He is the classic example of the old white (and white-haired) man: Jim Skea, the new IPCC head, prevailed against his competitor Thelma Krug from Brazil in the second round of voting at the UN Climate Council yesterday. There were many congratulations. But Skea now has two big tasks: Coordinating the work on the next Assessment Report over five to seven years. And to make the UN Climate Council more diverse, open and relevant.
Both are urgently needed: The importance of scientific expertise when classifying right and wrong solutions in the climate crisis grows with every tenth of a degree more warming. This is what we also report about in this issue: Devastating fires are raging in the Mediterranean, and the debate about the collapse of the Gulf Stream has reignited. In addition, we look at how offshore wind energy has become a lucrative business. And another analysis shows how important scientific facts are, but also their implementation in politics: The support for the climate movement in Germany has halved in two years. It remains unclear what this means for German climate policy.
The summer break is about to start for many people. It is important to take a breather. But one thing is already clear: The new head of the IPCC will hardly be able to relax over the next few years. And neither will we.
British physicist and renewable energy expert James “Jim” Ferguson Skea will head the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as chair for the next five to seven years. On Wednesday, the majority of delegates at the 59th IPCC Assembly in Nairobi, Kenya, voted to elect the Brit. As the new chair, he will lead the influential panel at the nexus of science and politics.
Skea prevailed against three other candidates, in the final vote against mathematician and climate researcher Thelma Krug from Brazil with 90 votes to 69. After the first round of voting, the Belgian Jean-Pascal von Ypersele and the South African Debra Roberts were eliminated. For the first time in the history of the panel, two women had run for the prestigious post of IPCC Chair.
Jim Skea is well-known at the IPCC and in politics: The 69-year-old, who teaches sustainable energy as a professor at the Imperial College in London, has been active in climate science for 40 years and at the IPCC for 30 years. Most recently, as co-chair of Working Group III (Mitigation of Climate Change), he led the work on this part of the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report. Prior to that, he was a key contributor to the IPCC’s influential “1.5 degrees report” of 2018 and the special report on land use 2019.
After his election, Skea outlined his priorities for the work, including preparing the 7th Assessment Report. His goals:
In his application, Skea emphasized his experience at the intersection between politics and science – this is also the intersection at which the IPCC works. Although the organization recruits scientists from many different fields worldwide, it coordinates all reports down to the last detail with representatives of the respective governments. The candidates for IPCC posts are also officially nominated by their respective nations, i.e., Skea was nominated by the British government.
Indeed, Skea, with his distinctive white hair and beard and polite demeanor, moves confidently on the diplomatic and political stage. He is one of the founding fathers of the British Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent panel of experts established by the British parliament. The CCC regularly evaluates and reprimands the more or less successful climate policy of the British government – just recently again in 2023 – as being too slow and lacking ambition: It said that London had lost its role as a pioneer in climate action.
Jim Skea succeeds South Korean Hoesung Lee. His term saw important reports such as the 1.5-degree report in 2018, which precisely defined the lower threshold of maximum global warming by 2100 after the Paris Agreement of 2015 and thus made it a generally recognized target. The IPCC chief himself, however, did not become a defining figure. From his predecessor, India’s Rajendra Pachauri, Lee inherited a panel that had won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 but had found itself in a precarious position due to external attacks, internal mistakes and allegations of sexual assault by Pachauri.
Skea’s responsibilities will be internal to the IPCC and external to the next reporting cycle. His statement suggests that he is well aware of how important it is for the IPCC to open up to more diversity and inclusion: More women on the panels and more indigenous knowledge incorporated into the reports. The last IPCC reports had already set such standards: Indigenous knowledge, for instance, was treated similarly to classical scientific literature. Skea will also have to address criticism that science is overly dominated by the Global North, and that there are too few studies and measuring points in the emerging and developing countries. There was also repeated loud and quiet criticism of the internal organization of the IPCC in Geneva.
Many more elections are on the agenda at the IPCC meeting, which runs until Friday: Skea’s deputies, the editorial boards for the various chapters of the next, seventh IPCC report, 34 posts in all. In addition, there are 12 members of the Task Force Bureau on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI).
Then the process begins for the next IPCC report AR7, which is expected to be ready in five to seven years. Many voices from the panel would like this stocktaking to not only compile scientific data. Instead, it should also outline solutions and clarify how they can be implemented in respective countries and societies.
The climate and environmental movement currently receives significantly less support among the German population than two years ago. This is the result of a recent survey by the non-profit organization “More in Common.”
However, respondents’ criticism seems to be directed primarily against specific forms of protest, such as the actions of the Last Generation movement – and not (yet) against the urgency of climate action per se. In supplementary interviews to the survey, many “recognized the fundamental necessity of strong actions for climate protection” and “partly defended the street blockades on this level,” writes More in Common. From this, the organization concludes: “It is possible for many people to reject the concrete protests in the way they are done and still be aware of the importance of climate engagement.”
“More in Common” invites interested parties to discuss the results in a webinar on 27 July. In its own initial interpretation of the data, the organization warns that the climate debate could develop into a culture war, for example, along the “supposed dividing line between activists on the one hand and commuting workers on the other.” This could damage the positive potential for climate action in people’s minds.
Many people already perceive climate policy as a “policy of loss and sanctions” directed against “ordinary people” and do not see the positive opportunities for shaping it.
The organization sees various ways to avoid a culture war: For instance, if climate policy conveys the “belief in the collective agency” and in the fact that “everyone does make a fair contribution.” Especially in times of crisis and rising prices, it is very important that climate protection can convey positive visions of the future. “This has nothing to do with sugarcoating” because most people already know “that there will be changes in how we live.” Therefore, they would need “positive, confidence-inspiring visions.”
The results of the survey in detail:
“More in Common” thus comes to similar conclusions as other recently presented studies. For example, the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) reported in late June that most Germans did not support radical climate protests, i.e., “street blockades or attacks on works of art.” But the radical actions did not affect the approval of climate policy measures per se “in the short term.”
The Social Sustainability Barometer published at the beginning of July also found that a majority of respondents (59 percent) were rather critical of the climate protests. Two-thirds feared that the protests could jeopardize social support for climate action. Almost half did not believe in their political effectiveness.
“More in Common” is active in the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In Germany, the organization is active in the form of a non-profit association financed by foundations. It sees itself as independent of party politics. Its goal is to fight polarization and division and to foster social cohesion. To this end, it also conducts its own research.
For the current survey, “More in Common” worked with the opinion research institute Kantar Public from 9 to 24 May 2023 and surveyed around two thousand people over the age of 18 about their opinion on the climate movement using an online procedure that is intended to represent the various social groups as reliably as possible. Two years ago, the organization presented its first study on the view of the German public on climate action.
The German government presented its new hydrogen strategy on Wednesday. It aims to secure Germany’s energy carrier supply while promoting a sustainable economy in partner countries. However, concrete guidelines for reconciling these goals have not yet been set.
In the now-adopted revision of the 2020 strategy, the supply of “sustainable and climate-neutral hydrogen” is considered “indispensable” for achieving net zero by 2045. At the same time, the German government wants to “ensure maximum synergies with the local socio-ecological transformation of society and economy and energy transition as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” in partner countries.
Cooperation with partner countries is important: By 2030, about 50 to 70 percent of Germany’s hydrogen demand is supposed to be imported. The strategy estimates a total demand of 95 to 130 terawatt hours (TWh). In order to be in a position to import 50 to 90 terawatt hours, a hydrogen economy must also be created in the exporting countries.
The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is convinced of the development policy potential. According to Jochen Flasbarth, State Secretary at the BMZ, the hydrogen economy could be “a real game changer for implementing the Agenda 2030,” referring to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The BMZ also urges considering risk factors to avoid the adverse effects of hydrogen production in partner countries:
So far, there is no strategy to counter these risks. Flasbarth admits that the positive benefits of a hydrogen economy cannot be “100 percent guaranteed,” but that policy must be focused on this. Germany’s hydrogen import strategy, which is expected by the end of the year, is supposed to be more specific on this.
In addition, the German government wants to promote “good governance standards” at the G7/G20 level to achieve the desired positive effects of a hydrogen economy. However, the G20 energy ministers were only able to agree on very vague green hydrogen common positions over the weekend.
“There is a significant risk that hydrogen projects will not deliver the promised benefits for producing countries,” Leonie Beaucamp, Policy Advisor for Renewable Energy and Hydrogen at Germanwatch, told Table.Media. “The time and price pressures built up by the global hydrogen trade ramp-up can have a negative impact on fulfilling local needs. Therefore, import strategies should include strict sustainability standards.”
Christoph Heinemann of the Öko-Institut also warns: “The hydrogen strategy must now be followed by the development of concrete criteria that incentivize positive effects such as the expansion of renewables or the improvement of water supply in partner countries.” Specifically, the German government could require such criteria when granting subsidies and issuing tenders for new projects, he said.
Green requirements are not necessarily a competitive disadvantage for Europe on the global market. “For pipeline distances, for example, imports from countries in North Africa, the cost advantage for transport is so large that the focus will be very much on the European market and stricter sustainability criteria would have to be met,” Heinemann says.
According to its hydrogen strategy, the German government wants to establish “cross-border value chains” with a number of countries. Currently, such alliances exist with 29 partner counties of various orientations. An initial overview shows the different categories:
Many projects are still in the early planning stages. Nevertheless, even supposed showcase projects already draw criticism. “The HYPHEN project in Namibia is often communicated as a showcase project regarding local development opportunities. At the same time, however, a closer look reveals flaws. For instance, there is a lack of transparency and presence of civil society in the planning and on the path to project implementation,” says Beaucamp of Germanwatch.
The BMZ has also set up a “PtX Development Fund” with a budget of 270 million euros, to be launched in the fall of 2023 with the first tenders. The fund is intended to leverage private investment of 1.3 billion euros “along the entire hydrogen value chain in the partner countries,” according to Jochen Flasbarth. The German economy ministry also supports the market ramp-up of green hydrogen and its derivatives in 15 countries, including Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, India and Nigeria, with the H2Uppp funding program.
In some electricity markets, offshore wind farms are now being built without government subsidies. For this reason, some countries have now allowed “negative bids” in tenders for offshore wind farms. This means that project developers not only forego guaranteed feed-in tariffs – they even put money on top to win the bid.
In Germany (currently ranking third in the global offshore capacity market with around eight GW of installed capacity), four areas in the North Sea and Baltic Sea have recently been awarded in exchange for several billion euros. BP will be allowed to build two farms, each with 2 gigawatts of installed capacity, around 120 kilometers northwest of Helgoland, and will pay just under 6.8 billion euros for them. TotalEnergies was awarded the contract for another wind farm in the same North Sea region and a smaller one in the Baltic Sea for just over 5.8 billion euros. The farms are scheduled to start producing electricity in 2030.
According to the European industry association WindEurope, tenders involving negative bids have been held in two other countries: Denmark and, most recently, Lithuania. Negative bids are now also permitted in the Netherlands.
Negative tender results were reported for the first time in Denmark. After the auction for the Thor offshore wind farm last year, the Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities spoke of a “new chapter in the development of Danish wind energy.” For the first time, the wind farm and its onshore connection will be built without state subsidies: RWE, as the successful bidder, will have to pay around 375 million euros to Denmark for the project, which has an installed capacity of one gigawatt.
Lithuania now also accepts negative bids, and has already awarded a project on this basis, as WindEurope reports. Recently, a consortium was awarded a contract with a bid of 20 million euros for the construction of a wind farm with 700 megawatts. The bids in Germany show entirely new dimensions: BP and TotalEnergies are spending 12.6 billion euros for their seven gigawatts in Germany – over 60 times the Lithuanian amount in terms of output.
Offshore wind is such a lucrative business model that companies are willing to pay a substantial amount for licenses. However, this is currently only successful in selected markets, as the regulatory conditions vary internationally. In the world’s largest market, China (current offshore wind capacity: around 30 GW), companies submit bids for government incentives based on a coal power price index, as explained by consulting agency Trivium China. The awarded bids are priced below the cost of coal power.
In Europe’s largest market, the UK (currently 14 GW), Vattenfall recently halted its 1.4-gigawatt Norfolk Boreas project, as the company announced at the presentation of its half-year figures. Construction costs had increased so much that the investor now considers the previously granted fixed remuneration of 37.35 pounds (about 43 euros) per megawatt hour insufficient. However, a comparison with Europe is hardly sensible because China’s electricity markets are nowhere near as developed.
In Germany, the concept of “negative bids” now made its debut. The reason: It had simply become unavoidable. In the past, those who offered their electricity at the best conditions were awarded the bid. In the meantime, however, bids at 0 cents have almost become the rule – meaning that most companies have long since foregone guaranteed compensation. In order to decide between the zero-cent bids, the Offshore Wind Energy Act introduced a second round of auctions under the title “dynamic bidding procedure.” In this round, the contract is awarded to the bidder who adds the most money on top after his first zero-cent bid.
The billions the state earns this way are earmarked for a specific purpose. 90 percent of the money is used to reduce the offshore grid levy, which is used to finance the connections to offshore wind farms. Consumers pay it via their electricity bills. Ten percent of the revenue also goes into the federal budget and half must be used “for marine nature conservation measures” and half “for environmentally friendly fisheries measures, including fisheries restructuring measures.”
The fact that only “two financially and equity-strong giants from the oil and gas sector” successfully bid in the German tender drew criticism from the German Offshore Wind Energy Foundation. The two companies plan to install nearly the total capacity that currently exists in German waters. An additional 8 to 9 gigawatts are to be tendered next year. If the auction design is not revised by then, there is a “risk of an oligopoly on the German offshore wind market,” the foundation complains. Politics must be careful to “preserve the diversity of players.”
Criticism has also come from WindEurope. Although the temptation to introduce a tender design with negative bids is obvious, as subsidies are no longer needed and even generate revenue for the state budget. “At first glance, this seems favorable, but unfortunately, it is a misconception,” says spokesman Christoph Zipf. Because project developers would have to pass on those costs. That would either drive up electricity prices or investors would have to “pass the costs on to the value chain.” This is done “at the expense of manufacturers and suppliers who are already in the red or have very low margins.”
The fact that the topic is now boiling up just after the German tender is simply because the money paid in the German offshore areas is unusually generous. If the billions are applied to the expected electricity yields, the assumed lifetime of the turbines is 20 years, resulting in a value of around two cents per kilowatt-hour.
The companies are also speculating on a long-term electricity market price level that will allow them to sell their power profitably despite the high premiums. Recently, the conditions in this regard have been favorable: The monthly average market values for offshore wind power in 2023 have ranged between around eight and eleven cents per kilowatt-hour.
However, the market values fluctuate significantly, which is now a risk for investors. The market was very attractive for electricity producers in 2022, as they could achieve an average of 18.3 cents per kilowatt-hour for offshore wind power at the exchange. In 2021, it had also been a solid nine cents, but in the pandemic year 2020, the market value of offshore wind power was a ruinous 2.7 cents.
Companies that invest in an offshore wind farm without a minimum state remuneration and with a hefty payment to the state need to have one thing above all else: Confidence in continued high market prices on the energy exchange.
The current news about forest fires in Europe might give the impression that half the continent is burning. However, measured by the total area burned, fires have been less devastating this year than the average of the past ten years. The 2023 cumulative burned area curve is actually quite close to the minimum value measured since 2012. In terms of the number of fires, 2023 is also below average. As of July 22, there have been 16,407 fires in Europe. This is the lowest number since 2012.
However, when only Greece is considered, for example, 2023 is well above the average between 2006 and 2022. In Germany, too, the area burned so far in 2023 is 900 hectares, which is above the previous average of 429 hectares.
It is undisputed that man-made climate change is responsible for the extreme heat that has contributed significantly to forest fires in Europe as well as in parts of Africa, the Americas and Asia. The record temperatures in June and July in Southern Europe would have been “virtually impossible” without human CO2 emissions, according to the World Weather Attribution (WWA), an academic initiative that examines whether and to what extent extreme weather events are influenced by climate change.
Thus, recent global heat waves would have been much cooler without climate change. The heat waves in Southern Europe are 2.5 °C hotter than they would have been without human-induced climate change, according to the WWA. luk
André de Ruyter has had three turbulent years: He was poisoned, was, by his own account, the head of an internal corporate intelligence operation, and ultimately had to leave South Africa. The story of Eskom’s former CEO sounds more like the plot of a Netflix crime series than the life of a CEO. But de Ruyter’s determined fight against deep-seated corruption at Eskom and in South Africa would have made him the enemy of the corrupt and criminals in the company’s environment: At least, that’s how de Ruyter describes his time at Eskom in his book “Truth To Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom” (2023, Penguin Random House South Africa). His account shows the difficult environment in which South Africa’s energy transition needs to be carried out.
The 55-year-old lawyer with years of experience as an executive in South Africa, China and Germany – including managing the international coal trading department at South African company Sasol – was appointed CEO of Eskom in December 2019. At the time, South Africa was in the midst of unraveling the corruption scandals involving former President Jacob Zuma, the Gupta family and their henchmen. “Eskom had become a feeding trough” for these circles, de Ruyter said. While the Financial Times had named the company the world’s best utility in 2001, Eskom was technically bankrupt when he took office, according to De Ruyter. Power outages were becoming more frequent. His goal: Getting the company back on track, securing the power supply and reducing its high dependence on coal.
But de Ruyter quickly realized that corruption at all levels of Eskom stood in his way. In “Truth to Power,” de Ruyter describes Eskom’s exploitation down to the smallest detail: How mafia-like gangs hijack coal transports and swap truckloads of high-grade coal for rocks and low-grade fuel that then destroys the power plants; how equipment in the coal power plants are deliberately destroyed and new equipment is bought from criminal contractors; and how even toilet paper and garbage bags were bought at artificially inflated prices through middlemen, with some of the money flowing into dark channels.
De Ruyter’s and his allies’ struggle against corruption is complicated by inaction by the police and the ties between high-ranking ANC officials and the criminals at Eskom, which even politicians from the ruling ANC have confessed to. Financed by contacts in the South African corporate world, de Ruyter launched an internal corporate intelligence operation to obtain more information and present evidence of deep-rooted corruption to the DA. In doing so, he made enemies within Eskom, among the state security services and the circles that plundered Eskom, the CEO says, looking back.
De Ruyter’s efforts to expand renewables had not won him many friends at ANC, the unions, or inside Eskom. According to the former company CEO, the numerous opportunities for corruption, theft and fraud in the coal sector illustrate that green energy will disrupt an ecosystem from which many interest groups benefit. This assessment does not bode well for South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership with Western nations, which de Ruyter says he helped negotiate.
De Ruyter’s time at Eskom ended with a bang. On December 12, 2022, he handed in his resignation. One day later, his coffee cup was laced with cyanide. Fortunately for De Ruyter, his doctor gave him high doses of vitamin B as an antidote to cyanide poisoning. Even before this incident, he feared for his safety. In “Truth to Power,” he cites two murders of anti-corruption whistle-blowers that made him fear for his safety.
After being poisoned, de Ruyter hurriedly left the country. He will go into hiding abroad for a while, but has no intention of leaving South Africa in the long term, the former Eskom CEO told the Financial Times, “I’ll just watch out who invites me for coffee.” Nico Beckert
He is the classic example of the old white (and white-haired) man: Jim Skea, the new IPCC head, prevailed against his competitor Thelma Krug from Brazil in the second round of voting at the UN Climate Council yesterday. There were many congratulations. But Skea now has two big tasks: Coordinating the work on the next Assessment Report over five to seven years. And to make the UN Climate Council more diverse, open and relevant.
Both are urgently needed: The importance of scientific expertise when classifying right and wrong solutions in the climate crisis grows with every tenth of a degree more warming. This is what we also report about in this issue: Devastating fires are raging in the Mediterranean, and the debate about the collapse of the Gulf Stream has reignited. In addition, we look at how offshore wind energy has become a lucrative business. And another analysis shows how important scientific facts are, but also their implementation in politics: The support for the climate movement in Germany has halved in two years. It remains unclear what this means for German climate policy.
The summer break is about to start for many people. It is important to take a breather. But one thing is already clear: The new head of the IPCC will hardly be able to relax over the next few years. And neither will we.
British physicist and renewable energy expert James “Jim” Ferguson Skea will head the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as chair for the next five to seven years. On Wednesday, the majority of delegates at the 59th IPCC Assembly in Nairobi, Kenya, voted to elect the Brit. As the new chair, he will lead the influential panel at the nexus of science and politics.
Skea prevailed against three other candidates, in the final vote against mathematician and climate researcher Thelma Krug from Brazil with 90 votes to 69. After the first round of voting, the Belgian Jean-Pascal von Ypersele and the South African Debra Roberts were eliminated. For the first time in the history of the panel, two women had run for the prestigious post of IPCC Chair.
Jim Skea is well-known at the IPCC and in politics: The 69-year-old, who teaches sustainable energy as a professor at the Imperial College in London, has been active in climate science for 40 years and at the IPCC for 30 years. Most recently, as co-chair of Working Group III (Mitigation of Climate Change), he led the work on this part of the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report. Prior to that, he was a key contributor to the IPCC’s influential “1.5 degrees report” of 2018 and the special report on land use 2019.
After his election, Skea outlined his priorities for the work, including preparing the 7th Assessment Report. His goals:
In his application, Skea emphasized his experience at the intersection between politics and science – this is also the intersection at which the IPCC works. Although the organization recruits scientists from many different fields worldwide, it coordinates all reports down to the last detail with representatives of the respective governments. The candidates for IPCC posts are also officially nominated by their respective nations, i.e., Skea was nominated by the British government.
Indeed, Skea, with his distinctive white hair and beard and polite demeanor, moves confidently on the diplomatic and political stage. He is one of the founding fathers of the British Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent panel of experts established by the British parliament. The CCC regularly evaluates and reprimands the more or less successful climate policy of the British government – just recently again in 2023 – as being too slow and lacking ambition: It said that London had lost its role as a pioneer in climate action.
Jim Skea succeeds South Korean Hoesung Lee. His term saw important reports such as the 1.5-degree report in 2018, which precisely defined the lower threshold of maximum global warming by 2100 after the Paris Agreement of 2015 and thus made it a generally recognized target. The IPCC chief himself, however, did not become a defining figure. From his predecessor, India’s Rajendra Pachauri, Lee inherited a panel that had won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 but had found itself in a precarious position due to external attacks, internal mistakes and allegations of sexual assault by Pachauri.
Skea’s responsibilities will be internal to the IPCC and external to the next reporting cycle. His statement suggests that he is well aware of how important it is for the IPCC to open up to more diversity and inclusion: More women on the panels and more indigenous knowledge incorporated into the reports. The last IPCC reports had already set such standards: Indigenous knowledge, for instance, was treated similarly to classical scientific literature. Skea will also have to address criticism that science is overly dominated by the Global North, and that there are too few studies and measuring points in the emerging and developing countries. There was also repeated loud and quiet criticism of the internal organization of the IPCC in Geneva.
Many more elections are on the agenda at the IPCC meeting, which runs until Friday: Skea’s deputies, the editorial boards for the various chapters of the next, seventh IPCC report, 34 posts in all. In addition, there are 12 members of the Task Force Bureau on National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (TFI).
Then the process begins for the next IPCC report AR7, which is expected to be ready in five to seven years. Many voices from the panel would like this stocktaking to not only compile scientific data. Instead, it should also outline solutions and clarify how they can be implemented in respective countries and societies.
The climate and environmental movement currently receives significantly less support among the German population than two years ago. This is the result of a recent survey by the non-profit organization “More in Common.”
However, respondents’ criticism seems to be directed primarily against specific forms of protest, such as the actions of the Last Generation movement – and not (yet) against the urgency of climate action per se. In supplementary interviews to the survey, many “recognized the fundamental necessity of strong actions for climate protection” and “partly defended the street blockades on this level,” writes More in Common. From this, the organization concludes: “It is possible for many people to reject the concrete protests in the way they are done and still be aware of the importance of climate engagement.”
“More in Common” invites interested parties to discuss the results in a webinar on 27 July. In its own initial interpretation of the data, the organization warns that the climate debate could develop into a culture war, for example, along the “supposed dividing line between activists on the one hand and commuting workers on the other.” This could damage the positive potential for climate action in people’s minds.
Many people already perceive climate policy as a “policy of loss and sanctions” directed against “ordinary people” and do not see the positive opportunities for shaping it.
The organization sees various ways to avoid a culture war: For instance, if climate policy conveys the “belief in the collective agency” and in the fact that “everyone does make a fair contribution.” Especially in times of crisis and rising prices, it is very important that climate protection can convey positive visions of the future. “This has nothing to do with sugarcoating” because most people already know “that there will be changes in how we live.” Therefore, they would need “positive, confidence-inspiring visions.”
The results of the survey in detail:
“More in Common” thus comes to similar conclusions as other recently presented studies. For example, the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) reported in late June that most Germans did not support radical climate protests, i.e., “street blockades or attacks on works of art.” But the radical actions did not affect the approval of climate policy measures per se “in the short term.”
The Social Sustainability Barometer published at the beginning of July also found that a majority of respondents (59 percent) were rather critical of the climate protests. Two-thirds feared that the protests could jeopardize social support for climate action. Almost half did not believe in their political effectiveness.
“More in Common” is active in the United States, the United Kingdom and France. In Germany, the organization is active in the form of a non-profit association financed by foundations. It sees itself as independent of party politics. Its goal is to fight polarization and division and to foster social cohesion. To this end, it also conducts its own research.
For the current survey, “More in Common” worked with the opinion research institute Kantar Public from 9 to 24 May 2023 and surveyed around two thousand people over the age of 18 about their opinion on the climate movement using an online procedure that is intended to represent the various social groups as reliably as possible. Two years ago, the organization presented its first study on the view of the German public on climate action.
The German government presented its new hydrogen strategy on Wednesday. It aims to secure Germany’s energy carrier supply while promoting a sustainable economy in partner countries. However, concrete guidelines for reconciling these goals have not yet been set.
In the now-adopted revision of the 2020 strategy, the supply of “sustainable and climate-neutral hydrogen” is considered “indispensable” for achieving net zero by 2045. At the same time, the German government wants to “ensure maximum synergies with the local socio-ecological transformation of society and economy and energy transition as well as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)” in partner countries.
Cooperation with partner countries is important: By 2030, about 50 to 70 percent of Germany’s hydrogen demand is supposed to be imported. The strategy estimates a total demand of 95 to 130 terawatt hours (TWh). In order to be in a position to import 50 to 90 terawatt hours, a hydrogen economy must also be created in the exporting countries.
The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is convinced of the development policy potential. According to Jochen Flasbarth, State Secretary at the BMZ, the hydrogen economy could be “a real game changer for implementing the Agenda 2030,” referring to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The BMZ also urges considering risk factors to avoid the adverse effects of hydrogen production in partner countries:
So far, there is no strategy to counter these risks. Flasbarth admits that the positive benefits of a hydrogen economy cannot be “100 percent guaranteed,” but that policy must be focused on this. Germany’s hydrogen import strategy, which is expected by the end of the year, is supposed to be more specific on this.
In addition, the German government wants to promote “good governance standards” at the G7/G20 level to achieve the desired positive effects of a hydrogen economy. However, the G20 energy ministers were only able to agree on very vague green hydrogen common positions over the weekend.
“There is a significant risk that hydrogen projects will not deliver the promised benefits for producing countries,” Leonie Beaucamp, Policy Advisor for Renewable Energy and Hydrogen at Germanwatch, told Table.Media. “The time and price pressures built up by the global hydrogen trade ramp-up can have a negative impact on fulfilling local needs. Therefore, import strategies should include strict sustainability standards.”
Christoph Heinemann of the Öko-Institut also warns: “The hydrogen strategy must now be followed by the development of concrete criteria that incentivize positive effects such as the expansion of renewables or the improvement of water supply in partner countries.” Specifically, the German government could require such criteria when granting subsidies and issuing tenders for new projects, he said.
Green requirements are not necessarily a competitive disadvantage for Europe on the global market. “For pipeline distances, for example, imports from countries in North Africa, the cost advantage for transport is so large that the focus will be very much on the European market and stricter sustainability criteria would have to be met,” Heinemann says.
According to its hydrogen strategy, the German government wants to establish “cross-border value chains” with a number of countries. Currently, such alliances exist with 29 partner counties of various orientations. An initial overview shows the different categories:
Many projects are still in the early planning stages. Nevertheless, even supposed showcase projects already draw criticism. “The HYPHEN project in Namibia is often communicated as a showcase project regarding local development opportunities. At the same time, however, a closer look reveals flaws. For instance, there is a lack of transparency and presence of civil society in the planning and on the path to project implementation,” says Beaucamp of Germanwatch.
The BMZ has also set up a “PtX Development Fund” with a budget of 270 million euros, to be launched in the fall of 2023 with the first tenders. The fund is intended to leverage private investment of 1.3 billion euros “along the entire hydrogen value chain in the partner countries,” according to Jochen Flasbarth. The German economy ministry also supports the market ramp-up of green hydrogen and its derivatives in 15 countries, including Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, India and Nigeria, with the H2Uppp funding program.
In some electricity markets, offshore wind farms are now being built without government subsidies. For this reason, some countries have now allowed “negative bids” in tenders for offshore wind farms. This means that project developers not only forego guaranteed feed-in tariffs – they even put money on top to win the bid.
In Germany (currently ranking third in the global offshore capacity market with around eight GW of installed capacity), four areas in the North Sea and Baltic Sea have recently been awarded in exchange for several billion euros. BP will be allowed to build two farms, each with 2 gigawatts of installed capacity, around 120 kilometers northwest of Helgoland, and will pay just under 6.8 billion euros for them. TotalEnergies was awarded the contract for another wind farm in the same North Sea region and a smaller one in the Baltic Sea for just over 5.8 billion euros. The farms are scheduled to start producing electricity in 2030.
According to the European industry association WindEurope, tenders involving negative bids have been held in two other countries: Denmark and, most recently, Lithuania. Negative bids are now also permitted in the Netherlands.
Negative tender results were reported for the first time in Denmark. After the auction for the Thor offshore wind farm last year, the Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities spoke of a “new chapter in the development of Danish wind energy.” For the first time, the wind farm and its onshore connection will be built without state subsidies: RWE, as the successful bidder, will have to pay around 375 million euros to Denmark for the project, which has an installed capacity of one gigawatt.
Lithuania now also accepts negative bids, and has already awarded a project on this basis, as WindEurope reports. Recently, a consortium was awarded a contract with a bid of 20 million euros for the construction of a wind farm with 700 megawatts. The bids in Germany show entirely new dimensions: BP and TotalEnergies are spending 12.6 billion euros for their seven gigawatts in Germany – over 60 times the Lithuanian amount in terms of output.
Offshore wind is such a lucrative business model that companies are willing to pay a substantial amount for licenses. However, this is currently only successful in selected markets, as the regulatory conditions vary internationally. In the world’s largest market, China (current offshore wind capacity: around 30 GW), companies submit bids for government incentives based on a coal power price index, as explained by consulting agency Trivium China. The awarded bids are priced below the cost of coal power.
In Europe’s largest market, the UK (currently 14 GW), Vattenfall recently halted its 1.4-gigawatt Norfolk Boreas project, as the company announced at the presentation of its half-year figures. Construction costs had increased so much that the investor now considers the previously granted fixed remuneration of 37.35 pounds (about 43 euros) per megawatt hour insufficient. However, a comparison with Europe is hardly sensible because China’s electricity markets are nowhere near as developed.
In Germany, the concept of “negative bids” now made its debut. The reason: It had simply become unavoidable. In the past, those who offered their electricity at the best conditions were awarded the bid. In the meantime, however, bids at 0 cents have almost become the rule – meaning that most companies have long since foregone guaranteed compensation. In order to decide between the zero-cent bids, the Offshore Wind Energy Act introduced a second round of auctions under the title “dynamic bidding procedure.” In this round, the contract is awarded to the bidder who adds the most money on top after his first zero-cent bid.
The billions the state earns this way are earmarked for a specific purpose. 90 percent of the money is used to reduce the offshore grid levy, which is used to finance the connections to offshore wind farms. Consumers pay it via their electricity bills. Ten percent of the revenue also goes into the federal budget and half must be used “for marine nature conservation measures” and half “for environmentally friendly fisheries measures, including fisheries restructuring measures.”
The fact that only “two financially and equity-strong giants from the oil and gas sector” successfully bid in the German tender drew criticism from the German Offshore Wind Energy Foundation. The two companies plan to install nearly the total capacity that currently exists in German waters. An additional 8 to 9 gigawatts are to be tendered next year. If the auction design is not revised by then, there is a “risk of an oligopoly on the German offshore wind market,” the foundation complains. Politics must be careful to “preserve the diversity of players.”
Criticism has also come from WindEurope. Although the temptation to introduce a tender design with negative bids is obvious, as subsidies are no longer needed and even generate revenue for the state budget. “At first glance, this seems favorable, but unfortunately, it is a misconception,” says spokesman Christoph Zipf. Because project developers would have to pass on those costs. That would either drive up electricity prices or investors would have to “pass the costs on to the value chain.” This is done “at the expense of manufacturers and suppliers who are already in the red or have very low margins.”
The fact that the topic is now boiling up just after the German tender is simply because the money paid in the German offshore areas is unusually generous. If the billions are applied to the expected electricity yields, the assumed lifetime of the turbines is 20 years, resulting in a value of around two cents per kilowatt-hour.
The companies are also speculating on a long-term electricity market price level that will allow them to sell their power profitably despite the high premiums. Recently, the conditions in this regard have been favorable: The monthly average market values for offshore wind power in 2023 have ranged between around eight and eleven cents per kilowatt-hour.
However, the market values fluctuate significantly, which is now a risk for investors. The market was very attractive for electricity producers in 2022, as they could achieve an average of 18.3 cents per kilowatt-hour for offshore wind power at the exchange. In 2021, it had also been a solid nine cents, but in the pandemic year 2020, the market value of offshore wind power was a ruinous 2.7 cents.
Companies that invest in an offshore wind farm without a minimum state remuneration and with a hefty payment to the state need to have one thing above all else: Confidence in continued high market prices on the energy exchange.
The current news about forest fires in Europe might give the impression that half the continent is burning. However, measured by the total area burned, fires have been less devastating this year than the average of the past ten years. The 2023 cumulative burned area curve is actually quite close to the minimum value measured since 2012. In terms of the number of fires, 2023 is also below average. As of July 22, there have been 16,407 fires in Europe. This is the lowest number since 2012.
However, when only Greece is considered, for example, 2023 is well above the average between 2006 and 2022. In Germany, too, the area burned so far in 2023 is 900 hectares, which is above the previous average of 429 hectares.
It is undisputed that man-made climate change is responsible for the extreme heat that has contributed significantly to forest fires in Europe as well as in parts of Africa, the Americas and Asia. The record temperatures in June and July in Southern Europe would have been “virtually impossible” without human CO2 emissions, according to the World Weather Attribution (WWA), an academic initiative that examines whether and to what extent extreme weather events are influenced by climate change.
Thus, recent global heat waves would have been much cooler without climate change. The heat waves in Southern Europe are 2.5 °C hotter than they would have been without human-induced climate change, according to the WWA. luk
André de Ruyter has had three turbulent years: He was poisoned, was, by his own account, the head of an internal corporate intelligence operation, and ultimately had to leave South Africa. The story of Eskom’s former CEO sounds more like the plot of a Netflix crime series than the life of a CEO. But de Ruyter’s determined fight against deep-seated corruption at Eskom and in South Africa would have made him the enemy of the corrupt and criminals in the company’s environment: At least, that’s how de Ruyter describes his time at Eskom in his book “Truth To Power: My Three Years Inside Eskom” (2023, Penguin Random House South Africa). His account shows the difficult environment in which South Africa’s energy transition needs to be carried out.
The 55-year-old lawyer with years of experience as an executive in South Africa, China and Germany – including managing the international coal trading department at South African company Sasol – was appointed CEO of Eskom in December 2019. At the time, South Africa was in the midst of unraveling the corruption scandals involving former President Jacob Zuma, the Gupta family and their henchmen. “Eskom had become a feeding trough” for these circles, de Ruyter said. While the Financial Times had named the company the world’s best utility in 2001, Eskom was technically bankrupt when he took office, according to De Ruyter. Power outages were becoming more frequent. His goal: Getting the company back on track, securing the power supply and reducing its high dependence on coal.
But de Ruyter quickly realized that corruption at all levels of Eskom stood in his way. In “Truth to Power,” de Ruyter describes Eskom’s exploitation down to the smallest detail: How mafia-like gangs hijack coal transports and swap truckloads of high-grade coal for rocks and low-grade fuel that then destroys the power plants; how equipment in the coal power plants are deliberately destroyed and new equipment is bought from criminal contractors; and how even toilet paper and garbage bags were bought at artificially inflated prices through middlemen, with some of the money flowing into dark channels.
De Ruyter’s and his allies’ struggle against corruption is complicated by inaction by the police and the ties between high-ranking ANC officials and the criminals at Eskom, which even politicians from the ruling ANC have confessed to. Financed by contacts in the South African corporate world, de Ruyter launched an internal corporate intelligence operation to obtain more information and present evidence of deep-rooted corruption to the DA. In doing so, he made enemies within Eskom, among the state security services and the circles that plundered Eskom, the CEO says, looking back.
De Ruyter’s efforts to expand renewables had not won him many friends at ANC, the unions, or inside Eskom. According to the former company CEO, the numerous opportunities for corruption, theft and fraud in the coal sector illustrate that green energy will disrupt an ecosystem from which many interest groups benefit. This assessment does not bode well for South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership with Western nations, which de Ruyter says he helped negotiate.
De Ruyter’s time at Eskom ended with a bang. On December 12, 2022, he handed in his resignation. One day later, his coffee cup was laced with cyanide. Fortunately for De Ruyter, his doctor gave him high doses of vitamin B as an antidote to cyanide poisoning. Even before this incident, he feared for his safety. In “Truth to Power,” he cites two murders of anti-corruption whistle-blowers that made him fear for his safety.
After being poisoned, de Ruyter hurriedly left the country. He will go into hiding abroad for a while, but has no intention of leaving South Africa in the long term, the former Eskom CEO told the Financial Times, “I’ll just watch out who invites me for coffee.” Nico Beckert
