Nothing new in the East, and yet we are looking in suspense to Moscow. Since yesterday, China’s President Xi Jinping has been a guest in the Russian capital. The first rumored snippets of talks between him and Vladimir Putin already suggest that nothing will change about the “deep friendship” of two authoritarian leaders, nor about their rhetoric on the war in Ukraine.
And yet the visit is symbolic of change. Because it reminds us that China is serious about its pursuit of a new world order. And that Russia, given its economic and political vulnerability, plays at best a secondary role in Xi’s global plans. Putin’s cheerfulness at the opening talks in the Kremlin certainly should not mask this. It was rather the attempt by a complacent ruler to display strength through composure in the face of the real strongman.
The meaning of the visit is exorbitantly high in times of war. That is why our analyses today focus solely on the relationship between China and Russia – current, future and past. This is another sign for you, the reader, that the world is currently reordering itself and that the West needs to be aware of this.
To what extent the world will then actually be guided by Chinese interests is still anyone’s guess. Even the professed deep friendship between the two authoritarian leaders does not change this.
When Xi Jinping landed at Moscow’s Vnukovo government airport, he quickly got straight to the point. China is ready with Russia “to stand guard over the world order based on international law,” China’s leader said in Moscow on Monday.
That raises hopes – and worries at the same time. After all, at least the European order has been under massive pressure since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The battles have been ongoing for more than a year, and China’s position vis-à-vis Russia so far shows little sign that Xi would overly urge his old friend Putin to end the war quickly. On the other hand, China has recently successfully acted as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia and presented a 12-point plan for a political resolution of the Ukraine war.
“Of course, Ukraine will feature on the agenda,” Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday. “Exhaustive clarifications will be given by President Putin, so that President Xi can get a first-hand view of the current moment from the Russian side.” The issues raised in the Chinese paper “will inevitably be touched upon during the exchange of views” between Xi and Putin, Peskov said. In any case, the three-day meeting is “very important”.
During their talks on Monday in the Kremlin, Xi and Putin appeared emphatically united. Moscow and Beijing have “many common goals and tasks”, Putin said. Xi, in turn, praised his country’s “close relations” with Russia. “We are partners in comprehensive strategic cooperation,” the Chinese leader said, according to Russian state television.
There is no question that China has the potential to play a decisive role in resolving the war. This opinion is also shared in Ukraine. There, the Foreign Ministry appealed to Xi on Monday to use his visit to Moscow to help find a peaceful solution. “We expect that Beijing will use its influence on Moscow to force it to stop its aggressive war against Ukraine,” said ministry spokesman Oleg Nikolenko.
But will Xi use his influence on Putin to do so? China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” certainly does not suggest so. Fittingly, Chinese customs authorities reported on Monday that Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s top oil supplier this year.
And politically, too, China clearly backed Putin from the very beginning of the visit. The Foreign Ministry in Beijing criticized the International Criminal Court (ICC) for issuing an arrest warrant against Putin, saying it would be better to take a fair position toward Putin. At any rate, China will continue to take an objective and just role in the Ukraine crisis and play a constructive role in the peace talks, said the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Yurii Poita is correspondingly skeptical about Moscow these days. “Xi’s meeting with Putin shows that China will not distance itself from Russia,” the Ukrainian political scientist told Table.Media. On the contrary: Politics and trade will be deepened, and Russia will also be promised further economic and technological aid, suspects the political scientist from the Kyiv-based think tank New Geopolitics Research Network. “China is far less sensitive than other countries to Putin’s toxicity.”
Poita also believes that China is willing to play a more active role as a mediator. The problem: “On the one hand, Xi is hoping for concessions from Ukraine, but on the other hand he is not demanding that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine. This is not how mediation works,” says Poita.
The Secretary of the Ukrainian Security and Defence Council takes a similar view. Oleksiy Danilov wrote on Twitter on Monday: “The first and major point is the capitulation or withdrawal of the Russian occupation troops from territory in accordance with the norms of international law and the UN Charter.”
In fact, this is already the first serious problem in the Chinese Ukraine paper. As Vladimir Putin wrote in the Chinese People’s Daily over the weekend: “Russia is open to a settlement of the Ukrainian crisis by political-diplomatic means.” However, Ukraine would have to recognize the “new geopolitical realities”. This refers to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, in violation of international law, and the occupation of four Ukrainian regions last year. And Xi remains extremely vague about this in the People’s Daily: 中国发布《关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场》文件，吸纳了各方合理关切. (The document “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” has addressed the legitimate concerns of all parties).
The announcement that Xi wants to talk on the phone with Volodymyr Selenskyj after his visit to Moscow is also not very convincing for Poita. The call would certainly be an important diplomatic element, but would unfortunately probably not lead to any tangible result. “Russia is not ready for peace negotiations, but is only trying to take an operational pause to gain a foothold in the occupied territory of Ukraine, to recuperate and continue the military campaign. But without the prospect of peace, Ukraine will not freeze the conflict as China would like,” says Poita.
Add to this are the repeated reports of alleged arms deliveries from China to Russia. It is obvious that China is considering such an option, says Poita. Beijing wants to prevent Putin from losing this war – and possibly being overthrown as a result – at all costs. Supplying Russia with weapons would completely destroy China’s attempts to portray itself as a peaceful, responsible and constructive actor, says Poita. He therefore suspects a Chinese balancing act: To prop up Putin, China could secretly supply weapons to Russia – for example via North Korea, Iran or Belarus.
One thing is clear: Xi Jinping is not interested in Russia or Ukraine. The Chinese leader sees the enemy in Washington. And this is where he will carefully weigh up how he can best score points in the rivalry with the USA. Xi is trying to square the circle in Moscow: On the one hand, he wants to present himself as an honest broker and leader of the Global South; on the other hand, he wants to secure the (economic and political) gratitude of a submissive Russia. And last but not least, he wants to win the goodwill of Europe.
The world looks to Moscow with bated breath. What will the leaders of China and Russia decide? Will Xi exert pressure on Putin to finally end the war in Ukraine? Or what does Xi want to achieve in Moscow? Shortly before he arrived in Moscow, Xi Jinping provided the answer to at least the last question in the Russian Gazette newspaper: Xi wants to position China as the leader of a new world order.
There is no doubt that the Ukraine war will also play a role in the talks with Putin. But the article written under Xi’s name “My visit to Moscow is a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace” (我即将对俄罗斯的访问，是一次友谊之旅、合作之旅、和平之旅) clearly sets other priorities.
For example, Xi praises the fact that China and Russia are not only comprehensive strategic partners, but also leading countries in the world that pursue an independent foreign policy. He claims that China and Russia have a deep mutual trust in each other and have also developed a new model of relations between major states.
With these words, Xi is basically pointing at Europe. From China’s point of view, the EU is an appendage of American foreign policy. According to Beijing, Europe should finally adopt its own stance – just as China and Russia are apparently doing.
It seems Xi assumes to receive broad approval and support from Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The Sino-Russian relationship is guided by a vision of lasting friendship and win-win cooperation, he said. “We firmly support each other in following a development path suited to our respective national realities,” Xi writes in the article, which was also published by the Chinese People’s Daily.
In this way, “China and Russia are firmly committed to safeguarding the UN-centered international system, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”. At the same time, Xi spoke out against a world order dominated by a single power.
国际社会清楚地认识到，世界上不存在高人一等的国家，不存在放之四海而皆准的国家治理模式，不存在由某个国家说了算的国际秩序。(The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others).
This refers to the USA, which Beijing and Moscow consider to be patronizing and oppressive of other countries. China and Russia, however, would seek genuine multilateralism, more democracy in international relations and a new type of international relations.
Putin writes the following fitting line in the Chinese People’s Daily: “Together with like-minded actors, have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain ‘rules’ serving the needs of the ‘golden billion’.” The “golden billion” are the wealthy, Western-oriented countries. Specifically, Putin accuses the USA of trying to keep Russia and China down.
In addition, Putin and Xi explain how the war in Ukraine could end in their view. For this to happen, Ukraine would first have to recognize the “new geopolitical realities”, Putin wrote in his article. This is in reference to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – which violated international law – and the occupation of four Ukrainian regions last year.
The Russian President praised China’s “constructive role” in the Ukraine war in the Chinese People’s Daily. Other countries, however, would only issue ultimatums to Russia. Such demands only show that these countries “have no interest in trying to find a solution”.
Xi, meanwhile, highlights China’s role as an honest broker. 中方始终着眼事情本身的是非曲直，秉持客观公正立场，积极劝和促谈 (“China has all along upheld an objective and impartial position based on the merits of the issue, and actively promoted peace talks.”). Any settlement of the Ukraine conflict should respect the goals and principles of the UN Charter. However, “the legitimate security concerns of all countries” should be taken into account.
Xi leaves no doubt that China will provide further impetus for international politics in the future.
未来，我们将坚定不移推进中国式现代化事业，努力实现高质量发展，扩大高水平对外开放，相信这将为包括俄罗斯在内的世界各国提供新的发展机遇。
“Going forward, we will steadfastly advance the cause of Chinese modernization, strive to realize high-quality development, and expand high-standard opening up. I believe that this will bring new development opportunities to Russia and all countries in the world.”
13 August 1969 is considered a milestone of hostilities between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. At that time, Soviet forces killed more than two dozen Chinese soldiers after the latter had repeatedly crossed the border into the Kazakh part of the Soviet Union. The Tielieketi incident not only worsened relations between the two states. For a few weeks, even a nuclear war between China and Russia seemed possible.
Two weeks after the incident, the Americans revealed to the public that Moscow had put a nuclear first strike against a Chinese nuclear facility in Xinjiang on the table. The Soviets were discussing a possible attack on China with several Eastern European allies at the time.
The revelation by the US State Department did not cause suspicion in Beijing at all. Under dictator Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership had been acutely aware over the preceding months that the Soviets were considering the use of nuclear weapons. Numerous sources from the time indicate that Beijing was well aware of this eventuality. However, the US publication suddenly made this option seem more threatening and credible.
That such tensions could arise between two communist states was hardly imaginable 20 years earlier. When Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic in 1949, the Soviets were considered good friends. Especially since they had supported Mao’s struggle against Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese nationalists. In February 1950, the two sides had even signed a treaty of friendship that obligated the partners to remain loyal to the alliance for 30 years and provide mutual military support in the event of an attack by their common enemy Japan or a state allied with Japan.
But with the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953, the relationship changed. His successor, Khrushchev, was far more critical of the years under Stalin than Mao in Beijing thought reasonable. Khrushchev condemned Stalin’s policies as crimes, while Mao maintained that Stalin’s work had been largely right. This skeptical view towards Moscow grew into a downright resentment, which gradually led to an estrangement between the two governments.
As early as 1954, Khrushchev had predicted after a trip to Beijing that a conflict with China was inevitable. Meanwhile, Beijing questioned the Soviet party leader’s suitability as a leader of the global communist movement. “The so-called de-Stalinization thus is simply de-Marxification, it is revisionism,” Mao said at the time.
The tensions grew into a military threat in the 1960s. China’s ambitious nuclear program, which led the People’s Republic into a gigantic famine during the Great Leap Forward, showed its first successes in the middle of the decade. In the Soviet Union, however, the progressive nuclearization of its neighbor was considered problematic.
Military presence was constantly increased along the 4,380-kilometer border between the two countries. The growing distrustful and hostile atmosphere escalated in the winter of 1969 when 31 Soviet border guards died and 14 were injured on 2 March at the Ussuri border river, separating China’s northeastern province of Heilongjiang from Russia. How many Chinese were killed in the fighting was never made public.
On the surface, the conflict was about the status of an island in the river. But in fact, the petty territorial dispute brought latent hostilities into the open. In the following months, there were repeated battles between the Soviets and the Chinese, culminating in the skirmish of 13 August.
Moscow’s diplomatic move to discuss the nuclear card with its allies was met with concern but also defiance in Beijing. The People’s Republic planned to counter the Soviets’ superiority in the long term with a sheer endless mass of human war material. Mao Zedong would also have responded to a possible nuclear attack with conventional warfare, which would have been used to wear down the enemy for years.
The fact that it did not come to this was due to the interest of both states in preventing disaster. In secret negotiations, the Soviets and Chinese agreed on a ceasefire along their shared border. A nuclear escalation was averted. However, during this process, Beijing decided to move closer to the USA. The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the gradual economic integration of China into the broader global community created prospects that would have been destroyed by a nuclear war.
It was not until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 that the territorial conflict over the island in the border river became an issue again. In 1995, Russia recognized China’s claim over the small area. A corresponding treaty has been in force since 2005. The pacification between the two states at that time provides an important mosaic stone for the foundation of today’s close ties between Moscow and Beijing.
As a journalist, Philipp Mattheistraveledtravelled to many parts of the globe. He was a correspondent in Turkey and the Middle East. “But everything seems small compared to China,” he says. China and the West’s relationship to China’s rise, he says, is the big story of the 21st century.
After studying philosophy in Munich and training at the German School of Journalism, he spent five years in Shanghai as a correspondent for the business weekly Wirtschaftswoche. “The fact that I simply moved to Shanghai back then, without a job, seems naïve to me in retrospect,” Mattheis says. But it worked out. Not even half a year passed before Wirtschaftswoche signed him on. In 2016, he moved from Shanghai to Istanbul, and in 2019, back to China, this time for the foreign editorial department of German magazines Stern and Capital. “To travel, to be able to follow one’s own curiosity and report about it, I still consider it a gift.”
After almost ten years abroad, the pandemic has “washed Mattheis back to Germany,” as he says – he currently lives in Munich. His new book “Die dreckige Seidenstraße” (The Dirty Silk Road) will be published at the end of May. In it, he talks about the billions China has invested worldwide since 2013, primarily in emerging countries, in order to assert its economic and political influence. “It’s not just about negative effects, as the title might suggest, but a multi-layered view.”
Mattheis has traveled to many countries along the New Silk Road. “I wanted to find out what was really behind the Chinese investments and what the money was doing in the recipient countries.” For his research, he traveled to Kenya, Kazakhstan, Iran, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Laos, among other places, looking at local projects and talking to the people involved.
With his research and books, Mattheis wants to educate people about China, make hidden mechanisms and consequences visible, and encourage political responsibility. Two years ago, his first China book, “A People are disappearing. How we watch China commit genocide against the Uyghurs,” and he is currently already working on another book project. “For that, I want to spend some time in Taiwan and East Asia this year.”
Whether he will receive another visa for the Mainland is not yet certain. His memories of Shanghai are mixed, but formative. “I like to think back to the sultry summer nights when we were still eating noodles late at night on little plastic chairs by the street,” he says. But he also remembers the smoggy, gray winters in poorly insulated, damp buildings. At any rate, there was never any boredom: “China is constantly changing.” Svenja Napp
Spring is here. Here, pink blossoms at Ming City Wall Site Park in Beijing signal the arrival of the warm months.
Nothing new in the East, and yet we are looking in suspense to Moscow. Since yesterday, China’s President Xi Jinping has been a guest in the Russian capital. The first rumored snippets of talks between him and Vladimir Putin already suggest that nothing will change about the “deep friendship” of two authoritarian leaders, nor about their rhetoric on the war in Ukraine.
And yet the visit is symbolic of change. Because it reminds us that China is serious about its pursuit of a new world order. And that Russia, given its economic and political vulnerability, plays at best a secondary role in Xi’s global plans. Putin’s cheerfulness at the opening talks in the Kremlin certainly should not mask this. It was rather the attempt by a complacent ruler to display strength through composure in the face of the real strongman.
The meaning of the visit is exorbitantly high in times of war. That is why our analyses today focus solely on the relationship between China and Russia – current, future and past. This is another sign for you, the reader, that the world is currently reordering itself and that the West needs to be aware of this.
To what extent the world will then actually be guided by Chinese interests is still anyone’s guess. Even the professed deep friendship between the two authoritarian leaders does not change this.
When Xi Jinping landed at Moscow’s Vnukovo government airport, he quickly got straight to the point. China is ready with Russia “to stand guard over the world order based on international law,” China’s leader said in Moscow on Monday.
That raises hopes – and worries at the same time. After all, at least the European order has been under massive pressure since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The battles have been ongoing for more than a year, and China’s position vis-à-vis Russia so far shows little sign that Xi would overly urge his old friend Putin to end the war quickly. On the other hand, China has recently successfully acted as a mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia and presented a 12-point plan for a political resolution of the Ukraine war.
“Of course, Ukraine will feature on the agenda,” Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Monday. “Exhaustive clarifications will be given by President Putin, so that President Xi can get a first-hand view of the current moment from the Russian side.” The issues raised in the Chinese paper “will inevitably be touched upon during the exchange of views” between Xi and Putin, Peskov said. In any case, the three-day meeting is “very important”.
During their talks on Monday in the Kremlin, Xi and Putin appeared emphatically united. Moscow and Beijing have “many common goals and tasks”, Putin said. Xi, in turn, praised his country’s “close relations” with Russia. “We are partners in comprehensive strategic cooperation,” the Chinese leader said, according to Russian state television.
There is no question that China has the potential to play a decisive role in resolving the war. This opinion is also shared in Ukraine. There, the Foreign Ministry appealed to Xi on Monday to use his visit to Moscow to help find a peaceful solution. “We expect that Beijing will use its influence on Moscow to force it to stop its aggressive war against Ukraine,” said ministry spokesman Oleg Nikolenko.
But will Xi use his influence on Putin to do so? China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” certainly does not suggest so. Fittingly, Chinese customs authorities reported on Monday that Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as China’s top oil supplier this year.
And politically, too, China clearly backed Putin from the very beginning of the visit. The Foreign Ministry in Beijing criticized the International Criminal Court (ICC) for issuing an arrest warrant against Putin, saying it would be better to take a fair position toward Putin. At any rate, China will continue to take an objective and just role in the Ukraine crisis and play a constructive role in the peace talks, said the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Yurii Poita is correspondingly skeptical about Moscow these days. “Xi’s meeting with Putin shows that China will not distance itself from Russia,” the Ukrainian political scientist told Table.Media. On the contrary: Politics and trade will be deepened, and Russia will also be promised further economic and technological aid, suspects the political scientist from the Kyiv-based think tank New Geopolitics Research Network. “China is far less sensitive than other countries to Putin’s toxicity.”
Poita also believes that China is willing to play a more active role as a mediator. The problem: “On the one hand, Xi is hoping for concessions from Ukraine, but on the other hand he is not demanding that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukraine. This is not how mediation works,” says Poita.
The Secretary of the Ukrainian Security and Defence Council takes a similar view. Oleksiy Danilov wrote on Twitter on Monday: “The first and major point is the capitulation or withdrawal of the Russian occupation troops from territory in accordance with the norms of international law and the UN Charter.”
In fact, this is already the first serious problem in the Chinese Ukraine paper. As Vladimir Putin wrote in the Chinese People’s Daily over the weekend: “Russia is open to a settlement of the Ukrainian crisis by political-diplomatic means.” However, Ukraine would have to recognize the “new geopolitical realities”. This refers to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, in violation of international law, and the occupation of four Ukrainian regions last year. And Xi remains extremely vague about this in the People’s Daily: 中国发布《关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场》文件，吸纳了各方合理关切. (The document “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis” has addressed the legitimate concerns of all parties).
The announcement that Xi wants to talk on the phone with Volodymyr Selenskyj after his visit to Moscow is also not very convincing for Poita. The call would certainly be an important diplomatic element, but would unfortunately probably not lead to any tangible result. “Russia is not ready for peace negotiations, but is only trying to take an operational pause to gain a foothold in the occupied territory of Ukraine, to recuperate and continue the military campaign. But without the prospect of peace, Ukraine will not freeze the conflict as China would like,” says Poita.
Add to this are the repeated reports of alleged arms deliveries from China to Russia. It is obvious that China is considering such an option, says Poita. Beijing wants to prevent Putin from losing this war – and possibly being overthrown as a result – at all costs. Supplying Russia with weapons would completely destroy China’s attempts to portray itself as a peaceful, responsible and constructive actor, says Poita. He therefore suspects a Chinese balancing act: To prop up Putin, China could secretly supply weapons to Russia – for example via North Korea, Iran or Belarus.
One thing is clear: Xi Jinping is not interested in Russia or Ukraine. The Chinese leader sees the enemy in Washington. And this is where he will carefully weigh up how he can best score points in the rivalry with the USA. Xi is trying to square the circle in Moscow: On the one hand, he wants to present himself as an honest broker and leader of the Global South; on the other hand, he wants to secure the (economic and political) gratitude of a submissive Russia. And last but not least, he wants to win the goodwill of Europe.
The world looks to Moscow with bated breath. What will the leaders of China and Russia decide? Will Xi exert pressure on Putin to finally end the war in Ukraine? Or what does Xi want to achieve in Moscow? Shortly before he arrived in Moscow, Xi Jinping provided the answer to at least the last question in the Russian Gazette newspaper: Xi wants to position China as the leader of a new world order.
There is no doubt that the Ukraine war will also play a role in the talks with Putin. But the article written under Xi’s name “My visit to Moscow is a journey of friendship, cooperation and peace” (我即将对俄罗斯的访问，是一次友谊之旅、合作之旅、和平之旅) clearly sets other priorities.
For example, Xi praises the fact that China and Russia are not only comprehensive strategic partners, but also leading countries in the world that pursue an independent foreign policy. He claims that China and Russia have a deep mutual trust in each other and have also developed a new model of relations between major states.
With these words, Xi is basically pointing at Europe. From China’s point of view, the EU is an appendage of American foreign policy. According to Beijing, Europe should finally adopt its own stance – just as China and Russia are apparently doing.
It seems Xi assumes to receive broad approval and support from Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The Sino-Russian relationship is guided by a vision of lasting friendship and win-win cooperation, he said. “We firmly support each other in following a development path suited to our respective national realities,” Xi writes in the article, which was also published by the Chinese People’s Daily.
In this way, “China and Russia are firmly committed to safeguarding the UN-centered international system, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms of international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”. At the same time, Xi spoke out against a world order dominated by a single power.
国际社会清楚地认识到，世界上不存在高人一等的国家，不存在放之四海而皆准的国家治理模式，不存在由某个国家说了算的国际秩序。(The international community has recognized that no country is superior to others).
This refers to the USA, which Beijing and Moscow consider to be patronizing and oppressive of other countries. China and Russia, however, would seek genuine multilateralism, more democracy in international relations and a new type of international relations.
Putin writes the following fitting line in the Chinese People’s Daily: “Together with like-minded actors, have consistently advocated the shaping of a more just multipolar world order based on international law rather than certain ‘rules’ serving the needs of the ‘golden billion’.” The “golden billion” are the wealthy, Western-oriented countries. Specifically, Putin accuses the USA of trying to keep Russia and China down.
In addition, Putin and Xi explain how the war in Ukraine could end in their view. For this to happen, Ukraine would first have to recognize the “new geopolitical realities”, Putin wrote in his article. This is in reference to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – which violated international law – and the occupation of four Ukrainian regions last year.
The Russian President praised China’s “constructive role” in the Ukraine war in the Chinese People’s Daily. Other countries, however, would only issue ultimatums to Russia. Such demands only show that these countries “have no interest in trying to find a solution”.
Xi, meanwhile, highlights China’s role as an honest broker. 中方始终着眼事情本身的是非曲直，秉持客观公正立场，积极劝和促谈 (“China has all along upheld an objective and impartial position based on the merits of the issue, and actively promoted peace talks.”). Any settlement of the Ukraine conflict should respect the goals and principles of the UN Charter. However, “the legitimate security concerns of all countries” should be taken into account.
Xi leaves no doubt that China will provide further impetus for international politics in the future.
未来，我们将坚定不移推进中国式现代化事业，努力实现高质量发展，扩大高水平对外开放，相信这将为包括俄罗斯在内的世界各国提供新的发展机遇。
“Going forward, we will steadfastly advance the cause of Chinese modernization, strive to realize high-quality development, and expand high-standard opening up. I believe that this will bring new development opportunities to Russia and all countries in the world.”
13 August 1969 is considered a milestone of hostilities between the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. At that time, Soviet forces killed more than two dozen Chinese soldiers after the latter had repeatedly crossed the border into the Kazakh part of the Soviet Union. The Tielieketi incident not only worsened relations between the two states. For a few weeks, even a nuclear war between China and Russia seemed possible.
Two weeks after the incident, the Americans revealed to the public that Moscow had put a nuclear first strike against a Chinese nuclear facility in Xinjiang on the table. The Soviets were discussing a possible attack on China with several Eastern European allies at the time.
The revelation by the US State Department did not cause suspicion in Beijing at all. Under dictator Mao Zedong, the Chinese leadership had been acutely aware over the preceding months that the Soviets were considering the use of nuclear weapons. Numerous sources from the time indicate that Beijing was well aware of this eventuality. However, the US publication suddenly made this option seem more threatening and credible.
That such tensions could arise between two communist states was hardly imaginable 20 years earlier. When Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic in 1949, the Soviets were considered good friends. Especially since they had supported Mao’s struggle against Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese nationalists. In February 1950, the two sides had even signed a treaty of friendship that obligated the partners to remain loyal to the alliance for 30 years and provide mutual military support in the event of an attack by their common enemy Japan or a state allied with Japan.
But with the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953, the relationship changed. His successor, Khrushchev, was far more critical of the years under Stalin than Mao in Beijing thought reasonable. Khrushchev condemned Stalin’s policies as crimes, while Mao maintained that Stalin’s work had been largely right. This skeptical view towards Moscow grew into a downright resentment, which gradually led to an estrangement between the two governments.
As early as 1954, Khrushchev had predicted after a trip to Beijing that a conflict with China was inevitable. Meanwhile, Beijing questioned the Soviet party leader’s suitability as a leader of the global communist movement. “The so-called de-Stalinization thus is simply de-Marxification, it is revisionism,” Mao said at the time.
The tensions grew into a military threat in the 1960s. China’s ambitious nuclear program, which led the People’s Republic into a gigantic famine during the Great Leap Forward, showed its first successes in the middle of the decade. In the Soviet Union, however, the progressive nuclearization of its neighbor was considered problematic.
Military presence was constantly increased along the 4,380-kilometer border between the two countries. The growing distrustful and hostile atmosphere escalated in the winter of 1969 when 31 Soviet border guards died and 14 were injured on 2 March at the Ussuri border river, separating China’s northeastern province of Heilongjiang from Russia. How many Chinese were killed in the fighting was never made public.
On the surface, the conflict was about the status of an island in the river. But in fact, the petty territorial dispute brought latent hostilities into the open. In the following months, there were repeated battles between the Soviets and the Chinese, culminating in the skirmish of 13 August.
Moscow’s diplomatic move to discuss the nuclear card with its allies was met with concern but also defiance in Beijing. The People’s Republic planned to counter the Soviets’ superiority in the long term with a sheer endless mass of human war material. Mao Zedong would also have responded to a possible nuclear attack with conventional warfare, which would have been used to wear down the enemy for years.
The fact that it did not come to this was due to the interest of both states in preventing disaster. In secret negotiations, the Soviets and Chinese agreed on a ceasefire along their shared border. A nuclear escalation was averted. However, during this process, Beijing decided to move closer to the USA. The establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972 and the gradual economic integration of China into the broader global community created prospects that would have been destroyed by a nuclear war.
It was not until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 that the territorial conflict over the island in the border river became an issue again. In 1995, Russia recognized China’s claim over the small area. A corresponding treaty has been in force since 2005. The pacification between the two states at that time provides an important mosaic stone for the foundation of today’s close ties between Moscow and Beijing.
As a journalist, Philipp Mattheistraveledtravelled to many parts of the globe. He was a correspondent in Turkey and the Middle East. “But everything seems small compared to China,” he says. China and the West’s relationship to China’s rise, he says, is the big story of the 21st century.
After studying philosophy in Munich and training at the German School of Journalism, he spent five years in Shanghai as a correspondent for the business weekly Wirtschaftswoche. “The fact that I simply moved to Shanghai back then, without a job, seems naïve to me in retrospect,” Mattheis says. But it worked out. Not even half a year passed before Wirtschaftswoche signed him on. In 2016, he moved from Shanghai to Istanbul, and in 2019, back to China, this time for the foreign editorial department of German magazines Stern and Capital. “To travel, to be able to follow one’s own curiosity and report about it, I still consider it a gift.”
After almost ten years abroad, the pandemic has “washed Mattheis back to Germany,” as he says – he currently lives in Munich. His new book “Die dreckige Seidenstraße” (The Dirty Silk Road) will be published at the end of May. In it, he talks about the billions China has invested worldwide since 2013, primarily in emerging countries, in order to assert its economic and political influence. “It’s not just about negative effects, as the title might suggest, but a multi-layered view.”
Mattheis has traveled to many countries along the New Silk Road. “I wanted to find out what was really behind the Chinese investments and what the money was doing in the recipient countries.” For his research, he traveled to Kenya, Kazakhstan, Iran, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Laos, among other places, looking at local projects and talking to the people involved.
With his research and books, Mattheis wants to educate people about China, make hidden mechanisms and consequences visible, and encourage political responsibility. Two years ago, his first China book, “A People are disappearing. How we watch China commit genocide against the Uyghurs,” and he is currently already working on another book project. “For that, I want to spend some time in Taiwan and East Asia this year.”
Whether he will receive another visa for the Mainland is not yet certain. His memories of Shanghai are mixed, but formative. “I like to think back to the sultry summer nights when we were still eating noodles late at night on little plastic chairs by the street,” he says. But he also remembers the smoggy, gray winters in poorly insulated, damp buildings. At any rate, there was never any boredom: “China is constantly changing.” Svenja Napp
Spring is here. Here, pink blossoms at Ming City Wall Site Park in Beijing signal the arrival of the warm months.
