industry are struggling with decarbonization. “Everyone knows that the 2045 target is completely illusory,” says the managing director of a municipal utility and medium-sized energy supplier that supplies 80,000 people with energy and water. However, the “political situation” is not yet ripe, “so everyone is staying quiet.”
He is also holding back for strategic reasons. After all, he has to expand his district heating network and must not spread doubt, “otherwise we won’t make any progress at all.” He therefore tells the city council – the majority of municipal utilities are owned by their local authorities – that “we have a plan, strong partners, a goal and we can do it.”
Other municipal utilities are also “putting on a good face. But everyone rolls their eyes over a beer after work.” His wish: “Politicians should finally make it clear that 2045 won’t work and postpone the German climate target to 2050.”
In his view, this would take the pressure and uncertainty off citizens. “We experience every day that a gas heating system breaks down and the owner doesn’t know what to do next.” Out of panic, they buy a heat pump – even if a district heating connection would be much cheaper for them. “But we can’t say when that will come,” says the Managing Director. Due to a lack of capacity, he can only install four kilometers of pipes per year. “But we would need six per year to achieve the 2045 climate target.”
Anton Berger, Partner at the consulting firm Rödl & Partner, also confirms the mood in the industry. The economist advises municipal utilities and says “hardly anyone would say ‘no’ to a postponement of the climate target, even if this is likely to slow down the transformation.” More resources are needed, such as construction companies. The current shortage is making the transformation more expensive for municipal utilities. “A little more time would certainly also take the financial pressure off,” says Berger.
There seems to be a lack of many things at the moment, according to reports from other municipal utility management levels. Electricity grids, storage facilities, specialists for civil engineering, fitters, excavators, financing.
According to a study by BDEW and consultants EY, EUR 721 billion in energy transition investments will be needed by 2030 alone. Huge investments will also be needed after that. “Realistically, hardly anyone believes that we will be climate-neutral in Germany by 2045 or at a national level by 2040. A postponement to 2050 would therefore make sense in order to have more time to refinance the huge investments. Especially in view of the shortage of skilled workers,” says the managing director of a municipal utility company in a major city in Baden-Württemberg, where the official goal is to be climate-neutral by 2040.
He thinks it is wrong to hold on to “an unrealistic goal. It will only lead to frustration and increase mistrust in politics.” The USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement will change the political discourse in Europe anyway.
Karl-Peter Hoffmann, Managing Director of Stadtwerke Sindelfingen, is even clearer and does not insist on anonymity. “We should postpone the German climate target – or say goodbye to a fixed end date right away. Realistically speaking, we won’t be climate-neutral by 2050 either, at least not without driving the population into the arms of populists or wrecking our industry.”
A position that is now echoed in broad political and business circles. Holger Lösch, Deputy Managing Director of the BDI, also recently warned in an interview with Table.Briefings that German climate policy is leading to deindustrialization. So would it be better to slow down instead of chasing a distant goal – or make an even greater effort to at least stay close to the target?
According to projections by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA), the goal of net greenhouse gas neutrality in 2045 cannot be achieved with current climate protection instruments. The German Association of Local Utilities (VKU) also concludes in a study that the target of a 55% CO₂ reduction by 2030 is “likely” to fail at EU level based on current emission forecasts from EU member states. The association therefore warns against further tightening the climate targets, but at least commits to “the legal goal of climate neutrality by 2045 for Germany” when asked.
The German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW), which also represents large energy suppliers, is less clear. “The energy sector is geared towards this goal, many investments have been made with the 2045 neutrality target in mind and want to continue to be made. […] But we also recognize the need for pragmatism and ambitious feasibility,” says Managing Director Kerstin Andreae.
There are several arguments against postponing decarbonization. Starting with the fact that Germany cannot simply disregard EU law. And there are also voices in the industry warning against entering into a discussion about climate targets now.
“That would just be an alibi campaign,” says Thomas Gebhart, CEO of Stadtwerke Saarbrücken. He no longer believes in the 2045 target either, but still wants to stick to it. “If you postpone once, you postpone again and again.” Planning is essential. “Even if we don’t quite make it, we clearly have in mind that we can hardly burn any more fossil fuels by the middle of the century.” Johannes Rager, Managing Director of Stadtwerke Ludwigsburg-Kornwestheim, also wants to stick with 2045, although he also confirms that most of his colleagues would prefer to postpone. He fears that “otherwise we will need another five to ten years longer. But climate change won’t wait.”
There was hardly any room to breathe in the TV studios for the Bundestag elections. That’s how big the elephant in the room was – the climate crisis. This crucial issue for the future was barely addressed and rarely questioned when the AfD in particular denied or distorted facts. That’s why Alexandra Endres took a closer look at the role of fake news in this crucial election in this penultimate Climate.Table before the election. Her piece rounds off our series of fact-checks on the election.
But even on the other side of the world, one government is not so precise with the facts when it comes to the climate. New Zealand has presented an NDC – but only the government calls the content “ambitious,” writes our correspondent Marc Daalder. And the municipal utilities in many German cities probably no longer believe in the agreed climate neutrality by 2045 either.
All the more urgent: making the right decisions at the election on Sunday. You have the vote, we provided information for your decision-making. We can do it!
Best regards,
In the election campaign, politicians and parties sometimes deliberately spread false facts about climate policy: AfD, but also parts of the CDU/CSU and FDP criticize renewable energies as expensive subsidy models with abbreviated data and propagate allegedly cheap electricity from nuclear energy or the widespread dismantling of wind turbines. Although distorted representations are not uncommon in election campaigns, experts are warning of a new level: Fake news is being used deliberately to discredit political opponents. And social imbalances in politics make it even easier to spread false reports.
“There is always disinformation in election campaigns,” says Julia Metag, Professor of Communication Science at the University of Münster – in other words, deliberately disseminated misinformation that is intended to influence elections or undermine trust, for example. “Individual false reports do not yet have a major impact,” says Metag. “But as soon as disinformation becomes widespread, it can lead to fundamental uncertainty and a decline in trust in democratic processes. This falls on fertile ground, especially in a polarized society. In the German context, this is what the AfD is currently trying to do.”
The energy transition is currently a particularly “lucrative field” for populists, says Johanna Siebert, who works at the Progressive Center think tank, focusing on anti-democratic influence on climate and environmental policy. “It combines currently pressing issues such as the rising cost of living, the energy crisis, and the transformation to climate neutrality.” This is why the energy transition is constantly being called into question, says Siebert, “for example by Alice Weidel’s call at the AfD party conference to dismantle wind turbines on a large scale.” Another example is the “narrative fueled by the AfD that rising energy prices are due to the expansion of renewables or the nuclear phase-out – which is at least a highly distorted explanation due to the Russian war of aggression and the massive profits of fossil fuel companies in the energy crisis.”
Many examples of false statements in the current election campaign come from the AfD. In her conversation with Elon Musk, party leader Weidel claimed, for example, that nuclear power is CO2-neutral – which is refuted by a Correctiv fact check based on IPCC data, among other things. Weidel also said that Germany is the only industrialized country to have phased out nuclear energy – which is also not true.
The AfD uses the climate issue specifically to denigrate its political opponents, says Joe Düker, who studies right-wing extremist phenomena on the internet at the Center for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS). Their representatives speak of “climate socialism” and “green enemies of combustion engines” and stir up fears of a supposed “green deindustrialization.” Sometimes established parties adopt the right-wing rhetoric – for example, the CDU when it warns of “(green) deindustrialization“, or the FDP when party leader Christian Lindner conjures up an alleged “climate ideology“. “These are buzzwords that the AfD has been using for a long time to denigrate measures against climate action,” says Düker.
Research has shown that the largest proportion of false information comes “from the right-wing to right-wing conservative spectrum,” says communications researcher Metag. Some actors operate in a gray area: They do not formulate any hard false statements on climate or energy policy, but instead initiate fake debates, such as the CDU/CSU when they want to make heating climate-friendly through supposedly green oil, or the CDU/CSU and FDP when they advocate a renaissance of nuclear power like the AfD.
The aim of misinformation and disinformation is often to stir up uncertainty and thus undermine trust in democracy – and climate policy seems particularly suitable for this. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s Mitte study from 2023 already gave indications of this.
However, climate policy also provides its opponents with points of attack, says expert Siebert. The accusation that climate policy is being made for a high-earning minority contains a kernel of truth: “Subsidy programs primarily benefit the higher earners. Those who suffer most from rising CO2 prices are those who already have to turn over every penny.” If populists succeed in combining this sense of injustice with the fear of unaffordably high prices and a broken economy, “then there is a lot of explosive power in it.”
There are ways to counter misinformation: Siebert advocates a more proactive debate on the question of who should be burdened – and relieved – by an effective climate policy. “A fair climate policy should relieve the burden on those at the bottom and make those at the top responsible in order to remove the breeding ground for populist narratives and misinformation,” she says. Düker advises politicians involved in climate action and the energy transition to be objective in the face of vilification – and to use particularly popular media in a targeted manner in order to reach many people.
Metag has four tips for people who want to promote climate policy even in the face of misinformation: Insist on the scientific consensus on climate change and communicate it. Avoid repeating misinformation as much as possible and instead focus on the actual facts. Maintain a dialogue across political differences of opinion in order to counteract the polarizing effect of disinformation. And finally: Talk about the economic, ecological and social facets of climate policy – for example about climate money, the Deutschlandticket, and public transport to reach people with a low household income in particular.
New Zealand’s new climate target for the period up to 2035 (NDC) under the Paris Agreement has drawn sharp criticism from climate activists. The former head of the IEA’s climate department called it “shockingly unambitious” and a former climate ambassador for the country said the government was “not taking the fight against climate change seriously.” The Conservative government, on the other hand, points out that the new NDC shifts significantly fewer climate protection efforts abroad. An analysis by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) concludes that the target is not ambitious enough to meet the 1.5-degree limit.
In contrast to the European Union and a number of other industrialized countries, New Zealand met the Feb. 10 deadline for submitting its climate target. However, New Zealand’s target only envisages reducing emissions by 51 to 55 percent by 2035 compared to 2005 levels. In mathematical terms, this is only one percentage point better than the previous target for 2030, which envisages a 50% reduction in emissions.
Announcing the target, New Zealand’s Minister for Climate Change, Simon Watts, said it was “both ambitious and achievable.” “Achieving this target means we are doing our fair share to reduce the impacts of climate change while enabling New Zealand to be stronger and thrive in the face of climate change,” he said.
CAT, on the other hand, criticizes that the new NDC could even allow higher net emissions compared to the 2030 target and entails greater uncertainties than the previous target.
The right-wing government elected in 2023 has inherited a difficult situation with the previous New Zealand NDC. This is because the plans up to 2030 envisage fulfilling one-third of the existing obligation through domestic measures and two-thirds through reduction measures abroad – probably by purchasing emission credits via Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.
Overall, the latest forecasts indicate that New Zealand will need at least 84 million tons of these reduction measures abroad by 2030, at an estimated cost of NZD 3.4 to 19.1 billion (around two to ten billion euros). New Zealand’s emissions in 2022 were 78 million tons, which is higher than those of Switzerland, Ireland or Norway. If the sink function of New Zealand’s forests is taken into account, emissions fall to 59 million tons.
The reason for the heavy use of Article 6 is that more than half of New Zealand’s emissions come from agriculture, a sector for which there are hardly any effective, scalable technologies to reduce climate pollution. Emission reductions of more than 50 percent could therefore be achieved primarily through reforestation, shrinking the sector, or purchasing measures abroad.
From the government’s perspective, the new NDC for 2035 now represents an ambitious commitment as it is to be met entirely domestically. In other words, although the overall figure is not significantly different, the target will result in New Zealand’s domestic emissions falling by a further 24 to 29 percent between 2030 and 2035.
However, the independent Commission on Climate Change has found that more could be done domestically by 2035, namely a reduction of 59 to 63 percent compared to 2005 levels. While the Commission had urged the previous government to go further in reducing emissions, the new government has instead slowed down the pace.
As a result, the government now had little scope for a new NDC. The range of 51 to 55% chosen by the government represents the smallest possible interpretation of the “progression beyond the then current national contribution of the party” called for in the Paris Agreement.
The NDC has been poorly received internationally. Compared to the UK’s target of reducing emissions by 81 percent by 2035 compared to 1990, Switzerland, which has pledged 65 percent, and even the emerging country Brazil, which has committed to a 59 to 67 percent reduction, it seems less ambitious. Andreas Sieber from 350.org said that “the new NDC allows [New Zealand] to do nothing on climate.”
The situation is exacerbated by the accounting the government plans to implement to meet its NDC. The new target continues a long-standing New Zealand practice of gross-to-net accounting – it promises that net emissions in 2035 will be 51 to 55 percent below gross 2005 levels.
New Zealand’s important forestry sector, which acts as a huge CO2 sink, is counted towards achieving the target, but is not included in the baseline. In a net-net calculation, the new target only corresponds to a reduction of around 25 percent compared to the values from 2005 to 2035.
Furthermore, the new target deviates from the budget approach that New Zealand had previously relied on, to the delight of climate scientists. The new target is only a single-year target, which means that emissions can increase between 2031 and 2034 without jeopardizing the 2035 target.
Former New Zealand climate ambassador Kay Harrison had previously spoken out in favor of a target of at least minus 66 percent. “If New Zealand only commits to minus 51 percent when the global average is minus 60 percent, we expect other countries to set targets that make up for our shortfall. Their targets will have to be much higher than ours, and much higher than minus 60 percent,” she said. “It’s as if we’re paying the stake – the bare minimum – to stay in the most dangerous game of our lives. But we’re not serious about winning.”
It’s not just the political firewall against the AfD that seems to be crumbling. The German climate neutrality target for 2045, which is based on the climate ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, is also under fire.
According to its election manifesto, the FDP would like to replace it with the European 2050 climate target. Bavaria’s Minister of Economic Affairs Hubert Aiwanger, who wants to enter the Bundestag with his Free Voters, would like to mothball climate targets altogether, just like the AfD. And Siegfried Russwurm, head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) until the end of 2024, said that “the target years are not set in stone.”
Support is now also growing among municipal utilities for postponing the German climate target to 2050. Over 900 municipal utilities in Germany are responsible for energy, water, mobility and high-speed internet. They are regarded as key players in the energy transition, as they build electricity grids or supply households with district heating on site, i.e. in the regions, cities and municipalities. With their proximity to customers, municipal utilities are crucial for integrating renewables at a local level. “No energy transition without municipal utilities,” says the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW).
But behind closed doors, many in the industry are struggling with decarbonization. “Everyone knows that the 2045 target is completely illusory,” says the managing director of a municipal utility and medium-sized energy supplier that supplies 80,000 people with energy and water. However, the “political situation” is not yet ripe, “so everyone is staying quiet.”
He is also holding back for strategic reasons. After all, he has to expand his district heating network and must not spread doubt, “otherwise we won’t make any progress at all.” He therefore tells the city council – the majority of municipal utilities are owned by their local authorities – that “we have a plan, strong partners, a goal and we can do it.”
Other municipal utilities are also “putting on a good face. But everyone rolls their eyes over a beer after work.” His wish: “Politicians should finally make it clear that 2045 won’t work and postpone the German climate target to 2050.”
In his view, this would take the pressure and uncertainty off citizens. “We experience every day that a gas heating system breaks down and the owner doesn’t know what to do next.” Out of panic, they buy a heat pump – even if a district heating connection would be much cheaper for them. “But we can’t say when that will come,” says the Managing Director. Due to a lack of capacity, he can only install four kilometers of pipes per year. “But we would need six per year to achieve the 2045 climate target.”
Anton Berger, Partner at the consulting firm Rödl & Partner, also confirms the mood in the industry. The economist advises municipal utilities and says “hardly anyone would say ‘no’ to a postponement of the climate target, even if this is likely to slow down the transformation.” More resources are needed, such as construction companies. The current shortage is making the transformation more expensive for municipal utilities. “A little more time would certainly also take the financial pressure off,” says Berger.
There seems to be a lack of many things at the moment, according to reports from other municipal utility management levels. Electricity grids, storage facilities, specialists for civil engineering, fitters, excavators, financing.
According to a study by BDEW and consultants EY, EUR 721 billion in energy transition investments will be needed by 2030 alone. Huge investments will also be needed after that. “Realistically, hardly anyone believes that we will be climate-neutral in Germany by 2045 or at a national level by 2040. A postponement to 2050 would therefore make sense in order to have more time to refinance the huge investments. Especially in view of the shortage of skilled workers,” says the managing director of a municipal utility company in a major city in Baden-Württemberg, where the official goal is to be climate-neutral by 2040.
He thinks it is wrong to hold on to “an unrealistic goal. It will only lead to frustration and increase mistrust in politics.” The USA’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement will change the political discourse in Europe anyway.
Karl-Peter Hoffmann, Managing Director of Stadtwerke Sindelfingen, is even clearer and does not insist on anonymity. “We should postpone the German climate target – or say goodbye to a fixed end date right away. Realistically speaking, we won’t be climate-neutral by 2050 either, at least not without driving the population into the arms of populists or wrecking our industry.”
A position that is now echoed in broad political and business circles. Holger Lösch, Deputy Managing Director of the BDI, also recently warned in an interview with Table.Briefings that German climate policy is leading to deindustrialization. So would it be better to slow down instead of chasing a distant goal – or make an even greater effort to at least stay close to the target?
According to projections by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA), the goal of net greenhouse gas neutrality in 2045 cannot be achieved with current climate protection instruments. The German Association of Local Utilities (VKU) also concludes in a study that the target of a 55% CO₂ reduction by 2030 is “likely” to fail at EU level based on current emission forecasts from EU member states. The association therefore warns against further tightening the climate targets, but at least commits to “the legal goal of climate neutrality by 2045 for Germany” when asked.
The German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW), which also represents large energy suppliers, is less clear. “The energy sector is geared towards this goal, many investments have been made with the 2045 neutrality target in mind and want to continue to be made. […] But we also recognize the need for pragmatism and ambitious feasibility,” says Managing Director Kerstin Andreae.
There are several arguments against postponing decarbonization. Starting with the fact that Germany cannot simply disregard EU law. And there are also voices in the industry warning against entering into a discussion about climate targets now.
“That would just be an alibi campaign,” says Thomas Gebhart, CEO of Stadtwerke Saarbrücken. He no longer believes in the 2045 target either, but still wants to stick to it. “If you postpone once, you postpone again and again.” Planning is essential. “Even if we don’t quite make it, we clearly have in mind that we can hardly burn any more fossil fuels by the middle of the century.” Johannes Rager, Managing Director of Stadtwerke Ludwigsburg-Kornwestheim, also wants to stick with 2045, although he also confirms that most of his colleagues would prefer to postpone. He fears that “otherwise we will need another five to ten years longer. But climate change won’t wait.”
