With the traditional hammer blow, Sameh Shoukry ended the second-longest climate conference on Sunday morning at 9:30 in Sharm el-Sheikh. Europe was unable to get its good proposals into the final documents. The demands of the EU did not really stick in the negotiations of the last days and hours. Especially not with those who, according to EU negotiators, would benefit most from these proposals: The island states and the least developed countries.
The discussions around loss & damage have shown in the past two weeks what Europe lacks: political clout. Instead of breaking the G77/China bloc with the European compromise proposal, it became clear how isolated the EU often is in the climate-cosmos. It took days before the first representatives of island states showed up at Europe’s side. Bernhard Pötter analyzes how an agreement on loss and damage was finally reached.
Above all, there often isn’t the necessary trust in their European partners to forge new alliances. The most vulnerable states are skeptical whether Europe will make money available despite its grandiose announcements. They know that Europe often stands alone in the geopolitical climate cosmos. Alexandra Endres and Bernhard Pötter explain the different positions of the countries during this COP.
At the end of COP27, Europe’s weakness was again apparent. The EU had previously invested a lot of political capital in the mitigation work program. The result is hardly worth mentioning, as we show in our analysis of the COP results.
After the eventful COP weeks, the next issue of Climate.Table will be published on Thursday.
Just a week ago – at the halfway point of COP27 – it was considered almost impossible that a fund for loss & damage would come to be. Now it has been decided and is to come next year. It is a historic decision, as developing countries have been calling for a financial instrument to address loss and damage resulting from climate change for 30 years. Christoph Bals, political director of Germanwatch called it an important breakthrough. He says the German government was instrumental in getting the EU and other industrialized countries to warm up to this fund.
The agreement on loss & damage at COP27 includes:
On Sunday night, there was still wrangling over whether only “particularly vulnerable” developing countries or all developing countries should be eligible to receive funds from the loss and damage financial instruments. A formulation that classified all developing countries as of 1992 as recipient countries was dropped shortly before the closing plenary of the COP.
Just as controversial was the question of who should provide the funding. The EU and later also some island states insisted that new financial sources must be found – so far, so vague. Originally, the EU demanded to expand the group of contributing countries. Thus, emerging economies that are now wealthy, such as China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico and oil-rich nations, would also have had to pay into the fund. “The EU wanted to make China and the Gulf states contributors – but in the end, it didn’t have the courage for the necessary confrontation,” analyzes David Ryfisch, head of the International Climate Policy team at Germanwatch.
While the new formulation does not exclude the expansion of contributors, it is not particularly explicit either. It is now up to the transition committee to propose new funding sources for loss and damage. This means that the debate on whether China, as the historically second-largest emitter, must also bear responsibility for climate damage is by no means over, but merely postponed until COP28.
The roadmap for global greenhouse gas reductions was of enormous importance to Europeans at the COP. It was supposed to be an ambitious path to achieving the 1.5-degree target. But it falls short of many expectations. “In Glasgow, we were still able to maintain the 1.5. At this COP, we are at a juncture where it could lose,” said Franz Perrez, Switzerland’s chief negotiator.
The Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Work Program:
The industrialized countries would have preferred even more ambitious targets, which they, as the main emitters, would most likely have had to implement themselves. But even less ambitious targets would have been possible: An earlier version of the text stated that the work program must not lead to higher climate targets. An absolute no-go for the EU, which it also made clear to the Egyptian COP presidency. Without higher climate targets (NDCs), the 1.5-degree target would remain out of reach. The EU prevailed, but at what price?
The price may have been horse-trading, as the final text – called the cover decision – falls short of Glasgow and will likely be a bad memory of European negotiators for a long time to come.
The cover decision states:
The last point in particular leaves many questions unanswered because “low-emission” also means gas and nuclear power. EU climate commissioner Frans Timmermans said on Sunday that only gas with CO2 capture is considered “low-emission”. However, David Ryfisch of Germanwatch estimates that other countries will interpret the wording differently.
However, there are also positive signals from the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. For example, the accelerated expansion of renewable energies in the Cover Decision is also considered progress in EU circles. What is not in the cover decision is much more important than what is in it:
An alliance of 80 countries (including the US, India and the EU) firmly tried to build on the ambitions shown in Glasgow on Saturday night. They explicitly called for a “phase-out” of all fossil fuels. But COP President Sameh Shoukry ignored the push, as opposition, particularly from oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, was too strong. Instead, the presidency submitted the now-agreed text to a “take it or leave it” vote, says Christoph Bals. In the end, after a night of negotiations, at 7 a.m., none of the 80 countries voiced any objections.
Loss and damage from climate change have increased sharply. What was known for a long time was ignored by official climate policy for almost as long. Especially recently, however, awareness of the problem has increased enormously: record heat in India and Pakistan, floods in Nigeria, the drought in the Horn of Africa, the flood disaster in Pakistan – and not least the devastating flood in the Ahr valley last year. This set the stage for the COP27 decision for a new fund. The road to this point was long and winding.
Mankind is on a path towards 2.7 degrees – this COP could not change that. There were hardly any new NDCs. And the mitigation work program that the European Union wanted to promote in Sharm el-Sheikh remained lackluster in the end. The program was supposed to set out a process by which industrialized countries would gradually tighten their climate targets, in exchanges between high-level government representatives and with annual reviews. But the EU was unable to prevail.
The gradual phase-out of all fossil fuels instead of just coal, as agreed in Glasgow, also did not make it into the final document, although many countries called for it. The reference to climate science and the 1.5-degree target remained weak.
In the coming year, it will be all the more important to pursue the decarbonization of the global economy. The handover of the G20 presidency to Indonesia offers a first opportunity. The country has just signed a Just Energy Transition Partnership (Climate.Table reported) with several industrialized countries and intends to prioritize the transition to sustainable energy during its G20 presidency.
It is a goal of the Paris Agreement that has received too little attention so far: Article 2(1)c calls for bringing financial flows worldwide into line with climate goals – for example, directing investments away from fossil energy toward climate-friendly technologies and also reviewing government subsidies for fossil fuels. The issue did not make it onto the agenda.
Nevertheless, there were discussions at COP27 about reforming development banks, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, for example, based on Barbados President Mia Mottley’s Bridgetown Initiative. French climate diplomat Laurence Tubiana, an architect of the Paris Agreement, noticed “momentum behind the push to restructure the World Bank and IMF to make them not only fairer for the vulnerable but also so that they meaningfully support renewables.”
Mottley will certainly continue to campaign for her initiative behind the scenes. The spring meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank next April could be an occasion to continue talking officially about redirecting global financial flows.
There is now a fund from which compensation payments for loss and damage are to be made. How it is to be structured is the big question that is likely to shape the next climate summit – and the working sessions that will take place between the two COPs under the UNFCCC. Closely related, however, is a much bigger question:
It’s an age-old dispute at international climate negotiations. Until the Paris Agreement was signed, China refused any commitment (Climate.Table reported) to cut domestic emissions. Instead, it joined other emerging economies in pointing to the historically rooted obligation of industrialized nations. The Paris Climate Agreement broke down the front between industrialized and developing countries.
At COP27, it again surfaced clearly: China – now a major power and the world’s largest emitter – insisted on its status as a developing country under the UNFCCC process. This had tangible consequences for the negotiations on loss-and-damage offset: China refused to pay into a fund. Instead, it wanted the opportunity to receive compensation payments itself.
A new working group is now dealing with the technical details of the Loss and Damage Fund and the financial mechanisms that are to be built around it. But China’s power ambitions are also likely to shape climate policy in the coming years. Alexandra Endres/Bernhard Pötter
After a night shift and 37 hours later than originally planned, COP27 ended and the delegates managed to reach an agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh after all. It was preceded by tough diplomatic disputes. Just the day before, the European Union threatened to break off the negotiations and let the entire conference fail. Several delegations drew red lines. For a short time, the summit was on the brink.
Geopolitics was to blame – but differently than expected. The most visible line of conflict was between the old industrialized countries, which allied themselves with the particularly vulnerable countries on some issues, and China, which partly allied itself with oil states such as Saudi Arabia.
Before the COP, it appeared that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine would complicate the talks. The conflict between China and the U.S., which had suspended their climate talks in the summer because of tensions over Taiwan, could also have put a strain on the COP. However, both sources of tension hardly played a role in Sharm el-Sheikh. Russia barely made an appearance throughout the summit. Instead, another conflict erupted.
The first question had hung unresolved over the climate summits for decades: What commitment to climate action and managing its consequences must China make? Seven years ago, the fact that China also agreed in the Paris climate agreement that all countries must reduce their emissions in the long term was a major success. Now, behind the scenes in Sharm el-Sheikh, the debate began about whether China, as an economic and climate superpower, can continue to dodge climate aid funding commitments in the long term.
A second fundamental dispute flared up over fossil energy sources. The oil states used the Ukraine war and the ensuing energy crisis as an opportunity to push for a renaissance of oil, coal and gas. In the end, their attack was repelled. But it prevented any progress on emissions reductions.
The EU has no mandate to vote on the modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty on Nov. 22. A qualified majority could not be reached in the vote in the Permanent Representatives Committee on Friday. Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands abstained. Accordingly, the EU cannot approve the modernization of the treaty at the Energy Charter Conference in Mongolia scheduled for Tuesday.
In recent months, more and more EU countries have decided to withdraw from the Charter. The German government decided to leave the Energy Charter only a week ago.
The EU Commission now wants to postpone the vote on modernizing the Energy Charter. It now works to remove the vote from the agenda of the ECT conference on November 22.
Meanwhile, calls for the EU to withdraw from the Energy Charter are growing louder. With the vote on Friday, “the climate killer treaty has now also finally failed at the EU level. We call on the EU Commission to immediately initiate the exit!”, writes the Munich Environmental Institute in a press release.
This is exactly how MEP Anna Cavazzini (Greens) sees it: “This climate-damaging adhesion contract can no longer be saved. The EU must now also finally get out.” Since last week, a letter has already been circulating in which MEPs from the Greens, Renew, S&D and the Left call on the EU Commission to withdraw from the Charter.
On Friday afternoon, Luxembourg also announced its withdrawal from the Energy Charter. “Even if the modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty leads to some progress, the treaty is still not compatible with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, as it continues to protect investments in fossil and nuclear energies,” criticizes Green energy minister Claude Turmes. Charlotte Wirth
With the traditional hammer blow, Sameh Shoukry ended the second-longest climate conference on Sunday morning at 9:30 in Sharm el-Sheikh. Europe was unable to get its good proposals into the final documents. The demands of the EU did not really stick in the negotiations of the last days and hours. Especially not with those who, according to EU negotiators, would benefit most from these proposals: The island states and the least developed countries.
The discussions around loss & damage have shown in the past two weeks what Europe lacks: political clout. Instead of breaking the G77/China bloc with the European compromise proposal, it became clear how isolated the EU often is in the climate-cosmos. It took days before the first representatives of island states showed up at Europe’s side. Bernhard Pötter analyzes how an agreement on loss and damage was finally reached.
Above all, there often isn’t the necessary trust in their European partners to forge new alliances. The most vulnerable states are skeptical whether Europe will make money available despite its grandiose announcements. They know that Europe often stands alone in the geopolitical climate cosmos. Alexandra Endres and Bernhard Pötter explain the different positions of the countries during this COP.
At the end of COP27, Europe’s weakness was again apparent. The EU had previously invested a lot of political capital in the mitigation work program. The result is hardly worth mentioning, as we show in our analysis of the COP results.
After the eventful COP weeks, the next issue of Climate.Table will be published on Thursday.
Just a week ago – at the halfway point of COP27 – it was considered almost impossible that a fund for loss & damage would come to be. Now it has been decided and is to come next year. It is a historic decision, as developing countries have been calling for a financial instrument to address loss and damage resulting from climate change for 30 years. Christoph Bals, political director of Germanwatch called it an important breakthrough. He says the German government was instrumental in getting the EU and other industrialized countries to warm up to this fund.
The agreement on loss & damage at COP27 includes:
On Sunday night, there was still wrangling over whether only “particularly vulnerable” developing countries or all developing countries should be eligible to receive funds from the loss and damage financial instruments. A formulation that classified all developing countries as of 1992 as recipient countries was dropped shortly before the closing plenary of the COP.
Just as controversial was the question of who should provide the funding. The EU and later also some island states insisted that new financial sources must be found – so far, so vague. Originally, the EU demanded to expand the group of contributing countries. Thus, emerging economies that are now wealthy, such as China, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Mexico and oil-rich nations, would also have had to pay into the fund. “The EU wanted to make China and the Gulf states contributors – but in the end, it didn’t have the courage for the necessary confrontation,” analyzes David Ryfisch, head of the International Climate Policy team at Germanwatch.
While the new formulation does not exclude the expansion of contributors, it is not particularly explicit either. It is now up to the transition committee to propose new funding sources for loss and damage. This means that the debate on whether China, as the historically second-largest emitter, must also bear responsibility for climate damage is by no means over, but merely postponed until COP28.
The roadmap for global greenhouse gas reductions was of enormous importance to Europeans at the COP. It was supposed to be an ambitious path to achieving the 1.5-degree target. But it falls short of many expectations. “In Glasgow, we were still able to maintain the 1.5. At this COP, we are at a juncture where it could lose,” said Franz Perrez, Switzerland’s chief negotiator.
The Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Work Program:
The industrialized countries would have preferred even more ambitious targets, which they, as the main emitters, would most likely have had to implement themselves. But even less ambitious targets would have been possible: An earlier version of the text stated that the work program must not lead to higher climate targets. An absolute no-go for the EU, which it also made clear to the Egyptian COP presidency. Without higher climate targets (NDCs), the 1.5-degree target would remain out of reach. The EU prevailed, but at what price?
The price may have been horse-trading, as the final text – called the cover decision – falls short of Glasgow and will likely be a bad memory of European negotiators for a long time to come.
The cover decision states:
The last point in particular leaves many questions unanswered because “low-emission” also means gas and nuclear power. EU climate commissioner Frans Timmermans said on Sunday that only gas with CO2 capture is considered “low-emission”. However, David Ryfisch of Germanwatch estimates that other countries will interpret the wording differently.
However, there are also positive signals from the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. For example, the accelerated expansion of renewable energies in the Cover Decision is also considered progress in EU circles. What is not in the cover decision is much more important than what is in it:
An alliance of 80 countries (including the US, India and the EU) firmly tried to build on the ambitions shown in Glasgow on Saturday night. They explicitly called for a “phase-out” of all fossil fuels. But COP President Sameh Shoukry ignored the push, as opposition, particularly from oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, was too strong. Instead, the presidency submitted the now-agreed text to a “take it or leave it” vote, says Christoph Bals. In the end, after a night of negotiations, at 7 a.m., none of the 80 countries voiced any objections.
Loss and damage from climate change have increased sharply. What was known for a long time was ignored by official climate policy for almost as long. Especially recently, however, awareness of the problem has increased enormously: record heat in India and Pakistan, floods in Nigeria, the drought in the Horn of Africa, the flood disaster in Pakistan – and not least the devastating flood in the Ahr valley last year. This set the stage for the COP27 decision for a new fund. The road to this point was long and winding.
Mankind is on a path towards 2.7 degrees – this COP could not change that. There were hardly any new NDCs. And the mitigation work program that the European Union wanted to promote in Sharm el-Sheikh remained lackluster in the end. The program was supposed to set out a process by which industrialized countries would gradually tighten their climate targets, in exchanges between high-level government representatives and with annual reviews. But the EU was unable to prevail.
The gradual phase-out of all fossil fuels instead of just coal, as agreed in Glasgow, also did not make it into the final document, although many countries called for it. The reference to climate science and the 1.5-degree target remained weak.
In the coming year, it will be all the more important to pursue the decarbonization of the global economy. The handover of the G20 presidency to Indonesia offers a first opportunity. The country has just signed a Just Energy Transition Partnership (Climate.Table reported) with several industrialized countries and intends to prioritize the transition to sustainable energy during its G20 presidency.
It is a goal of the Paris Agreement that has received too little attention so far: Article 2(1)c calls for bringing financial flows worldwide into line with climate goals – for example, directing investments away from fossil energy toward climate-friendly technologies and also reviewing government subsidies for fossil fuels. The issue did not make it onto the agenda.
Nevertheless, there were discussions at COP27 about reforming development banks, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, for example, based on Barbados President Mia Mottley’s Bridgetown Initiative. French climate diplomat Laurence Tubiana, an architect of the Paris Agreement, noticed “momentum behind the push to restructure the World Bank and IMF to make them not only fairer for the vulnerable but also so that they meaningfully support renewables.”
Mottley will certainly continue to campaign for her initiative behind the scenes. The spring meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank next April could be an occasion to continue talking officially about redirecting global financial flows.
There is now a fund from which compensation payments for loss and damage are to be made. How it is to be structured is the big question that is likely to shape the next climate summit – and the working sessions that will take place between the two COPs under the UNFCCC. Closely related, however, is a much bigger question:
It’s an age-old dispute at international climate negotiations. Until the Paris Agreement was signed, China refused any commitment (Climate.Table reported) to cut domestic emissions. Instead, it joined other emerging economies in pointing to the historically rooted obligation of industrialized nations. The Paris Climate Agreement broke down the front between industrialized and developing countries.
At COP27, it again surfaced clearly: China – now a major power and the world’s largest emitter – insisted on its status as a developing country under the UNFCCC process. This had tangible consequences for the negotiations on loss-and-damage offset: China refused to pay into a fund. Instead, it wanted the opportunity to receive compensation payments itself.
A new working group is now dealing with the technical details of the Loss and Damage Fund and the financial mechanisms that are to be built around it. But China’s power ambitions are also likely to shape climate policy in the coming years. Alexandra Endres/Bernhard Pötter
After a night shift and 37 hours later than originally planned, COP27 ended and the delegates managed to reach an agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh after all. It was preceded by tough diplomatic disputes. Just the day before, the European Union threatened to break off the negotiations and let the entire conference fail. Several delegations drew red lines. For a short time, the summit was on the brink.
Geopolitics was to blame – but differently than expected. The most visible line of conflict was between the old industrialized countries, which allied themselves with the particularly vulnerable countries on some issues, and China, which partly allied itself with oil states such as Saudi Arabia.
Before the COP, it appeared that the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine would complicate the talks. The conflict between China and the U.S., which had suspended their climate talks in the summer because of tensions over Taiwan, could also have put a strain on the COP. However, both sources of tension hardly played a role in Sharm el-Sheikh. Russia barely made an appearance throughout the summit. Instead, another conflict erupted.
The first question had hung unresolved over the climate summits for decades: What commitment to climate action and managing its consequences must China make? Seven years ago, the fact that China also agreed in the Paris climate agreement that all countries must reduce their emissions in the long term was a major success. Now, behind the scenes in Sharm el-Sheikh, the debate began about whether China, as an economic and climate superpower, can continue to dodge climate aid funding commitments in the long term.
A second fundamental dispute flared up over fossil energy sources. The oil states used the Ukraine war and the ensuing energy crisis as an opportunity to push for a renaissance of oil, coal and gas. In the end, their attack was repelled. But it prevented any progress on emissions reductions.
The EU has no mandate to vote on the modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty on Nov. 22. A qualified majority could not be reached in the vote in the Permanent Representatives Committee on Friday. Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands abstained. Accordingly, the EU cannot approve the modernization of the treaty at the Energy Charter Conference in Mongolia scheduled for Tuesday.
In recent months, more and more EU countries have decided to withdraw from the Charter. The German government decided to leave the Energy Charter only a week ago.
The EU Commission now wants to postpone the vote on modernizing the Energy Charter. It now works to remove the vote from the agenda of the ECT conference on November 22.
Meanwhile, calls for the EU to withdraw from the Energy Charter are growing louder. With the vote on Friday, “the climate killer treaty has now also finally failed at the EU level. We call on the EU Commission to immediately initiate the exit!”, writes the Munich Environmental Institute in a press release.
This is exactly how MEP Anna Cavazzini (Greens) sees it: “This climate-damaging adhesion contract can no longer be saved. The EU must now also finally get out.” Since last week, a letter has already been circulating in which MEPs from the Greens, Renew, S&D and the Left call on the EU Commission to withdraw from the Charter.
On Friday afternoon, Luxembourg also announced its withdrawal from the Energy Charter. “Even if the modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty leads to some progress, the treaty is still not compatible with the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement, as it continues to protect investments in fossil and nuclear energies,” criticizes Green energy minister Claude Turmes. Charlotte Wirth