Table.Briefing: China (English)

Xi’s cozy visit with Orbán + Gloomy mood among European companies + Chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile criticizes Scholz

Dear reader,

Xi Jinping could hardly imagine a more splendid reception, and right in the heart of Europe: Hungary welcomed China’s President in the courtyard of Buda Castle with the highest honors imaginable. Even more importantly, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán invoked the close friendship with Xi. In turn, Xi made it clear that he expects significant improvements in the relationship between the European Union and China, especially with Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the latter half of the year.

However, the EU does not function quite as Xi apparently imagines. Its hallmark: disunity. And even an EU Council President Orbán will be able to change little about this. For once, this is a good thing: Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European, as Michael Radunski analyzes. And Orbán seems all too recklessly willing to be exploited for this purpose.

Emmanuel Macron demonstrates a different approach, having met with Xi earlier this week in Paris: Just before the visit of the Chinese President, Macron received the chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Penpa Tsering. We remember: Angela Merkel was shunned by China for a long time after she met with the Dalai Lama in 2007.

In an interview with China.Table, Penpa Tsering calls for such courage from Olaf Scholz. “The world cannot simply watch as peoples are wiped out by the Chinese government for economic interests,” says Tsering. Read why he believes that Europe’s perceived weakness is an illusion and that the EU could dare to do much more, in the interview with Marcel Grzanna.

Your
Felix Lee
Image of Felix  Lee

Feature

Xi in Hungary: How Hungary acts as China’s asset within the EU

Upon arriving at Budapest Airport on Wednesday evening, Xi Jinping was greeted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

The visit of the Chinese President to Hungary was marked by assurances of mutual friendship: “The relations between China and Hungary are now better than ever in history,” said Xi Jinping on Thursday. Earlier, he had declared during a meeting with Hungarian President Tamas Sulyok that his country was ready to elevate bilateral relations with Hungary to a high level. Looking forward to Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the second half of the year, he also expressed hope that this would be an opportunity to improve relations between the European Union and China.

Hungary is the last stop on Xi Jinping’s European tour – and the most important one. After visits to France and Serbia, China’s President finally met his close ally: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Beijing’s calculation is simple and fully effective: The People’s Republic invests billions in Hungary and in return gains maximum political influence within the European Union. The workings of this are evident in the decisions made.

Potential decisions/agreements – and their implications:

  • Construction of a new factory by the Chinese automaker Great Wall Motor in southern Hungary. Last month in China, Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó hinted at this when he stated that Chinese investments amounting to six trillion Hungarian forints (15.3 billion euros) were planned. The factory in the southern city of Pécs could create 25,000 new jobs. Reports suggest Xi Jinping and Viktor Orbán will travel to Pécs to officially announce this major project.

This fits the trend. Chinese direct investments in the EV sector have recently soared – with a specific focus on Hungary. In 2022, CATL invested 6.7 billion euros in building a Gigafactory in Debrecen. This was followed by Chinese EV manufacturer BYD, which recently announced the construction of its first European production facility – in Szeged, Hungary. The costs amount to approximately five billion euros, creating about 8,000 to 9,000 new jobs. Now, the Great Wall Motor factory in Pécs is on the list.

Behind these billion-euro investments lies another strategic move: With such large production sites within the EU, Beijing has a solid countermeasure should the EU Commission decide in mid-July to impose anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China.

  • Discussions are also expected on the expansion of the 166-kilometer-long railway line between Budapest and the southern border with Serbia. The project has faced issues: The Chinese manufacturer apparently cannot meet the standards of the European-wide standardized train control system, ETCS. Additionally, construction costs have skyrocketed, and the originally estimated 2.1 billion euro project now requires additional funding.

China’s ambitions extend far beyond a simple railway line between the capitals of Serbia and Hungary. In February, Greece announced its intention to join the project. The railway line is set to become the main transport route for Chinese and Asian goods arriving in Europe by sea. The pieces fit together strategically: The Port of Piraeus is already predominantly under Chinese control.

No money from Brussels, but funding from Beijing

Xi Jinping achieves several goals with these projects: Firstly, he gives new momentum to his stalled “Belt and Road” initiative. Secondly, he pursues strategic objectives that go beyond individual projects. And lastly, Xi supports his partner Viktor Orbán, who urgently needs economic successes, especially at times when the EU is scrutinizing its payments to Hungary – keyword rule of law. Chinese investments worth billions are highly welcome.

Another point that causes deep resentment in Europe is the security cooperation between Hungary and China: Concerns range from secret Chinese police stations to potential Chinese access to EU databases.

Hungary as the first and last EU member in Xi’s prestige project

Hungary was the first EU state to join Xi’s flagship project in 2015. After Italy withdrew last year, it is now again the only EU country participating in the BRI. Thus, Orbán was also the only EU head of state to attend the third BRI summit in Beijing last October, where he encouraged more Chinese companies to invest in Hungary. Incidentally, to attend the event, Orbán missed an extraordinary video conference of EU heads of state, which was about the Hamas attacks against Israel.

The Budapest newspaper “Nepszava” also views this development critically. In a commentary on Tuesday, it stated: “Hungary’s government is entering into (infrastructure) investments financed with Chinese loans that may never pay off, solely to spite Brussels.”

Hungary as China’s wedge in the EU

And here lies the major problem for Europe. Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European. Hungary plays a crucial role in this. Under Orbán, the country has become a Chinese asset within the EU, which Beijing now needs more than ever.

The general mood in Europe towards the People’s Republic has considerably soured. Risk reduction is the order of the day – as evidenced by the clear words from EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Xi Jinping earlier this week. Von der Leyen announced in Paris that Europe would not hesitate to “make tough decisions to protect its economy and security”.

About 60 percent of vetoes from Hungary

In this context, Orbán is expected to help dilute overly critical EU policies – or completely block them if necessary. “The Hungarian government is China’s last true friend in the entire EU,” judges Tamas Matura, a China expert and professor at Corvinus University in Budapest. “For the Chinese, it is now very important to establish themselves in a country within the EU borders that is friendly towards the Chinese political system.”

That this is successfully happening is shown by the past: Hungary has vetoed several proposals at the EU level that would have condemned China for human rights violations or in relation to Hong Kong or Taiwan. According to research by the Budapest online portal valaszonline.hu, about 60 percent of the vetoes against Russia or China in the past six years came from Hungary. Understandably, Xi is looking forward to Hungary’s EU presidency.

  • Neue Seidenstraße

Business climate: Why EU companies in China are more pessimistic than ever

Elektroauto E-Auto
Too many EVs: China’s manufacturers have created overcapacity, burdening the global automotive industry.

A record number of European companies view their prospects in the Chinese market as worse than ever before. According to the annual business climate survey released on Friday by the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, 23 percent of the companies surveyed expressed pessimism about their growth prospects for the next two years – more than ever before. In last year’s survey, only 9 percent had expressed pessimism.

Meanwhile, the number of companies that are positive about their growth prospects has dropped from 55 percent last year to 32 percent, the lowest value to date.

Many companies had dreamed of a massive boom following the COVID-19 pandemic last year, but they have now been brought back down to reality. The biggest problems for companies, listed in order, are:

  • China’s economic slowdown
  • the weak global economy
  • the conflict between the USA and China
  • general geopolitical tensions
  • tougher competition with Chinese private companies

The past year was marked by “growing uncertainty” for European companies in China, according to the Chamber. Although China’s reopening after the pandemic initially triggered a “sense of optimism”, “deep structural problems” such as weak domestic demand, high debt levels among local governments, and ongoing challenges in the real estate sector quickly clouded prospects again. Company confidence was further weakened by contradictory messages from the Chinese government.

Less revenue, less investment

The message that this complex situation is challenging for companies runs like a red thread through the Chamber’s publication.

  • Over two-thirds of respondents (68 percent, +4 percentage points compared to last year) report that doing business in China became more difficult in 2023. This is the highest percentage ever recorded. Only six percent said it became easier.
  • Only 15 percent of respondents still consider China a top destination for current and future investments, also the lowest level so far.
  • 42 percent of companies plan to expand their current operations in China next year, also a record low (-6 percentage points compared to last year).
  • About two-fifths of respondents (39 percent, -2 percentage points compared to last year) report revenue increases in 2023, also a record low.
  • More than half of the respondents (52 percent, +11 percentage points compared to last year) plan cost reductions, with a quarter of those coming through staff reductions, which will increase pressure on the already strained labor market.

Overcapacity becoming a ‘significant problem’

The currently hotly debated issue of overcapacity is also highlighted in the Chamber survey. While China denies that these exist and claims they are only used by the West as a pretext to impose protectionist trade measures, EU companies paint a different picture.

Overcapacity has become a “significant problem” with the decline in domestic consumption. Overall, 36 percent of respondents observed overcapacity in their respective industries. An additional 10 percent expect to see it in the near future. The highest proportion of respondents (69 percent) reported overcapacity in construction and engineering. The automotive industry had the second highest proportion with 62 percent.

Three-fifths of respondents who reported overcapacity in their sector cited excessive investments in domestic production as the main cause. Half of them pointed to overcapacity due to insufficient domestic demand, and 34 percent cited a lack of foreign demand as another important reason.

No progress on regulatory obstacles

As economic challenges intensified, regulatory obstacles remained high in 2023. Only 16 percent of respondents expect a reduction in regulatory barriers – also the lowest value ever. The Chamber detailed the problems of specific industries:

  • In construction, domestic companies continue to have clear advantages in winning contracts. This has been exacerbated by the real estate crisis.
  • The business environment for medical technology companies also became more difficult last year, partly due to lengthy approval procedures. Chinese partners sometimes did not meet contractually agreed purchase quantities, demanded additional discounts or delayed payments.
  • In the legal sector, compliance requirements are increasingly becoming a problem. Foreign law firms, for example, must present two foreign representatives, which is difficult during times of declining cross-border investments and projects between the EU and China.

Decoupling from headquarters

The Chamber also pointed out an issue that has received little attention so far. When it comes to the right strategy for China, there is an increasing “decoupling” between a company’s Chinese branch and its headquarters in Europe. This is “a trend that should be closely monitored,” according to the Chamber. Even if the branch in China sees opportunities for expansion, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain approvals as the headquarters increasingly misunderstands the actual conditions on the ground.

  • Deutschland
  • EU-Handelskammer
Translation missing.

Interview

‘China practices economic colonialism’

Sikyong Penpa Tsering / Foto: Tanja Brückner
Penpa Tsering, chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile.

Sikyong Penpa Tsering, as the political leader of the Tibetans, you met personally with France’s President Emmanuel Macron just days before Xi Jinping’s arrival in Paris. What were you able to discuss with him?

Since my election three years ago, I have visited 24 countries in hopes of improving the situation for my people. As always, in political meetings, my goal is to work with our counterparts to find common strategies to end the cultural genocide against our people and other human rights abuses by the Chinese government as soon as possible.

What is your interim assessment after all these travels?

Other states should take a cue from President Macron, who did not avoid meeting with me out of concern for Chinese irritation. Unfortunately, I have found that at higher political levels, there is often a reluctance.

You were also in Berlin a few days ago for routine discussions, initiated by former Federal Minister and CDU politician Christian Schwarz-Schilling. What did you take away from Germany?

Honestly, I am not very pleased with how Germany positions itself. I am not even sure who is steering German foreign policy – the foreign ministry or the chancellery. During his trip to China, Chancellor Scholz left the impression that Germany prioritizes its economic interests at any cost.

Scholz said he addressed human rights issues.

I’ve heard that too. But is he really committed to advocating for them? I fear not. It is no secret what is happening in Tibet or East Turkestan. The world cannot just watch as peoples are decimated by the Chinese government for economic interests.

Do you sense a fear of Beijing in foreign governments?

I wouldn’t go that far. But almost everywhere I go, I encounter concerns that economic relations with China could be damaged.

You don’t accept that as a valid argument?

No, because it completely overlooks how vulnerable and how urgently China depends on Europe. However, China has managed to convince Europeans that they are dependent on China. Yet dependency is not a one-way street. Europe is not leveraging its strengths. And that is the self-inflicted dilemma that has arisen. China respects no one who does not stand up for their own values.

What do you expect from Western governments?

We have never demanded a decoupling. But it must be clear to all actors that the longer China is allowed to grow geopolitically stronger through massive trade surpluses that provide the funds to do everything the world would like to prevent.

For example?

Purchasing large quantities of Russian oil, which finances the war in Ukraine. Or billion-dollar investments in the Global South as part of the “Belt & Road” initiative, which traps many countries in debt and increasingly provokes Beijing’s political influence on these states.

In the Global South, many governments credit China with at least being willing to provide substantial aid.

China uses the history of Western colonialism to position itself as a supposed helper in need. But in reality, it is economic colonialism that China is practicing.

Sikyong Penpa Tsering is the democratically elected chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Penpa was one of the longest-serving members of the Tibetan exile parliament in Dharamsala, North India, which he led as the Speaker of the House during the last two election terms from 1996 to 2016. Penpa also served as the representative of the Dalai Lama and the exile government in North America. He has testified before the US Congress and parliaments worldwide.

  • Human Rights
  • Olaf Scholz
  • Tibet

Events

May 13, 12 p.m.
Table.live briefing: Adaptive learning environments: AI as a new opportunity for learning support? More

May 13, 5 p.m.
Confucius Institute at the FU Berlin, reading: Yan Lianke: The day the sun died More

May 14, 08:30 a.m. (2:30 p.m. Beijing time)
Dezan Shira, online and in Tianjin: GCC Knowledge Hub: China’s New Cross-Border Data Transfer Rules: Regulatory Highlights and Insights More

May 14, 1:30 p.m.
Sino-German Business Association, Seminar (in Chinese): Successful Business in Germany | Employee motivation and empowerment: key factors for business success in Germany More

May 15, 3 p.m.
Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin, vernissage: Art in dialog: Chinese Artists in Berlin More

May 15, 6:30 p.m.
Confucius Institute Ruhr, lecture by Hannes Jedeck: The Berliner Philharmoniker’s China tours as part of German cultural diplomacy between 1979 and 2018 More

May 15, 7 p.m., Mitsubishi Electric Halle in Düsseldorf
Comedy: DeYunShe talk show with Guo Degang and Yu Qian More

May 16, 08:30 a.m. (3:30 Beijing time)
China Network Baden-Württemberg, CNBW Business Talk: Staying on course in stormy times – Interview with Jens Hildebrandt More

May 16, 10 a.m. ( 4 p.m. Beijing time)
EU-SME-Centre, online and in Beijing: Navigating Cross-Border Data Rules: A Practical Guide for EU SMEs More

May 16, 4 p.m.
China Network Baden-Württemberg, Berlin-Nähkästle with Wolfgang Hirn: The tech war between China and the USA – and where is Europe? More

May 20, 5:30 p.m. London time
SOAS, presentation by Stephen Vines (on site in London): Hong Kong pays the price of dissent – was it worth it? More

May 24-26
Hefei Trade Fair: China International Wine & Food Fair More

News

Global trade: Why China is no longer Germany’s top trading partner

China is no longer the most important trading partner for Germany. In the first quarter, the USA surpassed the People’s Republic, according to calculations by the news agency Reuters based on official data from the Federal Statistical Office. The trade volume with the United States – including both exports and imports – from January to March amounted to just over 63 billion euros. Trade with China was significantly lower at nearly 60 billion euros. In 2023, the People’s Republic remained the number one trading partner for the eighth consecutive year, but with only a few hundred million euros ahead of the USA.

According to the Cologne-based German Economic Institute (IW), this development is also due to a geopolitically motivated reorientation. “Moving away from the systemic rival China and towards the transatlantic partner,” said IW expert Juergen Matthes. This is likely also influenced by the poorer-than-expected performance of the Chinese economy, while the US economy has tended to exceed expectations.

“The German exports to the USA have continued to rise due to the robust economy in the United States, while both exports to and imports from China have decreased,” explained Commerzbank economist Vincent Stamer about the change in leadership in the first quarter.

Structural reasons also slowed trade between Germany and the People’s Republic. “China has climbed the value chain ladder and is increasingly manufacturing more complex goods itself, which it used to import from Germany,” said Stamer. “Moreover, German companies are increasingly producing locally instead of exporting goods from Germany to China.” Geopolitical tensions – such as the dispute over Taiwan claimed by Beijing – could further reinforce this trend.

The Foreign Trade Association (BGA) also sees a change in the ranking of key markets. “Whether this change is sustainable is currently uncertain,” said BGA President Dirk Jandura to Reuters. If the former US President Donald Trump were to defeat incumbent Joe Biden in the November elections, new tariffs on European goods could threaten as they did during the Republican’s first term.

Overall, China’s foreign trade increased in April. Exports increased by 1.5 percent compared to the same month last year. Imports grew by 8.4 percent. rtr/flee

  • Geopolitik

Exports to Russia: Are US sanctions taking effect after all?

Chinese exports to Russia may have plummeted again in April, possibly due to US sanctions. Calculated in the local currency Yuan, they fell by 10.8 percent compared to the same month last year, according to data released by the customs authority on Thursday. In March, there had even been a decline of 13 percent. Last year, exports to Russia had seen double-digit growth.

The US has imposed a series of sanctions on Russia since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years ago. Now, there is the threat of extending these measures to banks in China. This has already deterred the local financial sector, which also finances non-military trade between China and Russia. Seven trade and banking insiders familiar with the situation told the news agency Reuters that this poses an increasing problem, especially for small Chinese exporters.

Despite the recent plunge in exports, bilateral trade between China and Russia in the first four months of this year has overall grown by 7.9 percent compared to the same period last year, amounting to 543.7 billion Yuan (70 billion Euros). “China is the most important alternative source country for Russia for sanctioned products,” according to a recently published study. It states that 61 percent of all sanctioned products now come from the People’s Republic. In 2021, this share was only at 35 percent. rtr

  • Geopolitik

Column

China Perspective: Why Xi finds a new word for friendship with Serbia

When Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participated in the One Belt One Road Forum in Beijing last October, his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping used an unusual Chinese word to describe bileteral relations: “iron-rod friendship 铁杆友谊”. With this, Serbia became the second country carrying the label in Xi’s country list. The first is Pakistan.  

In the run-up to his visit to Belgrade, Xi wrote for Serbian media and employed the word again.  

铁杆 Iron-rod is a colloquial word used when, for example, two macho men boast about their bromance or used to describe a die-hard fan’s loyalty to a pop star.   

It is informal, inelegant, but has the unmistakable connotation of (often exaggerated) affection. This simple word distinguished Serbia and Pakistan from China’s other allies such as Russia and North Korea. 

Standing out from usual Chinese diplomatic jargons 

China has its own perplexing terminology for defining its ties with different countries. 

It has “strategic co-operative partnerships”, preceded by various descriptions, with dozens of countries; it has an “all-weather strategic co-operative partnership” with Pakistan; a “traditional friendly co-operative relationship” with North Korea; and a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with Russia.  

When feeling the need, Chinese officials would also give further prefix or suffix to the definition, for example, “sealed in blood” for China-North Korea alliance, referring to their joint fight in the Korea War; and the more famous “no-limit” prefix for China-Russia rapport.  

Those are all in formal language, making the newly found “iron rod” expression exceptional. 

The choice of words tells a piece of truth

Despite the claims of friendship and co-operation in practice, mistrust, contempt, even hatred all exist in Sino-Russian and Sino-North Korea relations. They are more alliances of convenience in face of the same enemy. The element of common adversary can also be found in China’s ties with Pakistan (India) and with Serbia (the West), but they are generally not troubled by the other toxic feelings. 

China-Serbia relations dated back to the times of Mao and Tito, when China and Yugoslavia were both rebels against the Soviet Union. The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 provided the two countries with another piece of collective memory. In light of Serbia’s increasingly problematic relationship with the EU, China’s interest in consolidating its ties with Serbia (and Hungary) reflected Xi’s entrenched intention to resist the pressure from the EU. The embassy saga was not often mentioned in China in recent years. So Xi’s decision to conjure up the episode’s memory now is a message to both the domestic audience and the US.  

Xi’s art of expression

It is not the first time Xi’s extraordinary choice of words raised eyebrows. Xi loves to use “grassroot” vocabulary apparently to project a down-to-earth image. But his critics said this is the style of language that he is most familiar with, considering his poor education background and his years in the countryside in his youth. His talking style makes a sharp contrast to Jiang Zemin, one of his predecessors, who would grasp every opportunity to show he was able to speak with a literary flair. 

In his speeches to the military officers, Xi repeated urged them to have 血性 xue xing, meaning integrity and being unyielding, a word mostly used in folktales to describe masculine characters. 

In his New Year address in 2017, he called on the entire nation to “roll up our sleeves and work with added energy 撸起袖子加油干”, a gung-ho slogan typically heard in factory workshops and countryside production brigades in the 1970s.  

Occasionally, Xi also wants to give the impression that he is very familiar with classical literature. When lecturing Party and government officials last year, he often told them to bear in mind 国之大者 Guo Zhi Da Zhe, which sounded like an classic saying meaning the big tasks of the country, but actually not found in any Chinese classics. 

  • Communication
  • Propaganda
  • Serbia
  • Xi Jinping

Executive Moves

Xu Feihong has been appointed China’s new ambassador to India. The 60-year-old was previously ambassador to Afghanistan and Romania. The appointment was delayed by 18 months after relations between the two countries deteriorated due to the military conflict in eastern Ladakh.

Ai Xiaoming becomes the new President of Changan Ford. Ai has more than 20 years of experience in the manufacturing and consumer electronics industry in China. Before joining Ford China, Ai was Senior Director at Alvarez & Marsal in Shanghai and CEO of GiantKONE Elevator.

Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

Dessert

To commemorate “World Book Day”, the Chinese milk tea brand Lelecha 乐乐茶 printed an icon on the cups of their “Smoky Oolong”: Lu Xun, one of China’s most significant writers. However, the marketing campaign backfired. Online users debated that the use of the word “smoky” was disrespectful since Lu Xun had died from the consequences of excessive cigarette consumption. Others criticized that the Marxist was being misused as a capitalist brand ambassador. A great-grandson of the author, who passed away in 1936, sued on behalf of the Lu Xun Cultural Foundation for the unauthorized use of Lu Xun’s likeness. Lelecha apologized in an open letter: They had merely intended to inspire young Chinese to read.

China.Table editorial team

CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

Licenses:
    Dear reader,

    Xi Jinping could hardly imagine a more splendid reception, and right in the heart of Europe: Hungary welcomed China’s President in the courtyard of Buda Castle with the highest honors imaginable. Even more importantly, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán invoked the close friendship with Xi. In turn, Xi made it clear that he expects significant improvements in the relationship between the European Union and China, especially with Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the latter half of the year.

    However, the EU does not function quite as Xi apparently imagines. Its hallmark: disunity. And even an EU Council President Orbán will be able to change little about this. For once, this is a good thing: Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European, as Michael Radunski analyzes. And Orbán seems all too recklessly willing to be exploited for this purpose.

    Emmanuel Macron demonstrates a different approach, having met with Xi earlier this week in Paris: Just before the visit of the Chinese President, Macron received the chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Penpa Tsering. We remember: Angela Merkel was shunned by China for a long time after she met with the Dalai Lama in 2007.

    In an interview with China.Table, Penpa Tsering calls for such courage from Olaf Scholz. “The world cannot simply watch as peoples are wiped out by the Chinese government for economic interests,” says Tsering. Read why he believes that Europe’s perceived weakness is an illusion and that the EU could dare to do much more, in the interview with Marcel Grzanna.

    Your
    Felix Lee
    Image of Felix  Lee

    Feature

    Xi in Hungary: How Hungary acts as China’s asset within the EU

    Upon arriving at Budapest Airport on Wednesday evening, Xi Jinping was greeted by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

    The visit of the Chinese President to Hungary was marked by assurances of mutual friendship: “The relations between China and Hungary are now better than ever in history,” said Xi Jinping on Thursday. Earlier, he had declared during a meeting with Hungarian President Tamas Sulyok that his country was ready to elevate bilateral relations with Hungary to a high level. Looking forward to Hungary taking over the EU Council Presidency in the second half of the year, he also expressed hope that this would be an opportunity to improve relations between the European Union and China.

    Hungary is the last stop on Xi Jinping’s European tour – and the most important one. After visits to France and Serbia, China’s President finally met his close ally: Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Beijing’s calculation is simple and fully effective: The People’s Republic invests billions in Hungary and in return gains maximum political influence within the European Union. The workings of this are evident in the decisions made.

    Potential decisions/agreements – and their implications:

    • Construction of a new factory by the Chinese automaker Great Wall Motor in southern Hungary. Last month in China, Hungary’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó hinted at this when he stated that Chinese investments amounting to six trillion Hungarian forints (15.3 billion euros) were planned. The factory in the southern city of Pécs could create 25,000 new jobs. Reports suggest Xi Jinping and Viktor Orbán will travel to Pécs to officially announce this major project.

    This fits the trend. Chinese direct investments in the EV sector have recently soared – with a specific focus on Hungary. In 2022, CATL invested 6.7 billion euros in building a Gigafactory in Debrecen. This was followed by Chinese EV manufacturer BYD, which recently announced the construction of its first European production facility – in Szeged, Hungary. The costs amount to approximately five billion euros, creating about 8,000 to 9,000 new jobs. Now, the Great Wall Motor factory in Pécs is on the list.

    Behind these billion-euro investments lies another strategic move: With such large production sites within the EU, Beijing has a solid countermeasure should the EU Commission decide in mid-July to impose anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China.

    • Discussions are also expected on the expansion of the 166-kilometer-long railway line between Budapest and the southern border with Serbia. The project has faced issues: The Chinese manufacturer apparently cannot meet the standards of the European-wide standardized train control system, ETCS. Additionally, construction costs have skyrocketed, and the originally estimated 2.1 billion euro project now requires additional funding.

    China’s ambitions extend far beyond a simple railway line between the capitals of Serbia and Hungary. In February, Greece announced its intention to join the project. The railway line is set to become the main transport route for Chinese and Asian goods arriving in Europe by sea. The pieces fit together strategically: The Port of Piraeus is already predominantly under Chinese control.

    No money from Brussels, but funding from Beijing

    Xi Jinping achieves several goals with these projects: Firstly, he gives new momentum to his stalled “Belt and Road” initiative. Secondly, he pursues strategic objectives that go beyond individual projects. And lastly, Xi supports his partner Viktor Orbán, who urgently needs economic successes, especially at times when the EU is scrutinizing its payments to Hungary – keyword rule of law. Chinese investments worth billions are highly welcome.

    Another point that causes deep resentment in Europe is the security cooperation between Hungary and China: Concerns range from secret Chinese police stations to potential Chinese access to EU databases.

    Hungary as the first and last EU member in Xi’s prestige project

    Hungary was the first EU state to join Xi’s flagship project in 2015. After Italy withdrew last year, it is now again the only EU country participating in the BRI. Thus, Orbán was also the only EU head of state to attend the third BRI summit in Beijing last October, where he encouraged more Chinese companies to invest in Hungary. Incidentally, to attend the event, Orbán missed an extraordinary video conference of EU heads of state, which was about the Hamas attacks against Israel.

    The Budapest newspaper “Nepszava” also views this development critically. In a commentary on Tuesday, it stated: “Hungary’s government is entering into (infrastructure) investments financed with Chinese loans that may never pay off, solely to spite Brussels.”

    Hungary as China’s wedge in the EU

    And here lies the major problem for Europe. Xi’s visit is fundamentally anti-European. Hungary plays a crucial role in this. Under Orbán, the country has become a Chinese asset within the EU, which Beijing now needs more than ever.

    The general mood in Europe towards the People’s Republic has considerably soured. Risk reduction is the order of the day – as evidenced by the clear words from EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Xi Jinping earlier this week. Von der Leyen announced in Paris that Europe would not hesitate to “make tough decisions to protect its economy and security”.

    About 60 percent of vetoes from Hungary

    In this context, Orbán is expected to help dilute overly critical EU policies – or completely block them if necessary. “The Hungarian government is China’s last true friend in the entire EU,” judges Tamas Matura, a China expert and professor at Corvinus University in Budapest. “For the Chinese, it is now very important to establish themselves in a country within the EU borders that is friendly towards the Chinese political system.”

    That this is successfully happening is shown by the past: Hungary has vetoed several proposals at the EU level that would have condemned China for human rights violations or in relation to Hong Kong or Taiwan. According to research by the Budapest online portal valaszonline.hu, about 60 percent of the vetoes against Russia or China in the past six years came from Hungary. Understandably, Xi is looking forward to Hungary’s EU presidency.

    • Neue Seidenstraße

    Business climate: Why EU companies in China are more pessimistic than ever

    Elektroauto E-Auto
    Too many EVs: China’s manufacturers have created overcapacity, burdening the global automotive industry.

    A record number of European companies view their prospects in the Chinese market as worse than ever before. According to the annual business climate survey released on Friday by the EU Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, 23 percent of the companies surveyed expressed pessimism about their growth prospects for the next two years – more than ever before. In last year’s survey, only 9 percent had expressed pessimism.

    Meanwhile, the number of companies that are positive about their growth prospects has dropped from 55 percent last year to 32 percent, the lowest value to date.

    Many companies had dreamed of a massive boom following the COVID-19 pandemic last year, but they have now been brought back down to reality. The biggest problems for companies, listed in order, are:

    • China’s economic slowdown
    • the weak global economy
    • the conflict between the USA and China
    • general geopolitical tensions
    • tougher competition with Chinese private companies

    The past year was marked by “growing uncertainty” for European companies in China, according to the Chamber. Although China’s reopening after the pandemic initially triggered a “sense of optimism”, “deep structural problems” such as weak domestic demand, high debt levels among local governments, and ongoing challenges in the real estate sector quickly clouded prospects again. Company confidence was further weakened by contradictory messages from the Chinese government.

    Less revenue, less investment

    The message that this complex situation is challenging for companies runs like a red thread through the Chamber’s publication.

    • Over two-thirds of respondents (68 percent, +4 percentage points compared to last year) report that doing business in China became more difficult in 2023. This is the highest percentage ever recorded. Only six percent said it became easier.
    • Only 15 percent of respondents still consider China a top destination for current and future investments, also the lowest level so far.
    • 42 percent of companies plan to expand their current operations in China next year, also a record low (-6 percentage points compared to last year).
    • About two-fifths of respondents (39 percent, -2 percentage points compared to last year) report revenue increases in 2023, also a record low.
    • More than half of the respondents (52 percent, +11 percentage points compared to last year) plan cost reductions, with a quarter of those coming through staff reductions, which will increase pressure on the already strained labor market.

    Overcapacity becoming a ‘significant problem’

    The currently hotly debated issue of overcapacity is also highlighted in the Chamber survey. While China denies that these exist and claims they are only used by the West as a pretext to impose protectionist trade measures, EU companies paint a different picture.

    Overcapacity has become a “significant problem” with the decline in domestic consumption. Overall, 36 percent of respondents observed overcapacity in their respective industries. An additional 10 percent expect to see it in the near future. The highest proportion of respondents (69 percent) reported overcapacity in construction and engineering. The automotive industry had the second highest proportion with 62 percent.

    Three-fifths of respondents who reported overcapacity in their sector cited excessive investments in domestic production as the main cause. Half of them pointed to overcapacity due to insufficient domestic demand, and 34 percent cited a lack of foreign demand as another important reason.

    No progress on regulatory obstacles

    As economic challenges intensified, regulatory obstacles remained high in 2023. Only 16 percent of respondents expect a reduction in regulatory barriers – also the lowest value ever. The Chamber detailed the problems of specific industries:

    • In construction, domestic companies continue to have clear advantages in winning contracts. This has been exacerbated by the real estate crisis.
    • The business environment for medical technology companies also became more difficult last year, partly due to lengthy approval procedures. Chinese partners sometimes did not meet contractually agreed purchase quantities, demanded additional discounts or delayed payments.
    • In the legal sector, compliance requirements are increasingly becoming a problem. Foreign law firms, for example, must present two foreign representatives, which is difficult during times of declining cross-border investments and projects between the EU and China.

    Decoupling from headquarters

    The Chamber also pointed out an issue that has received little attention so far. When it comes to the right strategy for China, there is an increasing “decoupling” between a company’s Chinese branch and its headquarters in Europe. This is “a trend that should be closely monitored,” according to the Chamber. Even if the branch in China sees opportunities for expansion, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain approvals as the headquarters increasingly misunderstands the actual conditions on the ground.

    • Deutschland
    • EU-Handelskammer
    Translation missing.

    Interview

    ‘China practices economic colonialism’

    Sikyong Penpa Tsering / Foto: Tanja Brückner
    Penpa Tsering, chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile.

    Sikyong Penpa Tsering, as the political leader of the Tibetans, you met personally with France’s President Emmanuel Macron just days before Xi Jinping’s arrival in Paris. What were you able to discuss with him?

    Since my election three years ago, I have visited 24 countries in hopes of improving the situation for my people. As always, in political meetings, my goal is to work with our counterparts to find common strategies to end the cultural genocide against our people and other human rights abuses by the Chinese government as soon as possible.

    What is your interim assessment after all these travels?

    Other states should take a cue from President Macron, who did not avoid meeting with me out of concern for Chinese irritation. Unfortunately, I have found that at higher political levels, there is often a reluctance.

    You were also in Berlin a few days ago for routine discussions, initiated by former Federal Minister and CDU politician Christian Schwarz-Schilling. What did you take away from Germany?

    Honestly, I am not very pleased with how Germany positions itself. I am not even sure who is steering German foreign policy – the foreign ministry or the chancellery. During his trip to China, Chancellor Scholz left the impression that Germany prioritizes its economic interests at any cost.

    Scholz said he addressed human rights issues.

    I’ve heard that too. But is he really committed to advocating for them? I fear not. It is no secret what is happening in Tibet or East Turkestan. The world cannot just watch as peoples are decimated by the Chinese government for economic interests.

    Do you sense a fear of Beijing in foreign governments?

    I wouldn’t go that far. But almost everywhere I go, I encounter concerns that economic relations with China could be damaged.

    You don’t accept that as a valid argument?

    No, because it completely overlooks how vulnerable and how urgently China depends on Europe. However, China has managed to convince Europeans that they are dependent on China. Yet dependency is not a one-way street. Europe is not leveraging its strengths. And that is the self-inflicted dilemma that has arisen. China respects no one who does not stand up for their own values.

    What do you expect from Western governments?

    We have never demanded a decoupling. But it must be clear to all actors that the longer China is allowed to grow geopolitically stronger through massive trade surpluses that provide the funds to do everything the world would like to prevent.

    For example?

    Purchasing large quantities of Russian oil, which finances the war in Ukraine. Or billion-dollar investments in the Global South as part of the “Belt & Road” initiative, which traps many countries in debt and increasingly provokes Beijing’s political influence on these states.

    In the Global South, many governments credit China with at least being willing to provide substantial aid.

    China uses the history of Western colonialism to position itself as a supposed helper in need. But in reality, it is economic colonialism that China is practicing.

    Sikyong Penpa Tsering is the democratically elected chairman of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Penpa was one of the longest-serving members of the Tibetan exile parliament in Dharamsala, North India, which he led as the Speaker of the House during the last two election terms from 1996 to 2016. Penpa also served as the representative of the Dalai Lama and the exile government in North America. He has testified before the US Congress and parliaments worldwide.

    • Human Rights
    • Olaf Scholz
    • Tibet

    Events

    May 13, 12 p.m.
    Table.live briefing: Adaptive learning environments: AI as a new opportunity for learning support? More

    May 13, 5 p.m.
    Confucius Institute at the FU Berlin, reading: Yan Lianke: The day the sun died More

    May 14, 08:30 a.m. (2:30 p.m. Beijing time)
    Dezan Shira, online and in Tianjin: GCC Knowledge Hub: China’s New Cross-Border Data Transfer Rules: Regulatory Highlights and Insights More

    May 14, 1:30 p.m.
    Sino-German Business Association, Seminar (in Chinese): Successful Business in Germany | Employee motivation and empowerment: key factors for business success in Germany More

    May 15, 3 p.m.
    Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin, vernissage: Art in dialog: Chinese Artists in Berlin More

    May 15, 6:30 p.m.
    Confucius Institute Ruhr, lecture by Hannes Jedeck: The Berliner Philharmoniker’s China tours as part of German cultural diplomacy between 1979 and 2018 More

    May 15, 7 p.m., Mitsubishi Electric Halle in Düsseldorf
    Comedy: DeYunShe talk show with Guo Degang and Yu Qian More

    May 16, 08:30 a.m. (3:30 Beijing time)
    China Network Baden-Württemberg, CNBW Business Talk: Staying on course in stormy times – Interview with Jens Hildebrandt More

    May 16, 10 a.m. ( 4 p.m. Beijing time)
    EU-SME-Centre, online and in Beijing: Navigating Cross-Border Data Rules: A Practical Guide for EU SMEs More

    May 16, 4 p.m.
    China Network Baden-Württemberg, Berlin-Nähkästle with Wolfgang Hirn: The tech war between China and the USA – and where is Europe? More

    May 20, 5:30 p.m. London time
    SOAS, presentation by Stephen Vines (on site in London): Hong Kong pays the price of dissent – was it worth it? More

    May 24-26
    Hefei Trade Fair: China International Wine & Food Fair More

    News

    Global trade: Why China is no longer Germany’s top trading partner

    China is no longer the most important trading partner for Germany. In the first quarter, the USA surpassed the People’s Republic, according to calculations by the news agency Reuters based on official data from the Federal Statistical Office. The trade volume with the United States – including both exports and imports – from January to March amounted to just over 63 billion euros. Trade with China was significantly lower at nearly 60 billion euros. In 2023, the People’s Republic remained the number one trading partner for the eighth consecutive year, but with only a few hundred million euros ahead of the USA.

    According to the Cologne-based German Economic Institute (IW), this development is also due to a geopolitically motivated reorientation. “Moving away from the systemic rival China and towards the transatlantic partner,” said IW expert Juergen Matthes. This is likely also influenced by the poorer-than-expected performance of the Chinese economy, while the US economy has tended to exceed expectations.

    “The German exports to the USA have continued to rise due to the robust economy in the United States, while both exports to and imports from China have decreased,” explained Commerzbank economist Vincent Stamer about the change in leadership in the first quarter.

    Structural reasons also slowed trade between Germany and the People’s Republic. “China has climbed the value chain ladder and is increasingly manufacturing more complex goods itself, which it used to import from Germany,” said Stamer. “Moreover, German companies are increasingly producing locally instead of exporting goods from Germany to China.” Geopolitical tensions – such as the dispute over Taiwan claimed by Beijing – could further reinforce this trend.

    The Foreign Trade Association (BGA) also sees a change in the ranking of key markets. “Whether this change is sustainable is currently uncertain,” said BGA President Dirk Jandura to Reuters. If the former US President Donald Trump were to defeat incumbent Joe Biden in the November elections, new tariffs on European goods could threaten as they did during the Republican’s first term.

    Overall, China’s foreign trade increased in April. Exports increased by 1.5 percent compared to the same month last year. Imports grew by 8.4 percent. rtr/flee

    • Geopolitik

    Exports to Russia: Are US sanctions taking effect after all?

    Chinese exports to Russia may have plummeted again in April, possibly due to US sanctions. Calculated in the local currency Yuan, they fell by 10.8 percent compared to the same month last year, according to data released by the customs authority on Thursday. In March, there had even been a decline of 13 percent. Last year, exports to Russia had seen double-digit growth.

    The US has imposed a series of sanctions on Russia since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine more than two years ago. Now, there is the threat of extending these measures to banks in China. This has already deterred the local financial sector, which also finances non-military trade between China and Russia. Seven trade and banking insiders familiar with the situation told the news agency Reuters that this poses an increasing problem, especially for small Chinese exporters.

    Despite the recent plunge in exports, bilateral trade between China and Russia in the first four months of this year has overall grown by 7.9 percent compared to the same period last year, amounting to 543.7 billion Yuan (70 billion Euros). “China is the most important alternative source country for Russia for sanctioned products,” according to a recently published study. It states that 61 percent of all sanctioned products now come from the People’s Republic. In 2021, this share was only at 35 percent. rtr

    • Geopolitik

    Column

    China Perspective: Why Xi finds a new word for friendship with Serbia

    When Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participated in the One Belt One Road Forum in Beijing last October, his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping used an unusual Chinese word to describe bileteral relations: “iron-rod friendship 铁杆友谊”. With this, Serbia became the second country carrying the label in Xi’s country list. The first is Pakistan.  

    In the run-up to his visit to Belgrade, Xi wrote for Serbian media and employed the word again.  

    铁杆 Iron-rod is a colloquial word used when, for example, two macho men boast about their bromance or used to describe a die-hard fan’s loyalty to a pop star.   

    It is informal, inelegant, but has the unmistakable connotation of (often exaggerated) affection. This simple word distinguished Serbia and Pakistan from China’s other allies such as Russia and North Korea. 

    Standing out from usual Chinese diplomatic jargons 

    China has its own perplexing terminology for defining its ties with different countries. 

    It has “strategic co-operative partnerships”, preceded by various descriptions, with dozens of countries; it has an “all-weather strategic co-operative partnership” with Pakistan; a “traditional friendly co-operative relationship” with North Korea; and a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with Russia.  

    When feeling the need, Chinese officials would also give further prefix or suffix to the definition, for example, “sealed in blood” for China-North Korea alliance, referring to their joint fight in the Korea War; and the more famous “no-limit” prefix for China-Russia rapport.  

    Those are all in formal language, making the newly found “iron rod” expression exceptional. 

    The choice of words tells a piece of truth

    Despite the claims of friendship and co-operation in practice, mistrust, contempt, even hatred all exist in Sino-Russian and Sino-North Korea relations. They are more alliances of convenience in face of the same enemy. The element of common adversary can also be found in China’s ties with Pakistan (India) and with Serbia (the West), but they are generally not troubled by the other toxic feelings. 

    China-Serbia relations dated back to the times of Mao and Tito, when China and Yugoslavia were both rebels against the Soviet Union. The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 provided the two countries with another piece of collective memory. In light of Serbia’s increasingly problematic relationship with the EU, China’s interest in consolidating its ties with Serbia (and Hungary) reflected Xi’s entrenched intention to resist the pressure from the EU. The embassy saga was not often mentioned in China in recent years. So Xi’s decision to conjure up the episode’s memory now is a message to both the domestic audience and the US.  

    Xi’s art of expression

    It is not the first time Xi’s extraordinary choice of words raised eyebrows. Xi loves to use “grassroot” vocabulary apparently to project a down-to-earth image. But his critics said this is the style of language that he is most familiar with, considering his poor education background and his years in the countryside in his youth. His talking style makes a sharp contrast to Jiang Zemin, one of his predecessors, who would grasp every opportunity to show he was able to speak with a literary flair. 

    In his speeches to the military officers, Xi repeated urged them to have 血性 xue xing, meaning integrity and being unyielding, a word mostly used in folktales to describe masculine characters. 

    In his New Year address in 2017, he called on the entire nation to “roll up our sleeves and work with added energy 撸起袖子加油干”, a gung-ho slogan typically heard in factory workshops and countryside production brigades in the 1970s.  

    Occasionally, Xi also wants to give the impression that he is very familiar with classical literature. When lecturing Party and government officials last year, he often told them to bear in mind 国之大者 Guo Zhi Da Zhe, which sounded like an classic saying meaning the big tasks of the country, but actually not found in any Chinese classics. 

    • Communication
    • Propaganda
    • Serbia
    • Xi Jinping

    Executive Moves

    Xu Feihong has been appointed China’s new ambassador to India. The 60-year-old was previously ambassador to Afghanistan and Romania. The appointment was delayed by 18 months after relations between the two countries deteriorated due to the military conflict in eastern Ladakh.

    Ai Xiaoming becomes the new President of Changan Ford. Ai has more than 20 years of experience in the manufacturing and consumer electronics industry in China. Before joining Ford China, Ai was Senior Director at Alvarez & Marsal in Shanghai and CEO of GiantKONE Elevator.

    Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!

    Dessert

    To commemorate “World Book Day”, the Chinese milk tea brand Lelecha 乐乐茶 printed an icon on the cups of their “Smoky Oolong”: Lu Xun, one of China’s most significant writers. However, the marketing campaign backfired. Online users debated that the use of the word “smoky” was disrespectful since Lu Xun had died from the consequences of excessive cigarette consumption. Others criticized that the Marxist was being misused as a capitalist brand ambassador. A great-grandson of the author, who passed away in 1936, sued on behalf of the Lu Xun Cultural Foundation for the unauthorized use of Lu Xun’s likeness. Lelecha apologized in an open letter: They had merely intended to inspire young Chinese to read.

    China.Table editorial team

    CHINA.TABLE EDITORIAL OFFICE

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