Phew, we’ve done it again. That was the general mood on Sunday morning around half past five in Baku’s football stadium, as this extra-long COP finally came to an end. Delegates, NGOs, and media folks breathed a weary sigh of relief now that, after painfully long delays, a deal was finally struck. Sometimes it almost doesn’t seem to matter anymore what exactly was decided.
But of course, we see things differently. That’s why, after a day’s reflection – and having already provided you with the most important news in yesterday’s Table.Alert – we’re taking a closer look. We’ll examine how the reactions to COP29 are unfolding, the harsh criticism directed at the COP29 presidency’s leadership, and what the outcomes from Baku mean for the future.
But for now, that’s enough. After two weeks of daily news floods about the conference and beyond, we’d like to thank you for your diligent reading, your help with research, and the encouraging comments we’ve received in Baku and Berlin. And because all the effort has occasionally given even us some COPtigue, we’re granting you and ourselves a little break.
A little heads-up: The next Climate.Table, which you’re already eagerly awaiting, will appear as usual next Thursday.
Hearing no objections… it is so decided. Bam goes the gavel!
Your Bernhard Pötter
Feature
COP29: What the resolutions mean for future climate policy
COP29 is over, but the decisions will have consequences for international climate policy beyond the mere resolutions.
The decision taken at the climate conference in Baku has set an important course: a new international target for climate finance, the gradual expansion of the donor base for climate aid, and a final regulation for voluntary carbon markets. But COP29 also has other important consequences in its course and results that will shape global climate policy in the future. Some insights from Baku:
Climate action is on the defensive worldwide. Despite a year of extreme weather events and new temperature records, the core of climate action – emissions reduction and mitigation – is increasingly falling behind. There is agreement on the expansion of renewables and increasing efficiency. There is also movement when it comes to finance. The climate scene is hoping that the fossil fuel era is coming to an end. But the fossil fuel lobby is still strong enough to prevent a clear statement on phasing out fossil fuels at a COP – let alone concrete steps to do so.
It is not only the basic principles of climate policy that are under pressure, but the rules-based order that supports it as a whole. After three COPs in authoritarian states, the mores at the COPs have also become increasingly brutal: Procedures are non-transparent instead of open. Critical NGOs are kept out of the country and spied on, criticism of authoritarian fossil fuel structures is barely allowed. As a result, the voices that stand for liberalism are becoming quieter, partly because more countries such as the USA are switching to the populist camp.
China and the EU are becoming more important in the climate process
Ambitious NDC climate plans are receding into the distance. According to the UNFCCC synthesis report, CO2 reductions are currently just under three percent, but should be at 45 percent by 2030. A drastic acceleration is hardly to be expected – also because the new financing target in emerging and developing countries will not provide the funds for this. However, it is precisely in these NDCs that the reduction measures would have to be enshrined.
The change in the donor base for financing will change the geopolitics of climate – especially if the US withdraws. The climate process will become less US and EU-heavy and more shaped by China and the various interests of the BRICS countries. South-South cooperation will become more frequent and more important. Whether this will lead to more ambition in mitigation is doubtful.
The energy transition in the US and the UN climate process will probably survive the next four years of the Trump administration – but there will hardly be the necessary international momentum if the largest economy with the historically highest emissions withdraws.
Will China and the EU form a “green bloc” to counter this? And does this amount to a new bloc formation? EU and China as the camp of “renewables” and the Green Deal against the fossil empires Russia and USA?
Climate financing will have a major impact on financial policy in Europe. With the withdrawal of the USA, the Europeans in particular will be obligedto multiply their climate spending. However, this is practically impossible with current budgets. The debate about new financial instruments such as taxes and levies on fossil fuel production, flights or new instruments at central banks will be loud and clear. And the question of climate policy redistribution within the EU and worldwide will also be raised loudly.
Developing countries vs. industrialized countries
COP29 also showed once again how deep the divide is between developed and developing countries. Whilelast year a broad consensus could be reached between almost all UN signatory states, with only a few blocking it for a long time due to their fossil fuel profits, this year it was once again a question of bridging the deep rifts between rich and poor, between those who cause climate change and those who suffer from it. It only barely succeeded.
The High Ambition Coalition – HAC for short – is normally a reliable bridge builder between the Global North and South. In Baku, however, it only made an appearance at the beginning without being able to generate much momentum. It would have been needed to focus more on the interests of the most vulnerable countries at a time when the COP was on the brink of failure due to the poor leadership of the presidency and more momentum was needed for mitigation in particular.
The COP29 in Baku ended early on Sunday morning with a delay of more than 30 hours and a bundle of decisions. In the final days, which were sometimes chaotic, the conference was on the brink of collapse because many groups of countries felt they had not been considered. Many groups of negotiators strongly criticized the leadership of COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev because the process often lacked transparency and cooperation.
But when Babayev dropped the gavel early in the morning local time, these were the most important decisions of COP29:
Financial target NCQG
A new NCQG financial target: By 2035, industrialized countries are to raise at least USD 300 billion annually from private and public funds for developing countries. By 2035, a total of USD 1.3 trillion in climate finance should also flow every year. This includes the USD 300 billion, private investments, flows from the multilateral development banks (MDBs), and innovative mechanisms such as new levies.
To plan and review this process, a “Baku to Belém Roadmap” is to be established, which describes the growth to the mentioned 1.3 trillion by 2035.
The donor base for climate finance will be expanded beyond the industrialized countries: Emerging economies such as China, South Korea, the Gulf States, and Singapore can voluntarily define their share of the MDBs’ climate funds as climate aid. They can also have their South-South aid counted towards the joint climate target of at least 1.3 trillion.
However, Cuba, Bolivia, Nigeria and, above all, India loudly objected to the adoption of the NCQG at the meeting, to the applause of many observers in the room.
Emission reduction
The area of “mitigation” was particularly important to the industrialized countries, AOSIS, AILAC and LDC countries – but experienced strong resistance from the oil states led by Saudi Arabia. The corresponding GST resolutions from COP28 in Dubai (“transitioning away from fossil fuels“)were partially deleted from the texts and had to be laboriously written back in. There was no mention of the GST results in the mitigation work program of COP26.
To this end, “Dubai” should be anchored in the “UAE Dialogue“, which deals with the implementation of the Global Stocktake. The results of the COP28 Global Stocktake in Dubai are generally reaffirmed right at the beginning: These are tripling renewables, doubling energy efficiency and moving away from fossil fuels, the famous “transitioning away”.
However, this term itself was not found in this document. It was only referred to in paragraph 14 concerning paragraph 28 of the Dubai GST decision. One paragraph later, however, “transitional fuels” are explicitly mentioned – i.e. support for gas. There is also a rejection of “unilateral trade measures” such as the EU’s CBAM.
However, instead of being adopted as planned, the UAE Dialogue was postponed following objections from South American and EIG countries. It is now to be negotiated further at the SBSTA meetings in Bonn in June.
Adjustment, loss and damage
The global adaptation target was also only advanced with difficulty in Baku. To make it more concrete, a maximum of 100 indicators are now being targeted: All states are to undertake adaptation measures in certain key areas (for example the health sector, food, water). This also includes financial criteria. However, only procedural progress has been made. In terms of content, the work must be done by the conference in Belém.
In the area of finance, adaptation is mentioned in a separate paragraph, so there is a link to the NCQG, says Laura Schäfer from Germanwatch: According to the NCQG text, financing is to be “dramatically increased” and there is a high demand for grants and heavily discounted loans in this area. A “balance between adaptation and mitigation” is also being sought in the funding. The distributions from the funds that also deal with adaptation are to be tripled.
The topic of “Loss and Damage”, on the other hand, has disappeared from the financial text. The text recognizes that there are “significant gaps in the response to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage”. But it contains no call to action or commitment to provide funding. The Loss and Damage Fund is only very indirectly seen as part of the UNFCCC climate finance mechanism, similar to the Green Climate Fund. It is clear from all the texts that the topic is being handled very delicately.
Article 6
After nine years of intensive negotiations, rules and standards for trading emission reduction credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were agreed in Baku. The agreement was only possible because the European Union gave up a years-long blockade with which it wanted to prevent weak transparency and greenwashing by the carbon markets.
Gender
Hardly any progress was made on the topic of gender in Baku; instead, regression was prevented. The Lima Action Program of 2024 was extended by ten years. Next year at SB62 in Bonn, the development of a gender action plan is now to begin. However, a coalition of Saudi Arabia, Russia and the Vatican in particular rejected the new wording in many places, which was to be redesigned to be gender-inclusive.
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Climate & Environment
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COP29: allegations against the presidency
The man with the gavel: COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev.
When COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev dropped the gavel for the last time at 5:31 a.m. on Sunday and declared the Baku Climate Change Conference over, the delegates applauded. There was a mixture of joy and exhaustion, but also relief that the conference had not failed. And that the Azerbaijani presidency had managed to get the conference over the line reasonably unscathed in the end.
Restlessness and confusion in hectic days
This COP presidency had caused a lot of unrest and confusion, especially in the last days and hours of the conference. Babayev’s team sometimes seriously violated the unwritten rules for running a COP. Many delegations reported that the presidency had presented texts without consultation, sent out false documents and failed to consult important groups of countries. It is the primary task of a COP presidency to act as an “honest broker”, tolisten to all voices, and to present results that can be accepted by the vast majority of states, or at least compromises that are not rejected.
However, according to many experienced delegates and observers under the leadership of Mukhtar Babayev, this was often not the case. Delegates and observers report that the controversial negotiating texts of Friday evening on the central issues of finance and mitigation were not consulted and agreed with the most vulnerable country groups AOSIS, AILAC (Latin America and the Caribbean outside the G77), and LDCs (Least Developed Countries) in their final version. This is normally a mortal sin for any negotiator in this process.
‘Concerns of the island states ignored’
The Presidency had not spoken to the AOSIS negotiators by 3 p.m. on Saturday, as confirmed by the delegation of the island states. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock also complained on Saturday afternoon that the concerns of the most vulnerable “have unfortunately been ignored by the presidency so far”.
There was also confusion about texts and papers. During the decisive phase of the conference, documents were sent to the delegations, some of which were not up to date or had already been rejected by the countries. Furthermore, important Presidency texts had only been shown to the delegation leaders for inspection but had not been made available for detailed analysis. Finally, the Europeans complained that Babayev’s leadership team had not passed on some of their proposals to other countries. An inquiry by Table.Briefings to the presidency about the allegations was left unanswered.
Little cooperation with Troika member Brazil
Azerbaijan apparently did not rely on its own allies either: The controversial text from Friday evening had also not been discussed with Brazil, after all a member of the COP troika as host of the COP30 next year, delegates confirm. Due to the general dissatisfaction with the way the presidency was working, the LDC countries left the negotiations on the financial target at short notice on Saturday afternoon and risked the conference being called off.
The confusion in the conference leadership is remarkable because Azerbaijan had hired a whole range of external consultants for this planning. Like many COP presidencies, especially from emerging or developing countries, the COP29 presidency had also hired experts to understand and steer the UN process. These advisors are made up of former negotiators from UN member states or employees of the UN Secretariat and have deep insights into the dynamics of a climate conference.
Undiplomatic attacks
Many observers therefore wondered whether the confusion was due to the inadequacy of the presidency – or whether there may have been a plan to cause the conference to fail. For many observers, the frequent direct violations of the basic rules of UN diplomacy, such as consulting with all affected groups, are an indication of a deliberate strategy.
At the opening of COP29, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev had already attacked Western host countries in a highly undiplomatic manner: He called their criticism of the “petro-state” of Azerbaijan hypocritical, he praised fossil fuels as a “gift from God” and accused the USA and the EU of using their “fake news media” to create a mood against his country. His accusations against France and the Netherlands led to a boycott of the conference by French Environment Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher at the beginning.
How the COP29 presidency team will proceed with the UN rules will become clear next year, for example at the SBSTA meeting in Bonn in June. This is because Mukhtar Babayev’s term of office has only just begun and will last until COP30 in Brazil in November 2025.
COP29
‘Band-aid on a bullet wound’: comments on the COP29 conclusion
Not satisfied with the outcome: Protesters on the summit grounds in Baku demand more climate funding even after the conference has ended.
Relief that the climate conference did not fail. Disillusionment and anger at its outcome. The call to reform the process – and the appeal not to let up in climate action efforts. All of this can be found in the reactions to the final documents of COP29. While voices from the industrialized countries often emphasized the success that an agreement could be reached at all against a difficult geopolitical backdrop, experts from developing countries and climate protection NGOs criticized the inadequate results of the conference, in some cases harshly.
Reactions from the German government:
We know that “today’s decisions alone are not enough to meet all needs,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said at the plenary session in Baku on Saturday night. But no one has forgotten the industrialized countries’ historical responsibility.
Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck also called the results “inadequate, but we can continue to work with them”.
Development Minister Svenja Schulze referred to the need for large-scale private investment worldwide for climate action. “The new figure of USD 1300 billion symbolizes this vision.” The task now is to make the vision a reality.
Environment Minister Steffi Lemke commented: “What we had to experience here was the defensive struggle of a fossil world that does not want to accept that the age of fossil fuels is coming to an end.” Lemke warned that the “wasteful use of natural resources” must end.
The political climate and possibilities
A selection of further reactions:
Christoph Bals, Political Director, Germanwatch: “This world climate conference does not deliver what was actually necessary – but it is at the upper end of what is possible in the current political climate.”
Laurence Tubiana, CEO European Climate Foundation: “COP29 took place under difficult circumstances, but multilateralism is alive and more necessary than ever. The climate finance agreement is not as ambitious as the moment demands. The framework it sets out provides a foundation on which to build.”
Ottmar Edenhofer, climate economist and Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK): “The climate summit in Baku was not a success, but at best the avoidance of a diplomatic disaster. It is now abundantly clear that we need supplementary negotiation formats for the global fight against the climate crisis, (for example within) so-called climate clubs.”
Tina Stege, Climate Envoy, Marshall Islands: “(We have) seen the worst of political opportunismhere at this COP, playing with the lives of the world’s most vulnerable people. Countries seem to have forgotten the reason why we are all here. We are here to save lives. It’s about saving lives. We must work hard to restore confidence in this vital process.”
Caroline Brouillette, Executive Director of Climate Action Network Canada: “The climate finance agreement reached today in Baku is a band-aid on a bullet wound. The fact that it’s a bigger band-aid than we’ve seen before is small comfort when the world is bleeding more than ever.”
A ‘lazy compromise’
The influence of countries and groups of countries is also commented on from various sides:
Cosima Cassel, Head of the Climate Diplomacy Program, E3G Berlin: “The pioneering role of developing countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Kenya was crucial in driving this agreement forward. But the outcome falls far short of what is needed.”
Li Shuo, Director of China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute: “The protracted endgame at COP29 reflects the tougher geopolitical terrain the world finds itself in. […] The outcome is a rotten compromise between donor countries and the world’s most vulnerable nations. The careful coordination between the EU and China ensures stability in Baku.”
Luisa Neubauer, spokesperson for Fridays for Future Germany: “Fossil industries and petro-states have staked everything on failure at COP29. The fact that there is an agreement at COP29 – as shameful as it is – shows that resistance to fossil interests is worthwhile. But now the real work begins.”
New NCQG financial target
One of the milestones of the COP is the adoption of the new financial target. This has been met with criticism:
Sabine Minninger, climate expert at Bread for the World: “It is devastating that the poorest countries have droppedtheir demand to finance climate damage due to pressure from industrialized countries. As a result, they run the risk of continuing to run up massive debts to cover the high costs of damage.”
Ralph Regenvanu, Climate Envoy of the Republic of Vanuatu: “The commitments made in Baku – the dollar amounts pledged and the emission reductions promised – are not enough and never would have been. And even if they had been: Based on our experience so far, we know that they will not be fulfilled. The Global North’s inability to tackle the climate crisis – let alone stop it – is a global tragedy.”
Emilia Runeberg, International Climate Policy Coordinator, CAN Europe: “The increasing reliance on private finance flows to bail out developing countries risks skewing funding towards market-based loans and sectors that generate returns at the expense of adaptation and loss and damage repair, potentially violating the Paris Agreement’s goal of respecting the needs of developing countries.”
Jan Kowalzig, climate finance expert, Oxfam: “At first glance, it may seem as if the poorer countries can now count on considerably more support. But let’s not kid ourselves: Most of these funds will come in the form of loans, as they have in the past.They have to be repaid with interest and can further exacerbate the often overwhelming debt burden of low-income countries.”
Fred Njehu, Pan-African Policy Strategist, Greenpeace Africa: “This financial deal is not only a betrayal of climate justice, but also a mockery of the polluter pays principle. The same nations that have built their wealth on fossil fuels are now offering band-aids and expecting us to bear the trillion-dollar burden of their historic emissions.”
Avinash Persaud, Special Advisor on Climate Change to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): “It was hard-fought, but with USD 300 billion a year being passed on from the industrialized countries to the developing countries, we have reached the limit between what is politically feasible in the industrialized countries today and what would make a difference in the developing countries. What is crucial, however, is what is written around this figure in the agreement.”
Martin Kaiser, Managing Director, Greenpeace Germany: “It is scandalous that the oil and gas lobby, with the help of some oil states in cooperation with the gas donor country, has succeeded in blocking all the necessary accelerations to phase out coal, oil and gas.”
Ani Dasgupta, President and CEO of World Resources Institute (WRI): “While the COP29 decision on emissions cuts only reaffirmed previous commitments, it was encouraging to see several major emitters pledge that new national targets will put them on a credible path to achieve net zero emissions.”
Joeri Rogelj, Climate Scientist, Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London: “COP29 has set the stage for the most important item on next year’s climate policy calendar: a new wave of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The UK and Mexico’s ambitious new targets are encouraging.”
Thilo Brodtmann, Managing Director, German Engineering Federation (VDMA): “The moment of truth will now come when the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are set next year. It is questionable whether all countries will be able to make stronger climate action commitments on this basis and back them up with realistic regulatory measures and financing plans. Ultimately, however, this will define markets for our climate action technologies.”
Reactions to Article 6
After years of deadlock, COP29 also reached an agreement on Article 6, which regulates international carbon markets. This has mainly been criticized by civil society:
Erika Lennon, Senior Attorney, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL): “Agreeing to weak rules that lack transparency, accountability or meaningful oversight is not a collaborative approach to achieving more ambitious climate action, but a recipe for disaster.”
Linda Schneider, advisor for international climate and energy policy at the Heinrich Böll Foundation: “It is very worrying that the results of COP29 have also extended the controversial carbon markets under Article 6 to CO2 removals – which could also include dangerous geoengineering proposals for the large-scale technological removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.”
Lambert Schneider, Research Coordinator for International Climate Policy, Öko-Institut: “It remains to be seen how good the quality of climate certificates will be under the Paris Agreement. What matters now is how the rules are implemented in practice and whether countries will actually comply with the agreed rules.”
COP29
NCQG adopted: USD 300 billion and a roadmap to Belém
Demanding “trillions, not billions” for the Global South: protesters at COP29.
It took a walk-out by the island states (AOSIS) and the least developed countries (LDCs) to reach an agreement in Baku after all. Both left the negotiating room in protest on Saturday afternoon. The Azerbaijani COP29 presidency had left both groups of states out of the negotiations on the new climate finance target (NCQG) before presenting a first real draft text on Friday.
Subsequently, there was movement in the conference rooms. Europe, the most vulnerable states and the Presidency negotiated a new text behind closed doors, which, apart from a few changes, corresponded to the final text. The final agreement includes the following points:
There was still room for maneuver when it came to the amount (“quantum”) of the NCQG: The new climate financing target is now “at least” USD 300 billion – with the industrialized countries “in the lead”. In the previous draft, there had been talk of USD 250 billion. Bi- and multilateral donors from the public and private sectors are providing the funds for this core target. It is unclear to what extent the new target has improved on the previous target of USD 100 billion per year. If inflation up to 2035 and the expanded donor base are factored out, the contribution is unlikely to lead to a significantly higher commitment for industrialized nations.
The expanded donor base also includes contributions to climate finance from multilateral development banks. It is “recognized” that they contribute to the climate finance target “voluntarily”. In addition, developing countries can also voluntarily provide so-called South-South support, which would also contribute to the target.
The “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T” is intended to define the process for aligning the global financial system to bring total climate finance from all sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035. According to information obtained by Table.Briefings, the process could start as early as next year’s Petersberg Climate Dialogue, under the supervision of the COP presidencies in Baku and Belém. The development of minimum allocations, particularly for least developed countries and small island states, has been discussed for this process in the meantime, but is no longer included in the agreed text.
Quality: It is “recognized” that “grants” and “(highly) concessional loans” are “needed” in the areas of adaptation and Loss and Damage – a demand from the island states and least developed countries. However, there is no concrete figure in the text as to how large the share of the core objective should be made up of grants and concessional loans. However, development banks and their stakeholders are “invited” to provide more highly concessional loans.
What should the money be used for? The core objective only covers mitigation and adaptation. As in the Paris Agreement, a “balance” is to be achieved between the two areas. There is no specific sub-goal for adaptation. However, public spending on various funds to support developing countries (including the Adaptation Fund) is to be “at least tripled” by 2030 at the latest. However, some of the funds are severely underfunded. A tripling would not mean significant new resources. However, losses and damages are not mentioned in the core objective.
Review: The NCQG will be reviewed in 2030.
India rejects – without consequences
Once the applause for the historic agreement on the climate finance target had died down, critics of the deal were quick to speak out. Cuba and Bolivia attacked the target of USD 300 billion in particular as being too low. India’s negotiator Chandni Raina made it clear that she did not accept the result and rejected it – but only after COP President Mukhtar Babayev had dropped the gavel to accept the NCQG. India’s request to speak is thus recorded in the meeting minutes but has no effect. The NCQG remains adopted.
Raina complained that the presidency did not allow any requests to speak but immediately dropped the gavel. The usual question from the Presidency as to whether there were any objections failed to materialize. The document was nothing more than an optical illusion, Raina sharply criticized. EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra defended the result but showed little understanding for the criticism from the Global South. This is also because the island states and least developed countries support the deal.
Climate adaptation
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Finance
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Klimafinanzierung
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News
Article 6 adopted: EU lifts blockade against ‘anything goes’ approach
It is an important step on the way to international carbon markets: Rules and standards for trading emission reduction credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement have been agreed after nine years of intensive negotiations. The agreement was only possible because the European Union gave up a years-long blockade with which it wanted to prevent weak transparency and greenwashing by the carbon markets.
The agreement on intergovernmental trading in emission credits (Article 6.2), with which supplier countries can earn money and buyer countries can improve their greenhouse gas balance, states that:
Countries that do not comply with the regulations (according to the text: whose reports for trade show “inconsistencies”) have no consequences to fear – apart from a vague obligation to rectify the problems without a clear deadline. The NGO Carbon Market Watch criticizes this.
Countries must disclose important information about the emission credits traded, but without a time limit, so it could take years before the quality of the emission credits is publicly available.
Jonathan Crook, Policy Lead at Carbon Market Watch, describes the agreement on Article 6.2 as an “anything goes” mechanism with numerous loopholes, hurdles, and complicated registration instruments for carbon credits.
Regulations for voluntary markets under Article 6.4
Article 6.4 on voluntary carbon markets for private actors was further negotiated after the initial agreement in Baku and further details have now also been agreed upon:
Certificates for CO2 removal are only issued if carbon is removed from the atmosphere during “climate-relevant periods”.
Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) originating from the Kyoto Protocol can be transferred to Article 6.4 markets without further review and additionality.
There are no regular reviews of standards and methodologies for emission reduction projects to enable “regulatory stability”.
This means that the minimum standards on the voluntary carbon markets will be relatively loose in the future and therefore susceptible to greenwashing.
There is criticism of the new Article 6 regulations from many quarters – among them, “independent observers, researchers, the media and the countries themselves would carry a lot of weight on their shoulders to scrutinize the carbon markets,” says Jonathan Crook. The complexity and technical nature of Article 6 would likely present a significant obstacle to this task. Some countries could count on just that, says the emissions trading expert.
Large industrialized nations in particular, especially the USA, but also developing countries that want to make money on the markets, have always campaigned for weak rules in the past. They wanted to make the market simple and easily accessible for everyone. However, there is a risk that the instrument will lose integrity and enable greenwashing. luk
Phew, we’ve done it again. That was the general mood on Sunday morning around half past five in Baku’s football stadium, as this extra-long COP finally came to an end. Delegates, NGOs, and media folks breathed a weary sigh of relief now that, after painfully long delays, a deal was finally struck. Sometimes it almost doesn’t seem to matter anymore what exactly was decided.
But of course, we see things differently. That’s why, after a day’s reflection – and having already provided you with the most important news in yesterday’s Table.Alert – we’re taking a closer look. We’ll examine how the reactions to COP29 are unfolding, the harsh criticism directed at the COP29 presidency’s leadership, and what the outcomes from Baku mean for the future.
But for now, that’s enough. After two weeks of daily news floods about the conference and beyond, we’d like to thank you for your diligent reading, your help with research, and the encouraging comments we’ve received in Baku and Berlin. And because all the effort has occasionally given even us some COPtigue, we’re granting you and ourselves a little break.
A little heads-up: The next Climate.Table, which you’re already eagerly awaiting, will appear as usual next Thursday.
Hearing no objections… it is so decided. Bam goes the gavel!
Your Bernhard Pötter
Feature
COP29: What the resolutions mean for future climate policy
COP29 is over, but the decisions will have consequences for international climate policy beyond the mere resolutions.
The decision taken at the climate conference in Baku has set an important course: a new international target for climate finance, the gradual expansion of the donor base for climate aid, and a final regulation for voluntary carbon markets. But COP29 also has other important consequences in its course and results that will shape global climate policy in the future. Some insights from Baku:
Climate action is on the defensive worldwide. Despite a year of extreme weather events and new temperature records, the core of climate action – emissions reduction and mitigation – is increasingly falling behind. There is agreement on the expansion of renewables and increasing efficiency. There is also movement when it comes to finance. The climate scene is hoping that the fossil fuel era is coming to an end. But the fossil fuel lobby is still strong enough to prevent a clear statement on phasing out fossil fuels at a COP – let alone concrete steps to do so.
It is not only the basic principles of climate policy that are under pressure, but the rules-based order that supports it as a whole. After three COPs in authoritarian states, the mores at the COPs have also become increasingly brutal: Procedures are non-transparent instead of open. Critical NGOs are kept out of the country and spied on, criticism of authoritarian fossil fuel structures is barely allowed. As a result, the voices that stand for liberalism are becoming quieter, partly because more countries such as the USA are switching to the populist camp.
China and the EU are becoming more important in the climate process
Ambitious NDC climate plans are receding into the distance. According to the UNFCCC synthesis report, CO2 reductions are currently just under three percent, but should be at 45 percent by 2030. A drastic acceleration is hardly to be expected – also because the new financing target in emerging and developing countries will not provide the funds for this. However, it is precisely in these NDCs that the reduction measures would have to be enshrined.
The change in the donor base for financing will change the geopolitics of climate – especially if the US withdraws. The climate process will become less US and EU-heavy and more shaped by China and the various interests of the BRICS countries. South-South cooperation will become more frequent and more important. Whether this will lead to more ambition in mitigation is doubtful.
The energy transition in the US and the UN climate process will probably survive the next four years of the Trump administration – but there will hardly be the necessary international momentum if the largest economy with the historically highest emissions withdraws.
Will China and the EU form a “green bloc” to counter this? And does this amount to a new bloc formation? EU and China as the camp of “renewables” and the Green Deal against the fossil empires Russia and USA?
Climate financing will have a major impact on financial policy in Europe. With the withdrawal of the USA, the Europeans in particular will be obligedto multiply their climate spending. However, this is practically impossible with current budgets. The debate about new financial instruments such as taxes and levies on fossil fuel production, flights or new instruments at central banks will be loud and clear. And the question of climate policy redistribution within the EU and worldwide will also be raised loudly.
Developing countries vs. industrialized countries
COP29 also showed once again how deep the divide is between developed and developing countries. Whilelast year a broad consensus could be reached between almost all UN signatory states, with only a few blocking it for a long time due to their fossil fuel profits, this year it was once again a question of bridging the deep rifts between rich and poor, between those who cause climate change and those who suffer from it. It only barely succeeded.
The High Ambition Coalition – HAC for short – is normally a reliable bridge builder between the Global North and South. In Baku, however, it only made an appearance at the beginning without being able to generate much momentum. It would have been needed to focus more on the interests of the most vulnerable countries at a time when the COP was on the brink of failure due to the poor leadership of the presidency and more momentum was needed for mitigation in particular.
The COP29 in Baku ended early on Sunday morning with a delay of more than 30 hours and a bundle of decisions. In the final days, which were sometimes chaotic, the conference was on the brink of collapse because many groups of countries felt they had not been considered. Many groups of negotiators strongly criticized the leadership of COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev because the process often lacked transparency and cooperation.
But when Babayev dropped the gavel early in the morning local time, these were the most important decisions of COP29:
Financial target NCQG
A new NCQG financial target: By 2035, industrialized countries are to raise at least USD 300 billion annually from private and public funds for developing countries. By 2035, a total of USD 1.3 trillion in climate finance should also flow every year. This includes the USD 300 billion, private investments, flows from the multilateral development banks (MDBs), and innovative mechanisms such as new levies.
To plan and review this process, a “Baku to Belém Roadmap” is to be established, which describes the growth to the mentioned 1.3 trillion by 2035.
The donor base for climate finance will be expanded beyond the industrialized countries: Emerging economies such as China, South Korea, the Gulf States, and Singapore can voluntarily define their share of the MDBs’ climate funds as climate aid. They can also have their South-South aid counted towards the joint climate target of at least 1.3 trillion.
However, Cuba, Bolivia, Nigeria and, above all, India loudly objected to the adoption of the NCQG at the meeting, to the applause of many observers in the room.
Emission reduction
The area of “mitigation” was particularly important to the industrialized countries, AOSIS, AILAC and LDC countries – but experienced strong resistance from the oil states led by Saudi Arabia. The corresponding GST resolutions from COP28 in Dubai (“transitioning away from fossil fuels“)were partially deleted from the texts and had to be laboriously written back in. There was no mention of the GST results in the mitigation work program of COP26.
To this end, “Dubai” should be anchored in the “UAE Dialogue“, which deals with the implementation of the Global Stocktake. The results of the COP28 Global Stocktake in Dubai are generally reaffirmed right at the beginning: These are tripling renewables, doubling energy efficiency and moving away from fossil fuels, the famous “transitioning away”.
However, this term itself was not found in this document. It was only referred to in paragraph 14 concerning paragraph 28 of the Dubai GST decision. One paragraph later, however, “transitional fuels” are explicitly mentioned – i.e. support for gas. There is also a rejection of “unilateral trade measures” such as the EU’s CBAM.
However, instead of being adopted as planned, the UAE Dialogue was postponed following objections from South American and EIG countries. It is now to be negotiated further at the SBSTA meetings in Bonn in June.
Adjustment, loss and damage
The global adaptation target was also only advanced with difficulty in Baku. To make it more concrete, a maximum of 100 indicators are now being targeted: All states are to undertake adaptation measures in certain key areas (for example the health sector, food, water). This also includes financial criteria. However, only procedural progress has been made. In terms of content, the work must be done by the conference in Belém.
In the area of finance, adaptation is mentioned in a separate paragraph, so there is a link to the NCQG, says Laura Schäfer from Germanwatch: According to the NCQG text, financing is to be “dramatically increased” and there is a high demand for grants and heavily discounted loans in this area. A “balance between adaptation and mitigation” is also being sought in the funding. The distributions from the funds that also deal with adaptation are to be tripled.
The topic of “Loss and Damage”, on the other hand, has disappeared from the financial text. The text recognizes that there are “significant gaps in the response to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage”. But it contains no call to action or commitment to provide funding. The Loss and Damage Fund is only very indirectly seen as part of the UNFCCC climate finance mechanism, similar to the Green Climate Fund. It is clear from all the texts that the topic is being handled very delicately.
Article 6
After nine years of intensive negotiations, rules and standards for trading emission reduction credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were agreed in Baku. The agreement was only possible because the European Union gave up a years-long blockade with which it wanted to prevent weak transparency and greenwashing by the carbon markets.
Gender
Hardly any progress was made on the topic of gender in Baku; instead, regression was prevented. The Lima Action Program of 2024 was extended by ten years. Next year at SB62 in Bonn, the development of a gender action plan is now to begin. However, a coalition of Saudi Arabia, Russia and the Vatican in particular rejected the new wording in many places, which was to be redesigned to be gender-inclusive.
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COP29: allegations against the presidency
The man with the gavel: COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev.
When COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev dropped the gavel for the last time at 5:31 a.m. on Sunday and declared the Baku Climate Change Conference over, the delegates applauded. There was a mixture of joy and exhaustion, but also relief that the conference had not failed. And that the Azerbaijani presidency had managed to get the conference over the line reasonably unscathed in the end.
Restlessness and confusion in hectic days
This COP presidency had caused a lot of unrest and confusion, especially in the last days and hours of the conference. Babayev’s team sometimes seriously violated the unwritten rules for running a COP. Many delegations reported that the presidency had presented texts without consultation, sent out false documents and failed to consult important groups of countries. It is the primary task of a COP presidency to act as an “honest broker”, tolisten to all voices, and to present results that can be accepted by the vast majority of states, or at least compromises that are not rejected.
However, according to many experienced delegates and observers under the leadership of Mukhtar Babayev, this was often not the case. Delegates and observers report that the controversial negotiating texts of Friday evening on the central issues of finance and mitigation were not consulted and agreed with the most vulnerable country groups AOSIS, AILAC (Latin America and the Caribbean outside the G77), and LDCs (Least Developed Countries) in their final version. This is normally a mortal sin for any negotiator in this process.
‘Concerns of the island states ignored’
The Presidency had not spoken to the AOSIS negotiators by 3 p.m. on Saturday, as confirmed by the delegation of the island states. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock also complained on Saturday afternoon that the concerns of the most vulnerable “have unfortunately been ignored by the presidency so far”.
There was also confusion about texts and papers. During the decisive phase of the conference, documents were sent to the delegations, some of which were not up to date or had already been rejected by the countries. Furthermore, important Presidency texts had only been shown to the delegation leaders for inspection but had not been made available for detailed analysis. Finally, the Europeans complained that Babayev’s leadership team had not passed on some of their proposals to other countries. An inquiry by Table.Briefings to the presidency about the allegations was left unanswered.
Little cooperation with Troika member Brazil
Azerbaijan apparently did not rely on its own allies either: The controversial text from Friday evening had also not been discussed with Brazil, after all a member of the COP troika as host of the COP30 next year, delegates confirm. Due to the general dissatisfaction with the way the presidency was working, the LDC countries left the negotiations on the financial target at short notice on Saturday afternoon and risked the conference being called off.
The confusion in the conference leadership is remarkable because Azerbaijan had hired a whole range of external consultants for this planning. Like many COP presidencies, especially from emerging or developing countries, the COP29 presidency had also hired experts to understand and steer the UN process. These advisors are made up of former negotiators from UN member states or employees of the UN Secretariat and have deep insights into the dynamics of a climate conference.
Undiplomatic attacks
Many observers therefore wondered whether the confusion was due to the inadequacy of the presidency – or whether there may have been a plan to cause the conference to fail. For many observers, the frequent direct violations of the basic rules of UN diplomacy, such as consulting with all affected groups, are an indication of a deliberate strategy.
At the opening of COP29, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev had already attacked Western host countries in a highly undiplomatic manner: He called their criticism of the “petro-state” of Azerbaijan hypocritical, he praised fossil fuels as a “gift from God” and accused the USA and the EU of using their “fake news media” to create a mood against his country. His accusations against France and the Netherlands led to a boycott of the conference by French Environment Minister Agnès Pannier-Runacher at the beginning.
How the COP29 presidency team will proceed with the UN rules will become clear next year, for example at the SBSTA meeting in Bonn in June. This is because Mukhtar Babayev’s term of office has only just begun and will last until COP30 in Brazil in November 2025.
COP29
‘Band-aid on a bullet wound’: comments on the COP29 conclusion
Not satisfied with the outcome: Protesters on the summit grounds in Baku demand more climate funding even after the conference has ended.
Relief that the climate conference did not fail. Disillusionment and anger at its outcome. The call to reform the process – and the appeal not to let up in climate action efforts. All of this can be found in the reactions to the final documents of COP29. While voices from the industrialized countries often emphasized the success that an agreement could be reached at all against a difficult geopolitical backdrop, experts from developing countries and climate protection NGOs criticized the inadequate results of the conference, in some cases harshly.
Reactions from the German government:
We know that “today’s decisions alone are not enough to meet all needs,” German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said at the plenary session in Baku on Saturday night. But no one has forgotten the industrialized countries’ historical responsibility.
Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck also called the results “inadequate, but we can continue to work with them”.
Development Minister Svenja Schulze referred to the need for large-scale private investment worldwide for climate action. “The new figure of USD 1300 billion symbolizes this vision.” The task now is to make the vision a reality.
Environment Minister Steffi Lemke commented: “What we had to experience here was the defensive struggle of a fossil world that does not want to accept that the age of fossil fuels is coming to an end.” Lemke warned that the “wasteful use of natural resources” must end.
The political climate and possibilities
A selection of further reactions:
Christoph Bals, Political Director, Germanwatch: “This world climate conference does not deliver what was actually necessary – but it is at the upper end of what is possible in the current political climate.”
Laurence Tubiana, CEO European Climate Foundation: “COP29 took place under difficult circumstances, but multilateralism is alive and more necessary than ever. The climate finance agreement is not as ambitious as the moment demands. The framework it sets out provides a foundation on which to build.”
Ottmar Edenhofer, climate economist and Director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK): “The climate summit in Baku was not a success, but at best the avoidance of a diplomatic disaster. It is now abundantly clear that we need supplementary negotiation formats for the global fight against the climate crisis, (for example within) so-called climate clubs.”
Tina Stege, Climate Envoy, Marshall Islands: “(We have) seen the worst of political opportunismhere at this COP, playing with the lives of the world’s most vulnerable people. Countries seem to have forgotten the reason why we are all here. We are here to save lives. It’s about saving lives. We must work hard to restore confidence in this vital process.”
Caroline Brouillette, Executive Director of Climate Action Network Canada: “The climate finance agreement reached today in Baku is a band-aid on a bullet wound. The fact that it’s a bigger band-aid than we’ve seen before is small comfort when the world is bleeding more than ever.”
A ‘lazy compromise’
The influence of countries and groups of countries is also commented on from various sides:
Cosima Cassel, Head of the Climate Diplomacy Program, E3G Berlin: “The pioneering role of developing countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Kenya was crucial in driving this agreement forward. But the outcome falls far short of what is needed.”
Li Shuo, Director of China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute: “The protracted endgame at COP29 reflects the tougher geopolitical terrain the world finds itself in. […] The outcome is a rotten compromise between donor countries and the world’s most vulnerable nations. The careful coordination between the EU and China ensures stability in Baku.”
Luisa Neubauer, spokesperson for Fridays for Future Germany: “Fossil industries and petro-states have staked everything on failure at COP29. The fact that there is an agreement at COP29 – as shameful as it is – shows that resistance to fossil interests is worthwhile. But now the real work begins.”
New NCQG financial target
One of the milestones of the COP is the adoption of the new financial target. This has been met with criticism:
Sabine Minninger, climate expert at Bread for the World: “It is devastating that the poorest countries have droppedtheir demand to finance climate damage due to pressure from industrialized countries. As a result, they run the risk of continuing to run up massive debts to cover the high costs of damage.”
Ralph Regenvanu, Climate Envoy of the Republic of Vanuatu: “The commitments made in Baku – the dollar amounts pledged and the emission reductions promised – are not enough and never would have been. And even if they had been: Based on our experience so far, we know that they will not be fulfilled. The Global North’s inability to tackle the climate crisis – let alone stop it – is a global tragedy.”
Emilia Runeberg, International Climate Policy Coordinator, CAN Europe: “The increasing reliance on private finance flows to bail out developing countries risks skewing funding towards market-based loans and sectors that generate returns at the expense of adaptation and loss and damage repair, potentially violating the Paris Agreement’s goal of respecting the needs of developing countries.”
Jan Kowalzig, climate finance expert, Oxfam: “At first glance, it may seem as if the poorer countries can now count on considerably more support. But let’s not kid ourselves: Most of these funds will come in the form of loans, as they have in the past.They have to be repaid with interest and can further exacerbate the often overwhelming debt burden of low-income countries.”
Fred Njehu, Pan-African Policy Strategist, Greenpeace Africa: “This financial deal is not only a betrayal of climate justice, but also a mockery of the polluter pays principle. The same nations that have built their wealth on fossil fuels are now offering band-aids and expecting us to bear the trillion-dollar burden of their historic emissions.”
Avinash Persaud, Special Advisor on Climate Change to the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB): “It was hard-fought, but with USD 300 billion a year being passed on from the industrialized countries to the developing countries, we have reached the limit between what is politically feasible in the industrialized countries today and what would make a difference in the developing countries. What is crucial, however, is what is written around this figure in the agreement.”
Martin Kaiser, Managing Director, Greenpeace Germany: “It is scandalous that the oil and gas lobby, with the help of some oil states in cooperation with the gas donor country, has succeeded in blocking all the necessary accelerations to phase out coal, oil and gas.”
Ani Dasgupta, President and CEO of World Resources Institute (WRI): “While the COP29 decision on emissions cuts only reaffirmed previous commitments, it was encouraging to see several major emitters pledge that new national targets will put them on a credible path to achieve net zero emissions.”
Joeri Rogelj, Climate Scientist, Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London: “COP29 has set the stage for the most important item on next year’s climate policy calendar: a new wave of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The UK and Mexico’s ambitious new targets are encouraging.”
Thilo Brodtmann, Managing Director, German Engineering Federation (VDMA): “The moment of truth will now come when the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) are set next year. It is questionable whether all countries will be able to make stronger climate action commitments on this basis and back them up with realistic regulatory measures and financing plans. Ultimately, however, this will define markets for our climate action technologies.”
Reactions to Article 6
After years of deadlock, COP29 also reached an agreement on Article 6, which regulates international carbon markets. This has mainly been criticized by civil society:
Erika Lennon, Senior Attorney, Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL): “Agreeing to weak rules that lack transparency, accountability or meaningful oversight is not a collaborative approach to achieving more ambitious climate action, but a recipe for disaster.”
Linda Schneider, advisor for international climate and energy policy at the Heinrich Böll Foundation: “It is very worrying that the results of COP29 have also extended the controversial carbon markets under Article 6 to CO2 removals – which could also include dangerous geoengineering proposals for the large-scale technological removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.”
Lambert Schneider, Research Coordinator for International Climate Policy, Öko-Institut: “It remains to be seen how good the quality of climate certificates will be under the Paris Agreement. What matters now is how the rules are implemented in practice and whether countries will actually comply with the agreed rules.”
COP29
NCQG adopted: USD 300 billion and a roadmap to Belém
Demanding “trillions, not billions” for the Global South: protesters at COP29.
It took a walk-out by the island states (AOSIS) and the least developed countries (LDCs) to reach an agreement in Baku after all. Both left the negotiating room in protest on Saturday afternoon. The Azerbaijani COP29 presidency had left both groups of states out of the negotiations on the new climate finance target (NCQG) before presenting a first real draft text on Friday.
Subsequently, there was movement in the conference rooms. Europe, the most vulnerable states and the Presidency negotiated a new text behind closed doors, which, apart from a few changes, corresponded to the final text. The final agreement includes the following points:
There was still room for maneuver when it came to the amount (“quantum”) of the NCQG: The new climate financing target is now “at least” USD 300 billion – with the industrialized countries “in the lead”. In the previous draft, there had been talk of USD 250 billion. Bi- and multilateral donors from the public and private sectors are providing the funds for this core target. It is unclear to what extent the new target has improved on the previous target of USD 100 billion per year. If inflation up to 2035 and the expanded donor base are factored out, the contribution is unlikely to lead to a significantly higher commitment for industrialized nations.
The expanded donor base also includes contributions to climate finance from multilateral development banks. It is “recognized” that they contribute to the climate finance target “voluntarily”. In addition, developing countries can also voluntarily provide so-called South-South support, which would also contribute to the target.
The “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T” is intended to define the process for aligning the global financial system to bring total climate finance from all sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion by 2035. According to information obtained by Table.Briefings, the process could start as early as next year’s Petersberg Climate Dialogue, under the supervision of the COP presidencies in Baku and Belém. The development of minimum allocations, particularly for least developed countries and small island states, has been discussed for this process in the meantime, but is no longer included in the agreed text.
Quality: It is “recognized” that “grants” and “(highly) concessional loans” are “needed” in the areas of adaptation and Loss and Damage – a demand from the island states and least developed countries. However, there is no concrete figure in the text as to how large the share of the core objective should be made up of grants and concessional loans. However, development banks and their stakeholders are “invited” to provide more highly concessional loans.
What should the money be used for? The core objective only covers mitigation and adaptation. As in the Paris Agreement, a “balance” is to be achieved between the two areas. There is no specific sub-goal for adaptation. However, public spending on various funds to support developing countries (including the Adaptation Fund) is to be “at least tripled” by 2030 at the latest. However, some of the funds are severely underfunded. A tripling would not mean significant new resources. However, losses and damages are not mentioned in the core objective.
Review: The NCQG will be reviewed in 2030.
India rejects – without consequences
Once the applause for the historic agreement on the climate finance target had died down, critics of the deal were quick to speak out. Cuba and Bolivia attacked the target of USD 300 billion in particular as being too low. India’s negotiator Chandni Raina made it clear that she did not accept the result and rejected it – but only after COP President Mukhtar Babayev had dropped the gavel to accept the NCQG. India’s request to speak is thus recorded in the meeting minutes but has no effect. The NCQG remains adopted.
Raina complained that the presidency did not allow any requests to speak but immediately dropped the gavel. The usual question from the Presidency as to whether there were any objections failed to materialize. The document was nothing more than an optical illusion, Raina sharply criticized. EU Climate Commissioner Wopke Hoekstra defended the result but showed little understanding for the criticism from the Global South. This is also because the island states and least developed countries support the deal.
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News
Article 6 adopted: EU lifts blockade against ‘anything goes’ approach
It is an important step on the way to international carbon markets: Rules and standards for trading emission reduction credits under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement have been agreed after nine years of intensive negotiations. The agreement was only possible because the European Union gave up a years-long blockade with which it wanted to prevent weak transparency and greenwashing by the carbon markets.
The agreement on intergovernmental trading in emission credits (Article 6.2), with which supplier countries can earn money and buyer countries can improve their greenhouse gas balance, states that:
Countries that do not comply with the regulations (according to the text: whose reports for trade show “inconsistencies”) have no consequences to fear – apart from a vague obligation to rectify the problems without a clear deadline. The NGO Carbon Market Watch criticizes this.
Countries must disclose important information about the emission credits traded, but without a time limit, so it could take years before the quality of the emission credits is publicly available.
Jonathan Crook, Policy Lead at Carbon Market Watch, describes the agreement on Article 6.2 as an “anything goes” mechanism with numerous loopholes, hurdles, and complicated registration instruments for carbon credits.
Regulations for voluntary markets under Article 6.4
Article 6.4 on voluntary carbon markets for private actors was further negotiated after the initial agreement in Baku and further details have now also been agreed upon:
Certificates for CO2 removal are only issued if carbon is removed from the atmosphere during “climate-relevant periods”.
Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) originating from the Kyoto Protocol can be transferred to Article 6.4 markets without further review and additionality.
There are no regular reviews of standards and methodologies for emission reduction projects to enable “regulatory stability”.
This means that the minimum standards on the voluntary carbon markets will be relatively loose in the future and therefore susceptible to greenwashing.
There is criticism of the new Article 6 regulations from many quarters – among them, “independent observers, researchers, the media and the countries themselves would carry a lot of weight on their shoulders to scrutinize the carbon markets,” says Jonathan Crook. The complexity and technical nature of Article 6 would likely present a significant obstacle to this task. Some countries could count on just that, says the emissions trading expert.
Large industrialized nations in particular, especially the USA, but also developing countries that want to make money on the markets, have always campaigned for weak rules in the past. They wanted to make the market simple and easily accessible for everyone. However, there is a risk that the instrument will lose integrity and enable greenwashing. luk
