On the second day of COP28, the grand parade of heads of state and government began. In three-minute speeches, they urged more climate action, with few new commitments. Some remarks raised eyebrows: Macron announced a coal phase-out by 2027, even though coal accounts for less than one percent of the energy mix. Lula advocated for an economy with less oil consumption, but Brazil is considering joining OPEC, as recently revealed.
The host, the United Arab Emirates, caused a stir by pledging 30 billion for a climate investment fund. While many media reported on the large sum, many details remain unclear. Leveraging private funds has rarely worked as hoped in the past. We will closely examine the numerous new financing proposals at COP.
The World Bank also aims to mobilize more funds through carbon certificates from forest protection. The development bank promises a robust and well-controlled approach with few opportunities for greenwashing. However, Alexandra Endres and Lisa Kuner have identified some points of criticism.
Olaf Scholz achieved success as his Climate Club was officially launched at COP28. However, little remains of the original idea behind the Climate Club, as reported by Lukas Scheid.
This initiative was one with which Olaf Scholz campaigned as a potential “climate chancellor” during the 2021 election and was later concretized during the German presidency of the G7. The Climate Club has now been officially established at COP28, with 35 countries and the European Union already participating. More are expected to join, as announced by Scholz in Dubai on Friday.
The aim is to advance the decarbonization of particularly emissions-intensive industries such as steel and cement in the participating countries. This involves developing common standards and coordinating individual measures for decarbonization.
The Climate Club is intended to provide a forum to:
Originally, the club was meant to go much further and protect leaders in climate action from carbon leakage by dismantling trade barriers for green products among club members. The global south and numerous emerging countries would have been practically excluded, and only a group of ambitious industrialized countries would have ensured that major trading partners posed no risk to domestic industries and jobs.
Now, “inclusivity” is the hallmark of the Climate Club, allowing countries from the global south to participate in discussions on industrial decarbonization. Countries like Vanuatu, Kenya, Egypt and Colombia are participating. Their expectations likely include influencing the standards for assessing CO2-neutral products, urging industrialized nations to adopt ambitious decarbonization plans, or gaining acceptance for their own decarbonization plans. In the long term, the club is expected to include other industrial sectors once its operation has been tested on the dirtiest products.
What the Climate Club should not do:
Criticism of the Climate Club is also expressed behind closed doors. The close connection with the G7 is considered unwise, potentially alienating China. As the world’s largest producer of steel and cement, China is an essential partner in decarbonizing these industries. Calculation standards without China’s involvement would have little positive effect on global supply chains.
India, a much sought-after candidate for membership, also seems skeptical about the Climate Club. However, India is likely to have significant interest in common standards for assessing CO2-free products. The country is already in intense discussions with the EU on how its industry can be protected from high border levies through CBAM and is considering a carbon price. Therefore, it is unclear why India has not joined yet.
Germany and Chile will hold the chairmanship of the Climate Club until the end of 2025. An interim secretariat has been established at the OECD and IEA until the permanent secretariat is established next year. The initial funding of 20 million euros also comes from the German government.
The World Bank has unveiled plans at COP28 in Dubai to facilitate the growth of “high-integrity” global carbon markets. Trading on the market according to the new World Bank standards is set to begin next year. Fifteen countries participate in the “World Bank Engagement Roadmap for High-Integrity Carbon Markets”: Chile, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nepal, the Republic of Congo and Vietnam. Their carbon certificates are intended to be generated through forest protection.
Through the trade of these certificates, “countries and communities blessed with natural resources, such as forests, could unlock millions or even billions of dollars in new income in the future,” writes the Bank.
According to the initiative, more than 24 million certificates could already be issued next year. By 2028, the number could increase to 126 million. Assuming favorable market conditions, the certificates could generate up to 2.5 billion dollars in income, according to estimates by the Bank. “A large part of this could flow back to communities and countries.”
Trading in such forest protection certificates has come under heavy criticism in recent months because their climate impact is disputed. In several cases, research and studies have shown that much less CO2 was saved through forest protection than the papers had certified.
The effect can arise, for example, from unclear accounting rules. Moreover, it is not easy to determine how much deforestation would have occurred without a certified protection project. The accounting of carbon storage in the forest is complex. Sometimes, forest projects also lead to deforestation elsewhere. Their protective effect can be temporary – forest fires, for example, can quickly destroy the forest. It is also often criticized that the projects have negative impacts on indigenous and local communities.
The World Bank wants to avoid this. It says its certificates are particularly integral for two reasons:
Each certificate is to be audited and verified by a third party. The World Bank also wants to avoid that forest protection in one region leads to more deforestation elsewhere. Countries should be able to decide for themselves how to use their certificates, for example, for additional income or by incorporating the certificates into their national climate goals (NDCs). This is a clear reference to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Gilles Dufrasne of the non-governmental organization Carbon Market Watch doubts that World Bank certificates are more effective than others: “I don’t see why this initiative should be more trustworthy than others,” he says. Despite the assurances, Dufrasne sees the danger that a large number of “junk credits” could be issued.
In reality, it is hardly possible to control all the problems surrounding forest certificates. Since there are so many uncertainties, “forest certificates are fundamentally unsuitable for compensating or quantifiable CO2 savings.”
Nevertheless, he can understand that developing countries try to sell forest certificates: “Countries are desperately looking for financing options for forest protection,” he says. It is a systemic failure that the money is not provided in another way.
Levi Sucre Romero, a member of the Bribri people from Costa Rica and coordinator of the Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests, also expressed caution. “Whether we as indigenous peoples welcome this plan will depend on the conditions it formulates for the national REDD+ strategy,” he said. In the case of Costa Rica, there is such a clear framework agreed upon between indigenous peoples and the government, but his country is an exception. In other countries participating in the roadmap, this is not yet the case. “Each people will have to decide for themselves.” However, the rights of indigenous people must be preserved in any case.
Article 6 of the Paris Climate Agreement provides for tradable emission reductions (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes, ITMOs) between states. This refers in particular to forest protection, often results from REDD+ programs are understood as such. Some details were agreed upon at COP26 in Glasgow. However, how exactly carbon markets under Article 6 are to be regulated overall is still not decided.
This is to be distinguished from voluntary carbon markets, where companies trade certificates to meet their self-set climate goals. The World Bank expects the carbon certificate market to grow. It anticipates that, especially in the beginning, voluntarily traded certificates will play a more significant role, among other things, because the infrastructure and institutions in many countries are not yet designed for trade under Article 6.
However, voluntary markets must meet strict rules, be well-controlled and transparent, according to the World Bank. Its roadmap is intended to help “unlock the potential”.
The roadmap is based on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), in which the World Bank has been advancing carbon markets together with governments and local communities since 2008. However, the FCPF is also frequently criticized for having few concrete results in forest protection.
Read all previously published texts on COP28 here.
The global goal is to halt deforestation by 2030. At COP26 in Glasgow, heads of state and government pledged with the Forest Pledge to preserve forests, combat forest fires, promote sustainable agriculture and support indigenous communities. They also committed to “significantly” increase funds for these goals. Wealthy nations promised 12 billion dollars in climate financing for forest protection between 2021 and 2025. A smaller group of actors had previously committed to similar goals in the New York Declaration on Forests in 2014. Additionally, at COP27 last year, the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership was established to support the implementation of the Forest Pledge.
Like many topics at COP, it comes down to money. Regenwald nations had demanded more money for forest protection at a joint summit in the summer. In a joint statement, they expressed concern that the 100 billion dollars for climate financing had not been internationally achieved. They also called for an additional 200 billion dollars annually for biodiversity conservation. Commitments on this scale are unlikely.
Rainforest nations hope for substantial financial commitments to forest protection. The Forest & Climate Leaders’ Partnership will present its progress at COP28 and set targets for the next year. The focus will primarily be on the inclusive transformation of rural areas, benefiting local communities and indigenous people. Deforestation will likely play a role in the COP discussions on sustainable food systems.
A recent report from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) warns that if implemented, current commitments to climate action would lead to a three-degree increase in the global average temperature by 2050. This could surpass dangerous tipping points in our climate system. Actions taken now and the infrastructure financed and built today will determine if we can still prevent this.
Therefore, we must address questions such as where Germany’s natural gas comes from and what durable infrastructure is being built for it. What conditions can be set at COP28 in Dubai to globally achieve an exit from fossil energy? Important decisions will be made at the UN Climate Conference, discussing an exit from fossil fuels and the goal of tripling the expansion of renewables.Chancellor Olaf Scholz should unequivocally support and promote this goal at COP28. At the same time, the German government must draw the necessary consequences at home and restrict the infrastructure expansion for LNG imports. According to calculations by the New Climate Institute, the current plans already lead to overcapacity.
Imagine bringing your child to kindergarten or having to go to the hospital, and next to the kindergarten or behind the hospital, natural gas is being extracted. Imagine an industrial plant releasing methane into the air multiple times a day without legal consequences, visible from your house. This is the reality for many people in Texas and Louisiana. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is shipped from there to Germany, and new LNG terminals are planned there to transport more LNG, primarily produced through environmentally harmful fracking, to us.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown how wrong it was to make Germany’s energy supply dependent on Russia. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the consumption of natural gas in industry and heating should have been reduced much earlier and more decisively.
In the search for short-term solutions to become independent of Russian gas, long-term infrastructure is now being created, and long-term supply contracts are being signed, leading to another fossil lock-in. The global transformation of the energy industry is being slowed down. The climate goals are aboard LNG delivery ships sailing the world’s seas.
The injustice of the climate crisis begins where fossil extractivism takes place. Its effects on the population in Louisiana and Texas are cruel. The region is also called Cancer Alley due to abnormally high cancer rates. Due to air pollution, the risk of people contracting COVID-19 is particularly high. Fracking facilities are built directly next to residential areas, and LNG ports are located right next to nature reserves. Methane gas is released in large quantities through leaks.
The people in the region are sadly accustomed to this type of extractivism and environmental pollution. It began in the mid-19th century with the discovery of larger oil reserves, leading to numerous oil refineries and petrochemical plants settling in the region. Afro-American, indigenous, and Latino communities are particularly affected by the environmental consequences.
Last summer, I visited the region, talked to those affected, and saw the places where new LNG terminals are planned. Near New Orleans, where the new LNG site Plaquemines is being built, I met Jessi Parfait from the indigenous Houma Nation, a campaigner for the environmental organization Sierra Club. LNG is neither a clean fuel nor should it be used as a bridge technology, she told me. Her message to the Germans: The Gulf – her home – will no longer be a “sacrifice zone” for the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, Germany is significantly expanding its LNG import infrastructure, including a planned terminal on Rügen. The majority of LNG comes from the US, from the mentioned LNG terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. Several German companies have signed new, long-term supply contracts here:
To stop the climate crisis, preserve ecosystems and protect human rights, we must not only agree on an exit from fossil energies at COP28 but also ensure that German companies do not solidify fossil economic structures by signing long supply contracts and building new terminals in search of new gas imports.
Kathrin Henneberger has been a member of the German Bundestag for the Alliance 90/The Greens since 2021. She is a member of the Climate and Energy Committee, spokesperson in the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development, and responsible for climate justice in her parliamentary group.
On the second day of COP28, the grand parade of heads of state and government began. In three-minute speeches, they urged more climate action, with few new commitments. Some remarks raised eyebrows: Macron announced a coal phase-out by 2027, even though coal accounts for less than one percent of the energy mix. Lula advocated for an economy with less oil consumption, but Brazil is considering joining OPEC, as recently revealed.
The host, the United Arab Emirates, caused a stir by pledging 30 billion for a climate investment fund. While many media reported on the large sum, many details remain unclear. Leveraging private funds has rarely worked as hoped in the past. We will closely examine the numerous new financing proposals at COP.
The World Bank also aims to mobilize more funds through carbon certificates from forest protection. The development bank promises a robust and well-controlled approach with few opportunities for greenwashing. However, Alexandra Endres and Lisa Kuner have identified some points of criticism.
Olaf Scholz achieved success as his Climate Club was officially launched at COP28. However, little remains of the original idea behind the Climate Club, as reported by Lukas Scheid.
This initiative was one with which Olaf Scholz campaigned as a potential “climate chancellor” during the 2021 election and was later concretized during the German presidency of the G7. The Climate Club has now been officially established at COP28, with 35 countries and the European Union already participating. More are expected to join, as announced by Scholz in Dubai on Friday.
The aim is to advance the decarbonization of particularly emissions-intensive industries such as steel and cement in the participating countries. This involves developing common standards and coordinating individual measures for decarbonization.
The Climate Club is intended to provide a forum to:
Originally, the club was meant to go much further and protect leaders in climate action from carbon leakage by dismantling trade barriers for green products among club members. The global south and numerous emerging countries would have been practically excluded, and only a group of ambitious industrialized countries would have ensured that major trading partners posed no risk to domestic industries and jobs.
Now, “inclusivity” is the hallmark of the Climate Club, allowing countries from the global south to participate in discussions on industrial decarbonization. Countries like Vanuatu, Kenya, Egypt and Colombia are participating. Their expectations likely include influencing the standards for assessing CO2-neutral products, urging industrialized nations to adopt ambitious decarbonization plans, or gaining acceptance for their own decarbonization plans. In the long term, the club is expected to include other industrial sectors once its operation has been tested on the dirtiest products.
What the Climate Club should not do:
Criticism of the Climate Club is also expressed behind closed doors. The close connection with the G7 is considered unwise, potentially alienating China. As the world’s largest producer of steel and cement, China is an essential partner in decarbonizing these industries. Calculation standards without China’s involvement would have little positive effect on global supply chains.
India, a much sought-after candidate for membership, also seems skeptical about the Climate Club. However, India is likely to have significant interest in common standards for assessing CO2-free products. The country is already in intense discussions with the EU on how its industry can be protected from high border levies through CBAM and is considering a carbon price. Therefore, it is unclear why India has not joined yet.
Germany and Chile will hold the chairmanship of the Climate Club until the end of 2025. An interim secretariat has been established at the OECD and IEA until the permanent secretariat is established next year. The initial funding of 20 million euros also comes from the German government.
The World Bank has unveiled plans at COP28 in Dubai to facilitate the growth of “high-integrity” global carbon markets. Trading on the market according to the new World Bank standards is set to begin next year. Fifteen countries participate in the “World Bank Engagement Roadmap for High-Integrity Carbon Markets”: Chile, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nepal, the Republic of Congo and Vietnam. Their carbon certificates are intended to be generated through forest protection.
Through the trade of these certificates, “countries and communities blessed with natural resources, such as forests, could unlock millions or even billions of dollars in new income in the future,” writes the Bank.
According to the initiative, more than 24 million certificates could already be issued next year. By 2028, the number could increase to 126 million. Assuming favorable market conditions, the certificates could generate up to 2.5 billion dollars in income, according to estimates by the Bank. “A large part of this could flow back to communities and countries.”
Trading in such forest protection certificates has come under heavy criticism in recent months because their climate impact is disputed. In several cases, research and studies have shown that much less CO2 was saved through forest protection than the papers had certified.
The effect can arise, for example, from unclear accounting rules. Moreover, it is not easy to determine how much deforestation would have occurred without a certified protection project. The accounting of carbon storage in the forest is complex. Sometimes, forest projects also lead to deforestation elsewhere. Their protective effect can be temporary – forest fires, for example, can quickly destroy the forest. It is also often criticized that the projects have negative impacts on indigenous and local communities.
The World Bank wants to avoid this. It says its certificates are particularly integral for two reasons:
Each certificate is to be audited and verified by a third party. The World Bank also wants to avoid that forest protection in one region leads to more deforestation elsewhere. Countries should be able to decide for themselves how to use their certificates, for example, for additional income or by incorporating the certificates into their national climate goals (NDCs). This is a clear reference to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Gilles Dufrasne of the non-governmental organization Carbon Market Watch doubts that World Bank certificates are more effective than others: “I don’t see why this initiative should be more trustworthy than others,” he says. Despite the assurances, Dufrasne sees the danger that a large number of “junk credits” could be issued.
In reality, it is hardly possible to control all the problems surrounding forest certificates. Since there are so many uncertainties, “forest certificates are fundamentally unsuitable for compensating or quantifiable CO2 savings.”
Nevertheless, he can understand that developing countries try to sell forest certificates: “Countries are desperately looking for financing options for forest protection,” he says. It is a systemic failure that the money is not provided in another way.
Levi Sucre Romero, a member of the Bribri people from Costa Rica and coordinator of the Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests, also expressed caution. “Whether we as indigenous peoples welcome this plan will depend on the conditions it formulates for the national REDD+ strategy,” he said. In the case of Costa Rica, there is such a clear framework agreed upon between indigenous peoples and the government, but his country is an exception. In other countries participating in the roadmap, this is not yet the case. “Each people will have to decide for themselves.” However, the rights of indigenous people must be preserved in any case.
Article 6 of the Paris Climate Agreement provides for tradable emission reductions (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes, ITMOs) between states. This refers in particular to forest protection, often results from REDD+ programs are understood as such. Some details were agreed upon at COP26 in Glasgow. However, how exactly carbon markets under Article 6 are to be regulated overall is still not decided.
This is to be distinguished from voluntary carbon markets, where companies trade certificates to meet their self-set climate goals. The World Bank expects the carbon certificate market to grow. It anticipates that, especially in the beginning, voluntarily traded certificates will play a more significant role, among other things, because the infrastructure and institutions in many countries are not yet designed for trade under Article 6.
However, voluntary markets must meet strict rules, be well-controlled and transparent, according to the World Bank. Its roadmap is intended to help “unlock the potential”.
The roadmap is based on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), in which the World Bank has been advancing carbon markets together with governments and local communities since 2008. However, the FCPF is also frequently criticized for having few concrete results in forest protection.
Read all previously published texts on COP28 here.
The global goal is to halt deforestation by 2030. At COP26 in Glasgow, heads of state and government pledged with the Forest Pledge to preserve forests, combat forest fires, promote sustainable agriculture and support indigenous communities. They also committed to “significantly” increase funds for these goals. Wealthy nations promised 12 billion dollars in climate financing for forest protection between 2021 and 2025. A smaller group of actors had previously committed to similar goals in the New York Declaration on Forests in 2014. Additionally, at COP27 last year, the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership was established to support the implementation of the Forest Pledge.
Like many topics at COP, it comes down to money. Regenwald nations had demanded more money for forest protection at a joint summit in the summer. In a joint statement, they expressed concern that the 100 billion dollars for climate financing had not been internationally achieved. They also called for an additional 200 billion dollars annually for biodiversity conservation. Commitments on this scale are unlikely.
Rainforest nations hope for substantial financial commitments to forest protection. The Forest & Climate Leaders’ Partnership will present its progress at COP28 and set targets for the next year. The focus will primarily be on the inclusive transformation of rural areas, benefiting local communities and indigenous people. Deforestation will likely play a role in the COP discussions on sustainable food systems.
A recent report from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) warns that if implemented, current commitments to climate action would lead to a three-degree increase in the global average temperature by 2050. This could surpass dangerous tipping points in our climate system. Actions taken now and the infrastructure financed and built today will determine if we can still prevent this.
Therefore, we must address questions such as where Germany’s natural gas comes from and what durable infrastructure is being built for it. What conditions can be set at COP28 in Dubai to globally achieve an exit from fossil energy? Important decisions will be made at the UN Climate Conference, discussing an exit from fossil fuels and the goal of tripling the expansion of renewables.Chancellor Olaf Scholz should unequivocally support and promote this goal at COP28. At the same time, the German government must draw the necessary consequences at home and restrict the infrastructure expansion for LNG imports. According to calculations by the New Climate Institute, the current plans already lead to overcapacity.
Imagine bringing your child to kindergarten or having to go to the hospital, and next to the kindergarten or behind the hospital, natural gas is being extracted. Imagine an industrial plant releasing methane into the air multiple times a day without legal consequences, visible from your house. This is the reality for many people in Texas and Louisiana. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is shipped from there to Germany, and new LNG terminals are planned there to transport more LNG, primarily produced through environmentally harmful fracking, to us.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown how wrong it was to make Germany’s energy supply dependent on Russia. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the consumption of natural gas in industry and heating should have been reduced much earlier and more decisively.
In the search for short-term solutions to become independent of Russian gas, long-term infrastructure is now being created, and long-term supply contracts are being signed, leading to another fossil lock-in. The global transformation of the energy industry is being slowed down. The climate goals are aboard LNG delivery ships sailing the world’s seas.
The injustice of the climate crisis begins where fossil extractivism takes place. Its effects on the population in Louisiana and Texas are cruel. The region is also called Cancer Alley due to abnormally high cancer rates. Due to air pollution, the risk of people contracting COVID-19 is particularly high. Fracking facilities are built directly next to residential areas, and LNG ports are located right next to nature reserves. Methane gas is released in large quantities through leaks.
The people in the region are sadly accustomed to this type of extractivism and environmental pollution. It began in the mid-19th century with the discovery of larger oil reserves, leading to numerous oil refineries and petrochemical plants settling in the region. Afro-American, indigenous, and Latino communities are particularly affected by the environmental consequences.
Last summer, I visited the region, talked to those affected, and saw the places where new LNG terminals are planned. Near New Orleans, where the new LNG site Plaquemines is being built, I met Jessi Parfait from the indigenous Houma Nation, a campaigner for the environmental organization Sierra Club. LNG is neither a clean fuel nor should it be used as a bridge technology, she told me. Her message to the Germans: The Gulf – her home – will no longer be a “sacrifice zone” for the rest of the world.
Meanwhile, Germany is significantly expanding its LNG import infrastructure, including a planned terminal on Rügen. The majority of LNG comes from the US, from the mentioned LNG terminals in the Gulf of Mexico. Several German companies have signed new, long-term supply contracts here:
To stop the climate crisis, preserve ecosystems and protect human rights, we must not only agree on an exit from fossil energies at COP28 but also ensure that German companies do not solidify fossil economic structures by signing long supply contracts and building new terminals in search of new gas imports.
Kathrin Henneberger has been a member of the German Bundestag for the Alliance 90/The Greens since 2021. She is a member of the Climate and Energy Committee, spokesperson in the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development, and responsible for climate justice in her parliamentary group.
