For us, what we write about is crucial – but sometimes, what we choose not to write about is equally important. Recently, we debated in our editorial team whether to cover the CDU/CSU’s proposal to reverse the EU’s decision to phase out internal combustion engines by 2035. Our decision: no. This proposal conveniently surfaces just before the EU elections, leaving numerous questions unanswered about serious policy-making: How else can climate goals be realistically achieved without relying on the hope for unknown new technologies? Where will climate-friendly alternative fuels come from? Where is the investment security for the European automotive industry? And why are the Christian Democrats opposing the Green Deal promoted by their own party colleague and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen? Should serious answers emerge, we will certainly cover them.
Instead, today we focus on real challenges: the EU Commission’s long-term plans for the Green Deal, the demands on Germany’s water supply in the face of climate change, the dire state of mangrove forests that protect coastlines worldwide, a melting mega-glacier in Antarctica and the risk that Germany might miss its efficiency target for 2030.
Kurt Vandenberghe, the commission proposed a net greenhouse gas reduction target of 90 percent for 2040, at a point where the legislation for the 2030 climate target is not yet fully implemented. What exactly are you preparing currently?
The full climate transition is basically an agenda of modernizing our economy and investing. Investment that our economy needs, because investment in China is 40 percent of GDP, in Europe it is 20 percent. So, all the talk about competitiveness is basically brought down to the question of how much you invest in your economy. And we have a lot of catching up to do.
But why now? There’s hardly any momentum for climate policy at the moment.
When you talk about investment, you can’t have a perspective of six years. You need a perspective of ten, 15, 20 years, because that’s the time horizon for many of these investments. We presented the 2040 communication to give long-term predictability and certainty to investors and economic actors.
And the Green Deal currently does not give that predictability? That was the main reason to set it up in the first place, wasn’t it?
When we look at investment in the future, we have a framework with the Fit for 55 package that is very fit for 2030. But it is not necessarily fit for 2040. With our current framework, if we extend beyond 2030, we will reduce emissions by 88 percent in 2040, but not in the most cost-efficient manner.
Why not?
ETS 1 for example would go to zero emission allowances by 2039 which would be prohibitive for a number of industry sectors. Take cement for example, they have process emissions which they cannot mitigate or abate so it will become very expensive for them. Also, not all sectors are covered sufficiently, like agriculture for instance. However, we do not want to change the framework for 2030. So, we will not add rules or change rules. We’re only talking about what needs to change after that.
What is the most cost-efficient way?
It won’t be a radical overhaul. What works extremely well is emission trading. So, putting a price on carbon will remain the workhorse of our climate policy. But we also need to go to net negative emissions, so we need carbon removals big time in the future. That’s why we study how to reward carbon removals in the ETS.
For instance, by including the agrifood sector?
The agrifood sector can be a very important sink for carbon. But let me be very clear, we do not have a position on this yet whether we do an ETS for agrifood. We’re studying this currently. But we see an increasing need for land in the future, not only for foods. While food remains the basic premise of agriculture and farming, there’s a need for much more from land in the future: Bioenergy, biogenic carbon, biomass that we need for a circular economy that moves away from fossil fuels. There is the opportunity to store carbon in the soil. So, we argue that there is a greater portfolio of business opportunities ahead for farmers, additional areas of farming that rewards them. One is carbon removals.
And what happens to the EU subsidy scheme for farmers, the so-called CAP?
If there is a broader scale of business opportunities, we should move the model of farming from one based on European subsidies to one based on market signals. This way the farmers become real entrepreneurs and economic actors that respond not to subsidies for which they must fill out a lot of paperwork, but to what the market is willing to buy and to pay for it. If we go in this direction, then what is very important is that the market signals internalize the external costs. In other words, the cost of greenhouse gas emissions. That’s why we’re looking into the possibility of an Agrifood-ETS.
And you think this will get support from farmers?
I think the agrifood ecosystem as a whole is not opposed in principle to this, because the food producers know that this is a way of dealing with scope three emissions, that otherwise they don’t know how to deal with. And the farming sector says, well, it could be interesting as far as it generates revenues that could go back to reward sustainable farming practices. And it would also send a price signal to the consumer, who would be incentivized to a better consumption behavior.
What is the timeline of the legislation for the 2040 target?
We’re currently putting all the studies in place, all the expert groups, all the analysis that is needed. The sequence we will recommend to the next commission is that as soon as the college comes into office, end of this year or beginning of 2025, we adopt the proposal to amend the climate law to introduce the 2040 target. That will then go through the legislative process in the European Parliament and the council. By summer 2025 the Commission needs to come up with the proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework which will be crucial as well because, as achieving the targets will be all about investments. Therefore, the way European budget can mobilize and capitalize investment will be very important. In 2026 we would then come up with a new package of proposals to make ourselves fit for 2040.
2026 is also the year when many reviews of current legislations are due…
Yes, we need to avoid that these reviews are done in isolation one from another because we need a systemic view to this. That’s why we want the new legislative package in 2026 which then will give us three or four years to discuss and negotiate with stakeholders, with member states and with the parliament. This way we can prepare the next decades in very close dialogue with all the parties concerned.
Last summer’s drought, an extremely wet winter, and now flooding in Saarland: Climate change presents significant challenges to public infrastructure in Germany. It is becoming an increasingly important factor in the supply of drinking water as well. Irregular precipitation, higher water demand during droughts, and more effort to ensure quality are major challenges, especially for reservoir management. Although the supply is secure, experts warn that the effort and cost of adapting to the climate crisis will continue to rise.
About ten percent of Germany’s drinking water comes from reservoirs, supplying approximately eight million people. The climate crisis increasingly requires adaptation measures: long, intense droughts, floods and more effort to treat water for drinking are challenges identified by the federal government in last year’s National Water Strategy.
“Reservoirs as surface waters are much more susceptible to climate changes than groundwater,” explains Karsten Rinke, who heads the lake research department at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ) in Leipzig.
The water quality in reservoirs is influenced by the following factors:
“The average conditions of the water balance in Germany will not change drastically in the future,” explains Andreas Marx to Table.Briefings. He is responsible for the Drought Monitor at UFZ. “What climate change has brought is greater variability.” This means that individual years can be wetter or drier than the long-term average. Additionally, within a year, precipitation amounts can fluctuate more than usual.
These are challenges for reservoir operators because the reservoirs serve both drinking water supply and flood control. They follow water management plans, which often specify calendar dates for when more water should be released or stored. Due to climate change, these plans need to become more flexible, and reservoir operators must make more short-term decisions, argues Maren Dietze in an interview with Table.Briefings. She is responsible for the Rappbode Reservoir in the Harz at the Saxony-Anhalt Reservoir Operations.
In addition, higher temperatures also lead to an increase in demand for drinking water. However, Matthias Strandfuß from Elbhaus-Ostharz GmbH assumes that this selective fluctuation will only be small on an annual average. According to his forecasts, an increase in temperature of two degrees will only lead to an increase of one percent in the demand for drinking water. More problematic, however, is the fact that we will also have to be prepared for a sharp increase in peak demand during heatwaves. This change will be expensive and time-consuming for dam operators.
“Technically, we can now treat any water to drinking water quality,” says Matthias Böhme to Table.Briefings. He is currently working with the engineering firm Rinne to install a new treatment plant in Steina in the Harz. There have been repeated problems with water quality in recent years, and the plant had to be taken out of operation temporarily.
The new plant will treat water using ozone. All this comes at a price, Böhme notes. If even more complex, technical solutions are needed in the future, the operating costs of reservoirs will increase. This could significantly drive up water prices.
In addition to technical adaptation measures, other instruments are also necessary, says Böhme. Sustainable forest and forestry management are needed: forests should be resiliently reforested, and various stakeholders must collaborate.
There are also opportunities in reservoir management: Karsten Rinke from UFZ explains that the ecosystem of lakes can be stabilized if warm water from the surface is discharged instead of cold water from the bottom of the reservoirs. However, this might require expensive investments in infrastructure for deep-variable water withdrawal. It is also crucial that authorities, scientific institutions, and reservoir operators collaborate effectively, Dietze suggests.
Andreas Marx from UFZ reassures that the security of the supply is not immediately at risk. The drinking water supply in Germany is not immediately endangered. “We have a socially resilient system. We have both functioning authorities and regulations. At the same time, we are a wealthy country.” In Southern Europe or countries in the Global South, this challenge is much greater.
In Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, could soon govern. The 61-year-old is running for election on June 2. She launched her campaign in early March in Mexico City. Sheinbaum is considered one of the frontrunners and aims to continue the work of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who cannot run again. Both belong to the Morena party. Mexico’s current president is known as a populist with a connection to the people. In contrast, Sheinbaum is a technocrat benefiting from the popularity of the current president. She currently leads in polls for the election.
Theoretically, Sheinbaum’s election could be a real advancement for the country’s climate policy. She holds a Ph.D. in energy engineering, has contributed to two IPCC reports, and is seen as a politician deeply aligned with science. Some even refer to her as “Latin America’s Angela Merkel”. Sheinbaum comes from a Jewish family of immigrants from Lithuania and Bulgaria and has studied physics. She has two children and, after separating from her husband in 2016, remarried last year. Little else is known about her private life; past employees have described her as somewhat arrogant and curt.
Sheinbaum’s political career began in 2000 as the environmental secretary for Mexico City. After various positions, she became the mayor of Mexico City in 2018. Last year, she stepped down as mayor to run for president. As the mayor of the 20-million metropolis, she advanced climate action selectively, such as through the electrification of buses and installing solar panels on the massive market halls of the “Mercado de Abastos” food market.
However, projects like these are barely more than a drop in the ocean. Last year, the online portal Energy Monitor titled Mexico’s climate policy as the “weakest in the G20”. The Climate Action Tracker rates the climate policy in the worst category, “critically insufficient”. Since 2018, under López Obrador, “energy sovereignty” has been prioritized, and renewables have barely been expanded. By the end of 2022, only 23 percent of electricity came from renewables, making the goal of reaching 35 percent by the end of 2024 unrealistic. Mexico is the only G20 country that has not yet set a net-zero target.
Despite this, there is some movement in renewables. The country’s flagship project is “Sonora,” a solar park with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts, expected to be operational by 2028. However, new oil refineries have also been opened in recent years, and the state-owned company PEMEX remains a significant player. López Obrador had also promised to keep at least 54 percent of electricity production in state hands, including PEMEX. Sheinbaum intends to maintain this goal, which discourages private investors in renewables.
It is unclear whether Sheinbaum would pursue a significantly more ambitious energy policy than López Obrador. Critics label her as his puppet since she initially stands for his policies. However, she seems more open to private investments in renewables than the current president. In mid-April, Sheinbaum presented a plan that offers some hope. If elected, she plans to invest around 13.5 billion US dollars in renewable projects by 2030.
Under certain circumstances, Mexico’s climate policy might gain more if Sheinbaum surprisingly loses the election. Another candidate, 60-year-old computer engineer and entrepreneur Xochitl Gálvez, also has a chance of winning. Thus, the country is likely to be led by a woman for the first time. Gálvez, representing the “Frente Amplio” alliance, is a strong advocate for expanding renewables. She aims to combat the “addiction to fossil fuels” and work with the private sector to develop cheap and clean energy.
For us, what we write about is crucial – but sometimes, what we choose not to write about is equally important. Recently, we debated in our editorial team whether to cover the CDU/CSU’s proposal to reverse the EU’s decision to phase out internal combustion engines by 2035. Our decision: no. This proposal conveniently surfaces just before the EU elections, leaving numerous questions unanswered about serious policy-making: How else can climate goals be realistically achieved without relying on the hope for unknown new technologies? Where will climate-friendly alternative fuels come from? Where is the investment security for the European automotive industry? And why are the Christian Democrats opposing the Green Deal promoted by their own party colleague and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen? Should serious answers emerge, we will certainly cover them.
Instead, today we focus on real challenges: the EU Commission’s long-term plans for the Green Deal, the demands on Germany’s water supply in the face of climate change, the dire state of mangrove forests that protect coastlines worldwide, a melting mega-glacier in Antarctica and the risk that Germany might miss its efficiency target for 2030.
Kurt Vandenberghe, the commission proposed a net greenhouse gas reduction target of 90 percent for 2040, at a point where the legislation for the 2030 climate target is not yet fully implemented. What exactly are you preparing currently?
The full climate transition is basically an agenda of modernizing our economy and investing. Investment that our economy needs, because investment in China is 40 percent of GDP, in Europe it is 20 percent. So, all the talk about competitiveness is basically brought down to the question of how much you invest in your economy. And we have a lot of catching up to do.
But why now? There’s hardly any momentum for climate policy at the moment.
When you talk about investment, you can’t have a perspective of six years. You need a perspective of ten, 15, 20 years, because that’s the time horizon for many of these investments. We presented the 2040 communication to give long-term predictability and certainty to investors and economic actors.
And the Green Deal currently does not give that predictability? That was the main reason to set it up in the first place, wasn’t it?
When we look at investment in the future, we have a framework with the Fit for 55 package that is very fit for 2030. But it is not necessarily fit for 2040. With our current framework, if we extend beyond 2030, we will reduce emissions by 88 percent in 2040, but not in the most cost-efficient manner.
Why not?
ETS 1 for example would go to zero emission allowances by 2039 which would be prohibitive for a number of industry sectors. Take cement for example, they have process emissions which they cannot mitigate or abate so it will become very expensive for them. Also, not all sectors are covered sufficiently, like agriculture for instance. However, we do not want to change the framework for 2030. So, we will not add rules or change rules. We’re only talking about what needs to change after that.
What is the most cost-efficient way?
It won’t be a radical overhaul. What works extremely well is emission trading. So, putting a price on carbon will remain the workhorse of our climate policy. But we also need to go to net negative emissions, so we need carbon removals big time in the future. That’s why we study how to reward carbon removals in the ETS.
For instance, by including the agrifood sector?
The agrifood sector can be a very important sink for carbon. But let me be very clear, we do not have a position on this yet whether we do an ETS for agrifood. We’re studying this currently. But we see an increasing need for land in the future, not only for foods. While food remains the basic premise of agriculture and farming, there’s a need for much more from land in the future: Bioenergy, biogenic carbon, biomass that we need for a circular economy that moves away from fossil fuels. There is the opportunity to store carbon in the soil. So, we argue that there is a greater portfolio of business opportunities ahead for farmers, additional areas of farming that rewards them. One is carbon removals.
And what happens to the EU subsidy scheme for farmers, the so-called CAP?
If there is a broader scale of business opportunities, we should move the model of farming from one based on European subsidies to one based on market signals. This way the farmers become real entrepreneurs and economic actors that respond not to subsidies for which they must fill out a lot of paperwork, but to what the market is willing to buy and to pay for it. If we go in this direction, then what is very important is that the market signals internalize the external costs. In other words, the cost of greenhouse gas emissions. That’s why we’re looking into the possibility of an Agrifood-ETS.
And you think this will get support from farmers?
I think the agrifood ecosystem as a whole is not opposed in principle to this, because the food producers know that this is a way of dealing with scope three emissions, that otherwise they don’t know how to deal with. And the farming sector says, well, it could be interesting as far as it generates revenues that could go back to reward sustainable farming practices. And it would also send a price signal to the consumer, who would be incentivized to a better consumption behavior.
What is the timeline of the legislation for the 2040 target?
We’re currently putting all the studies in place, all the expert groups, all the analysis that is needed. The sequence we will recommend to the next commission is that as soon as the college comes into office, end of this year or beginning of 2025, we adopt the proposal to amend the climate law to introduce the 2040 target. That will then go through the legislative process in the European Parliament and the council. By summer 2025 the Commission needs to come up with the proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework which will be crucial as well because, as achieving the targets will be all about investments. Therefore, the way European budget can mobilize and capitalize investment will be very important. In 2026 we would then come up with a new package of proposals to make ourselves fit for 2040.
2026 is also the year when many reviews of current legislations are due…
Yes, we need to avoid that these reviews are done in isolation one from another because we need a systemic view to this. That’s why we want the new legislative package in 2026 which then will give us three or four years to discuss and negotiate with stakeholders, with member states and with the parliament. This way we can prepare the next decades in very close dialogue with all the parties concerned.
Last summer’s drought, an extremely wet winter, and now flooding in Saarland: Climate change presents significant challenges to public infrastructure in Germany. It is becoming an increasingly important factor in the supply of drinking water as well. Irregular precipitation, higher water demand during droughts, and more effort to ensure quality are major challenges, especially for reservoir management. Although the supply is secure, experts warn that the effort and cost of adapting to the climate crisis will continue to rise.
About ten percent of Germany’s drinking water comes from reservoirs, supplying approximately eight million people. The climate crisis increasingly requires adaptation measures: long, intense droughts, floods and more effort to treat water for drinking are challenges identified by the federal government in last year’s National Water Strategy.
“Reservoirs as surface waters are much more susceptible to climate changes than groundwater,” explains Karsten Rinke, who heads the lake research department at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ) in Leipzig.
The water quality in reservoirs is influenced by the following factors:
“The average conditions of the water balance in Germany will not change drastically in the future,” explains Andreas Marx to Table.Briefings. He is responsible for the Drought Monitor at UFZ. “What climate change has brought is greater variability.” This means that individual years can be wetter or drier than the long-term average. Additionally, within a year, precipitation amounts can fluctuate more than usual.
These are challenges for reservoir operators because the reservoirs serve both drinking water supply and flood control. They follow water management plans, which often specify calendar dates for when more water should be released or stored. Due to climate change, these plans need to become more flexible, and reservoir operators must make more short-term decisions, argues Maren Dietze in an interview with Table.Briefings. She is responsible for the Rappbode Reservoir in the Harz at the Saxony-Anhalt Reservoir Operations.
In addition, higher temperatures also lead to an increase in demand for drinking water. However, Matthias Strandfuß from Elbhaus-Ostharz GmbH assumes that this selective fluctuation will only be small on an annual average. According to his forecasts, an increase in temperature of two degrees will only lead to an increase of one percent in the demand for drinking water. More problematic, however, is the fact that we will also have to be prepared for a sharp increase in peak demand during heatwaves. This change will be expensive and time-consuming for dam operators.
“Technically, we can now treat any water to drinking water quality,” says Matthias Böhme to Table.Briefings. He is currently working with the engineering firm Rinne to install a new treatment plant in Steina in the Harz. There have been repeated problems with water quality in recent years, and the plant had to be taken out of operation temporarily.
The new plant will treat water using ozone. All this comes at a price, Böhme notes. If even more complex, technical solutions are needed in the future, the operating costs of reservoirs will increase. This could significantly drive up water prices.
In addition to technical adaptation measures, other instruments are also necessary, says Böhme. Sustainable forest and forestry management are needed: forests should be resiliently reforested, and various stakeholders must collaborate.
There are also opportunities in reservoir management: Karsten Rinke from UFZ explains that the ecosystem of lakes can be stabilized if warm water from the surface is discharged instead of cold water from the bottom of the reservoirs. However, this might require expensive investments in infrastructure for deep-variable water withdrawal. It is also crucial that authorities, scientific institutions, and reservoir operators collaborate effectively, Dietze suggests.
Andreas Marx from UFZ reassures that the security of the supply is not immediately at risk. The drinking water supply in Germany is not immediately endangered. “We have a socially resilient system. We have both functioning authorities and regulations. At the same time, we are a wealthy country.” In Southern Europe or countries in the Global South, this challenge is much greater.
In Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, could soon govern. The 61-year-old is running for election on June 2. She launched her campaign in early March in Mexico City. Sheinbaum is considered one of the frontrunners and aims to continue the work of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who cannot run again. Both belong to the Morena party. Mexico’s current president is known as a populist with a connection to the people. In contrast, Sheinbaum is a technocrat benefiting from the popularity of the current president. She currently leads in polls for the election.
Theoretically, Sheinbaum’s election could be a real advancement for the country’s climate policy. She holds a Ph.D. in energy engineering, has contributed to two IPCC reports, and is seen as a politician deeply aligned with science. Some even refer to her as “Latin America’s Angela Merkel”. Sheinbaum comes from a Jewish family of immigrants from Lithuania and Bulgaria and has studied physics. She has two children and, after separating from her husband in 2016, remarried last year. Little else is known about her private life; past employees have described her as somewhat arrogant and curt.
Sheinbaum’s political career began in 2000 as the environmental secretary for Mexico City. After various positions, she became the mayor of Mexico City in 2018. Last year, she stepped down as mayor to run for president. As the mayor of the 20-million metropolis, she advanced climate action selectively, such as through the electrification of buses and installing solar panels on the massive market halls of the “Mercado de Abastos” food market.
However, projects like these are barely more than a drop in the ocean. Last year, the online portal Energy Monitor titled Mexico’s climate policy as the “weakest in the G20”. The Climate Action Tracker rates the climate policy in the worst category, “critically insufficient”. Since 2018, under López Obrador, “energy sovereignty” has been prioritized, and renewables have barely been expanded. By the end of 2022, only 23 percent of electricity came from renewables, making the goal of reaching 35 percent by the end of 2024 unrealistic. Mexico is the only G20 country that has not yet set a net-zero target.
Despite this, there is some movement in renewables. The country’s flagship project is “Sonora,” a solar park with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts, expected to be operational by 2028. However, new oil refineries have also been opened in recent years, and the state-owned company PEMEX remains a significant player. López Obrador had also promised to keep at least 54 percent of electricity production in state hands, including PEMEX. Sheinbaum intends to maintain this goal, which discourages private investors in renewables.
It is unclear whether Sheinbaum would pursue a significantly more ambitious energy policy than López Obrador. Critics label her as his puppet since she initially stands for his policies. However, she seems more open to private investments in renewables than the current president. In mid-April, Sheinbaum presented a plan that offers some hope. If elected, she plans to invest around 13.5 billion US dollars in renewable projects by 2030.
Under certain circumstances, Mexico’s climate policy might gain more if Sheinbaum surprisingly loses the election. Another candidate, 60-year-old computer engineer and entrepreneur Xochitl Gálvez, also has a chance of winning. Thus, the country is likely to be led by a woman for the first time. Gálvez, representing the “Frente Amplio” alliance, is a strong advocate for expanding renewables. She aims to combat the “addiction to fossil fuels” and work with the private sector to develop cheap and clean energy.
