You might almost get the impression that there’s a permanent show going on here called “China Incompetence.” The latest episode is set in France. Even before Xi Jinping’s arrival in Paris, President Emmanuel Macron already broadcasted his demands on the French media. So far, so good. At the same time, however, he assured the People’s Republic that China was needed to solve the world’s problems.
As true as this statement may be, as wrong it is to keep repeating it. China does not need Macron, Olaf Scholz or anyone else to reaffirm its own importance. This will not make China any more cooperative. Instead, Xi Jinping once again gets the impression that he is free to parade the Europeans around the stage.
Let’s do the cross-check. China needs Europe just as much as the other way around. The country needs European investment, European research, European consumers and European expertise in order to get a grip on its structural problems on many levels. When was the last time Xi Jinping explicitly said “China needs Europe” in public? Probably a very long time ago. Xi knows why.
Gabriel Bub analyzes how Macron fared on the first day of Xi’s visit. Meanwhile, the author of today’s opinion, political scientist Andreas Fulda, also assesses Germany’s China policy as naive. Fulda argues that Berlin not only ignores critical China expertise in many key political positions, it even deems it undesirable. He believes Scholz has already shelved the German government’s China strategy.
During Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris on Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to achieve harmony in order to win China’s president over for a possible mediation in the Ukraine war. With some success, at least. In addition to various economic agreements in aviation and battery production, Xi at least pledged his support for Macron’s wish for a ceasefire during the Olympic Games from 26 July to 11 August in Paris. If the weapons were actually to be laid down during the Games, it would be a great success for Macron. However, Putin is unlikely to go along with this.
While Macron cajoled the Chinese President in Paris and praised “the commitment of the Chinese authorities to refrain from selling any weapons or aid to Moscow and to strictly control the export of dual-use goods,” EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen chose a very tough tone. At the trilateral meeting at midday, she emphasized to the Chinese President that too many Chinese dual-use goods were still being discovered on Ukrainian battlefields. As this is an existential issue for Ukraine and Europe, “this does affect the EU-China relations.”
Another topic was Chinese overcapacity. “Chinese subsidized products (…) such as the electric vehicles or, for example, steel are flooding the European market,” von der Leyen said. The world “cannot absorb” China’s production growth. That is why she “encouraged” the Chinese government to tackle this overcapacity. “We will defend our companies; we will defend our economies,” she said. Europe would not hesitate to make “tough decisions needed to protect its economy and its security.”
After all, French volume manufacturers such as Renault and Stellantis, in particular, suffer from the offensive by Chinese manufacturers, who have entered the French market with aggressive prices. The EU Commission is expected to decide by mid-July on imposing anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China. The French government has reportedly been repeatedly pushing for this.
Germany’s premium manufacturers, on the other hand, reject such anti-subsidy tariffs. On the one hand, they could be affected themselves, as Mercedes, VW and BMW also manufacture EVs in China. On the other hand, they fear Chinese retaliation against combustion vehicles sold by German manufacturers in China. The EU already imposes a ten percent import duty on Chinese EVs.
Macron and von der Leyen wanted to influence Xi to do more to stop the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s response was sobering. During the meeting, he repeatedly stated that “China is not at the origin of this crisis, nor is it a participant.” In a guest commentary for Le Figaro on Monday, Xi had already pointed out that he had already insisted “that nuclear weapons should not be used.” And that he is fully aware that the war in Ukraine is causing upheaval in Europe.
While the Chinese president likes to pretend that his country is neutral between Russia and the West, China, in fact, supports its Russian ally. “We oppose using the Ukraine crisis to cast blame, smear a third country and incite a new Cold War,” Xi said in Paris on Monday.
Gesine Weber, Visiting Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in New York, does not have high hopes for any Chinese mediation announcements anyway. “China likes to present itself as a responsible global player,” she says. This is in line with Chinese foreign policy and is “by no means something you should expect a major initiative from.”
“He doesn’t have the capacity to mediate because China is not neutral,” says Merics analyst Abigaël Vasselier. He would first have to recognize that it was a war in the first place. “He’s still talking about a crisis,” says Vasselier. China is helping Russia economically, helping Putin out of diplomatic isolation, and “making a difference on the battlefield in Ukraine.”
Fittingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to travel to China on 15 and 16 May. It will be his first trip abroad after his inauguration this Tuesday.
Macron would actually have preferred to display a signal of unity with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and von der Leyen. However, Scholz preferred to attend appointments in the Baltic States, even though Macron had tried to persuade the Federal Chancellor to attend the meeting at a joint dinner in Paris on Thursday. Scholz had already met the Chinese President during his trip to China in mid-April anyway.
“I think France wants to show that the French voice is also a European voice,” says Vasselier. That is why von der Leyen was also in Paris. ‘The fact that Scholz had a preparatory meeting with Macron is excellent, because it makes it possible to coordinate the messages that you want to send.’ She considers it problematic that the German Chancellor did not “Europeanize” his China visit by not including ministers from other EU countries or members of the EU Commission.
Macron would have gladly accompanied Scholz on his visit to Beijing in November 2022. Instead, the French president traveled with von der Leyen in April 2023 and turned Scholz and the United States against him for saying that Europeans should not become “vassals” of the USA. In his second Sorbonne speech in late April, Macron repeated his statement – with an almost identical choice of words.
Xi has cleverly chosen the dates for his talks. At the meeting with Macron, the two presidents celebrated the 60th anniversary of Franco-Chinese relations; during his visit to Serbia on Tuesday, Xi wants to highlight the double standards of the West 25 years after the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Before that, he will dine with Macron in the Pyrenees, where Macron’s grandmother lived.
China’s automotive industry is struggling with legal requirements. The multi-stage plan to achieve the carbon reduction targets stipulates that the average gasoline consumption of new cars must only be 4.6 liters per hundred kilometers from 2026 – this is the fifth stage. The sixth stage will come into force in 2030, when it is expected to be just 3.7 liters. This value is causing headaches for manufacturers, as many currently popular hybrid variants fail to meet this level. Alongside traditional battery vehicles and range extenders, hydrogen engines could be part of the solution.
Chinese manufacturers have stepped up their research accordingly. The US, Europe, and China regard hydrogen as a key technology for solving the mobility and energy transition problems across all sectors. It is suitable as an energy storage medium as well as a fuel and can help reduce carbon emissions under certain circumstances.
At the International Vienna Motor Symposium 2024, Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DMC) and Huazhong University of Science and Technology gave an insight into the current state of research. Despite the optimism of many at the conference, the hurdles on the road to a hydrogen future are tremendous. Every major Chinese manufacturer already has a fully developed unit that could quickly go into mass production. These include Dongfeng Motor, FAW-Hongqi, Geely, Guangzhou Automobile, BAIC and Great Wall Motor.
Three things stand out in the designs. Firstly, the engines have a displacement of 1.5 liters or 2.0 liters. This means the brands intend to fit them in cars rather than trucks or buses. However, experts argue that they would make much more sense for larger vehicles. China already has a strategy to use hydrogen to make the north of the country more mobile.
Secondly, the engines have a gross thermal efficiency (GTE) of between 42 percent (Great Wall) and 46 percent (Geely). This means less than half of the chemical energy stored in the hydrogen is converted into mechanical output – comparatively high for hydrogen engines. Previous calculations estimated between 30 and 40 percent. By comparison, the GTE for gasoline engines is around 20 to 25 percent. An electric car does not have a gross thermal efficiency since there is no combustion. Electric motors have an efficiency of around 85 to 95 percent.
Point three is a technological change in thinking. China’s new hydrogen engines do not use a fuel cell. In a fuel cell vehicle, an electric motor provides the propulsion. The fuel cell supplies the electricity, which is, in turn, fed from a hydrogen tank. On the other hand, the new hydrogen engines function like conventional gasoline engines – only with hydrogen.
Conventional combustion engines can be converted to process hydrogen with just a few modifications – a new injection system, spark plugs compatible with cold temperatures, a new turbocharger, adapted lubrication and adapted venting. The significant advantage for the industry is that the systems and production facilities can simply be reused. This makes the engines scalable and cost-effective. This, in turn, makes the technology interesting for meeting the fuel consumption targets stipulated by the government.
From the perspective of Chinese manufacturers, the move to hydrogen engines may seem logical. However, other industries and customers still have their doubts. This is because hydrogen production, storage and transport would have to be significantly expanded to make it usable for private transportation. After the gasoline supply and electric car charging systems, the People’s Republic would have to build a third, nationwide infrastructure network.
On top of this, green hydrogen – i.e., from renewable energies – plays no role in China. It is currently around four times more expensive than gray hydrogen from fossil fuels, which accounts for around 96 to 98 percent of the market. The production of gray hydrogen requires a lot of energy, which the country could use elsewhere. However, it is worth noting that – over the entire life cycle (production, 15 years of use, 225,000 kilometers) – even a hydrogen car running on gray hydrogen still emits around 40 percent less greenhouse gases than a conventional combustion engine.
The Chinese government has big plans for hydrogen. The People’s Republic currently has around 310 hydrogen filling stations. The plan is to have 1,000 by 2025. There are also plans for a hydrogen pipeline between Inner Mongolia and Beijing. The industry is also experimenting with adding hydrogen to natural gas pipelines.
At the Munich Security Conference in 2014, then-German President Joachim Gauck reminded Germans: “Thinking about existential questions must be at the heart of society.” Almost ten years later, Gauck expressed his disappointment that his appeal for Germany to become more involved in security policy went largely unheeded.
Few issues reveal this misguided development more clearly than Germany’s unresolved relationship with China. Even if the meaning of China competence is not always clear, there is a broad consensus in Germany that a solid knowledge of China’s strategies and the political logic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is necessary.
Unfortunately, such debates have hardly been held in political Berlin since the publication of the China strategy last summer. And without addressing the issue, China competence cannot contribute to the political process. Leaders have an obligation to allow dissent and criticism of the current political course in public debates.
As the lengthy discussion about the role of Huawei and 5G has shown, industrial policy, safeguarding critical infrastructure and geopolitics cannot be separated in the 21st century. Systemic differences between democracies and autocracies should thus be clearly named and risks and conflicts must not be downplayed for tactical reasons. But this happens too rarely.
Olaf Scholz’s most recent trip to China left the impression that the German Chancellor has already shelved the China strategy he had adopted last year. In the Chancellery, Jens Ploetner advises Scholz. During a lecture at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in June 2022, the former diplomat argued that the systematic rivalry with China should “not be overemphasized” as this would complicate cooperative efforts in international dealings with the country. Is this the crux of the matter?
Ploetner’s speech clearly showed that the SPD-led Chancellery, in contrast to the Foreign Office under Annalena Baerbock, rejects a change of course in German China policy. This has also severely restricted the corridor for developing critical China expertise inside the German government. China experts must assume they will not be welcome in political Berlin if they strongly emphasize the systemic rivalry and express themselves too critically.
The adverse effects the suppression of critical debates by political decision-makers has on the development of a strategic culture and autocratic competence are also evident in Germany’s failed Russia policy. Uncomfortable criticism was dismissed and critics were excluded from future debates. Cautionary voices from Eastern European and Russian democrats were ignored. Is this pattern now repeating itself with China?
“To find its way through difficult times, Germany requires resources, above all intellectual resources – minds, institutions, forums,” said Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security Conference in 2014. Ten years later, it is clear that we regrettably have made little progress in our debate culture.
In 2018, the long-standing chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, published his book “World in Danger”. Inexplicably, he omitted China from the book, ostensibly “in order to have enough space to deal with the fundamental issues of war and peace and global governance.” In the same year, the US Chamber of Commerce awarded him the Transatlantic Partnership Award. As an award winner, he should have known that the USA’s increasing focus on China would also have implications for Europe’s long-term security.
Shortly before the Federal Chancellor’s Asia trip, Ischinger himself visited China. He wanted to persuade the Chinese leadership to get Russia to participate in a peace conference on Ukraine in Switzerland in June 2024. This contradicted his own assessment from September 2022, when he pleaded for a realistic evaluation of Xi Jinping’s autocracy. This implied that such an effort towards China would also remain wishful thinking in this regard.
When faced with criticism of this contradiction, Ischinger appears thin-skinned. He questioned the competence of China experts and blocked critical questions on social media. Yet, it should be possible to criticize the strategic thinking of German decision-makers without being ostracized.
The situation that ignorance and denial of reality in political Berlin has brought us can be seen in the daily news. Disproved narratives (“change through trade”) and failed strategic approaches (“trusting dialog and cooperation with dictatorships”) must be questioned in a public debate.
Otherwise, outdated mindsets, concepts and strategies will always prevail. Scholz’s naive travel diplomacy in China has shown this. More realistic approaches, such as the mantra “peace through strength,” coupled with strengthening industrial competitiveness and democratic resilience, are urgently needed so that Germany can better assert itself against the Chinese autocracy in the future.
Andreas Fulda is a political scientist and China scholar. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Nottingham. His latest book “Germany and China: How Entanglement Undermines Freedom, Prosperity and Security” will be published by Bloomsbury on May 30.
Would you have recognized it? The night sky above Chongqing is illuminated by a choreography of 500 drones dancing in the air to entertain the crowds.
The use of drones has come a long way in China. They deliver food, extinguish building fires or paint silhouettes in the night. In Shenzhen, 2,000 drones were deployed at the Dragon Boat Festival to create a dancing dragon at lofty heights.
You might almost get the impression that there’s a permanent show going on here called “China Incompetence.” The latest episode is set in France. Even before Xi Jinping’s arrival in Paris, President Emmanuel Macron already broadcasted his demands on the French media. So far, so good. At the same time, however, he assured the People’s Republic that China was needed to solve the world’s problems.
As true as this statement may be, as wrong it is to keep repeating it. China does not need Macron, Olaf Scholz or anyone else to reaffirm its own importance. This will not make China any more cooperative. Instead, Xi Jinping once again gets the impression that he is free to parade the Europeans around the stage.
Let’s do the cross-check. China needs Europe just as much as the other way around. The country needs European investment, European research, European consumers and European expertise in order to get a grip on its structural problems on many levels. When was the last time Xi Jinping explicitly said “China needs Europe” in public? Probably a very long time ago. Xi knows why.
Gabriel Bub analyzes how Macron fared on the first day of Xi’s visit. Meanwhile, the author of today’s opinion, political scientist Andreas Fulda, also assesses Germany’s China policy as naive. Fulda argues that Berlin not only ignores critical China expertise in many key political positions, it even deems it undesirable. He believes Scholz has already shelved the German government’s China strategy.
During Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris on Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron attempted to achieve harmony in order to win China’s president over for a possible mediation in the Ukraine war. With some success, at least. In addition to various economic agreements in aviation and battery production, Xi at least pledged his support for Macron’s wish for a ceasefire during the Olympic Games from 26 July to 11 August in Paris. If the weapons were actually to be laid down during the Games, it would be a great success for Macron. However, Putin is unlikely to go along with this.
While Macron cajoled the Chinese President in Paris and praised “the commitment of the Chinese authorities to refrain from selling any weapons or aid to Moscow and to strictly control the export of dual-use goods,” EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen chose a very tough tone. At the trilateral meeting at midday, she emphasized to the Chinese President that too many Chinese dual-use goods were still being discovered on Ukrainian battlefields. As this is an existential issue for Ukraine and Europe, “this does affect the EU-China relations.”
Another topic was Chinese overcapacity. “Chinese subsidized products (…) such as the electric vehicles or, for example, steel are flooding the European market,” von der Leyen said. The world “cannot absorb” China’s production growth. That is why she “encouraged” the Chinese government to tackle this overcapacity. “We will defend our companies; we will defend our economies,” she said. Europe would not hesitate to make “tough decisions needed to protect its economy and its security.”
After all, French volume manufacturers such as Renault and Stellantis, in particular, suffer from the offensive by Chinese manufacturers, who have entered the French market with aggressive prices. The EU Commission is expected to decide by mid-July on imposing anti-subsidy duties on EVs imported from China. The French government has reportedly been repeatedly pushing for this.
Germany’s premium manufacturers, on the other hand, reject such anti-subsidy tariffs. On the one hand, they could be affected themselves, as Mercedes, VW and BMW also manufacture EVs in China. On the other hand, they fear Chinese retaliation against combustion vehicles sold by German manufacturers in China. The EU already imposes a ten percent import duty on Chinese EVs.
Macron and von der Leyen wanted to influence Xi to do more to stop the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s response was sobering. During the meeting, he repeatedly stated that “China is not at the origin of this crisis, nor is it a participant.” In a guest commentary for Le Figaro on Monday, Xi had already pointed out that he had already insisted “that nuclear weapons should not be used.” And that he is fully aware that the war in Ukraine is causing upheaval in Europe.
While the Chinese president likes to pretend that his country is neutral between Russia and the West, China, in fact, supports its Russian ally. “We oppose using the Ukraine crisis to cast blame, smear a third country and incite a new Cold War,” Xi said in Paris on Monday.
Gesine Weber, Visiting Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies in New York, does not have high hopes for any Chinese mediation announcements anyway. “China likes to present itself as a responsible global player,” she says. This is in line with Chinese foreign policy and is “by no means something you should expect a major initiative from.”
“He doesn’t have the capacity to mediate because China is not neutral,” says Merics analyst Abigaël Vasselier. He would first have to recognize that it was a war in the first place. “He’s still talking about a crisis,” says Vasselier. China is helping Russia economically, helping Putin out of diplomatic isolation, and “making a difference on the battlefield in Ukraine.”
Fittingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to travel to China on 15 and 16 May. It will be his first trip abroad after his inauguration this Tuesday.
Macron would actually have preferred to display a signal of unity with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and von der Leyen. However, Scholz preferred to attend appointments in the Baltic States, even though Macron had tried to persuade the Federal Chancellor to attend the meeting at a joint dinner in Paris on Thursday. Scholz had already met the Chinese President during his trip to China in mid-April anyway.
“I think France wants to show that the French voice is also a European voice,” says Vasselier. That is why von der Leyen was also in Paris. ‘The fact that Scholz had a preparatory meeting with Macron is excellent, because it makes it possible to coordinate the messages that you want to send.’ She considers it problematic that the German Chancellor did not “Europeanize” his China visit by not including ministers from other EU countries or members of the EU Commission.
Macron would have gladly accompanied Scholz on his visit to Beijing in November 2022. Instead, the French president traveled with von der Leyen in April 2023 and turned Scholz and the United States against him for saying that Europeans should not become “vassals” of the USA. In his second Sorbonne speech in late April, Macron repeated his statement – with an almost identical choice of words.
Xi has cleverly chosen the dates for his talks. At the meeting with Macron, the two presidents celebrated the 60th anniversary of Franco-Chinese relations; during his visit to Serbia on Tuesday, Xi wants to highlight the double standards of the West 25 years after the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Before that, he will dine with Macron in the Pyrenees, where Macron’s grandmother lived.
China’s automotive industry is struggling with legal requirements. The multi-stage plan to achieve the carbon reduction targets stipulates that the average gasoline consumption of new cars must only be 4.6 liters per hundred kilometers from 2026 – this is the fifth stage. The sixth stage will come into force in 2030, when it is expected to be just 3.7 liters. This value is causing headaches for manufacturers, as many currently popular hybrid variants fail to meet this level. Alongside traditional battery vehicles and range extenders, hydrogen engines could be part of the solution.
Chinese manufacturers have stepped up their research accordingly. The US, Europe, and China regard hydrogen as a key technology for solving the mobility and energy transition problems across all sectors. It is suitable as an energy storage medium as well as a fuel and can help reduce carbon emissions under certain circumstances.
At the International Vienna Motor Symposium 2024, Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DMC) and Huazhong University of Science and Technology gave an insight into the current state of research. Despite the optimism of many at the conference, the hurdles on the road to a hydrogen future are tremendous. Every major Chinese manufacturer already has a fully developed unit that could quickly go into mass production. These include Dongfeng Motor, FAW-Hongqi, Geely, Guangzhou Automobile, BAIC and Great Wall Motor.
Three things stand out in the designs. Firstly, the engines have a displacement of 1.5 liters or 2.0 liters. This means the brands intend to fit them in cars rather than trucks or buses. However, experts argue that they would make much more sense for larger vehicles. China already has a strategy to use hydrogen to make the north of the country more mobile.
Secondly, the engines have a gross thermal efficiency (GTE) of between 42 percent (Great Wall) and 46 percent (Geely). This means less than half of the chemical energy stored in the hydrogen is converted into mechanical output – comparatively high for hydrogen engines. Previous calculations estimated between 30 and 40 percent. By comparison, the GTE for gasoline engines is around 20 to 25 percent. An electric car does not have a gross thermal efficiency since there is no combustion. Electric motors have an efficiency of around 85 to 95 percent.
Point three is a technological change in thinking. China’s new hydrogen engines do not use a fuel cell. In a fuel cell vehicle, an electric motor provides the propulsion. The fuel cell supplies the electricity, which is, in turn, fed from a hydrogen tank. On the other hand, the new hydrogen engines function like conventional gasoline engines – only with hydrogen.
Conventional combustion engines can be converted to process hydrogen with just a few modifications – a new injection system, spark plugs compatible with cold temperatures, a new turbocharger, adapted lubrication and adapted venting. The significant advantage for the industry is that the systems and production facilities can simply be reused. This makes the engines scalable and cost-effective. This, in turn, makes the technology interesting for meeting the fuel consumption targets stipulated by the government.
From the perspective of Chinese manufacturers, the move to hydrogen engines may seem logical. However, other industries and customers still have their doubts. This is because hydrogen production, storage and transport would have to be significantly expanded to make it usable for private transportation. After the gasoline supply and electric car charging systems, the People’s Republic would have to build a third, nationwide infrastructure network.
On top of this, green hydrogen – i.e., from renewable energies – plays no role in China. It is currently around four times more expensive than gray hydrogen from fossil fuels, which accounts for around 96 to 98 percent of the market. The production of gray hydrogen requires a lot of energy, which the country could use elsewhere. However, it is worth noting that – over the entire life cycle (production, 15 years of use, 225,000 kilometers) – even a hydrogen car running on gray hydrogen still emits around 40 percent less greenhouse gases than a conventional combustion engine.
The Chinese government has big plans for hydrogen. The People’s Republic currently has around 310 hydrogen filling stations. The plan is to have 1,000 by 2025. There are also plans for a hydrogen pipeline between Inner Mongolia and Beijing. The industry is also experimenting with adding hydrogen to natural gas pipelines.
At the Munich Security Conference in 2014, then-German President Joachim Gauck reminded Germans: “Thinking about existential questions must be at the heart of society.” Almost ten years later, Gauck expressed his disappointment that his appeal for Germany to become more involved in security policy went largely unheeded.
Few issues reveal this misguided development more clearly than Germany’s unresolved relationship with China. Even if the meaning of China competence is not always clear, there is a broad consensus in Germany that a solid knowledge of China’s strategies and the political logic of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is necessary.
Unfortunately, such debates have hardly been held in political Berlin since the publication of the China strategy last summer. And without addressing the issue, China competence cannot contribute to the political process. Leaders have an obligation to allow dissent and criticism of the current political course in public debates.
As the lengthy discussion about the role of Huawei and 5G has shown, industrial policy, safeguarding critical infrastructure and geopolitics cannot be separated in the 21st century. Systemic differences between democracies and autocracies should thus be clearly named and risks and conflicts must not be downplayed for tactical reasons. But this happens too rarely.
Olaf Scholz’s most recent trip to China left the impression that the German Chancellor has already shelved the China strategy he had adopted last year. In the Chancellery, Jens Ploetner advises Scholz. During a lecture at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in June 2022, the former diplomat argued that the systematic rivalry with China should “not be overemphasized” as this would complicate cooperative efforts in international dealings with the country. Is this the crux of the matter?
Ploetner’s speech clearly showed that the SPD-led Chancellery, in contrast to the Foreign Office under Annalena Baerbock, rejects a change of course in German China policy. This has also severely restricted the corridor for developing critical China expertise inside the German government. China experts must assume they will not be welcome in political Berlin if they strongly emphasize the systemic rivalry and express themselves too critically.
The adverse effects the suppression of critical debates by political decision-makers has on the development of a strategic culture and autocratic competence are also evident in Germany’s failed Russia policy. Uncomfortable criticism was dismissed and critics were excluded from future debates. Cautionary voices from Eastern European and Russian democrats were ignored. Is this pattern now repeating itself with China?
“To find its way through difficult times, Germany requires resources, above all intellectual resources – minds, institutions, forums,” said Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security Conference in 2014. Ten years later, it is clear that we regrettably have made little progress in our debate culture.
In 2018, the long-standing chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, published his book “World in Danger”. Inexplicably, he omitted China from the book, ostensibly “in order to have enough space to deal with the fundamental issues of war and peace and global governance.” In the same year, the US Chamber of Commerce awarded him the Transatlantic Partnership Award. As an award winner, he should have known that the USA’s increasing focus on China would also have implications for Europe’s long-term security.
Shortly before the Federal Chancellor’s Asia trip, Ischinger himself visited China. He wanted to persuade the Chinese leadership to get Russia to participate in a peace conference on Ukraine in Switzerland in June 2024. This contradicted his own assessment from September 2022, when he pleaded for a realistic evaluation of Xi Jinping’s autocracy. This implied that such an effort towards China would also remain wishful thinking in this regard.
When faced with criticism of this contradiction, Ischinger appears thin-skinned. He questioned the competence of China experts and blocked critical questions on social media. Yet, it should be possible to criticize the strategic thinking of German decision-makers without being ostracized.
The situation that ignorance and denial of reality in political Berlin has brought us can be seen in the daily news. Disproved narratives (“change through trade”) and failed strategic approaches (“trusting dialog and cooperation with dictatorships”) must be questioned in a public debate.
Otherwise, outdated mindsets, concepts and strategies will always prevail. Scholz’s naive travel diplomacy in China has shown this. More realistic approaches, such as the mantra “peace through strength,” coupled with strengthening industrial competitiveness and democratic resilience, are urgently needed so that Germany can better assert itself against the Chinese autocracy in the future.
Andreas Fulda is a political scientist and China scholar. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Nottingham. His latest book “Germany and China: How Entanglement Undermines Freedom, Prosperity and Security” will be published by Bloomsbury on May 30.
Would you have recognized it? The night sky above Chongqing is illuminated by a choreography of 500 drones dancing in the air to entertain the crowds.
The use of drones has come a long way in China. They deliver food, extinguish building fires or paint silhouettes in the night. In Shenzhen, 2,000 drones were deployed at the Dragon Boat Festival to create a dancing dragon at lofty heights.
