It was foreseeable that access restrictions to Dutch high technology would be in focus during the China visit of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Due to pressure from Washington, the company ASML from Veldhoven has been unable to export its ultraviolet lithography machines to the People’s Republic for some time now. However, these machines are needed to produce competitive state-of-the-art computer chips. “The Chinese people have a right to development,” the state media quoted Xi Jinping after the meeting with Rutte.
Soon, ASML may even be prohibited from servicing ASML machines already sold to China. This means one of the most important markets is slipping away for arguably the most important company in the Netherlands, writes Amelie Richter. At the same time, China’s domestic manufacturer Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) continues to work on ultraviolet lithography machines. However, Peking still awaits the technical breakthrough.
Understanding who sets the rules within the Communist Party of China is often opaque to outsiders, and this also applies to climate policy. However, one thing is clear: Since taking office, Xi Jinping has set the tone in this area as well. Climate goals are also a way for him to present China as a modern socialist country, explains Christiane Kuehl in her Feature.
Nevertheless, despite all his power, Xi does not hold all the reins alone. Cities and provinces play an important role in boosting the engine for green energy with their own investments. And young companies in the cleantech sector are also pushing for a faster transformation. The conflict of interest between the state dinosaurs and the new industries is therefore likely to intensify significantly in the coming years. And Xi will have to show how much priority he really places on the energy transition.
Due to the upcoming holidays, the next issue of China.Table will be in your inbox on Tuesday.
In the dispute over Western export restrictions on high technology, President Xi Jinping had strong words during his meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in Beijing: “No power can stop the pace of scientific and technological development and progress in China,” Xi said according to a report by state television. The Chinese people have a right to development. Xi criticized Rutte sharply for obstructing access to Western high technology. “Decoupling and cutting off connections lead to nowhere, and cooperation is the only option,” Xi said.
The Netherlands find themselves in the crosshairs of trade tensions between China and the US. At the urging of Washington, the Dutch government has restricted the sale of machines for the production of advanced processor chips. The Dutch company ASML is the world’s only manufacturer of machines capable of producing state-of-the-art semiconductor chips using extreme ultraviolet lithography. Until the licensing issues began, China was ASML’s second-largest market after Taiwan. According to the company’s report, about 26 percent of its revenue was generated in China in 2023.
At the beginning of the year, the Dutch government began revoking ASML’s export approval for some machines to China. However, this seems insufficient for the US. According to media reports, the US government is pushing for a ban on the maintenance of machines delivered before the current sales ban. China fears that The Hague may comply with this request. The loss for Chinese chip manufacturers would be enormous. ASML machines cost well over a hundred million euros. If they are not regularly maintained, they have to be written off.
Rutte tried to soothe tensions in Beijing: The Netherlands ensure that export restrictions affecting “our semiconductor sector and companies like ASML never specifically target one country“.
However, ASML is likely to be unenthusiastic about being at the center of the US-China trade conflict. The company recently threatened to leave the Netherlands – officially stating that anti-immigration policies would limit its ability to hire talented specialists. However, the real reason is likely that the Rutte government succumbed to US pressure.
In an interview with the Dutch business newspaper FD on Tuesday, the Dutch trade minister emphasized that defending ASML’s interests was his “top” priority. ASML “is the most important company we have”, said Geoffrey van Leeuwen. At the same time, he emphasized: “We also say that the national security of ourselves and our partners takes precedence over economic interests.” On Wednesday, he met his counterpart Wang Wentao in Beijing.
Exports from the Netherlands to China have risen again at the beginning of the year – contrary to the general trend of exports from the EU. In January and February, they grew by 26.6 percent compared to the previous year, according to Chinese customs data. Whether this is solely due to EUV (extreme ultraviolet light) and DUV (deep ultraviolet light) lithography machines is unclear. However, the numbers suggest that Chinese customers bought ASML machines before more export restrictions took effect.
China is striving for rapid replacement. The most promising domestic manufacturer, Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), still lags behind ASML despite remarkable progress. As Li Jinxiang, deputy secretary-general of the China Electronic Production Equipment Industry Association, noted last year, “Not a single chip production line in China is equipped with a lithography system made in China – most of them are only used in academic research.”
SMEE was successful exclusively in the chip packaging industry for a long time. For the assembly and packaging of chips into their final structures, lithography machines of the lower price range are required. According to data from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University, SMEE sold a handful of KrF machines between 2011 and 2014, but none between 2015 and 2019. While SMEE still advertises an ArF machine on its website, The Wire China cites several sources skeptical that these machines are likely prototypes and not commercial products.
In June 2020, Chinese media reported that a new 28-nanometer machine from SMEE would be available by the end of 2021. The state-owned Global Times called the move a “groundbreaking breakthrough for China’s semiconductor industry.” However, nothing has happened on this matter so far.
Who decides on climate policy in China – and through which processes – is not easily discernible in the opaque structures of the Communist Party. However, one trend is clear: Since 2014, China’s system has increasingly been tailored to President Xi Jinping, who took office at that time. Consequently, Xi also sets the tone for climate policy.
For instance, in July 2023, he emphasized in a speech that the next five years would be a crucial phase to build a “beautiful China” (美丽中国) and an “ecological civilization” (生态文明). These are Xi’s code words for environmental and climate action, which he linked in the speech to his overarching goals of building a modern socialist country and promoting national rejuvenation. According to experts, this indicated a high priority for Xi on the issue. “Xi has been a key figure in China’s shifting stance on climate change,” several authors recently concluded in a Carbon Brief article.
He takes the issue seriously – because China suffers from the climate crisis and because the cleantech sector has become a growth industry for the country. Xi personally announced China’s 30/60 climate goals – peak emissions by 2030, carbon neutrality by 2060 – at the United Nations in September 2021.
Of course, China also has a Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and a climate envoy like Liu Zhenmin for COP climate conferences. In addition, there is the National Energy Administration (NEA), the powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which sets the framework for industrial policy, and a number of other ministries, all of which belong to the State Council. However, in the Xi era, they are ultimately just implementers of political directives coming from the CCP, as Prime Minister Li Qiang recently emphasized.
Xi manages the party through a network of commissions that he has gradually introduced since 2014. So-called “Central Commissions” act as permanent political super-ministries. A key role in this system is played by the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CCDR/中央全面深化改革委员会), led by Xi himself.
The CCDR assigns ministries to develop specific plans or laws for a pre-determined point on Xi’s reform agenda. Once a measure is finalized, it is published in a document that immediately becomes a “law in force” and is therefore binding. The CCDR deals extensively with environmental policy, says Nis Grünberg, a climate expert at Merics, a German think tank with a focus on China. For example, it was the CCDR that once decided on China’s import ban on plastic waste. The government only formally adopted the ban afterward.
Often, it is party documents or plans – not laws – that set firm targets and thus anticipate legal regulations. Just like China’s Five-Year Plan, which is legally binding. Guidelines for the emission reduction path can be found, for example, in the 1+N plans gradually released since October 2021. They specify how China’s economy should be aligned with the 30/60 goals, broken down by sectors, industries and technologies.
The CCP documents always define the framework. For example, a document titled “Opinions on comprehensively promoting the construction of a beautiful China” (关于全面推进美丽中国建设的意见) was published by the Central Committee and the State Council at the turn of the year. “There are some meaningful targets for 2027 in this document and it is significant in speeding things up as it can provide a deadline for a lot of things,” comments Lauri Myllyvirta of the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Because it sets many specific deadlines, many of them for 2027. For instance, by 2027, 45 percent of new vehicle registrations are to be electric cars.
The document lacks details, which, according to Myllyvirta, is logical: High-level papers from the CCP Central Committee do not deal with the specifics of specific technologies. “That would be the task of the National Energy Administration, which is subordinate to the NDRC, which in turn is subordinate to the State Council, which in turn is subordinate to the party.” This corresponds exactly to the decision hierarchy for climate policy.
The 14th Five-Year Plan requires reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 13.5 percent between 2021 and 2025. The interim report on the ongoing plan, published in late December 2023, acknowledged that China is not on track to achieve its targets for CO2 intensity and energy intensity. Since the plan is binding, the authorities must now take action to prevent the plan from failing by 2025.
The number of published documents is as important as their content as a political signal, emphasizes a new study by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) on the subject. It is significant that so many recent documents have “highlighted the importance of environmental protection and targets across multiple major sectors”. This sends an important signal to local officials and the industry. “The official climate targets are a strategy that aspiring provincial politicians must follow today,” says Nis Grünberg to Table.Briefings. “It is important that Xi Jinping repeatedly addresses the issue of green development – and ensures that it is promoted. It is also about openness to new ways of thinking.”
This is crucial because, according to Grünberg, provinces and cities are very important in decisions about the future direction of energy policy. “They still have a lot of influence on investments and sometimes act as drivers for green energies. For example, some provinces are directly investing in the construction of large solar plants in their areas.” How a region decides depends, among other things, on its geography. “But leadership personalities also play a role,” emphasizes Grünberg: “Do they opt for the good old heavy industry and infrastructure programs? Or do they formulate a smart green development plan?”
In China too, lobbyists try to exert influence. While the old sectors – fossil energy producers or the heavy industry fueled by them, all large state-owned enterprises – want to stay in the game for as long as possible, the young companies of the cleantech sector are pushing for a faster transformation. This sector has long since become a systemically important growth engine, says Grünberg. “In climate policy, the conflict of interest between the old and new industries will intensify in the coming years. How this conflict is resolved by the government is the decisive factor, as it is with us.”
“你好，欢迎收听故事FM。我是爱哲，一个收集故事的人。在这里，我们用你的声音讲出你的故事.” – “Hello and welcome to Gushi FM. I am Aizhe, a person who collects stories. Here, we tell your story in your own voice.”
This is how almost every episode of Gushi FM, one of China’s most popular podcasts, begins. The stories come from people who appear ordinary yet have extraordinary tales to tell. A social worker shares her experiences with female prison inmates, students recount how they sleep in their offices during internships in China’s major cities due to exorbitant rents, and a man describes accompanying his father to a euthanasia clinic in Switzerland. Over the past seven years, almost 800 episodes on various topics have been released, together forming a mosaic of contemporary Chinese society.
About three million listeners follow Gushi FM weekly on audio platforms like Xiǎoyǔzhòu (小宇宙) and Xǐmǎlāyǎ (喜马拉雅). Some of the – always true – stories are identified by podcast founder Kou Aizhe and his production team in Beijing, while others are suggested by listeners.
In China’s podcast scene, Gushi FM was a trailblazer with its format of free storytelling. For 41-year-old Kou, the success of his format primarily reflects a “desire for authenticity”. In China’s media, whether in mainstream news or documentaries, unfiltered stories are rarely heard. “Most of the time, there is a narrator who presents everything in a beautiful voice.” Through his show, he wants to give people the opportunity to speak for themselves.
Kou’s father was a miner in Jilin, in the cold northeastern region of China, near the border with North Korea. He instilled in Kou a fascination for stories from an early age. One of his first books was Grimm’s Fairy Tales.
Later, Aizhe Kou studied library science and also worked as a librarian for several years – and found it boring. During a side job at a Swedish television channel in Beijing, he learned the tools of reporting. In the format of story podcasts, he saw a gap in the Chinese market – and started his own business.
According to Kou, Gushi FM rarely comes into contact with Chinese censorship authorities. However, political questions often implicitly resonate in the stories. For example, in one episode, gay and lesbian couples talk about their arduous journey to raise children. In several episodes, women share their experiences with sexual harassment. These stories bear witness to how individuals in China deal with societal issues.
Many listeners of the podcast come from younger generations. “They love stories from the past, from the early era of reform and opening up,” says Kou. It was a time of upheaval when new opportunities emerged. In contrast, Kou perceives younger people in China today as less optimistic. The prevailing attitude behind terms like tǎngpíng (躺平 – “lying flat“) and bǎilàn (摆烂 – “let it rot”), which have emerged in recent years to describe the mood among young people in China, is roughly: “If I just make it through the day unscathed, I’m already satisfied.”
Kou Aizhe hesitates when it comes to how these underlying problems could be solved. Perhaps a look beyond national borders could help. In recent months, Kou has been on a quest for stories in Japan. The country already experienced a similar period of stagnation and declining birth rates in the 1990s. “You can already see China’s future in Japan.” The stories of migrants recruited as laborers in other aging societies could also provide insights into the direction China could take. Whether one wants to draw hope from these insights, Kou prefers to leave to his listeners. In any case, it sounds like there are still many stories to be told. Leonardo Pape
Micro-dramas are the latest trend in China’s entertainment industry. Known as Wēiduǎnjù (微短剧) in Chinese, these are streaming series with episodes lasting no more than two minutes. They are considered light entertainment for smartphones and often revolve around romances or humorous dialogues.
However, there are now more sophisticated productions as well, such as the time-traveling romantic comedy 我在八零年代当后妈 (translated roughly as “I Traveled Back to the 1980s and Became a Stepmother”). This series, costing $11,000, was shot in just ten days and earned over $277,000 in revenue in a single day. It’s no wonder, then, that the streaming giant Douyin is currently planning a micro-series with Hong Kong’s star director Stephen Chow (“Kung Fu Hustle”).
It was foreseeable that access restrictions to Dutch high technology would be in focus during the China visit of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Due to pressure from Washington, the company ASML from Veldhoven has been unable to export its ultraviolet lithography machines to the People’s Republic for some time now. However, these machines are needed to produce competitive state-of-the-art computer chips. “The Chinese people have a right to development,” the state media quoted Xi Jinping after the meeting with Rutte.
Soon, ASML may even be prohibited from servicing ASML machines already sold to China. This means one of the most important markets is slipping away for arguably the most important company in the Netherlands, writes Amelie Richter. At the same time, China’s domestic manufacturer Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE) continues to work on ultraviolet lithography machines. However, Peking still awaits the technical breakthrough.
Understanding who sets the rules within the Communist Party of China is often opaque to outsiders, and this also applies to climate policy. However, one thing is clear: Since taking office, Xi Jinping has set the tone in this area as well. Climate goals are also a way for him to present China as a modern socialist country, explains Christiane Kuehl in her Feature.
Nevertheless, despite all his power, Xi does not hold all the reins alone. Cities and provinces play an important role in boosting the engine for green energy with their own investments. And young companies in the cleantech sector are also pushing for a faster transformation. The conflict of interest between the state dinosaurs and the new industries is therefore likely to intensify significantly in the coming years. And Xi will have to show how much priority he really places on the energy transition.
Due to the upcoming holidays, the next issue of China.Table will be in your inbox on Tuesday.
In the dispute over Western export restrictions on high technology, President Xi Jinping had strong words during his meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte in Beijing: “No power can stop the pace of scientific and technological development and progress in China,” Xi said according to a report by state television. The Chinese people have a right to development. Xi criticized Rutte sharply for obstructing access to Western high technology. “Decoupling and cutting off connections lead to nowhere, and cooperation is the only option,” Xi said.
The Netherlands find themselves in the crosshairs of trade tensions between China and the US. At the urging of Washington, the Dutch government has restricted the sale of machines for the production of advanced processor chips. The Dutch company ASML is the world’s only manufacturer of machines capable of producing state-of-the-art semiconductor chips using extreme ultraviolet lithography. Until the licensing issues began, China was ASML’s second-largest market after Taiwan. According to the company’s report, about 26 percent of its revenue was generated in China in 2023.
At the beginning of the year, the Dutch government began revoking ASML’s export approval for some machines to China. However, this seems insufficient for the US. According to media reports, the US government is pushing for a ban on the maintenance of machines delivered before the current sales ban. China fears that The Hague may comply with this request. The loss for Chinese chip manufacturers would be enormous. ASML machines cost well over a hundred million euros. If they are not regularly maintained, they have to be written off.
Rutte tried to soothe tensions in Beijing: The Netherlands ensure that export restrictions affecting “our semiconductor sector and companies like ASML never specifically target one country“.
However, ASML is likely to be unenthusiastic about being at the center of the US-China trade conflict. The company recently threatened to leave the Netherlands – officially stating that anti-immigration policies would limit its ability to hire talented specialists. However, the real reason is likely that the Rutte government succumbed to US pressure.
In an interview with the Dutch business newspaper FD on Tuesday, the Dutch trade minister emphasized that defending ASML’s interests was his “top” priority. ASML “is the most important company we have”, said Geoffrey van Leeuwen. At the same time, he emphasized: “We also say that the national security of ourselves and our partners takes precedence over economic interests.” On Wednesday, he met his counterpart Wang Wentao in Beijing.
Exports from the Netherlands to China have risen again at the beginning of the year – contrary to the general trend of exports from the EU. In January and February, they grew by 26.6 percent compared to the previous year, according to Chinese customs data. Whether this is solely due to EUV (extreme ultraviolet light) and DUV (deep ultraviolet light) lithography machines is unclear. However, the numbers suggest that Chinese customers bought ASML machines before more export restrictions took effect.
China is striving for rapid replacement. The most promising domestic manufacturer, Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (SMEE), still lags behind ASML despite remarkable progress. As Li Jinxiang, deputy secretary-general of the China Electronic Production Equipment Industry Association, noted last year, “Not a single chip production line in China is equipped with a lithography system made in China – most of them are only used in academic research.”
SMEE was successful exclusively in the chip packaging industry for a long time. For the assembly and packaging of chips into their final structures, lithography machines of the lower price range are required. According to data from the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) at Georgetown University, SMEE sold a handful of KrF machines between 2011 and 2014, but none between 2015 and 2019. While SMEE still advertises an ArF machine on its website, The Wire China cites several sources skeptical that these machines are likely prototypes and not commercial products.
In June 2020, Chinese media reported that a new 28-nanometer machine from SMEE would be available by the end of 2021. The state-owned Global Times called the move a “groundbreaking breakthrough for China’s semiconductor industry.” However, nothing has happened on this matter so far.
Who decides on climate policy in China – and through which processes – is not easily discernible in the opaque structures of the Communist Party. However, one trend is clear: Since 2014, China’s system has increasingly been tailored to President Xi Jinping, who took office at that time. Consequently, Xi also sets the tone for climate policy.
For instance, in July 2023, he emphasized in a speech that the next five years would be a crucial phase to build a “beautiful China” (美丽中国) and an “ecological civilization” (生态文明). These are Xi’s code words for environmental and climate action, which he linked in the speech to his overarching goals of building a modern socialist country and promoting national rejuvenation. According to experts, this indicated a high priority for Xi on the issue. “Xi has been a key figure in China’s shifting stance on climate change,” several authors recently concluded in a Carbon Brief article.
He takes the issue seriously – because China suffers from the climate crisis and because the cleantech sector has become a growth industry for the country. Xi personally announced China’s 30/60 climate goals – peak emissions by 2030, carbon neutrality by 2060 – at the United Nations in September 2021.
Of course, China also has a Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and a climate envoy like Liu Zhenmin for COP climate conferences. In addition, there is the National Energy Administration (NEA), the powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which sets the framework for industrial policy, and a number of other ministries, all of which belong to the State Council. However, in the Xi era, they are ultimately just implementers of political directives coming from the CCP, as Prime Minister Li Qiang recently emphasized.
Xi manages the party through a network of commissions that he has gradually introduced since 2014. So-called “Central Commissions” act as permanent political super-ministries. A key role in this system is played by the Central Commission for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CCDR/中央全面深化改革委员会), led by Xi himself.
The CCDR assigns ministries to develop specific plans or laws for a pre-determined point on Xi’s reform agenda. Once a measure is finalized, it is published in a document that immediately becomes a “law in force” and is therefore binding. The CCDR deals extensively with environmental policy, says Nis Grünberg, a climate expert at Merics, a German think tank with a focus on China. For example, it was the CCDR that once decided on China’s import ban on plastic waste. The government only formally adopted the ban afterward.
Often, it is party documents or plans – not laws – that set firm targets and thus anticipate legal regulations. Just like China’s Five-Year Plan, which is legally binding. Guidelines for the emission reduction path can be found, for example, in the 1+N plans gradually released since October 2021. They specify how China’s economy should be aligned with the 30/60 goals, broken down by sectors, industries and technologies.
The CCP documents always define the framework. For example, a document titled “Opinions on comprehensively promoting the construction of a beautiful China” (关于全面推进美丽中国建设的意见) was published by the Central Committee and the State Council at the turn of the year. “There are some meaningful targets for 2027 in this document and it is significant in speeding things up as it can provide a deadline for a lot of things,” comments Lauri Myllyvirta of the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA). Because it sets many specific deadlines, many of them for 2027. For instance, by 2027, 45 percent of new vehicle registrations are to be electric cars.
The document lacks details, which, according to Myllyvirta, is logical: High-level papers from the CCP Central Committee do not deal with the specifics of specific technologies. “That would be the task of the National Energy Administration, which is subordinate to the NDRC, which in turn is subordinate to the State Council, which in turn is subordinate to the party.” This corresponds exactly to the decision hierarchy for climate policy.
The 14th Five-Year Plan requires reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 13.5 percent between 2021 and 2025. The interim report on the ongoing plan, published in late December 2023, acknowledged that China is not on track to achieve its targets for CO2 intensity and energy intensity. Since the plan is binding, the authorities must now take action to prevent the plan from failing by 2025.
The number of published documents is as important as their content as a political signal, emphasizes a new study by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) on the subject. It is significant that so many recent documents have “highlighted the importance of environmental protection and targets across multiple major sectors”. This sends an important signal to local officials and the industry. “The official climate targets are a strategy that aspiring provincial politicians must follow today,” says Nis Grünberg to Table.Briefings. “It is important that Xi Jinping repeatedly addresses the issue of green development – and ensures that it is promoted. It is also about openness to new ways of thinking.”
This is crucial because, according to Grünberg, provinces and cities are very important in decisions about the future direction of energy policy. “They still have a lot of influence on investments and sometimes act as drivers for green energies. For example, some provinces are directly investing in the construction of large solar plants in their areas.” How a region decides depends, among other things, on its geography. “But leadership personalities also play a role,” emphasizes Grünberg: “Do they opt for the good old heavy industry and infrastructure programs? Or do they formulate a smart green development plan?”
In China too, lobbyists try to exert influence. While the old sectors – fossil energy producers or the heavy industry fueled by them, all large state-owned enterprises – want to stay in the game for as long as possible, the young companies of the cleantech sector are pushing for a faster transformation. This sector has long since become a systemically important growth engine, says Grünberg. “In climate policy, the conflict of interest between the old and new industries will intensify in the coming years. How this conflict is resolved by the government is the decisive factor, as it is with us.”
“你好，欢迎收听故事FM。我是爱哲，一个收集故事的人。在这里，我们用你的声音讲出你的故事.” – “Hello and welcome to Gushi FM. I am Aizhe, a person who collects stories. Here, we tell your story in your own voice.”
This is how almost every episode of Gushi FM, one of China’s most popular podcasts, begins. The stories come from people who appear ordinary yet have extraordinary tales to tell. A social worker shares her experiences with female prison inmates, students recount how they sleep in their offices during internships in China’s major cities due to exorbitant rents, and a man describes accompanying his father to a euthanasia clinic in Switzerland. Over the past seven years, almost 800 episodes on various topics have been released, together forming a mosaic of contemporary Chinese society.
About three million listeners follow Gushi FM weekly on audio platforms like Xiǎoyǔzhòu (小宇宙) and Xǐmǎlāyǎ (喜马拉雅). Some of the – always true – stories are identified by podcast founder Kou Aizhe and his production team in Beijing, while others are suggested by listeners.
In China’s podcast scene, Gushi FM was a trailblazer with its format of free storytelling. For 41-year-old Kou, the success of his format primarily reflects a “desire for authenticity”. In China’s media, whether in mainstream news or documentaries, unfiltered stories are rarely heard. “Most of the time, there is a narrator who presents everything in a beautiful voice.” Through his show, he wants to give people the opportunity to speak for themselves.
Kou’s father was a miner in Jilin, in the cold northeastern region of China, near the border with North Korea. He instilled in Kou a fascination for stories from an early age. One of his first books was Grimm’s Fairy Tales.
Later, Aizhe Kou studied library science and also worked as a librarian for several years – and found it boring. During a side job at a Swedish television channel in Beijing, he learned the tools of reporting. In the format of story podcasts, he saw a gap in the Chinese market – and started his own business.
According to Kou, Gushi FM rarely comes into contact with Chinese censorship authorities. However, political questions often implicitly resonate in the stories. For example, in one episode, gay and lesbian couples talk about their arduous journey to raise children. In several episodes, women share their experiences with sexual harassment. These stories bear witness to how individuals in China deal with societal issues.
Many listeners of the podcast come from younger generations. “They love stories from the past, from the early era of reform and opening up,” says Kou. It was a time of upheaval when new opportunities emerged. In contrast, Kou perceives younger people in China today as less optimistic. The prevailing attitude behind terms like tǎngpíng (躺平 – “lying flat“) and bǎilàn (摆烂 – “let it rot”), which have emerged in recent years to describe the mood among young people in China, is roughly: “If I just make it through the day unscathed, I’m already satisfied.”
Kou Aizhe hesitates when it comes to how these underlying problems could be solved. Perhaps a look beyond national borders could help. In recent months, Kou has been on a quest for stories in Japan. The country already experienced a similar period of stagnation and declining birth rates in the 1990s. “You can already see China’s future in Japan.” The stories of migrants recruited as laborers in other aging societies could also provide insights into the direction China could take. Whether one wants to draw hope from these insights, Kou prefers to leave to his listeners. In any case, it sounds like there are still many stories to be told. Leonardo Pape
Micro-dramas are the latest trend in China’s entertainment industry. Known as Wēiduǎnjù (微短剧) in Chinese, these are streaming series with episodes lasting no more than two minutes. They are considered light entertainment for smartphones and often revolve around romances or humorous dialogues.
However, there are now more sophisticated productions as well, such as the time-traveling romantic comedy 我在八零年代当后妈 (translated roughly as “I Traveled Back to the 1980s and Became a Stepmother”). This series, costing $11,000, was shot in just ten days and earned over $277,000 in revenue in a single day. It’s no wonder, then, that the streaming giant Douyin is currently planning a micro-series with Hong Kong’s star director Stephen Chow (“Kung Fu Hustle”).
