Xi Jinping faces a dilemma. The People’s Republic struggles with the Omicron wave, and Xi’s course is: zero-Covid. But the weeks-long lockdowns jeopardize economic growth. International companies have already announced plans to withdraw investments. And resentment among the people is rising. There have even been street protests in some areas. Xi, however, cannot back down, analyzes Michael Radunski. By now, he is so closely tied to the zero-Covid policy that he will lose face should he change his strategy.
In many Western democracies, holding on to such a controversial strategy would be political suicide. But not so in China. Instead, lower cadres are blamed for the Covid mess. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, seems untouchable. This puts Western companies deeper and deeper into a predicament: Given the long-term market potential, they want to hold out, but the situation is often becoming personally unbearable.
Slovenia has pestered China over the past few months. Under Prime Minister Janez Janša, the EU state had moved closer to Taiwan, at least verbally. Naturally, this left Beijing angered. But the shift away from China could soon come to an end, analyzes Amelie Richter. Janša was voted out of office. His successor, Robert Golob, is likely to pursue a more China-friendly course – especially in economic policy.
Beijing still holds its ground, China’s capital may still prevent a Covid lockdown (China.Table reported). And President Xi Jinping still maintains his strict zero-Covid policy. But behind each of these points lies the unspoken question: for how much longer? The number of new Covid infections continues to rise daily, after all. At the beginning of the week, the district of Shunyi experienced a fresh outbreak. Beijingers can expect more mass testing and tighter restrictions. With zero-covid, a lockdown in China’s capital seems almost inevitable.
Still, Xi Jinping leaves no doubt about his strategy. During a recent inspection trip to Hainan, he made it clear that China would not back down an inch: “China must not relax COVID control and prevention measures.” It is the strategy for which China was highly praised by the World Health Organization (WHO) almost exactly two years ago: China’s bold approach had turned the tide, it was said at the time.
In any case, Xi knew how to use the WHO’s praise to his advantage. He made it clear to the world that the success against Covid reflected the superiority of the Chinese system over the United States and other Western democracies. While corpses piled up in Bergamo and mask mandates were discussed in Berlin, Paris or Washington, China managed to bring the Covid surge under control.
And there is no denying it: To date, China has confirmed fewer than 5,000 deaths; in the US, the number is just under 1 million. The message that Xi formed from this is unmistakable: Only the Communist Party under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping manages to protect its people.
Since then, the Chinese propaganda machine has been running at full speed: Hardly a day goes by without Chinese diplomats and state media editorials referring to these numbers – and praising the superiority of the Chinese system. “This is how Chinese propaganda has succeeded over time in credibly conveying to people that there is no alternative to the hard zero-covid strategy,” Eberhard Sandschneider told China.Table. “Everyone has to know: The man at the top has once again made the right decision for the country.”
Even with the vaccine, Xi has so far chosen a nationalistic path. Studies show that the Chinese vaccines provide significantly less protection against Covid than foreign mRNA vaccines. Biontech signed a cooperation agreement with the Chinese company Fosun a long time ago. It would be possible to vaccinate the entire Chinese population against the virus within a short time, according to a statement from headquarters at the time. But Beijing has not yet approved the foreign vaccine.
Meanwhile, Chinese medical experts point out that around 49 million people in the country over the age of 60 are still not vaccinated at all. The rate of fully vaccinated people over the age of 80 does not even reach 60 percent.
And the costs of Xi’s zero-Covid strategy are enormous – economically, socially and increasingly politically. Resentment within Chinese society continues to grow, especially in Shanghai, where millions of citizens have been forced to endure massive restrictions for weeks. And the people have begun to voice their frustration in digital media. Besides countless small clips, complaints and comments, the video 四月之声 – “Voice of April” recently attracted attention (China.Table reported).
And so Xi suddenly finds himself in a tight spot. While the Communist Party promises prosperity and constant growth, its policy of massive restrictions poses an increasing danger to the country’s economic development.
However, Klaus Muehlhahn still does not believe that the policy will change. “On the one hand, the Chinese government fears that a course correction would be interpreted as an admission of mistakes and errors – after all, the government has spent almost two years describing the zero-covid line as superior and without alternatives,” explains the sinologist and president of Zeppelin University in Friedrichshafen in an interview with China.Table. “And second, the government is afraid that China’s fragile and vulnerable healthcare system could easily be overwhelmed.”
The anger of the Chinese still only manifests itself in the digital world. And the problems are still mainly local. But even without a major policy change, someone will have to pay for the mistakes committed by politics – especially the local cadres. So far, Beijing has dropped more than 4,000 local politicians for a wide variety of Corona outbreaks – starting with Wuhan Party Chief Ma Guoqiang 马国强. High on the current list of penitents is likely to be Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng 龚正, who will probably lose his post after the lockdown. In chess, this would be dismissed as a simple pawn sacrifice.
But the problems have long since reached the highest level surrounding Xi Jinping. The Head of the Communist Party in Shanghai is none other than Li Qiang 李强. Li is a member of the 19th Politburo. He is rumored to be the successor to Premier Li Keqiang – and is considered a close confidant of Xi. When Li was promoted in 2017, Xi had managed to fill the four key posts in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing with acquaintances. In the fall, Xi wanted his confidant Li to join the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Will Xi manage to promote his buddy despite the Covid debacle, or will he have to drop him to distance himself from the mistakes made in Shanghai?
At any rate, the upcoming party congress in the fall puts Xi under enormous pressure. While the political leadership is supposed to be replaced in rotation, Xi wants to remain at the helm and serve a third term. The reputation of the state leader as a strong decision-maker who is always right must not be tarnished by a change of Covid policy in such a process.
On the other hand, the upcoming party congress also has a disciplining effect on the CCP – personally, because various cadres hope to be promoted by Xi Jinping; and institutionally, because the Party must display unity and cohesion in this uncertain period of change.
Therefore, sinologist Muehlhahn does not see any direct threat to Xi. “In the Chinese system, the president is supported under all circumstances.” Propaganda will do everything it can to portray Xi’s policies as a success – even if the problems are plain to see. “Even the inner-party opposition will not use Covid to attack Xi, because the zero-Covid policy was, particularly in the beginning, uncontroversial in the Party,” Muehlhahn says.
But a lockdown in Beijing would ultimately turn zero Covid into a political problem. And if a potential lockdown in the capital were to be as chaotic as in Shanghai, the consequences would be unpredictable. “This explosive combination could then become a risk for Xi Jinping himself,” warns China expert Sandschneider.
After all, at the national level, there is currently only one person of critical importance in China’s politics: Xi Jinping. It is this personalization that allowed him to shine as the world’s most successful Covid fighter at the advent of the pandemic. But now, as the zero-Covid threatens to fail, this personalization makes it almost impossible for Xi to correct his strategy. “Xi has suddenly become a prisoner of his own policies,” Sandschneider concludes.
Xi has set the course for his countrymen: Persistence is victory – 坚持就是胜利 (jiānchí jiùshì shènglì). This is not a good prospect for the people of Beijing. And troubled days lie ahead for local cadres as well. Because while Xi may be a prisoner of his policies, others are trapped in the prison of his zero-Covid strategy.
In January, the Chinese Foreign Ministry experienced a “severe shock”, according to spokesman Zhao Lijian. Slovenia’s Prime Minister Janez Janša had called Taiwan a “democratic country” and announced closer relations with Taipei. The right-wing populist also did not rule out the opening of a trade representation called the “Taiwan Office” (China.Table reported). Whether the plan is still relevant in Ljubljana is, however, doubtful: Janša has been voted out of office – and with the new government under political newcomer Robert Golob, the signs of China policy in the central European EU state once again point more to economic cooperation than confrontation.
Two weeks ago, Prime Minister-designate Golob and his oppositional Freedom Movement (Gibanje Svoboda, GS) received 34 percent of the votes, compared to only 24 percent for Janša. Previously, the green-liberal Golob had been known to Slovenians only as a businessman and chairman of the partly state-owned energy company Gen-I. He had been appointed to this post, presumably at the request of the government. Sacked from this post, presumably at Janša’s behest, political newcomer Golob founded the GS party.
The 55-year-old’s success came as no surprise. “The Freedom Movement had large support already in pre-election polls,” Slovenian political scientist and China expert Nina Pejič told China.Table. Under incumbent Janša, independent media and independent journalists came under increasing pressure. Critics also accused Janša, who has also been dubbed the “Donald Trump of the Karawanks,” of jeopardizing the independence of the justice system.
The Freedom Movement is now set to change that, which was the main theme of Golob’s election campaign. But GS’s foreign policy plans remained relatively unclear: “[The] Freedom Movement did not state clearly what its position on China would be,” says Pejič.
Coalition negotiations between the GS and the Social Democrats have been ongoing since last week. When it comes to filling the most important foreign policy post, the focus could now primarily lie on economic ties with the People’s Republic, as Marta Kos is currently being considered for the post of foreign minister. Kos had already represented Slovenia as ambassador to Switzerland and Germany, and resigned in 2020 over differences about the foreign policy positions of the Janša government. “She seems to be held in high regard, especially by the business sector,” Pejič said. A confrontational course toward Beijing is less likely with Kos.
Pejič assumes, however, that Ljubljana will certainly support the thrust of the EU’s policy toward China, for example concerning demands for respect for human rights. According to the China expert, there could also be support for one particular project: the CAI investment agreement between the EU and China. This is because Golob’s party is strongly focused on the competitiveness of Slovenia and the EU, according to Pejič. Economic relations with Taiwan are also expected to be further improved – but with a different approach than that of the previous government: “I believe that we can also expect diversification: open doors wide open for doing business with Taipei, without the political engagement with it.”
A stronger focus on economic ties between Slovenia and China is also expected by Tinkara Godec. The Slovenian researches EU-China relations at the University of Vienna. During the election campaign, ties between the two countries did not play any role, Godec said. “China is not mentioned either on the freedom movement’s Twitter account or in the election manifesto.” China also did not receive any major mention from any of the parties during the TV debates.
After the political turmoil over Janša’s statement on Taiwan in January, she had expected that China would become a more prominent issue. “That was ultimately not a point of interest for the parties during the election campaign.”
In the past, Janša openly criticized human rights violations in the People’s Republic and warned against excessive economic dependence. Whether the new government will continue this remains to be seen, Godec said. The parties that now form the governing coalition like to describe themselves as the protectors of democracy in Slovenia. “It will be exciting to see whether they will also adopt this attitude in international politics and not only have an economic focus,” said Godec.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Daniel Roetting has been living and working in Beijing for ten years. When he moved to the Chinese capital in 2012, he started there as CEO and partner of the trading company Plix Trading Co., Ltd. Two years earlier, he was already the European representative of this company. His main task in Beijing is to market items from the high-end, luxury living sector. “At that time, I only knew China as a tourist,” the 53-year-old recalls.
But how did the German end up in China? “It all started with my mother’s late Sinology studies and her curiosity about the people and their culture.” Initially, Marlis Roetting went to China as a tour guide. This was followed by an unexpected job offer from Moevenpick Hotels to staff a new five-star hotel. Today’s honorary Hamburg ambassador later co-founded the German Chamber of Commerce in China, among other things.
Daniel Roetting stayed behind in Hamburg with his two sisters and his father. His interest in the country and its people grew with each visit to China. He first studied law at the University of Hamburg for three years. Afterward, he decided to study at the University of Music and Theatre in Hamburg. For more than 15 years his commitment as an international stage director, orchestra and cultural manager took him to Italy, Spain, Austria, Japan and also China.
When his father unexpectedly passed away, the three siblings were still in apprenticeship. Marlis Roetting had built up her life’s work in Beijing and stayed there. Her son, who had shifted his focus to the cultural-commercial field quite early on and was also enthusiastic about design and architecture, found his new calling in Beijing with the job as CEO and partner of Plix Trading: “For me, it doesn’t make much difference whether I sell an orchestra or a product. The main thing is that you have to master the product that you want to bring to the world.”
The product in question is the Hinterseer Parquet, which is highly valued on the Asian market for its quality and zero pollutants. The manufacturer ships the high-quality wood flooring to China via the port of Hamburg. On-site, the Plix Trading team takes care of sales to the various buyers: designers, architects, industrial partners and retail. A second mainstay of the company is trade consulting: “We advise companies on setting up their own branches in China,” says Daniel Roetting. This begins with the search for a suitable Chinese brand name and extends to tracking down the most relevant initial business contact.
“Yue Da,” Daniel Roetting’s Chinese name, considers himself a European through and through. The cornerstone for business success? “We Europeans have to be honest with the Chinese, appear clear, open and, above all, confident,” Roettting is convinced. “Then we will be taken seriously.” Another door opener is the Chinese language. It is also essential to think in longer terms. “Arriving in China and building something up takes time.” Daniel Roetting has long since arrived: he found his partner in Beijing. He volunteers at the German Protestant Church and in the Kantorei. Daniela Krause
Using a magnifying glass against Covid-19? Customs officials inspect herbs from Vietnam. Chinese authorities assume that the Coronavirus is also introduced through imported goods – hence the protective suits.
Xi Jinping faces a dilemma. The People’s Republic struggles with the Omicron wave, and Xi’s course is: zero-Covid. But the weeks-long lockdowns jeopardize economic growth. International companies have already announced plans to withdraw investments. And resentment among the people is rising. There have even been street protests in some areas. Xi, however, cannot back down, analyzes Michael Radunski. By now, he is so closely tied to the zero-Covid policy that he will lose face should he change his strategy.
In many Western democracies, holding on to such a controversial strategy would be political suicide. But not so in China. Instead, lower cadres are blamed for the Covid mess. Xi Jinping, on the other hand, seems untouchable. This puts Western companies deeper and deeper into a predicament: Given the long-term market potential, they want to hold out, but the situation is often becoming personally unbearable.
Slovenia has pestered China over the past few months. Under Prime Minister Janez Janša, the EU state had moved closer to Taiwan, at least verbally. Naturally, this left Beijing angered. But the shift away from China could soon come to an end, analyzes Amelie Richter. Janša was voted out of office. His successor, Robert Golob, is likely to pursue a more China-friendly course – especially in economic policy.
Beijing still holds its ground, China’s capital may still prevent a Covid lockdown (China.Table reported). And President Xi Jinping still maintains his strict zero-Covid policy. But behind each of these points lies the unspoken question: for how much longer? The number of new Covid infections continues to rise daily, after all. At the beginning of the week, the district of Shunyi experienced a fresh outbreak. Beijingers can expect more mass testing and tighter restrictions. With zero-covid, a lockdown in China’s capital seems almost inevitable.
Still, Xi Jinping leaves no doubt about his strategy. During a recent inspection trip to Hainan, he made it clear that China would not back down an inch: “China must not relax COVID control and prevention measures.” It is the strategy for which China was highly praised by the World Health Organization (WHO) almost exactly two years ago: China’s bold approach had turned the tide, it was said at the time.
In any case, Xi knew how to use the WHO’s praise to his advantage. He made it clear to the world that the success against Covid reflected the superiority of the Chinese system over the United States and other Western democracies. While corpses piled up in Bergamo and mask mandates were discussed in Berlin, Paris or Washington, China managed to bring the Covid surge under control.
And there is no denying it: To date, China has confirmed fewer than 5,000 deaths; in the US, the number is just under 1 million. The message that Xi formed from this is unmistakable: Only the Communist Party under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping manages to protect its people.
Since then, the Chinese propaganda machine has been running at full speed: Hardly a day goes by without Chinese diplomats and state media editorials referring to these numbers – and praising the superiority of the Chinese system. “This is how Chinese propaganda has succeeded over time in credibly conveying to people that there is no alternative to the hard zero-covid strategy,” Eberhard Sandschneider told China.Table. “Everyone has to know: The man at the top has once again made the right decision for the country.”
Even with the vaccine, Xi has so far chosen a nationalistic path. Studies show that the Chinese vaccines provide significantly less protection against Covid than foreign mRNA vaccines. Biontech signed a cooperation agreement with the Chinese company Fosun a long time ago. It would be possible to vaccinate the entire Chinese population against the virus within a short time, according to a statement from headquarters at the time. But Beijing has not yet approved the foreign vaccine.
Meanwhile, Chinese medical experts point out that around 49 million people in the country over the age of 60 are still not vaccinated at all. The rate of fully vaccinated people over the age of 80 does not even reach 60 percent.
And the costs of Xi’s zero-Covid strategy are enormous – economically, socially and increasingly politically. Resentment within Chinese society continues to grow, especially in Shanghai, where millions of citizens have been forced to endure massive restrictions for weeks. And the people have begun to voice their frustration in digital media. Besides countless small clips, complaints and comments, the video 四月之声 – “Voice of April” recently attracted attention (China.Table reported).
And so Xi suddenly finds himself in a tight spot. While the Communist Party promises prosperity and constant growth, its policy of massive restrictions poses an increasing danger to the country’s economic development.
However, Klaus Muehlhahn still does not believe that the policy will change. “On the one hand, the Chinese government fears that a course correction would be interpreted as an admission of mistakes and errors – after all, the government has spent almost two years describing the zero-covid line as superior and without alternatives,” explains the sinologist and president of Zeppelin University in Friedrichshafen in an interview with China.Table. “And second, the government is afraid that China’s fragile and vulnerable healthcare system could easily be overwhelmed.”
The anger of the Chinese still only manifests itself in the digital world. And the problems are still mainly local. But even without a major policy change, someone will have to pay for the mistakes committed by politics – especially the local cadres. So far, Beijing has dropped more than 4,000 local politicians for a wide variety of Corona outbreaks – starting with Wuhan Party Chief Ma Guoqiang 马国强. High on the current list of penitents is likely to be Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng 龚正, who will probably lose his post after the lockdown. In chess, this would be dismissed as a simple pawn sacrifice.
But the problems have long since reached the highest level surrounding Xi Jinping. The Head of the Communist Party in Shanghai is none other than Li Qiang 李强. Li is a member of the 19th Politburo. He is rumored to be the successor to Premier Li Keqiang – and is considered a close confidant of Xi. When Li was promoted in 2017, Xi had managed to fill the four key posts in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing with acquaintances. In the fall, Xi wanted his confidant Li to join the powerful Politburo Standing Committee. Will Xi manage to promote his buddy despite the Covid debacle, or will he have to drop him to distance himself from the mistakes made in Shanghai?
At any rate, the upcoming party congress in the fall puts Xi under enormous pressure. While the political leadership is supposed to be replaced in rotation, Xi wants to remain at the helm and serve a third term. The reputation of the state leader as a strong decision-maker who is always right must not be tarnished by a change of Covid policy in such a process.
On the other hand, the upcoming party congress also has a disciplining effect on the CCP – personally, because various cadres hope to be promoted by Xi Jinping; and institutionally, because the Party must display unity and cohesion in this uncertain period of change.
Therefore, sinologist Muehlhahn does not see any direct threat to Xi. “In the Chinese system, the president is supported under all circumstances.” Propaganda will do everything it can to portray Xi’s policies as a success – even if the problems are plain to see. “Even the inner-party opposition will not use Covid to attack Xi, because the zero-Covid policy was, particularly in the beginning, uncontroversial in the Party,” Muehlhahn says.
But a lockdown in Beijing would ultimately turn zero Covid into a political problem. And if a potential lockdown in the capital were to be as chaotic as in Shanghai, the consequences would be unpredictable. “This explosive combination could then become a risk for Xi Jinping himself,” warns China expert Sandschneider.
After all, at the national level, there is currently only one person of critical importance in China’s politics: Xi Jinping. It is this personalization that allowed him to shine as the world’s most successful Covid fighter at the advent of the pandemic. But now, as the zero-Covid threatens to fail, this personalization makes it almost impossible for Xi to correct his strategy. “Xi has suddenly become a prisoner of his own policies,” Sandschneider concludes.
Xi has set the course for his countrymen: Persistence is victory – 坚持就是胜利 (jiānchí jiùshì shènglì). This is not a good prospect for the people of Beijing. And troubled days lie ahead for local cadres as well. Because while Xi may be a prisoner of his policies, others are trapped in the prison of his zero-Covid strategy.
In January, the Chinese Foreign Ministry experienced a “severe shock”, according to spokesman Zhao Lijian. Slovenia’s Prime Minister Janez Janša had called Taiwan a “democratic country” and announced closer relations with Taipei. The right-wing populist also did not rule out the opening of a trade representation called the “Taiwan Office” (China.Table reported). Whether the plan is still relevant in Ljubljana is, however, doubtful: Janša has been voted out of office – and with the new government under political newcomer Robert Golob, the signs of China policy in the central European EU state once again point more to economic cooperation than confrontation.
Two weeks ago, Prime Minister-designate Golob and his oppositional Freedom Movement (Gibanje Svoboda, GS) received 34 percent of the votes, compared to only 24 percent for Janša. Previously, the green-liberal Golob had been known to Slovenians only as a businessman and chairman of the partly state-owned energy company Gen-I. He had been appointed to this post, presumably at the request of the government. Sacked from this post, presumably at Janša’s behest, political newcomer Golob founded the GS party.
The 55-year-old’s success came as no surprise. “The Freedom Movement had large support already in pre-election polls,” Slovenian political scientist and China expert Nina Pejič told China.Table. Under incumbent Janša, independent media and independent journalists came under increasing pressure. Critics also accused Janša, who has also been dubbed the “Donald Trump of the Karawanks,” of jeopardizing the independence of the justice system.
The Freedom Movement is now set to change that, which was the main theme of Golob’s election campaign. But GS’s foreign policy plans remained relatively unclear: “[The] Freedom Movement did not state clearly what its position on China would be,” says Pejič.
Coalition negotiations between the GS and the Social Democrats have been ongoing since last week. When it comes to filling the most important foreign policy post, the focus could now primarily lie on economic ties with the People’s Republic, as Marta Kos is currently being considered for the post of foreign minister. Kos had already represented Slovenia as ambassador to Switzerland and Germany, and resigned in 2020 over differences about the foreign policy positions of the Janša government. “She seems to be held in high regard, especially by the business sector,” Pejič said. A confrontational course toward Beijing is less likely with Kos.
Pejič assumes, however, that Ljubljana will certainly support the thrust of the EU’s policy toward China, for example concerning demands for respect for human rights. According to the China expert, there could also be support for one particular project: the CAI investment agreement between the EU and China. This is because Golob’s party is strongly focused on the competitiveness of Slovenia and the EU, according to Pejič. Economic relations with Taiwan are also expected to be further improved – but with a different approach than that of the previous government: “I believe that we can also expect diversification: open doors wide open for doing business with Taipei, without the political engagement with it.”
A stronger focus on economic ties between Slovenia and China is also expected by Tinkara Godec. The Slovenian researches EU-China relations at the University of Vienna. During the election campaign, ties between the two countries did not play any role, Godec said. “China is not mentioned either on the freedom movement’s Twitter account or in the election manifesto.” China also did not receive any major mention from any of the parties during the TV debates.
After the political turmoil over Janša’s statement on Taiwan in January, she had expected that China would become a more prominent issue. “That was ultimately not a point of interest for the parties during the election campaign.”
In the past, Janša openly criticized human rights violations in the People’s Republic and warned against excessive economic dependence. Whether the new government will continue this remains to be seen, Godec said. The parties that now form the governing coalition like to describe themselves as the protectors of democracy in Slovenia. “It will be exciting to see whether they will also adopt this attitude in international politics and not only have an economic focus,” said Godec.
Sinolytics is a European consulting and analysis company specializing in China. It advises European companies on their strategic orientation and concrete business activities in the People’s Republic.
Daniel Roetting has been living and working in Beijing for ten years. When he moved to the Chinese capital in 2012, he started there as CEO and partner of the trading company Plix Trading Co., Ltd. Two years earlier, he was already the European representative of this company. His main task in Beijing is to market items from the high-end, luxury living sector. “At that time, I only knew China as a tourist,” the 53-year-old recalls.
But how did the German end up in China? “It all started with my mother’s late Sinology studies and her curiosity about the people and their culture.” Initially, Marlis Roetting went to China as a tour guide. This was followed by an unexpected job offer from Moevenpick Hotels to staff a new five-star hotel. Today’s honorary Hamburg ambassador later co-founded the German Chamber of Commerce in China, among other things.
Daniel Roetting stayed behind in Hamburg with his two sisters and his father. His interest in the country and its people grew with each visit to China. He first studied law at the University of Hamburg for three years. Afterward, he decided to study at the University of Music and Theatre in Hamburg. For more than 15 years his commitment as an international stage director, orchestra and cultural manager took him to Italy, Spain, Austria, Japan and also China.
When his father unexpectedly passed away, the three siblings were still in apprenticeship. Marlis Roetting had built up her life’s work in Beijing and stayed there. Her son, who had shifted his focus to the cultural-commercial field quite early on and was also enthusiastic about design and architecture, found his new calling in Beijing with the job as CEO and partner of Plix Trading: “For me, it doesn’t make much difference whether I sell an orchestra or a product. The main thing is that you have to master the product that you want to bring to the world.”
The product in question is the Hinterseer Parquet, which is highly valued on the Asian market for its quality and zero pollutants. The manufacturer ships the high-quality wood flooring to China via the port of Hamburg. On-site, the Plix Trading team takes care of sales to the various buyers: designers, architects, industrial partners and retail. A second mainstay of the company is trade consulting: “We advise companies on setting up their own branches in China,” says Daniel Roetting. This begins with the search for a suitable Chinese brand name and extends to tracking down the most relevant initial business contact.
“Yue Da,” Daniel Roetting’s Chinese name, considers himself a European through and through. The cornerstone for business success? “We Europeans have to be honest with the Chinese, appear clear, open and, above all, confident,” Roettting is convinced. “Then we will be taken seriously.” Another door opener is the Chinese language. It is also essential to think in longer terms. “Arriving in China and building something up takes time.” Daniel Roetting has long since arrived: he found his partner in Beijing. He volunteers at the German Protestant Church and in the Kantorei. Daniela Krause
Using a magnifying glass against Covid-19? Customs officials inspect herbs from Vietnam. Chinese authorities assume that the Coronavirus is also introduced through imported goods – hence the protective suits.
