The long overdue Third Plenum finally begins today. This plenary CPC Central Committee session was expected to be held last fall. There has been much speculation about the reasons for the delay of this event, which will set the future economic course. Now, the question is what Xi Jinping’s leadership will adopt. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has written down what exactly will be important at this mighty economic gathering and why the word “reform” has completely lost all meaning.
China’s influence is growing, particularly in the countries of the Global South. This is one reason why, and in view of the shrinking budget of the German Development Ministry, the Federation of German Industries has called for a paradigm shift in development policy. Among other things, the Association calls for subsidized Chinese state-owned companies to be excluded from international procurement processes. In an interview with Arne Schuette, BDI expert Vanessa Wannicke explains why German and European companies would otherwise not stand a real chance.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will meet from Monday to Thursday for the Third Plenum, one of the rare plenary sessions attended by all 276 members. The topic is the future direction of the economy. Two main announcements are on the agenda:
Both papers will be written exclusively in heavily coded CCP terminology. It is worth taking a close look. Much hinges on the CCP’s economic policy ideas, including for the German economy. These are the points to keep an eye on:
The time when various factions in the Party, from neoliberals to genuine socialists, fought for dominance and compromise is over. There is only one powerful group left: the one around Xi Jinping. This means that the Third Plenum will also be a Xi Jinping show.
This requires a different way of looking at the substantive value of CPC meetings. After legendary Third Plenums such as 1978 (“reform and opening up,” condemnation of the Cultural Revolution) or 1993 (introduction of the “socialist market economy”), China watchers had associated the format with the hope of liberal forms.
Even if there may well still be pockets of resistance within the Party: In the end, the only thing that will come out is what Xi wants and what people already know from him. Especially as the draft of the final document has long been available and only needs to be approved. Xi’s priorities:
There will again be a wild mix of Marxist phrases alongside those from the Mao era, plus some Confucianism and Xi Jinping’s new inventions. The overarching aim of the propaganda efforts is to keep people in line and loyal despite tough times.
This gives rise to initial conclusions. Xi Jinping is first and foremost a power politician. He has positioned his country against the Western countries and wants to make it more conflict-capable. This is why Xi tends to emphasize economic independence. Even his “dual circulation” concept envisages an inner cycle in which China’s economy is a planet of its own that can foremost do everything itself. Trade with the rest of the world comes as a second cycle. Instead of more opportunities for international companies, the focus will once again be on a trend towards greater autonomy. The USA, with its technology sanctions, reinforces and justifies this view.
There will be much talk of reform in the final document. And business representatives will encounter many formulations that sound promising to their ears. However, “reform,” as used today, does not necessarily mean change, but can also mean “business as usual.” In other words, the word has been completely stripped of its meaning and has become a kind of religious phrase.
The rule of thumb is: Promises of opening up and deregulation are just a pretty facade, while anything that points to centralization and control can be taken at face value.
But of course, there is also a genuine economic policy program. China’s leading technological position reflects the resounding success of the “Made in China 2025” catch-up program, which was, admittedly, initiated by Xi’s economically savvy rival Li Keqiang as Premier.
The collapse of the property market and its negative impact on economic sentiment, the job market, gross domestic product and consumption makes a growth-oriented program necessary. In all likelihood, Xi will focus on further investment in the technology sector, as this has worked reasonably well so far as an alternative to construction.
However, the effects will continue to include high capacities in high-value sectors where Germany has to defend its leading position. Specifically, investment means more research and larger plants – in other words, even tougher competition for Germany.
These are the goals that the propaganda media have already announced as the expected outcomes of the Plenum:
Behind this is also the “new-type industrialization” 新型工业化, a concept from 2002. These are the key points:
This means that hopes for more openness towards foreign countries will likely be disappointed.
The financing of local authorities such as provinces, cities and municipalities has long been out of balance. The state needs fresh sources of income. In the past, these were land sales at ever-higher prices. However, this bubble has burst. At the same time, the CCP does not want to stifle economic dynamism by imposing excessive taxes. The Plenum will attempt to square the circle here.
The Third Plenum may have the image of being an economic plenum. However, on average, the CPC only meets about once every year. It goes without saying that important current issues are always discussed at all plenums. The think tank Merics suggests that Xi is particularly keen to focus on streamlining the organization of the armed forces. In times of war and conflict, China wants to look strong. Added to this are Xi’s ambitions to control Taiwan. However, the army continues to be plagued by systemic corruption scandals. Xi’s remedy at the Plenum will probably be tighter control – not more transparency. To this day, the resignations and dismissals of generals continue to puzzle observers at home and abroad.
Ms. Wannicke, the BDI recently published a position paper calling for reorienting German development policy. What do you think is going wrong?
We believe that when development cooperation projects end, their successes tend to end, too. In order to be more effective, more long-term programs and investments are needed. In addition, the context in which development cooperation occurs has changed fundamentally. We should respond to this. One example is the Chinese dominance in international project tenders. The Chinese are very aggressive in Africa and too often win tenders that are funded with Western money. For us, this begs the question: How can we structure international procurement procedures in such a way that German and European companies once again have a real competitive chance?
What does Chinese dominance look like?
For example, German companies apply for international tenders, for example via KfW or the European Investment Bank EIB. If they then realize during the process that a certain number of Chinese state-owned companies are also bidding, they sometimes withdraw again. The reason is that they now know from experience that they cannot keep up with the subsidized companies, which, of course, have completely different cost structures.
How do you intend to break this dominance?
Our current position paper calls for excluding subsidized Chinese state-owned companies from these procurement processes. Of course, this requires scrutinizing the ownership structures of the bidding companies more closely. In times of global systemic competition, we should pay much more attention to this.
But surely Germany cannot influence the procurement procedures in African countries?
As part of government negotiations, we could certainly insist that the tendering organizations comply with binding criteria and conditions when using funds from Germany, Europe or multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. In general, we should utilize all the OECD’s scope for tied aid. Untied aid is no longer appropriate in many areas. After all, it presupposes a global level playing field that we no longer have today.
Don’t you see any risks? The Chinese will certainly not appreciate being excluded.
It would only be consistent because, after all, China also links most of its spending to its own economy.
Are there any less direct options?
Another lever would be to apply binding quality criteria in procurement procedures. We firmly believe that German and European companies are still ahead of the Chinese regarding labor and environmental standards and life cycle costs. It makes little sense to impose supply chain due diligence obligations on European companies and not, or only to a limited extent, monitor these in international tenders co-funded by Europe.
What is your message to the decision-makers at the BMZ?
We would like to see a more strategic development policy. Of course, we should serve the interests of our partner countries. But please also serve our own. This is urgently necessary given the systemic competition in which we find ourselves. Moreover, the BMZ and BMWK need to work much more closely together in order to finally advance the dovetailing of development policy and foreign trade promotion. If we want to mobilize private capital to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, we must make funding and hedging conditions even more competitive.
Vanessa Wannicke is a consultant for international cooperation, security, raw materials and space at the Federation of German Industries (BDI).
Let’s be honest: We all have a bit of a marketing strategist inside us who knows how to present ourselves well. And we generally know precisely which clientele we can best sell which product to. With Asian men – including Chinese men – 萌 méng – i.e., “cuteness” – is a great seller, at least when it is sold by female sales assistants. In other words, if you play it sweet, coquettish, cute-looking and adorable, you can win over the hearts of even the most muscular men in no time. In Chinese, this sales strategy is called 卖萌 màiméng – literally “selling cuteness.” It means deliberately playing cute to get what you want.
Alongside 撒娇 sājiāo (the art of acting like a spoiled child), 卖萌 màiméng is the second charm bazooka of the Chinese ladies’ world. Incidentally, both products also work really well with parents (when children are involved) and pet owners (from the perspective of the furry friends). So it’s no wonder that the WeChat auto mode displays a cuddly dog’s head with its tongue sticking out as the default meme when you type the keyword 卖萌 màiméng into the chat box.
However, “méng” is by no means the only character that the popular Chinese vocabulary blueprints have to offer. The bargain bin of linguistic clearance sales offers numerous other things that can be sold to men and women in day-to-day communication. In addition to 卖惨 màiméng, the manipulative psycho-products also include 卖惨 màicǎn “to sell misery” (fishing for sympathy) and 卖傻 màishǎ “to sell stupidity” (to play dumb).
Those who can masterfully juggle all these words may feel tempted to “sell cleverness” (卖乖 màiguāi), that is, to show off their wits or to “sell their mouth” (卖嘴 màizuǐ), to brag and show off.
On the job market, however, other talents are offered for sale. According to the Chinese dictionary, you can “sell art” (卖艺 màiyì – make a living from art), for example, the art of singing (卖唱 màichàng – sing for a living) or the art of writing or poetry (卖文 màiwén – make a living from writing). Those who make it big will hopefully end up selling seats (卖座 màizuò – to draw a large audience). Those who are less lucky, on the other hand, have no choice but to work themselves to the bone (卖苦力 mài kǔlì – to slave away for money physically), or even worse, to sell their lives (卖命 màimìng – to work oneself to the bone, literally: “to sell one’s life”).
Some people believe that shady deals are a shortcut to quick money. We enter dodgy market territory with sales vocabulary such as 卖狗皮膏药 mài gǒupí gāoyào – literally the sale of dog leather patches. So what is this all about? Well, originally, the term was used in China to describe dubious traveling healers who touted healing plasters with miraculous effects, supposedly made from dog skin. Over time, the term has taken on a derogatory meaning and today describes crooked racketeers who fool consumers with counterfeit or completely useless goods. In English, we know it as the similarly figurative (albeit somewhat outdated) expression “selling snake oil.”
Money can also be made in Mandarin by selling “joints.” If you have ever had a knee injury or dislocated a hip joint, you will know that you can only function properly if your joints are healthy. In Chinese, “joint sales” (卖关节 mài guānjié from 关节 guānjié “joint”) can help somewhat here – at least when it comes to business relationships. We are not talking about hip or knee joints here, but relationship hinges. To make a long story short: The term is simply a fancy phrase for accepting bribes and corruption.
Things get even more colorful with “spring selling,” a euphemism for the world’s oldest trade (卖春 màichūn – to prostitute oneself, prostitution, literally “selling the spring”). In this context, however, the term “selling meat” (卖肉màiròu) is often used in a less flowery way. A term that leads unsuspecting Chinese learners not to the deli counter, but straight into the red-light district. And you will finally get into trouble with the law if you dare to sell out your own country, called卖国 màiguó – the Chinese equivalent of “treason.”
But before we drift completely into the sinister realm, let’s get back to sales channels of a completely legal nature. If you want to turn odds and ends that you no longer need into cash in China, it’s best to throw the stuff into the maw of the “idle fish,” also known as 闲鱼 Xiányú. This is the name of the Alibaba Group’s trading platform, which specializes in buying and selling second-hand goods (二手 èrshǒu – second-hand). The app is China’s equivalent to eBay and Craigslist. Incidentally, the animal name is an allusion to the eponymous word 闲余 xiányú, “idle, idle, having free time.” And let’s be honest: what you buy and sell in your free time – whether it’s cuteness or second-hand socks – is luckily a private matter.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
When China began to open up to the West in the late 1980s, subcultural trends also found their way into the People’s Republic. To this day, punk rock has remained a fairly vibrant niche, which, depending on the founding legend, originated either in Beijing or Wuhan. Today, it even evolved into a small cultural export. For years, Chinese bands have been touring the globe, supported by a stable network of promoters. This month, two groups are touring Germany independently of each other: Dummy Toys from Qingdao and Gum Bleed from Beijing.
The long overdue Third Plenum finally begins today. This plenary CPC Central Committee session was expected to be held last fall. There has been much speculation about the reasons for the delay of this event, which will set the future economic course. Now, the question is what Xi Jinping’s leadership will adopt. Finn Mayer-Kuckuk has written down what exactly will be important at this mighty economic gathering and why the word “reform” has completely lost all meaning.
China’s influence is growing, particularly in the countries of the Global South. This is one reason why, and in view of the shrinking budget of the German Development Ministry, the Federation of German Industries has called for a paradigm shift in development policy. Among other things, the Association calls for subsidized Chinese state-owned companies to be excluded from international procurement processes. In an interview with Arne Schuette, BDI expert Vanessa Wannicke explains why German and European companies would otherwise not stand a real chance.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will meet from Monday to Thursday for the Third Plenum, one of the rare plenary sessions attended by all 276 members. The topic is the future direction of the economy. Two main announcements are on the agenda:
Both papers will be written exclusively in heavily coded CCP terminology. It is worth taking a close look. Much hinges on the CCP’s economic policy ideas, including for the German economy. These are the points to keep an eye on:
The time when various factions in the Party, from neoliberals to genuine socialists, fought for dominance and compromise is over. There is only one powerful group left: the one around Xi Jinping. This means that the Third Plenum will also be a Xi Jinping show.
This requires a different way of looking at the substantive value of CPC meetings. After legendary Third Plenums such as 1978 (“reform and opening up,” condemnation of the Cultural Revolution) or 1993 (introduction of the “socialist market economy”), China watchers had associated the format with the hope of liberal forms.
Even if there may well still be pockets of resistance within the Party: In the end, the only thing that will come out is what Xi wants and what people already know from him. Especially as the draft of the final document has long been available and only needs to be approved. Xi’s priorities:
There will again be a wild mix of Marxist phrases alongside those from the Mao era, plus some Confucianism and Xi Jinping’s new inventions. The overarching aim of the propaganda efforts is to keep people in line and loyal despite tough times.
This gives rise to initial conclusions. Xi Jinping is first and foremost a power politician. He has positioned his country against the Western countries and wants to make it more conflict-capable. This is why Xi tends to emphasize economic independence. Even his “dual circulation” concept envisages an inner cycle in which China’s economy is a planet of its own that can foremost do everything itself. Trade with the rest of the world comes as a second cycle. Instead of more opportunities for international companies, the focus will once again be on a trend towards greater autonomy. The USA, with its technology sanctions, reinforces and justifies this view.
There will be much talk of reform in the final document. And business representatives will encounter many formulations that sound promising to their ears. However, “reform,” as used today, does not necessarily mean change, but can also mean “business as usual.” In other words, the word has been completely stripped of its meaning and has become a kind of religious phrase.
The rule of thumb is: Promises of opening up and deregulation are just a pretty facade, while anything that points to centralization and control can be taken at face value.
But of course, there is also a genuine economic policy program. China’s leading technological position reflects the resounding success of the “Made in China 2025” catch-up program, which was, admittedly, initiated by Xi’s economically savvy rival Li Keqiang as Premier.
The collapse of the property market and its negative impact on economic sentiment, the job market, gross domestic product and consumption makes a growth-oriented program necessary. In all likelihood, Xi will focus on further investment in the technology sector, as this has worked reasonably well so far as an alternative to construction.
However, the effects will continue to include high capacities in high-value sectors where Germany has to defend its leading position. Specifically, investment means more research and larger plants – in other words, even tougher competition for Germany.
These are the goals that the propaganda media have already announced as the expected outcomes of the Plenum:
Behind this is also the “new-type industrialization” 新型工业化, a concept from 2002. These are the key points:
This means that hopes for more openness towards foreign countries will likely be disappointed.
The financing of local authorities such as provinces, cities and municipalities has long been out of balance. The state needs fresh sources of income. In the past, these were land sales at ever-higher prices. However, this bubble has burst. At the same time, the CCP does not want to stifle economic dynamism by imposing excessive taxes. The Plenum will attempt to square the circle here.
The Third Plenum may have the image of being an economic plenum. However, on average, the CPC only meets about once every year. It goes without saying that important current issues are always discussed at all plenums. The think tank Merics suggests that Xi is particularly keen to focus on streamlining the organization of the armed forces. In times of war and conflict, China wants to look strong. Added to this are Xi’s ambitions to control Taiwan. However, the army continues to be plagued by systemic corruption scandals. Xi’s remedy at the Plenum will probably be tighter control – not more transparency. To this day, the resignations and dismissals of generals continue to puzzle observers at home and abroad.
Ms. Wannicke, the BDI recently published a position paper calling for reorienting German development policy. What do you think is going wrong?
We believe that when development cooperation projects end, their successes tend to end, too. In order to be more effective, more long-term programs and investments are needed. In addition, the context in which development cooperation occurs has changed fundamentally. We should respond to this. One example is the Chinese dominance in international project tenders. The Chinese are very aggressive in Africa and too often win tenders that are funded with Western money. For us, this begs the question: How can we structure international procurement procedures in such a way that German and European companies once again have a real competitive chance?
What does Chinese dominance look like?
For example, German companies apply for international tenders, for example via KfW or the European Investment Bank EIB. If they then realize during the process that a certain number of Chinese state-owned companies are also bidding, they sometimes withdraw again. The reason is that they now know from experience that they cannot keep up with the subsidized companies, which, of course, have completely different cost structures.
How do you intend to break this dominance?
Our current position paper calls for excluding subsidized Chinese state-owned companies from these procurement processes. Of course, this requires scrutinizing the ownership structures of the bidding companies more closely. In times of global systemic competition, we should pay much more attention to this.
But surely Germany cannot influence the procurement procedures in African countries?
As part of government negotiations, we could certainly insist that the tendering organizations comply with binding criteria and conditions when using funds from Germany, Europe or multilateral institutions such as the World Bank. In general, we should utilize all the OECD’s scope for tied aid. Untied aid is no longer appropriate in many areas. After all, it presupposes a global level playing field that we no longer have today.
Don’t you see any risks? The Chinese will certainly not appreciate being excluded.
It would only be consistent because, after all, China also links most of its spending to its own economy.
Are there any less direct options?
Another lever would be to apply binding quality criteria in procurement procedures. We firmly believe that German and European companies are still ahead of the Chinese regarding labor and environmental standards and life cycle costs. It makes little sense to impose supply chain due diligence obligations on European companies and not, or only to a limited extent, monitor these in international tenders co-funded by Europe.
What is your message to the decision-makers at the BMZ?
We would like to see a more strategic development policy. Of course, we should serve the interests of our partner countries. But please also serve our own. This is urgently necessary given the systemic competition in which we find ourselves. Moreover, the BMZ and BMWK need to work much more closely together in order to finally advance the dovetailing of development policy and foreign trade promotion. If we want to mobilize private capital to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, we must make funding and hedging conditions even more competitive.
Vanessa Wannicke is a consultant for international cooperation, security, raw materials and space at the Federation of German Industries (BDI).
Let’s be honest: We all have a bit of a marketing strategist inside us who knows how to present ourselves well. And we generally know precisely which clientele we can best sell which product to. With Asian men – including Chinese men – 萌 méng – i.e., “cuteness” – is a great seller, at least when it is sold by female sales assistants. In other words, if you play it sweet, coquettish, cute-looking and adorable, you can win over the hearts of even the most muscular men in no time. In Chinese, this sales strategy is called 卖萌 màiméng – literally “selling cuteness.” It means deliberately playing cute to get what you want.
Alongside 撒娇 sājiāo (the art of acting like a spoiled child), 卖萌 màiméng is the second charm bazooka of the Chinese ladies’ world. Incidentally, both products also work really well with parents (when children are involved) and pet owners (from the perspective of the furry friends). So it’s no wonder that the WeChat auto mode displays a cuddly dog’s head with its tongue sticking out as the default meme when you type the keyword 卖萌 màiméng into the chat box.
However, “méng” is by no means the only character that the popular Chinese vocabulary blueprints have to offer. The bargain bin of linguistic clearance sales offers numerous other things that can be sold to men and women in day-to-day communication. In addition to 卖惨 màiméng, the manipulative psycho-products also include 卖惨 màicǎn “to sell misery” (fishing for sympathy) and 卖傻 màishǎ “to sell stupidity” (to play dumb).
Those who can masterfully juggle all these words may feel tempted to “sell cleverness” (卖乖 màiguāi), that is, to show off their wits or to “sell their mouth” (卖嘴 màizuǐ), to brag and show off.
On the job market, however, other talents are offered for sale. According to the Chinese dictionary, you can “sell art” (卖艺 màiyì – make a living from art), for example, the art of singing (卖唱 màichàng – sing for a living) or the art of writing or poetry (卖文 màiwén – make a living from writing). Those who make it big will hopefully end up selling seats (卖座 màizuò – to draw a large audience). Those who are less lucky, on the other hand, have no choice but to work themselves to the bone (卖苦力 mài kǔlì – to slave away for money physically), or even worse, to sell their lives (卖命 màimìng – to work oneself to the bone, literally: “to sell one’s life”).
Some people believe that shady deals are a shortcut to quick money. We enter dodgy market territory with sales vocabulary such as 卖狗皮膏药 mài gǒupí gāoyào – literally the sale of dog leather patches. So what is this all about? Well, originally, the term was used in China to describe dubious traveling healers who touted healing plasters with miraculous effects, supposedly made from dog skin. Over time, the term has taken on a derogatory meaning and today describes crooked racketeers who fool consumers with counterfeit or completely useless goods. In English, we know it as the similarly figurative (albeit somewhat outdated) expression “selling snake oil.”
Money can also be made in Mandarin by selling “joints.” If you have ever had a knee injury or dislocated a hip joint, you will know that you can only function properly if your joints are healthy. In Chinese, “joint sales” (卖关节 mài guānjié from 关节 guānjié “joint”) can help somewhat here – at least when it comes to business relationships. We are not talking about hip or knee joints here, but relationship hinges. To make a long story short: The term is simply a fancy phrase for accepting bribes and corruption.
Things get even more colorful with “spring selling,” a euphemism for the world’s oldest trade (卖春 màichūn – to prostitute oneself, prostitution, literally “selling the spring”). In this context, however, the term “selling meat” (卖肉màiròu) is often used in a less flowery way. A term that leads unsuspecting Chinese learners not to the deli counter, but straight into the red-light district. And you will finally get into trouble with the law if you dare to sell out your own country, called卖国 màiguó – the Chinese equivalent of “treason.”
But before we drift completely into the sinister realm, let’s get back to sales channels of a completely legal nature. If you want to turn odds and ends that you no longer need into cash in China, it’s best to throw the stuff into the maw of the “idle fish,” also known as 闲鱼 Xiányú. This is the name of the Alibaba Group’s trading platform, which specializes in buying and selling second-hand goods (二手 èrshǒu – second-hand). The app is China’s equivalent to eBay and Craigslist. Incidentally, the animal name is an allusion to the eponymous word 闲余 xiányú, “idle, idle, having free time.” And let’s be honest: what you buy and sell in your free time – whether it’s cuteness or second-hand socks – is luckily a private matter.
Verena Menzel runs the online language school New Chinese in Beijing.
When China began to open up to the West in the late 1980s, subcultural trends also found their way into the People’s Republic. To this day, punk rock has remained a fairly vibrant niche, which, depending on the founding legend, originated either in Beijing or Wuhan. Today, it even evolved into a small cultural export. For years, Chinese bands have been touring the globe, supported by a stable network of promoters. This month, two groups are touring Germany independently of each other: Dummy Toys from Qingdao and Gum Bleed from Beijing.
