15 July marks the first “EU day for the victims of the global climate crisis.” On this day, the EU wants to “raise awareness of the human lives lost and humanitarian crisis caused by climate change”. EU climate commissioner Timmermans will visit three regions that were particularly affected by extreme weather in 2021. A nice gesture. But is that enough, given the current heatwaves and floods in many parts of the world? Shouldn’t there be a Europe-wide minute of silence? A public pause to ensure the climate crisis reaches people’s minds instead of being drowned in party-political pettiness?
The EU itself just managed to get its act together yesterday on the important Nature Restoration Law. The European Parliament has surprisingly adopted the law after all – Claire Stam has the details. And Bernhard Pötter reports on what the new climate targets for international shipping mean for future emissions.
While there will soon be more clarity on shipping emissions, Russia is increasingly becoming a “black box.” As Angelina Davydova points out, three additional climate NGOs have now been banned, which has serious implications for climate policy. And Philippa Nuttall Jones explains why the UK has lost its pioneering role.
Rarely has a vote in the EU Parliament been so eagerly anticipated. After weeks of political disputes over allegations of manipulation and pressure from Green Deal Commissioner Frans Timmermans, the decision was finally made: The MEPs gathered in Strasbourg yesterday (Wednesday) adopted the controversial draft regulation on Nature Restoration Law with 336 votes in favor, 300 against and 13 abstentions. Shortly before, a motion tabled by Christian Democrats (EPP) to reject the law altogether had been rejected by a majority of twelve votes.
Less than a year before the European elections, the law had recently become a symbol of the political tensions over European environmental policy. Adopting the Parliament’s position means the trilogue negotiations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Member States can begin. However, the way forward for the law has not necessarily become easier.
To be sure, the EU Parliament has adopted an amendment to continue work based on the Council’s position. However, the Council’s level of ambition is well below the Commission’s proposal, which is why even the supporters of the Restoration Law – Greens, Social Democrats, Left and some Liberals – could only reluctantly celebrate yesterday. The text ultimately adopted was a mix of the Council’s position and the Parliament’s amendments, said the Nature Restoration Law’s rapporteur, Cesar Luena (S&D).
“We are in a bizarre situation where the Parliament’s text is less ambitious than the Council’s,” admitted Pascal Canfin (Renew), Chair of the Environment Committee. Typically, it is the other way around. The whole part on agriculture has been watered down, he said. “This is an important aspect that we want to negotiate with the Council,” Canfin said.
The removal of an article on the restoration of agricultural ecosystems, including targets for the rewetting of drained peat bogs, particularly pains rapporteur Luena. The ultra-conservative ECR group had requested this and received a majority for it.
Luean and Canfin stressed that it is better to have a watered-down text than no text at all. Most importantly, the vote ended the “hostage-taking” of an important law of the Green Deal by the EPP under Manfred Weber, they explained. Weber countered that the text was watered down. “It has been changed to ensure that it can be properly implemented on the ground.”
Former French Environment Minister Canfin highlighted how adopting the text in the EU Parliament a few months before COP28 sent an important global signal. On the international climate stage, the EU had pushed for more ambition on biodiversity. “We are under scrutiny,” he said, stressing that the EU’s credibility in international negotiations on climate and biodiversity is at stake. “If the EU had rejected the text, it would have sent the signal that it is pushing other countries to do something that it itself does not want to implement at home.”
The compromise means that the original goal of the law is slightly modified. At least 20 percent of all land and marine areas in the EU are to be restored by 2030. However, this quota will only apply to habitats not in “good condition.” Moreover, the target does not have to be achieved for each habitat group individually, but on a total average.
Another downgrade compared to the Commission’s proposal is the non-deterioration requirement for habitats subject to restoration measures. The new rules will only apply in the event of “significant” deterioration, the Council decided. Regarding areas that are already in good status or where restoration measures have not yet been implemented, especially outside Natura 2000 sites, member states “ensure that significant deterioration does not occur.” This means an effort-based obligation instead of a result-based one.
The early parliamentary elections in Spain on July 23 could also complicate the trialogue negotiations. Teresa Ribera, Spain’s Minister for Ecological Change, has announced that she will “do everything” to reach an agreement in the trialogue under the Spanish Council Presidency. However, she may soon no longer be part of the government, as a right-wing alliance of parties could take power.
Since the start of the Ukraine war, pressure has been growing in Russia on any form of independent public activism and critical analysis. As early as 2022, five Russian environmental NGOs were classified as “foreign agents” due to their international affiliations. This significantly complicates the work of these organizations. Among other things, they are banned from cooperating with authorities and state educational institutions. As a result, four of the five organizations decided to discontinue their work as NGOs. Their experts now continue to work unofficially, for example, on an individual level.
In 2023, pressure was also increased on international organizations still operating in Russia. Many climate and environmental organizations had chosen to stay in the country despite the Ukraine war – unlike most international human rights or political organizations.
The fact that they are now facing pressure as well worsens the prospects for an effective Russian climate policy. This has implications for the global climate: Russia is the world’s fifth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China, the United States, the EU and India. Although the country’s emissions declined mainly because of the 1990s and early 2000s economic crisis. In 2012, they were 32 percent lower than in 1990, if CO2 sequestration by forests is not considered. If they are included, they were 50 percent lower. Currently, emissions excluding land use change are about 30 percent lower compared to 1990.
In the years before the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian emissions slowly increased. Their trajectory depends, above all, on Russia’s future economic performance, and, thus also on international sanctions and trade barriers. Russia’s Low-Carbon Strategy to 2050 sets a net-zero target for 2060 and expects a significant increase in CO2 sequestration by forests. Some analysts consider this unrealistic. The Climate Action Tracker describes Russia’s climate policy as “critically inadequate.”
In April 2023, the Norwegian environmental organization Bellona was declared undesirable. Greenpeace International followed in May, WWF International in June, and the Altai Project in July. This means they are practically banned from any activity in the country. Russian citizens can be prosecuted for cooperating with these organizations.
Bellona already closed its office in the Russian Federation in 2022. The organization now continues to work on Russia from a new office in exile in Vilnius. Greenpeace is in the process of closing its office in Moscow. Both organizations had operated in Russia for more than 30 years. The Russian World Wide Fund for Nature announced to cease cooperation with the international WWF, and drop the panda logo and the acronym “WWF.”
The official reason for the ban is that they have criticized large new infrastructure projects and made efforts to launch independent investigations. Among them were fossil fuel extraction projects, particularly in the Arctic region.
In fact, however, Russia is driving out all international organizations that could provide independent expertise and analysis, evaluate climate and environmental policies, express alternative views to those of the state, and inform the global community about environmental and climate grievances in the country.
With these organizations withdrawing from Russia, a lot of independent climate and environmental expertise will be lost – both in terms of numbers and quality. After all, all of these organizations employed dozens of experts. They analyzed and criticized legislative changes as well as government and corporate policies, organized public and media campaigns, and were able to work with thousands of volunteers.
The support for many grassroots environmental initiatives is also declining. Even during the Ukraine war, grassroots environmental movements and protests continue to occur in most regions of Russia. Until recently, their initiators received legal, administrative or media support from Greenpeace or WWF Russia, for instance.
The fact that international NGOs are withdrawing is a significant blow to the country’s climate policy. In the past years, WWF Russia and Greenpeace belonged to the leading climate organizations. For example, Greenpeace, together with a number of researchers and other experts, compiled the “Green Turn” report in 2021 (Disclaimer: The author of this text was an editor of this report). It highlights the threats and risks the climate crisis poses to Russia and suggests opportunities for restructuring the economy and transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Now the opportunity for such independent analysis is disappearing fast. All that remains is the official opinion and no public discussion. This is particularly evident in the critical assessment of Russia’s climate goals, the laws and programs required to achieve them, and the climate declarations of Russian companies.
Anna Korppoo of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, who worked with other experts from Russia and the EU on the “Russian Climate Strategy: Imitating Leadership” project of the London-based think tank Climate Strategies, says: “Russia’s climate policy has always had an imitative character. It aimed to water down effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to protect the interests of fossil fuel industry elites.”
In the past, external pressure has led Russia to develop some genuine climate regulations, she says. Examples include managing joint-implementation projects under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 to 2012 and supporting renewable energy development, she says. But since February 2022, “this pressure and incentives from the West have diminished, and with it, the ability of Russian officials and civil society to point out shortcomings in policy implementation.”
In the past, Russian NGOs – along with critical voices within the government – were able to actively participate in setting climate targets, for example, under the 2050 Low Carbon Strategy, and carefully criticize policy implementation. Now these voices will be absent.
For example, when it comes to challenging the unrealistic goal of carbon sinks in Russian forests under the Low Carbon Strategy, says Anna Korppoo. These sinks are being used to justify continued emissions from the industrial sector. Emissions reporting and climate pledges by major Russian companies also need a watchdog, Korppoo argues. But Russian legislation provides no framework to evaluate the data collected. And NGOs will no longer be around to do that.
Thane Gustafson, professor of political science at Georgetown University and author of the book “Klimat” on Russian energy policy, stresses that the country is chained to the hydrocarbons model in climate policy as in other fields. He accuses the country of putting very little effort into renewables and EV development, even before the invasion of Ukraine. Gustafson sees Russia continue to be the ‘bad guy’ of big CO2 polluters. “No doubt it will continue to play an obstructive role in international climate policy.” It will highlight its forests and talk big about hydrogen. But fossil fuels will remain at the center, Gustafson said.
The climate action agreement reached by the UN Maritime Organization (IMO) late last week is the most impactful agreement in international climate action in a long time. It has the potential to bring emissions from maritime shipping in line with the two-degree limit and influence the recently stalled diplomatic efforts in the run-up to COP28 in Dubai. However, it falls short of expectations to bring shipping on a 1.5-degree path.
After long and complicated IMO negotiations by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in London, where traditionally neither media nor non-governmental organizations were allowed, a compromise was reached. Instead of defining emissions targets for specific years, it includes emissions “checkpoints.” These are not legally binding, but are intended to have a political effect and show the industry the path to investment.
The agreement now reached tightens the previous climate targets set by the 175 IMO countries in 2018, which had only envisioned a 50 percent reduction of sector emissions by 2050. The countries now agreed to:
After the adoption, praise came from the EU Commission, for example, for this “milestone to cut the carbon footprint of international maritime transport and ensure that the shipping sector makes a fair contribution to achieving the Paris Agreement targets.” David Ryfisch, a climate expert at the environment and development organization Germanwatch, also spoke of “important progress,” saying that “in just five years, the debate in shipping is at a very different point” and that the risks of “false solutions, like in aviation with offsetting, seem much lower.” For a real breakthrough, however, the agreement on a CO2 levy was missing, he said.
After all, the sector accounts for about three percent of all global greenhouse gas emissions. And emissions would rise by 250 percent in an extreme case under a “business as usual” (BAU) scenario between 2008 and 2050.
Norwegian shipping company A.P. Moller-Maersk, which had lobbied for an ambitious agreement, also approved the agreement to Table.Media: Just a year ago, “the mere idea of introducing a global emissions pricing mechanism and a global standard for eco-friendly fuels by 2027 was considered a fantasy,” said Simon Bergulf, responsible for energy transition and public affairs at the shipping company. He called it a “clear signal to the shipping industry and fuel producers: The time for investment is now, and associated risks have been eliminated.” A CO2 price and technical measures should be “implemented globally within the next four years.”
Environmental groups, in turn, were up in arms over what they saw as an inadequate outcome: They accused the agreement of abandoning the 1.5-degree target for the shipping sector. For this target, emissions would have to be halved by 2030 and already brought to zero by 2040, they criticized. Now, ambitious “countries and blocs” such as the US, EU and UK would have to lead the way in pricing emissions at a minimum of 100 dollars per ton of CO2. The EU recently adopted its corresponding FuelEU Maritime regulation on sustainable fuels.
Groups such as the Clean Shipping Coalition demand more climate action at sea:
At least the agreement showed the will to cooperate between states whose interests are far apart in times of entrenched fronts in the climate field. However, observers reported that the signs in London had long pointed to confrontation: While an alliance of developed and island states supported more ambitious targets, countries with export dependencies or oil production, such as China, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, argued for less ambition and opposed “unrealistic targets.”
The Pacific island states, in particular, exerted pressure, and the COP host United Arab Emirates was among its opponents. The argument, particularly from Latin American countries, was that a CO2 levy would raise the cost of maritime trade, put their export industries at a disadvantage and reinforce existing inequalities in international trade.
The IMO agreement now brings an actor on board that has long kept out of climate commitments. This is because, although emissions from international aviation and shipping have been regularly debated by the UNFCCC since 1995, they have not been subject to any reduction requirements. After all, they did not appear in the decisive country statistics on CO2 emissions.
“The global shipping industry and IMO have always been reluctant to act on climate change and are controlled by a handful of maritime countries,” said Saleemul Huq, director of the Dhaka-based think tank ICCAD and an experienced climate advisor to developing countries. “That’s why this decision is an important breakthrough to finally take responsibility and act. Hopefully we will see more ambition in this in the future.”
At first glance, the trend looks like the one we know from the other end of the world: The extent of sea ice off Antarctica is at an all-time low as winter begins there. So far, 2.1 million square kilometers less seawater has frozen than the long-term average since satellite measurements began in 1979: An area as large as Greenland or about six times the size of Germany, reports the latest “Sea Ice Portal,” compiled by the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) and others. By the end of June, 12.4 million square kilometers of the southern ocean were covered with ice.
This continues a trend. Aside from two spots off the icy continent, the Amundsen Sea and the Ross Sea, significantly less ice has formed in recent years. Air temperatures are also currently 2 to 3 degrees Celsius above the mean, and in some places, as much as 6 degrees.
However, it should be noted that, unlike in the Arctic Ocean, scientists are not certain whether this trend is a result of accelerating global warming. According to sea ice physicist, Stefanie Arndt of AWI, it is “too early to claim that there is a significant negative trend in ice extent in the Antarctic Ocean, similar to that in the Arctic.”
Although over the last 50 years, a warming trend of 0.5 degrees Celsius per decade has developed on the Antarctic Peninsula, the continent’s main mass is still isolated from powerful air currents, the polar jet stream. There are large annual variations in ice formation, according to Arndt. It remains to be seen whether a clear trend will emerge, she added. bpo
The Paris climate agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius is in the headlines again. According to the latest projections from the World Meteorological Organization, “There is a 66 percent likelihood that the annual average near-surface global temperature between 2023 and 2027 will be more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for at least one year.” A supercharged El Niño cycle means that record-breaking temperatures are almost certain.
But, as concerning as these warnings are, it would be even more worrying if one year above 1.5°C was taken as a sign that the 1.5°C target has been missed. Drawing that erroneous conclusion would lead us to abandon the Paris agreement’s goal just when we should be doubling down on it.
The 1.5°C goal will not be lost with just one or a few years of extreme temperatures. The Paris goal refers to human-caused temperature increases that are measured over the course of decades. We must keep this firmly in mind to stave off the dangerous climate fatalism that has been gaining momentum in recent years.
Yes, now that the planet has warmed roughly 1.2°C above pre-industrial levels, “once-in-a-century” heatwaves, forest fires, and floods are becoming more familiar to us. In some low-lying regions, rising seas are already forcing people to relocate. But there is still a massive difference between 1.2°C and 1.5°C – let alone between 1.5°C and 2°C – and the science shows that it is still possible to end this century at or below 1.5°C.
Recent climate research has affirmed the importance and necessity of the 1.5°C guardrail. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned last year, extreme weather events, ecosystem collapse, and planetary tipping points can happen at markedly lower levels of global warming than previously thought. Since the IPCC’s last reporting cycle in 2014, we have amassed much more evidence to show that even a 1.5°C warmer world would be immensely challenging, and that temperature increases above that level would be truly devastating.
With every additional tenth of a degree of warming, more people will be exposed to life-threatening heatwaves, water shortages, and flooding. Worse, various studies show that the likelihood of reaching tipping points, like the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet, increases exponentially above 1.5°C. These represent red lines. The world would not fall off a cliff, but there would be a fundamental shift in which planetary systems start moving irreversibly down the path toward more ice melt, marine-ecosystem change, and rising sea levels.
The only sensible approach is to mitigate that risk by reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions as fast as possible. Though we still might overshoot the 1.5°C limit in the short term, we can return to it in the long run. But that will be possible only if we have cut fossil-fuel emissions to zero. This is the crucial first step toward achieving net-zero GHG emissions.
It is no less important to preserve and restore the natural land and ocean systems that absorb and store carbon. And if we distort the Earth’s carbon cycle (through the thawing of permafrost, for example), we will undermine our ability to reverse global temperature increases.
Limiting warming to 1.5°C this century requires that we halve our emissions by 2030. This is not an arbitrary figure. Only if we halve our emissions this decade will we halve the pace of warming in the 2030s and bring it to a halt in the 2040s. Think of it as the difference between tackling climate change ourselves, or passing a civilizational time-bomb to our children.
Slowing the warming process also buys us precious time for adaptation. Even a rich country like the United States will be limited in how fast and fully it can adapt to the consequences of climate change. For those in more vulnerable places, the situation is incomparably worse. Disasters like the flooding in Pakistan last year can derail a country’s economy and leave it in a downward spiral of rising debt and poverty – all of which will be compounded by future climate disasters for which it could not afford to prepare.
Moreover, many of the net-zero commitments made by governments, companies, and cities around the world are premised on the 1.5°C limit. Phaseout plans for coal (such as those in Germany, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom) are based on 1.5°C-aligned modeling, which shows that OECD countries need to stop using coal by 2030, and that non-OECD countries need to do so by 2040. Gas must follow shortly thereafter.
With the clock ticking down, these 1.5°C-based models are telling us how to prioritize. We must decarbonize electricity first, then electrify as much transportation, buildings, and industry as we can, while also reducing demand. Beyond this low-hanging fruit, we also will need to scale up technologies for carbon removal.
Investments have been moving in this direction. Since the Paris agreement was concluded in 2015, the costs of solar, wind, and batteries have plummeted. Electric vehicles and heat pumps are going mainstream. These are market-driven responses to government incentives. Public policy has been crucial for instilling confidence and supporting clean-energy growth.
To give up and start looking beyond 1.5°C would let big emitters off the hook. Rather than instilling confidence, it would signal to everyone that they should expect less – and betray all those who live in places that lack the resources and possibilities to adapt to a warmer world.
If we don’t keep pushing for the most ambitious science-based targets, those with vested interests in the status quo will exploit our fatalism. Following a massively profitable year, owing to Russia’s war in Ukraine, BP recently signaled that it will divert much of its intended investments in decarbonization toward oil and gas.
The best science we have tells us that 1.5°C is still feasible, and it tells us how to get there. As the British climate-change diplomat Pete Betts puts it, “If we do go above 1.5°C, the message is not to give up. It’s to double down.”
Carl-Friedrich Schleussner is Head of Climate Science at Climate Analytics and an honorary professor at Humboldt University Berlin. Bill Hare is a founder and CEO of Climate Analytics. Johan Rockström is Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Professor of Earth System Science at the University of Potsdam. In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2023.
15 July marks the first “EU day for the victims of the global climate crisis.” On this day, the EU wants to “raise awareness of the human lives lost and humanitarian crisis caused by climate change”. EU climate commissioner Timmermans will visit three regions that were particularly affected by extreme weather in 2021. A nice gesture. But is that enough, given the current heatwaves and floods in many parts of the world? Shouldn’t there be a Europe-wide minute of silence? A public pause to ensure the climate crisis reaches people’s minds instead of being drowned in party-political pettiness?
The EU itself just managed to get its act together yesterday on the important Nature Restoration Law. The European Parliament has surprisingly adopted the law after all – Claire Stam has the details. And Bernhard Pötter reports on what the new climate targets for international shipping mean for future emissions.
While there will soon be more clarity on shipping emissions, Russia is increasingly becoming a “black box.” As Angelina Davydova points out, three additional climate NGOs have now been banned, which has serious implications for climate policy. And Philippa Nuttall Jones explains why the UK has lost its pioneering role.
Rarely has a vote in the EU Parliament been so eagerly anticipated. After weeks of political disputes over allegations of manipulation and pressure from Green Deal Commissioner Frans Timmermans, the decision was finally made: The MEPs gathered in Strasbourg yesterday (Wednesday) adopted the controversial draft regulation on Nature Restoration Law with 336 votes in favor, 300 against and 13 abstentions. Shortly before, a motion tabled by Christian Democrats (EPP) to reject the law altogether had been rejected by a majority of twelve votes.
Less than a year before the European elections, the law had recently become a symbol of the political tensions over European environmental policy. Adopting the Parliament’s position means the trilogue negotiations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Member States can begin. However, the way forward for the law has not necessarily become easier.
To be sure, the EU Parliament has adopted an amendment to continue work based on the Council’s position. However, the Council’s level of ambition is well below the Commission’s proposal, which is why even the supporters of the Restoration Law – Greens, Social Democrats, Left and some Liberals – could only reluctantly celebrate yesterday. The text ultimately adopted was a mix of the Council’s position and the Parliament’s amendments, said the Nature Restoration Law’s rapporteur, Cesar Luena (S&D).
“We are in a bizarre situation where the Parliament’s text is less ambitious than the Council’s,” admitted Pascal Canfin (Renew), Chair of the Environment Committee. Typically, it is the other way around. The whole part on agriculture has been watered down, he said. “This is an important aspect that we want to negotiate with the Council,” Canfin said.
The removal of an article on the restoration of agricultural ecosystems, including targets for the rewetting of drained peat bogs, particularly pains rapporteur Luena. The ultra-conservative ECR group had requested this and received a majority for it.
Luean and Canfin stressed that it is better to have a watered-down text than no text at all. Most importantly, the vote ended the “hostage-taking” of an important law of the Green Deal by the EPP under Manfred Weber, they explained. Weber countered that the text was watered down. “It has been changed to ensure that it can be properly implemented on the ground.”
Former French Environment Minister Canfin highlighted how adopting the text in the EU Parliament a few months before COP28 sent an important global signal. On the international climate stage, the EU had pushed for more ambition on biodiversity. “We are under scrutiny,” he said, stressing that the EU’s credibility in international negotiations on climate and biodiversity is at stake. “If the EU had rejected the text, it would have sent the signal that it is pushing other countries to do something that it itself does not want to implement at home.”
The compromise means that the original goal of the law is slightly modified. At least 20 percent of all land and marine areas in the EU are to be restored by 2030. However, this quota will only apply to habitats not in “good condition.” Moreover, the target does not have to be achieved for each habitat group individually, but on a total average.
Another downgrade compared to the Commission’s proposal is the non-deterioration requirement for habitats subject to restoration measures. The new rules will only apply in the event of “significant” deterioration, the Council decided. Regarding areas that are already in good status or where restoration measures have not yet been implemented, especially outside Natura 2000 sites, member states “ensure that significant deterioration does not occur.” This means an effort-based obligation instead of a result-based one.
The early parliamentary elections in Spain on July 23 could also complicate the trialogue negotiations. Teresa Ribera, Spain’s Minister for Ecological Change, has announced that she will “do everything” to reach an agreement in the trialogue under the Spanish Council Presidency. However, she may soon no longer be part of the government, as a right-wing alliance of parties could take power.
Since the start of the Ukraine war, pressure has been growing in Russia on any form of independent public activism and critical analysis. As early as 2022, five Russian environmental NGOs were classified as “foreign agents” due to their international affiliations. This significantly complicates the work of these organizations. Among other things, they are banned from cooperating with authorities and state educational institutions. As a result, four of the five organizations decided to discontinue their work as NGOs. Their experts now continue to work unofficially, for example, on an individual level.
In 2023, pressure was also increased on international organizations still operating in Russia. Many climate and environmental organizations had chosen to stay in the country despite the Ukraine war – unlike most international human rights or political organizations.
The fact that they are now facing pressure as well worsens the prospects for an effective Russian climate policy. This has implications for the global climate: Russia is the world’s fifth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China, the United States, the EU and India. Although the country’s emissions declined mainly because of the 1990s and early 2000s economic crisis. In 2012, they were 32 percent lower than in 1990, if CO2 sequestration by forests is not considered. If they are included, they were 50 percent lower. Currently, emissions excluding land use change are about 30 percent lower compared to 1990.
In the years before the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian emissions slowly increased. Their trajectory depends, above all, on Russia’s future economic performance, and, thus also on international sanctions and trade barriers. Russia’s Low-Carbon Strategy to 2050 sets a net-zero target for 2060 and expects a significant increase in CO2 sequestration by forests. Some analysts consider this unrealistic. The Climate Action Tracker describes Russia’s climate policy as “critically inadequate.”
In April 2023, the Norwegian environmental organization Bellona was declared undesirable. Greenpeace International followed in May, WWF International in June, and the Altai Project in July. This means they are practically banned from any activity in the country. Russian citizens can be prosecuted for cooperating with these organizations.
Bellona already closed its office in the Russian Federation in 2022. The organization now continues to work on Russia from a new office in exile in Vilnius. Greenpeace is in the process of closing its office in Moscow. Both organizations had operated in Russia for more than 30 years. The Russian World Wide Fund for Nature announced to cease cooperation with the international WWF, and drop the panda logo and the acronym “WWF.”
The official reason for the ban is that they have criticized large new infrastructure projects and made efforts to launch independent investigations. Among them were fossil fuel extraction projects, particularly in the Arctic region.
In fact, however, Russia is driving out all international organizations that could provide independent expertise and analysis, evaluate climate and environmental policies, express alternative views to those of the state, and inform the global community about environmental and climate grievances in the country.
With these organizations withdrawing from Russia, a lot of independent climate and environmental expertise will be lost – both in terms of numbers and quality. After all, all of these organizations employed dozens of experts. They analyzed and criticized legislative changes as well as government and corporate policies, organized public and media campaigns, and were able to work with thousands of volunteers.
The support for many grassroots environmental initiatives is also declining. Even during the Ukraine war, grassroots environmental movements and protests continue to occur in most regions of Russia. Until recently, their initiators received legal, administrative or media support from Greenpeace or WWF Russia, for instance.
The fact that international NGOs are withdrawing is a significant blow to the country’s climate policy. In the past years, WWF Russia and Greenpeace belonged to the leading climate organizations. For example, Greenpeace, together with a number of researchers and other experts, compiled the “Green Turn” report in 2021 (Disclaimer: The author of this text was an editor of this report). It highlights the threats and risks the climate crisis poses to Russia and suggests opportunities for restructuring the economy and transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Now the opportunity for such independent analysis is disappearing fast. All that remains is the official opinion and no public discussion. This is particularly evident in the critical assessment of Russia’s climate goals, the laws and programs required to achieve them, and the climate declarations of Russian companies.
Anna Korppoo of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, who worked with other experts from Russia and the EU on the “Russian Climate Strategy: Imitating Leadership” project of the London-based think tank Climate Strategies, says: “Russia’s climate policy has always had an imitative character. It aimed to water down effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to protect the interests of fossil fuel industry elites.”
In the past, external pressure has led Russia to develop some genuine climate regulations, she says. Examples include managing joint-implementation projects under the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 to 2012 and supporting renewable energy development, she says. But since February 2022, “this pressure and incentives from the West have diminished, and with it, the ability of Russian officials and civil society to point out shortcomings in policy implementation.”
In the past, Russian NGOs – along with critical voices within the government – were able to actively participate in setting climate targets, for example, under the 2050 Low Carbon Strategy, and carefully criticize policy implementation. Now these voices will be absent.
For example, when it comes to challenging the unrealistic goal of carbon sinks in Russian forests under the Low Carbon Strategy, says Anna Korppoo. These sinks are being used to justify continued emissions from the industrial sector. Emissions reporting and climate pledges by major Russian companies also need a watchdog, Korppoo argues. But Russian legislation provides no framework to evaluate the data collected. And NGOs will no longer be around to do that.
Thane Gustafson, professor of political science at Georgetown University and author of the book “Klimat” on Russian energy policy, stresses that the country is chained to the hydrocarbons model in climate policy as in other fields. He accuses the country of putting very little effort into renewables and EV development, even before the invasion of Ukraine. Gustafson sees Russia continue to be the ‘bad guy’ of big CO2 polluters. “No doubt it will continue to play an obstructive role in international climate policy.” It will highlight its forests and talk big about hydrogen. But fossil fuels will remain at the center, Gustafson said.
The climate action agreement reached by the UN Maritime Organization (IMO) late last week is the most impactful agreement in international climate action in a long time. It has the potential to bring emissions from maritime shipping in line with the two-degree limit and influence the recently stalled diplomatic efforts in the run-up to COP28 in Dubai. However, it falls short of expectations to bring shipping on a 1.5-degree path.
After long and complicated IMO negotiations by the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) in London, where traditionally neither media nor non-governmental organizations were allowed, a compromise was reached. Instead of defining emissions targets for specific years, it includes emissions “checkpoints.” These are not legally binding, but are intended to have a political effect and show the industry the path to investment.
The agreement now reached tightens the previous climate targets set by the 175 IMO countries in 2018, which had only envisioned a 50 percent reduction of sector emissions by 2050. The countries now agreed to:
After the adoption, praise came from the EU Commission, for example, for this “milestone to cut the carbon footprint of international maritime transport and ensure that the shipping sector makes a fair contribution to achieving the Paris Agreement targets.” David Ryfisch, a climate expert at the environment and development organization Germanwatch, also spoke of “important progress,” saying that “in just five years, the debate in shipping is at a very different point” and that the risks of “false solutions, like in aviation with offsetting, seem much lower.” For a real breakthrough, however, the agreement on a CO2 levy was missing, he said.
After all, the sector accounts for about three percent of all global greenhouse gas emissions. And emissions would rise by 250 percent in an extreme case under a “business as usual” (BAU) scenario between 2008 and 2050.
Norwegian shipping company A.P. Moller-Maersk, which had lobbied for an ambitious agreement, also approved the agreement to Table.Media: Just a year ago, “the mere idea of introducing a global emissions pricing mechanism and a global standard for eco-friendly fuels by 2027 was considered a fantasy,” said Simon Bergulf, responsible for energy transition and public affairs at the shipping company. He called it a “clear signal to the shipping industry and fuel producers: The time for investment is now, and associated risks have been eliminated.” A CO2 price and technical measures should be “implemented globally within the next four years.”
Environmental groups, in turn, were up in arms over what they saw as an inadequate outcome: They accused the agreement of abandoning the 1.5-degree target for the shipping sector. For this target, emissions would have to be halved by 2030 and already brought to zero by 2040, they criticized. Now, ambitious “countries and blocs” such as the US, EU and UK would have to lead the way in pricing emissions at a minimum of 100 dollars per ton of CO2. The EU recently adopted its corresponding FuelEU Maritime regulation on sustainable fuels.
Groups such as the Clean Shipping Coalition demand more climate action at sea:
At least the agreement showed the will to cooperate between states whose interests are far apart in times of entrenched fronts in the climate field. However, observers reported that the signs in London had long pointed to confrontation: While an alliance of developed and island states supported more ambitious targets, countries with export dependencies or oil production, such as China, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, argued for less ambition and opposed “unrealistic targets.”
The Pacific island states, in particular, exerted pressure, and the COP host United Arab Emirates was among its opponents. The argument, particularly from Latin American countries, was that a CO2 levy would raise the cost of maritime trade, put their export industries at a disadvantage and reinforce existing inequalities in international trade.
The IMO agreement now brings an actor on board that has long kept out of climate commitments. This is because, although emissions from international aviation and shipping have been regularly debated by the UNFCCC since 1995, they have not been subject to any reduction requirements. After all, they did not appear in the decisive country statistics on CO2 emissions.
“The global shipping industry and IMO have always been reluctant to act on climate change and are controlled by a handful of maritime countries,” said Saleemul Huq, director of the Dhaka-based think tank ICCAD and an experienced climate advisor to developing countries. “That’s why this decision is an important breakthrough to finally take responsibility and act. Hopefully we will see more ambition in this in the future.”
At first glance, the trend looks like the one we know from the other end of the world: The extent of sea ice off Antarctica is at an all-time low as winter begins there. So far, 2.1 million square kilometers less seawater has frozen than the long-term average since satellite measurements began in 1979: An area as large as Greenland or about six times the size of Germany, reports the latest “Sea Ice Portal,” compiled by the Alfred Wegener Institute (AWI) and others. By the end of June, 12.4 million square kilometers of the southern ocean were covered with ice.
This continues a trend. Aside from two spots off the icy continent, the Amundsen Sea and the Ross Sea, significantly less ice has formed in recent years. Air temperatures are also currently 2 to 3 degrees Celsius above the mean, and in some places, as much as 6 degrees.
However, it should be noted that, unlike in the Arctic Ocean, scientists are not certain whether this trend is a result of accelerating global warming. According to sea ice physicist, Stefanie Arndt of AWI, it is “too early to claim that there is a significant negative trend in ice extent in the Antarctic Ocean, similar to that in the Arctic.”
Although over the last 50 years, a warming trend of 0.5 degrees Celsius per decade has developed on the Antarctic Peninsula, the continent’s main mass is still isolated from powerful air currents, the polar jet stream. There are large annual variations in ice formation, according to Arndt. It remains to be seen whether a clear trend will emerge, she added. bpo
The Paris climate agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to 1.5° Celsius is in the headlines again. According to the latest projections from the World Meteorological Organization, “There is a 66 percent likelihood that the annual average near-surface global temperature between 2023 and 2027 will be more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for at least one year.” A supercharged El Niño cycle means that record-breaking temperatures are almost certain.
But, as concerning as these warnings are, it would be even more worrying if one year above 1.5°C was taken as a sign that the 1.5°C target has been missed. Drawing that erroneous conclusion would lead us to abandon the Paris agreement’s goal just when we should be doubling down on it.
The 1.5°C goal will not be lost with just one or a few years of extreme temperatures. The Paris goal refers to human-caused temperature increases that are measured over the course of decades. We must keep this firmly in mind to stave off the dangerous climate fatalism that has been gaining momentum in recent years.
Yes, now that the planet has warmed roughly 1.2°C above pre-industrial levels, “once-in-a-century” heatwaves, forest fires, and floods are becoming more familiar to us. In some low-lying regions, rising seas are already forcing people to relocate. But there is still a massive difference between 1.2°C and 1.5°C – let alone between 1.5°C and 2°C – and the science shows that it is still possible to end this century at or below 1.5°C.
Recent climate research has affirmed the importance and necessity of the 1.5°C guardrail. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned last year, extreme weather events, ecosystem collapse, and planetary tipping points can happen at markedly lower levels of global warming than previously thought. Since the IPCC’s last reporting cycle in 2014, we have amassed much more evidence to show that even a 1.5°C warmer world would be immensely challenging, and that temperature increases above that level would be truly devastating.
With every additional tenth of a degree of warming, more people will be exposed to life-threatening heatwaves, water shortages, and flooding. Worse, various studies show that the likelihood of reaching tipping points, like the potential collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet, increases exponentially above 1.5°C. These represent red lines. The world would not fall off a cliff, but there would be a fundamental shift in which planetary systems start moving irreversibly down the path toward more ice melt, marine-ecosystem change, and rising sea levels.
The only sensible approach is to mitigate that risk by reducing greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions as fast as possible. Though we still might overshoot the 1.5°C limit in the short term, we can return to it in the long run. But that will be possible only if we have cut fossil-fuel emissions to zero. This is the crucial first step toward achieving net-zero GHG emissions.
It is no less important to preserve and restore the natural land and ocean systems that absorb and store carbon. And if we distort the Earth’s carbon cycle (through the thawing of permafrost, for example), we will undermine our ability to reverse global temperature increases.
Limiting warming to 1.5°C this century requires that we halve our emissions by 2030. This is not an arbitrary figure. Only if we halve our emissions this decade will we halve the pace of warming in the 2030s and bring it to a halt in the 2040s. Think of it as the difference between tackling climate change ourselves, or passing a civilizational time-bomb to our children.
Slowing the warming process also buys us precious time for adaptation. Even a rich country like the United States will be limited in how fast and fully it can adapt to the consequences of climate change. For those in more vulnerable places, the situation is incomparably worse. Disasters like the flooding in Pakistan last year can derail a country’s economy and leave it in a downward spiral of rising debt and poverty – all of which will be compounded by future climate disasters for which it could not afford to prepare.
Moreover, many of the net-zero commitments made by governments, companies, and cities around the world are premised on the 1.5°C limit. Phaseout plans for coal (such as those in Germany, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom) are based on 1.5°C-aligned modeling, which shows that OECD countries need to stop using coal by 2030, and that non-OECD countries need to do so by 2040. Gas must follow shortly thereafter.
With the clock ticking down, these 1.5°C-based models are telling us how to prioritize. We must decarbonize electricity first, then electrify as much transportation, buildings, and industry as we can, while also reducing demand. Beyond this low-hanging fruit, we also will need to scale up technologies for carbon removal.
Investments have been moving in this direction. Since the Paris agreement was concluded in 2015, the costs of solar, wind, and batteries have plummeted. Electric vehicles and heat pumps are going mainstream. These are market-driven responses to government incentives. Public policy has been crucial for instilling confidence and supporting clean-energy growth.
To give up and start looking beyond 1.5°C would let big emitters off the hook. Rather than instilling confidence, it would signal to everyone that they should expect less – and betray all those who live in places that lack the resources and possibilities to adapt to a warmer world.
If we don’t keep pushing for the most ambitious science-based targets, those with vested interests in the status quo will exploit our fatalism. Following a massively profitable year, owing to Russia’s war in Ukraine, BP recently signaled that it will divert much of its intended investments in decarbonization toward oil and gas.
The best science we have tells us that 1.5°C is still feasible, and it tells us how to get there. As the British climate-change diplomat Pete Betts puts it, “If we do go above 1.5°C, the message is not to give up. It’s to double down.”
Carl-Friedrich Schleussner is Head of Climate Science at Climate Analytics and an honorary professor at Humboldt University Berlin. Bill Hare is a founder and CEO of Climate Analytics. Johan Rockström is Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Professor of Earth System Science at the University of Potsdam. In cooperation with Project Syndicate, 2023.
