When it comes to the competitiveness of Germany’s big car manufacturers, bad news has almost become the norm. Volkswagen, in particular, faces persistent criticism: too slow, structurally inflexible – but then again, morally far too flexible as far as the plant in Xinjiang is concerned. These are the accusations. Against this backdrop, the outlook of automotive market expert Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer on this traditional company is surprising. He praises the company’s reputation, strong brand, strong investments, and new partnerships – such as the one with Xpeng, which is supposed to shorten development times.
And despite the debate about human rights violations and excessive dependence on the People’s Republic, Dudenhoeffer is convinced that Volkswagen should not withdraw from China, but rather strengthen its position there.
Christian Domke-Seidel’s analysis provides the context for the transformation the German company is currently undergoing. He is also cautiously optimistic about the – slow – transformation of the company. Even though the world has changed rapidly: After all, the German car manufacturer suddenly must cooperate with companies that had to cooperate with VW a few years ago.
Numbers don’t lie, and they look good for Volkswagen in China. Last year, the company sold 3.2 million cars in the People’s Republic. Most of these – around three million – were cars with combustion engines and made a profit. However, the German company is increasingly falling behind in electromobility. An investment offensive is intended to change this. The necessary transformation is starting slowly, but at least it is underway.
Together with its joint ventures, the German company sold 1.6 percent more vehicles last year than in the year before. In the non-electric car segment, Volkswagen even increased its market share from 19 to 20 percent. Even EV sales are not as low as the reports suggest. 200,000 cars represent an increase of 23 percent.
But it all depends on the context. Volkswagen grows slower than the market. The EV market grew by 24 percent, and the New Energy Vehicle (NEV) segment, which also includes hybrid drives, grew by as much as 38 percent. Extrapolated to the overall market, this resulted in a growth of 5.6 percent. The fact that VW gained market share is attributable to the shrinking market for combustion engines, which lost around 6 percent, according to calculations by the Chinese Passenger Car Association (CPCA).
This did not happen by chance, as Stefan Bratzel explains. He is the founder and director of the Center of Automotive Management (CAM). “The situation in China is also related to the diesel scandal and the subsequent transformation. After 2015, VW was very focused on itself and had to take care of its European and US business. Then Covid hit. For years, China was not the focus of the company’s executives. They simply didn’t recognize the speed and innovation in the Chinese market.”
Volkswagen rightly concluded that it must react now and advance the transformation from a strong position.
At the end of last year, VW’s top management decided on a ten billion euro austerity package. The aim is to sustainably reduce the number of employees to increase the margin at the core brand. However, Volkswagen’s enormous investment plan, already approved in 2022, remains untouched. 180 billion euros are to improve the company in key areas by 2028. Two-thirds of the money is earmarked for electrification and digitalization.
China has an important role here. Volkswagen has massively expanded its production, development and innovation hub in Hefei. “This enables us to customize our products even faster to meet the needs of Chinese customers. In a dynamic market environment, a high pace of development is crucial for competitiveness,” Ralf Branstaetter, Volkswagen AG Board Member for China, commented on the move.
Chinese customers are very price-sensitive, Brandstaetter said during the announcement of the investments. The result is an almost destructive discount battle in the car market. This makes it crucial for Volkswagen to reduce costs and offer affordable cars.
Specifically, Volkswagen China Technology Company (VCTC) is developing an electric platform for the entry-level segment. The electric drive kit will be based on Volkswagen’s modular system. This could take new EVs from the concept stage to production readiness within 36 months. This is why the cost-cutting measures left VCTC untouched. On the contrary. When the platform goes online in 2026, it is expected to employ around 3,000 people. All developments and decisions relating to vehicles destined for the Chinese market come together at VCTC.
All of this is ambitious. However, the Chinese market is highly competitive. “VW will never regain the position it once had in China – i.e., being the big market leader. The Chinese manufacturers are too strong in next-generation technologies for that. VW must focus on maintaining its current strong position,” says Bratzel.
Volkswagen also further expands its management team in China. Thomas Ulbrich will take over as Chief Technology Officer China on 1 April 2024 and thus also become CEO at VCTC. He most recently served as a Board Member for New Mobility at VW. Within the company, Ulbrich is considered a proven development and software expert and has already held two management positions in China. His task is to advance localization (keyword: “in China, for China”) and networking.
“VW has sent Ralf Brandstaetter and now Thomas Ulbrich to China to have good people with a certain amount of clout there. The background to this is that VW wants to utilize the experience, speed and processes that exist in China as a blueprint for Europe,” Bratzel comments on the personnel decision.
Success will probably also be measured by whether and how well the various projects and investments can be harmonized. In addition to the well-known joint ventures SAIC Volkswagen, FAW-Volkswagen and Volkswagen Anhui, these also include the companies Gotion (battery) and the software unit Cariad. The integration of partners from Horizon Robotics (autonomous driving), ARK (user experience) and Thundersoft (infotainment) is also crucial for the company’s future.
Earlier this year, Anhui Automotive started manufacturing the Cupra Tavascan for export to Europe. A model for the Chinese market will follow later this year. Volkswagen’s investment in the Chinese EV pioneer Xpeng has also caused a stir. In exchange for 700 million dollars, the German company gained around five percent of the company, a seat on the board of directors and, a partner with whom two new electric cars are to be developed for the Chinese market. “With XPENG, we now have another strong partner that is one of the leading manufacturers in China in key technology areas,” Brandstaetter commented on the deal last year.
However, Bratzel also sees a bit of irony here: “In this catch-up process, VW suddenly finds itself cooperating with companies that had to cooperate with VW just a few years ago.”
Mr. Dudenhöffer, what do you know about how Volkswagen is currently doing in China?
Sales figures have significantly picked up again. With China boss Ralf Brandstaetter, Volkswagen is forging ahead in the Chinese market. Incentives such as price discounts certainly play a role here. But the important thing is that VW is stabilizing its market position. And what VW has planned – the new research and development center with the Chinese joint venture partner in Anhui, for example, or the cooperation with the Chinese car manufacturer Xpeng – I think is very promising. In my opinion, VW has made significant strides in China over the last twelve months. And you can now see that bit by bit.
VW seems to be in a dilemma. Combustion cars are selling very well – they make up a significant proportion of VW’s global sales. But when it comes to the transformation to electromobility, VW is clearly behind its Chinese competitors.
Everyone is lagging behind the Chinese, including Tesla. For VW, this has two reasons: the newly developed models, the ID family, have found little favor with Chinese customers. The models were not playful enough compared to the Chinese competition. And prices were relatively high. Both have now been adjusted. VW has recognized that the new cars need to have much more Chinese flair. Changes take time, you can’t make them in twelve months.
However, Volkswagen is still outclassed by its Chinese competitors, particularly in EV technologies like batteries and software. Can the gap be closed?
Absolutely. The decision to cooperate with Xpeng was important because Xpeng has the smart cockpit covered. And VW is in the process of becoming more Chinese by setting up a large development center in Anhui. Working closely with Chinese developers is particularly important in the software sector. In the battery sector, the Volkswagen subsidiary PowerCo is currently setting up battery plants for VW in China in cooperation with Guoxuan. When we look at the market today, we look at yesterday’s picture. The picture of tomorrow looks more positive.
There are currently over 150 EV manufacturers in China. Only a handful will probably survive. What makes you so sure that VW will be among them?
VW has a strong past, continues to enjoy a strong reputation and customers trust the brand. And: VW is investing heavily. There is a strategy whereby the cars are not developed in Wolfsburg but in China, i.e., in cooperation with Chinese companies. And they have found good cooperation partners. Volkswagen is working with Horizon Robotics, one of the leading AI specialists, so that the company can also catch up in terms of software. A new beginning can be seen at VW. In five years, we will know whether this is very successful or more of a medium success. But the direction is right.
But will that be enough? The big competitor is BYD, which knocked VW from first place in China last year. BYD needs less than 18 months to get a new model ready for the market, while VW needs over 40. Can the Germans keep up with that?
That’s why VW is developing its new models in China and no longer in Wolfsburg. And things are moving faster there with partners like Xpeng. BYD is a competitor that should be taken very seriously. But BYD will not be the only one selling electric cars in China and worldwide. There is SAIC, Great Wall, Geely – it’s a race for the future. What VW is currently doing in the battery sector is not yet at BYD’s level, but it does show exciting approaches.
In a transformation like the current one from the combustion engine to the electric car, newcomers such as Tesla have it easier than traditional manufacturers because they don’t have to lug around a huge apparatus with a large workforce that was hired for the old technology. How much of an impact will these legacy issues have on Volkswagen’s transformation in China?
BYD is not a newcomer either, but has also built combustion cars. However, BYD decided a year and a half ago to only build electric cars and plug-in hybrids. BYD is obviously also capable of this transformation. Yes, newcomers like NIO, Xpeng and Li Auto have an edge. But VW’s experience in the car business should not be underestimated. Customer relationships, for example, how to connect intermediate products in the long term. Nobody wants product recalls. You can also see that with Tesla, how certain things have only been improved and learned over time. But as I said, BYD is not a newcomer either, but it has quickly made the transition to electric cars.
Then there is the debate about the Xinjiang plant: BASF has announced its withdrawal from the province. Now, VW is also under massive pressure. How do you think VW should proceed?
That is difficult. BASF is a supplier in the chemicals sector. VW, on the other hand, is much more in the public eye in the end customer market. As far as I can tell, VW has already ensured that human rights and working conditions at its own plant are meticulous. To sell the plant overnight or even close it down would be a considerable entrepreneurial risk. Such a withdrawal would not only alienate the political elite in China, but also many Chinese customers.
And yet there is growing evidence that Uyghur forced laborers were involved in the construction of a VW test track, for example. Surely VW cannot ignore this?
I can’t pass judgment because I don’t know the situation on the ground. But we should be careful not to run around the world pointing fingers. I agree with former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who once said that Germany is not the world’s moral teacher. What VW should do is commission auditors to assess the situation independently. If they can prove that there have indeed been human rights violations, consequences must be drawn.
Human rights organizations criticize that such independent audits are not even possible in an authoritarian country like China.
These organizations raise whether we can cooperate with China at all.
And?
I’ll stick by the words of Helmut Schmidt.
A debate about de-risking from China has long been raging in German politics. Can VW, with its holdings in 35 plants, become more independent of China?
Just like BMW does, just like Mercedes or Toyota do: VW must strengthen its position in China. Because without the Chinese market, you are no longer in the car business. Future innovations are coming from China. Autonomous driving is being rolled out from China because China has the opportunity to work with an infinite amount of data. Artificial intelligence needs to gather experience, i.e., data. And that’s what AI learns in China. The battery also has its home in China. Without the help of Chinese manufacturers, we wouldn’t have it at all. The same applies to the software. So it would be a mistake to disengage from the technological progress of the future. And that is happening in China.
Do the Chinese still need the German carmakers at all?
The cooperation with German companies was and still is characterized by mutual recognition. Both sides have benefited considerably from this. The Chinese strengthen German engineering expertise. In the future, VW will benefit from the fact that technologies are developed much faster in China, which we can then incorporate into our cars. Perhaps China no longer needs Germany as much as the other way around. But there can still be a win-win situation.
Ferdinand Dudenhöffer was Professor of General Business Administration and Automotive Economics at the University of Duisburg-Essen until 2020. Now, he heads the CAR-Center Automotive Research in Bochum.
Feb. 26, 2024; 6:30 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China, Beijing: New Year’s Reception 2024: Economic Outlook More
Feb. 26, 2024; 7 p.m. CET (Feb. 27, 2 a.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Webcast: Transatlantic Trade and Climate: A Strategic Roadmap for 2024 More
Feb. 27, 2024; 8:30 p.m. CET (3:30 p.m. CST)
CNBW Working group “Sino-German Corporate Communications”, Webcast: How to navigate China’s “Xiaohongshu” (小红书) for your business More
Feb. 27, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Centre, the European Chamber and the China IP SME Helpdesk, Seminar (Hybrid): Ready for 2024: An SME-Friendly Overview of the IP Regulatory Landscape and Compliance Considerations More
Feb. 27, 2024; 9:30 a.m. CET (4:30 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Webinar: Fast-Tracking International Trade: Selling and Buying on Alibaba.com for SMEs More
Feb. 28, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Tianjin & Online: Navigating the Digitalization Journey: Empowering SMEs in the Manufacturing Sector More
Feb. 28, 2024; 3 9.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Webcast: Hong Kong’s New Security Law: Assessing Article 23 More
Feb. 29, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST):
EU SME Center, Shanghai; online: Emerging Opportunities for SMEs in China’s Green and Sustainable Urban Landscape More
Feb. 29, 2024; 3 p.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Webcast: China’s Economy: Has THE Crisis Started? More
Feb. 29, 2024; 4 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China – South and Southwest, Shenzen: Spring Reception 2024: Economic Outlook More
Feb. 29, 2024; 6 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2024; 1 a.m. CST)
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School, hybrid event: Daniel H. Rosen – Spillover Implications of a China Growing 0-2% More
Mar. 4, 2024; 6 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China – North China: German Chamber Spring Reception Dalian 2024: Economic Outlook More
China’s carbon emissions in the energy sector grew by 5.2 percent in 2023 – an increase that jeopardizes the People’s Republic’s climate target. Based on official data, this is the finding of a study published on Thursday by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air for the specialist service Carbon Brief. According to the study, emissions in the People’s Republic rose by a whopping 12 percent between 2020 and 2023 – partly due to “a highly energy- and carbon-intensive response to the Covid-19 pandemic.” The study found that coal consumption rose by 4.4 percent last year.
According to author Lauri Myllyvirta from CREA, this increase in carbon emissions means that China must now be even more ambitious in order to achieve the target it has set for itself. The target is to reduce carbon emissions per unit of economic output by 18 percent during the current 14th five-year plan (by 2025). To achieve this, carbon emissions still have to fall by 4-6 percent by 2025. This would be an unprecedented record reduction.
China also risks missing all other important climate targets for 2025. According to Myllyvirta, 2023 was the first time in a long time that China had missed its carbon reduction target. In recent years, Beijing has consistently exceeded its own targets. For example, the country has built up vast wind and solar energy capacities, which will be connected to the grid in 2024 – and, according to a previous CREA study, will also reduce the demand for coal-fired electricity.
However, Beijing finds it difficult to abandon coal due to its growing focus on energy security. According to Reuters, the country approved coal-fired power plants with a total capacity of 114 gigawatts (GW) last year, another 10 percent more than in 2022. ck
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) reportedly barred accredited participants from entering the venue temporarily because China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was at the conference. This was reported by Dolkun Isa, Chair of the World Uyghur Congress, on Thursday in Berlin at an event organized by members of the German Bundestag on the topic of human rights in China.
MPs criticized the behavior of the Security Conference. “The accreditation was obviously only to be activated after Wang Yi left the auditorium. This was no coincidence, but kowtowing to China without backbone,” said CDU MP Michael Brand, a member of the Uyghur parliamentary group. “The MSC’s subsequent explanations are not convincing. This behavior is a moral and, above all, political bankruptcy.”
Wang Yi spoke at noon on the Saturday of the conference, while Isa’s access card only became valid at 4 pm, Brand told China.Table. At that time, Wang had already left the conference venue. Isa was not allowed into the event area before then. Isa claims to have applied to attend the conference at the end of January.
The Munich Security Conference confirmed that Uyghur participants were only granted access after a delay, but cited other reasons. “The Uyghur representatives’ request to attend only reached us at very short notice, two days before the start of the conference,” a spokesperson told Table.Media, adding that it was common practice that requests on short notice are only granted day passes once the conference venue is less busy.
In fact, the conference organizers would have made efforts to be accommodating. “In order to enable the Uyghur representatives to participate despite the short notice, we have given them the opportunity to attend the conference on Saturday after the peak sessions, i.e., from the early afternoon, and on Sunday.” fin
The US will support Taiwan regardless of the outcome of the presidential elections, Republican Mike Gallagher emphasized during his visit to Taiwan. The chairman of the China Committee of the US House of Representatives has reaffirmed the USA’s continued support for Taiwan in Taipei. Gallagher and a delegation of Democratic and Republican politicians are on a visit to Taiwan until Saturday. Gallagher is considered a supporter of Taiwan and a fierce China critic.
At a press conference in Taipei on Thursday, he said: “I see growing and extremely strong support for Taiwan. The people of Taiwan should be confident that America stands with them even as we see through a very intense political season domestically.”
As usual, the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized its rejection of any official exchange between the US and the Taiwanese authorities as well as interference in Taiwanese affairs in any shape or form. “We urge the US to be mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity of the Taiwan question,” said spokeswoman Mao Ning.
Taiwan’s outgoing President, Tsai Ing-wen, thanked the US government and parliament for their support in strengthening Taiwan’s defense. She also reiterated her hope for more exchanges between Taiwan and the USA this year. At a meeting with Tsai’s newly elected successor, William Lai, who will take office on 20 May, Gallagher pledged to deepen the partnership with Taiwan once Lai takes office. rtr
Chinese stock exchanges do not limit share selling and only carry out regulatory measures on abnormal trading activities of certain institutions. They only implement regulatory measures for abnormal trading activities of certain institutions, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) stated on Thursday, rejecting an earlier Bloomberg report.
Referring to industry sources, the report suggested that China had banned major institutional investors from reducing equity holdings at the open and close of each trading day. Such a measure would have hindered the sell-off of major stocks in an already fragile stock market environment. The CSRC further said on Thursday that it would guide exchanges and financial futures exchanges to improve regulatory standards for abnormal trading. cyb/rtr
How did Xi Jinping become China’s most powerful man since Mao Zedong? This question was often asked. The most comprehensive answer so far comes from Cai Xia 蔡霞, a former dissident professor at the Central Party School, who in 2020 went into exile in the United States. In an interview with Li Yuan, a columnist at the New York Times and host of the Chinese podcast Bumingbai, Cai explained how Xi maneuvered to come to the totalitarian throne. The following text is a precis of what she said in the podcast.
The rule of the Chinese Communist Party has always been a dictatorship. However, since Deng Xiaoping, it has been a collective one, under which different factions balanced each other. But Xi excelled and accomplished an individual dictatorship.
To achieve this, he first used a heavy-handed anti-corruption campaign to terrorize the entire party and to eliminate rivals, then modified party rules to muzzle critics, paving the way for the constitution’s amendment and scrapping term limit for the presidency. Blackmailing was often used along the way to silence people against him.
Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the weakest leader since the 1980s. Throughout his tenure as the party boss 2002-2012, the central leadership was fragmented.
During Hu’s ten years, each of the nine standing members of the all-powerful CCP Central Committee’s Politburo had a specific domain, in which the other eight members, Hu himself included, generally couldn’t intervene. For example, Zhou Yongkang was the czar for the judiciary and policy system. Liu Yunshan was in charge of ideology, controlling news media, publishing, film and television, among others. The territory of then-the Premier, Wen Jiabao, was the economy.
Under such an arrangement, many cross-sector policies and measures were impossible to implement if some members felt they were not to their benefit. Wen once famously complained that “(The central government’s) directives can’t often make it even out of the doors of Zhongnanhai.” (政令不出中南海). The Zhongnanhai compound, next to Tiananmen, is where the offices and homes of the top leaders are located.
Xi took power with expectations for a stronger leadership and used this expectation very well. He centralized power effectively. Countless steering groups and commissions, all headed by him, were established. The groups and commissions, which are above party and government departments, enabled Xi to become literally the final decision-maker for everything.
It’s an open secret that in the Chinese party and government bureaucracies, nobody is clean. One of the first major moves Xi made was a massive anti-corruption campaign. Millions were investigated. Heavyweight figures purged and imprisoned in the campaign included his arch-rival Bo Xilai, potential rival Sun Zhengcai, and two top military leaders, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Officials of lower levels close to them were subsequently also removed, leaving vacancies to be filled by Xi’s own people.
Xi also introduced a system under which all officials must report annually to the party the amount and sources of income of themselves and their family members and any economic activities in which they are involved. Random checks are conducted. Incomplete, inaccurate reporting will be punished. But the information is not open to the public. It’s for the use of the party only. These measures put the entire party and entire bureaucracy under constant fear.
China’s most corrupt group are the incumbent and retired senior officials and their family members and cronies. But these people were almost all left intact in every round of anti-corruption campaigns, including the one launched by Xi. Grumbles over the selective approach started to be heard.
To counter the backlash, a term was coined for a newly invented offense, “irresponsible criticism of the leadership 妄议中央,” which was written into Party rules. Offenders would be disciplined. Even the slightest punishment could mean the end of an official’s political career.
Despite this, criticism about Xi’s overly authoritarianism still surfaced sporadically, particularly among the retired former top party officials. To inform these people that they are not immune to Xi’s iron hand, a hostage tactic is often employed. First, a member of the targeted person’s entourage – their driver, for example – will be arrested as a warning. If it still doesn’t work, the secretary will be the next one, then the children. When children are taken, all would surrender.
The entire party, which has 98 million members, was tamed. When the proposal for scrapping the term limits for the country’s president was put on the table in early 2018, only one small disagreeing voice – from Li Datong, a senior editor of the Communist Youth League’s newspaper – was briefly heard online. But his influence was way too small, and he was immediately put under house arrest. The constitutional amendments were smoothly passed, sealing the deal for Xi’s life-long service to the Chinese people.
Josh Chuang is now Sales Director Greater China Turck, a supplier of automation technology from Germany. He comes from Taiwan.
Stephan Lampel has been a member of the Bosch Mobility Board China at the Shanghai location since January. He comes from Bosch Digital in Stuttgart, where he was Executive Vice President Finance, Administration and HR.
Is something changing in your organization? Let us know at heads@table.media!
Fancy a tasty treat? Instead of boring conventional drinks like Pumpkin Spice Latte, Starbucks China is currently offering coffee specialties with crispy pork belly nibbles as a topping on the milk foam, lovingly decorated with syrup, of course. Or is that gravy? Dear baristas: How about chicken foot oat cappuccino or cardamom garlic coffee next?
When it comes to the competitiveness of Germany’s big car manufacturers, bad news has almost become the norm. Volkswagen, in particular, faces persistent criticism: too slow, structurally inflexible – but then again, morally far too flexible as far as the plant in Xinjiang is concerned. These are the accusations. Against this backdrop, the outlook of automotive market expert Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer on this traditional company is surprising. He praises the company’s reputation, strong brand, strong investments, and new partnerships – such as the one with Xpeng, which is supposed to shorten development times.
And despite the debate about human rights violations and excessive dependence on the People’s Republic, Dudenhoeffer is convinced that Volkswagen should not withdraw from China, but rather strengthen its position there.
Christian Domke-Seidel’s analysis provides the context for the transformation the German company is currently undergoing. He is also cautiously optimistic about the – slow – transformation of the company. Even though the world has changed rapidly: After all, the German car manufacturer suddenly must cooperate with companies that had to cooperate with VW a few years ago.
Numbers don’t lie, and they look good for Volkswagen in China. Last year, the company sold 3.2 million cars in the People’s Republic. Most of these – around three million – were cars with combustion engines and made a profit. However, the German company is increasingly falling behind in electromobility. An investment offensive is intended to change this. The necessary transformation is starting slowly, but at least it is underway.
Together with its joint ventures, the German company sold 1.6 percent more vehicles last year than in the year before. In the non-electric car segment, Volkswagen even increased its market share from 19 to 20 percent. Even EV sales are not as low as the reports suggest. 200,000 cars represent an increase of 23 percent.
But it all depends on the context. Volkswagen grows slower than the market. The EV market grew by 24 percent, and the New Energy Vehicle (NEV) segment, which also includes hybrid drives, grew by as much as 38 percent. Extrapolated to the overall market, this resulted in a growth of 5.6 percent. The fact that VW gained market share is attributable to the shrinking market for combustion engines, which lost around 6 percent, according to calculations by the Chinese Passenger Car Association (CPCA).
This did not happen by chance, as Stefan Bratzel explains. He is the founder and director of the Center of Automotive Management (CAM). “The situation in China is also related to the diesel scandal and the subsequent transformation. After 2015, VW was very focused on itself and had to take care of its European and US business. Then Covid hit. For years, China was not the focus of the company’s executives. They simply didn’t recognize the speed and innovation in the Chinese market.”
Volkswagen rightly concluded that it must react now and advance the transformation from a strong position.
At the end of last year, VW’s top management decided on a ten billion euro austerity package. The aim is to sustainably reduce the number of employees to increase the margin at the core brand. However, Volkswagen’s enormous investment plan, already approved in 2022, remains untouched. 180 billion euros are to improve the company in key areas by 2028. Two-thirds of the money is earmarked for electrification and digitalization.
China has an important role here. Volkswagen has massively expanded its production, development and innovation hub in Hefei. “This enables us to customize our products even faster to meet the needs of Chinese customers. In a dynamic market environment, a high pace of development is crucial for competitiveness,” Ralf Branstaetter, Volkswagen AG Board Member for China, commented on the move.
Chinese customers are very price-sensitive, Brandstaetter said during the announcement of the investments. The result is an almost destructive discount battle in the car market. This makes it crucial for Volkswagen to reduce costs and offer affordable cars.
Specifically, Volkswagen China Technology Company (VCTC) is developing an electric platform for the entry-level segment. The electric drive kit will be based on Volkswagen’s modular system. This could take new EVs from the concept stage to production readiness within 36 months. This is why the cost-cutting measures left VCTC untouched. On the contrary. When the platform goes online in 2026, it is expected to employ around 3,000 people. All developments and decisions relating to vehicles destined for the Chinese market come together at VCTC.
All of this is ambitious. However, the Chinese market is highly competitive. “VW will never regain the position it once had in China – i.e., being the big market leader. The Chinese manufacturers are too strong in next-generation technologies for that. VW must focus on maintaining its current strong position,” says Bratzel.
Volkswagen also further expands its management team in China. Thomas Ulbrich will take over as Chief Technology Officer China on 1 April 2024 and thus also become CEO at VCTC. He most recently served as a Board Member for New Mobility at VW. Within the company, Ulbrich is considered a proven development and software expert and has already held two management positions in China. His task is to advance localization (keyword: “in China, for China”) and networking.
“VW has sent Ralf Brandstaetter and now Thomas Ulbrich to China to have good people with a certain amount of clout there. The background to this is that VW wants to utilize the experience, speed and processes that exist in China as a blueprint for Europe,” Bratzel comments on the personnel decision.
Success will probably also be measured by whether and how well the various projects and investments can be harmonized. In addition to the well-known joint ventures SAIC Volkswagen, FAW-Volkswagen and Volkswagen Anhui, these also include the companies Gotion (battery) and the software unit Cariad. The integration of partners from Horizon Robotics (autonomous driving), ARK (user experience) and Thundersoft (infotainment) is also crucial for the company’s future.
Earlier this year, Anhui Automotive started manufacturing the Cupra Tavascan for export to Europe. A model for the Chinese market will follow later this year. Volkswagen’s investment in the Chinese EV pioneer Xpeng has also caused a stir. In exchange for 700 million dollars, the German company gained around five percent of the company, a seat on the board of directors and, a partner with whom two new electric cars are to be developed for the Chinese market. “With XPENG, we now have another strong partner that is one of the leading manufacturers in China in key technology areas,” Brandstaetter commented on the deal last year.
However, Bratzel also sees a bit of irony here: “In this catch-up process, VW suddenly finds itself cooperating with companies that had to cooperate with VW just a few years ago.”
Mr. Dudenhöffer, what do you know about how Volkswagen is currently doing in China?
Sales figures have significantly picked up again. With China boss Ralf Brandstaetter, Volkswagen is forging ahead in the Chinese market. Incentives such as price discounts certainly play a role here. But the important thing is that VW is stabilizing its market position. And what VW has planned – the new research and development center with the Chinese joint venture partner in Anhui, for example, or the cooperation with the Chinese car manufacturer Xpeng – I think is very promising. In my opinion, VW has made significant strides in China over the last twelve months. And you can now see that bit by bit.
VW seems to be in a dilemma. Combustion cars are selling very well – they make up a significant proportion of VW’s global sales. But when it comes to the transformation to electromobility, VW is clearly behind its Chinese competitors.
Everyone is lagging behind the Chinese, including Tesla. For VW, this has two reasons: the newly developed models, the ID family, have found little favor with Chinese customers. The models were not playful enough compared to the Chinese competition. And prices were relatively high. Both have now been adjusted. VW has recognized that the new cars need to have much more Chinese flair. Changes take time, you can’t make them in twelve months.
However, Volkswagen is still outclassed by its Chinese competitors, particularly in EV technologies like batteries and software. Can the gap be closed?
Absolutely. The decision to cooperate with Xpeng was important because Xpeng has the smart cockpit covered. And VW is in the process of becoming more Chinese by setting up a large development center in Anhui. Working closely with Chinese developers is particularly important in the software sector. In the battery sector, the Volkswagen subsidiary PowerCo is currently setting up battery plants for VW in China in cooperation with Guoxuan. When we look at the market today, we look at yesterday’s picture. The picture of tomorrow looks more positive.
There are currently over 150 EV manufacturers in China. Only a handful will probably survive. What makes you so sure that VW will be among them?
VW has a strong past, continues to enjoy a strong reputation and customers trust the brand. And: VW is investing heavily. There is a strategy whereby the cars are not developed in Wolfsburg but in China, i.e., in cooperation with Chinese companies. And they have found good cooperation partners. Volkswagen is working with Horizon Robotics, one of the leading AI specialists, so that the company can also catch up in terms of software. A new beginning can be seen at VW. In five years, we will know whether this is very successful or more of a medium success. But the direction is right.
But will that be enough? The big competitor is BYD, which knocked VW from first place in China last year. BYD needs less than 18 months to get a new model ready for the market, while VW needs over 40. Can the Germans keep up with that?
That’s why VW is developing its new models in China and no longer in Wolfsburg. And things are moving faster there with partners like Xpeng. BYD is a competitor that should be taken very seriously. But BYD will not be the only one selling electric cars in China and worldwide. There is SAIC, Great Wall, Geely – it’s a race for the future. What VW is currently doing in the battery sector is not yet at BYD’s level, but it does show exciting approaches.
In a transformation like the current one from the combustion engine to the electric car, newcomers such as Tesla have it easier than traditional manufacturers because they don’t have to lug around a huge apparatus with a large workforce that was hired for the old technology. How much of an impact will these legacy issues have on Volkswagen’s transformation in China?
BYD is not a newcomer either, but has also built combustion cars. However, BYD decided a year and a half ago to only build electric cars and plug-in hybrids. BYD is obviously also capable of this transformation. Yes, newcomers like NIO, Xpeng and Li Auto have an edge. But VW’s experience in the car business should not be underestimated. Customer relationships, for example, how to connect intermediate products in the long term. Nobody wants product recalls. You can also see that with Tesla, how certain things have only been improved and learned over time. But as I said, BYD is not a newcomer either, but it has quickly made the transition to electric cars.
Then there is the debate about the Xinjiang plant: BASF has announced its withdrawal from the province. Now, VW is also under massive pressure. How do you think VW should proceed?
That is difficult. BASF is a supplier in the chemicals sector. VW, on the other hand, is much more in the public eye in the end customer market. As far as I can tell, VW has already ensured that human rights and working conditions at its own plant are meticulous. To sell the plant overnight or even close it down would be a considerable entrepreneurial risk. Such a withdrawal would not only alienate the political elite in China, but also many Chinese customers.
And yet there is growing evidence that Uyghur forced laborers were involved in the construction of a VW test track, for example. Surely VW cannot ignore this?
I can’t pass judgment because I don’t know the situation on the ground. But we should be careful not to run around the world pointing fingers. I agree with former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who once said that Germany is not the world’s moral teacher. What VW should do is commission auditors to assess the situation independently. If they can prove that there have indeed been human rights violations, consequences must be drawn.
Human rights organizations criticize that such independent audits are not even possible in an authoritarian country like China.
These organizations raise whether we can cooperate with China at all.
And?
I’ll stick by the words of Helmut Schmidt.
A debate about de-risking from China has long been raging in German politics. Can VW, with its holdings in 35 plants, become more independent of China?
Just like BMW does, just like Mercedes or Toyota do: VW must strengthen its position in China. Because without the Chinese market, you are no longer in the car business. Future innovations are coming from China. Autonomous driving is being rolled out from China because China has the opportunity to work with an infinite amount of data. Artificial intelligence needs to gather experience, i.e., data. And that’s what AI learns in China. The battery also has its home in China. Without the help of Chinese manufacturers, we wouldn’t have it at all. The same applies to the software. So it would be a mistake to disengage from the technological progress of the future. And that is happening in China.
Do the Chinese still need the German carmakers at all?
The cooperation with German companies was and still is characterized by mutual recognition. Both sides have benefited considerably from this. The Chinese strengthen German engineering expertise. In the future, VW will benefit from the fact that technologies are developed much faster in China, which we can then incorporate into our cars. Perhaps China no longer needs Germany as much as the other way around. But there can still be a win-win situation.
Ferdinand Dudenhöffer was Professor of General Business Administration and Automotive Economics at the University of Duisburg-Essen until 2020. Now, he heads the CAR-Center Automotive Research in Bochum.
Feb. 26, 2024; 6:30 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China, Beijing: New Year’s Reception 2024: Economic Outlook More
Feb. 26, 2024; 7 p.m. CET (Feb. 27, 2 a.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Webcast: Transatlantic Trade and Climate: A Strategic Roadmap for 2024 More
Feb. 27, 2024; 8:30 p.m. CET (3:30 p.m. CST)
CNBW Working group “Sino-German Corporate Communications”, Webcast: How to navigate China’s “Xiaohongshu” (小红书) for your business More
Feb. 27, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Centre, the European Chamber and the China IP SME Helpdesk, Seminar (Hybrid): Ready for 2024: An SME-Friendly Overview of the IP Regulatory Landscape and Compliance Considerations More
Feb. 27, 2024; 9:30 a.m. CET (4:30 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Webinar: Fast-Tracking International Trade: Selling and Buying on Alibaba.com for SMEs More
Feb. 28, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST)
EU SME Center, Tianjin & Online: Navigating the Digitalization Journey: Empowering SMEs in the Manufacturing Sector More
Feb. 28, 2024; 3 9.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Webcast: Hong Kong’s New Security Law: Assessing Article 23 More
Feb. 29, 2024; 9 a.m. CET (4 p.m. CST):
EU SME Center, Shanghai; online: Emerging Opportunities for SMEs in China’s Green and Sustainable Urban Landscape More
Feb. 29, 2024; 3 p.m. CET (10 p.m. CST)
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Webcast: China’s Economy: Has THE Crisis Started? More
Feb. 29, 2024; 4 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China – South and Southwest, Shenzen: Spring Reception 2024: Economic Outlook More
Feb. 29, 2024; 6 p.m. CET (Mar. 1, 2024; 1 a.m. CST)
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School, hybrid event: Daniel H. Rosen – Spillover Implications of a China Growing 0-2% More
Mar. 4, 2024; 6 p.m. CST
German Chamber of Commerce in China – North China: German Chamber Spring Reception Dalian 2024: Economic Outlook More
China’s carbon emissions in the energy sector grew by 5.2 percent in 2023 – an increase that jeopardizes the People’s Republic’s climate target. Based on official data, this is the finding of a study published on Thursday by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air for the specialist service Carbon Brief. According to the study, emissions in the People’s Republic rose by a whopping 12 percent between 2020 and 2023 – partly due to “a highly energy- and carbon-intensive response to the Covid-19 pandemic.” The study found that coal consumption rose by 4.4 percent last year.
According to author Lauri Myllyvirta from CREA, this increase in carbon emissions means that China must now be even more ambitious in order to achieve the target it has set for itself. The target is to reduce carbon emissions per unit of economic output by 18 percent during the current 14th five-year plan (by 2025). To achieve this, carbon emissions still have to fall by 4-6 percent by 2025. This would be an unprecedented record reduction.
China also risks missing all other important climate targets for 2025. According to Myllyvirta, 2023 was the first time in a long time that China had missed its carbon reduction target. In recent years, Beijing has consistently exceeded its own targets. For example, the country has built up vast wind and solar energy capacities, which will be connected to the grid in 2024 – and, according to a previous CREA study, will also reduce the demand for coal-fired electricity.
However, Beijing finds it difficult to abandon coal due to its growing focus on energy security. According to Reuters, the country approved coal-fired power plants with a total capacity of 114 gigawatts (GW) last year, another 10 percent more than in 2022. ck
The Munich Security Conference (MSC) reportedly barred accredited participants from entering the venue temporarily because China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was at the conference. This was reported by Dolkun Isa, Chair of the World Uyghur Congress, on Thursday in Berlin at an event organized by members of the German Bundestag on the topic of human rights in China.
MPs criticized the behavior of the Security Conference. “The accreditation was obviously only to be activated after Wang Yi left the auditorium. This was no coincidence, but kowtowing to China without backbone,” said CDU MP Michael Brand, a member of the Uyghur parliamentary group. “The MSC’s subsequent explanations are not convincing. This behavior is a moral and, above all, political bankruptcy.”
Wang Yi spoke at noon on the Saturday of the conference, while Isa’s access card only became valid at 4 pm, Brand told China.Table. At that time, Wang had already left the conference venue. Isa was not allowed into the event area before then. Isa claims to have applied to attend the conference at the end of January.
The Munich Security Conference confirmed that Uyghur participants were only granted access after a delay, but cited other reasons. “The Uyghur representatives’ request to attend only reached us at very short notice, two days before the start of the conference,” a spokesperson told Table.Media, adding that it was common practice that requests on short notice are only granted day passes once the conference venue is less busy.
In fact, the conference organizers would have made efforts to be accommodating. “In order to enable the Uyghur representatives to participate despite the short notice, we have given them the opportunity to attend the conference on Saturday after the peak sessions, i.e., from the early afternoon, and on Sunday.” fin
The US will support Taiwan regardless of the outcome of the presidential elections, Republican Mike Gallagher emphasized during his visit to Taiwan. The chairman of the China Committee of the US House of Representatives has reaffirmed the USA’s continued support for Taiwan in Taipei. Gallagher and a delegation of Democratic and Republican politicians are on a visit to Taiwan until Saturday. Gallagher is considered a supporter of Taiwan and a fierce China critic.
At a press conference in Taipei on Thursday, he said: “I see growing and extremely strong support for Taiwan. The people of Taiwan should be confident that America stands with them even as we see through a very intense political season domestically.”
As usual, the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasized its rejection of any official exchange between the US and the Taiwanese authorities as well as interference in Taiwanese affairs in any shape or form. “We urge the US to be mindful of the extreme complexity and sensitivity of the Taiwan question,” said spokeswoman Mao Ning.
Taiwan’s outgoing President, Tsai Ing-wen, thanked the US government and parliament for their support in strengthening Taiwan’s defense. She also reiterated her hope for more exchanges between Taiwan and the USA this year. At a meeting with Tsai’s newly elected successor, William Lai, who will take office on 20 May, Gallagher pledged to deepen the partnership with Taiwan once Lai takes office. rtr
Chinese stock exchanges do not limit share selling and only carry out regulatory measures on abnormal trading activities of certain institutions. They only implement regulatory measures for abnormal trading activities of certain institutions, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) stated on Thursday, rejecting an earlier Bloomberg report.
Referring to industry sources, the report suggested that China had banned major institutional investors from reducing equity holdings at the open and close of each trading day. Such a measure would have hindered the sell-off of major stocks in an already fragile stock market environment. The CSRC further said on Thursday that it would guide exchanges and financial futures exchanges to improve regulatory standards for abnormal trading. cyb/rtr
How did Xi Jinping become China’s most powerful man since Mao Zedong? This question was often asked. The most comprehensive answer so far comes from Cai Xia 蔡霞, a former dissident professor at the Central Party School, who in 2020 went into exile in the United States. In an interview with Li Yuan, a columnist at the New York Times and host of the Chinese podcast Bumingbai, Cai explained how Xi maneuvered to come to the totalitarian throne. The following text is a precis of what she said in the podcast.
The rule of the Chinese Communist Party has always been a dictatorship. However, since Deng Xiaoping, it has been a collective one, under which different factions balanced each other. But Xi excelled and accomplished an individual dictatorship.
To achieve this, he first used a heavy-handed anti-corruption campaign to terrorize the entire party and to eliminate rivals, then modified party rules to muzzle critics, paving the way for the constitution’s amendment and scrapping term limit for the presidency. Blackmailing was often used along the way to silence people against him.
Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, was the weakest leader since the 1980s. Throughout his tenure as the party boss 2002-2012, the central leadership was fragmented.
During Hu’s ten years, each of the nine standing members of the all-powerful CCP Central Committee’s Politburo had a specific domain, in which the other eight members, Hu himself included, generally couldn’t intervene. For example, Zhou Yongkang was the czar for the judiciary and policy system. Liu Yunshan was in charge of ideology, controlling news media, publishing, film and television, among others. The territory of then-the Premier, Wen Jiabao, was the economy.
Under such an arrangement, many cross-sector policies and measures were impossible to implement if some members felt they were not to their benefit. Wen once famously complained that “(The central government’s) directives can’t often make it even out of the doors of Zhongnanhai.” (政令不出中南海). The Zhongnanhai compound, next to Tiananmen, is where the offices and homes of the top leaders are located.
Xi took power with expectations for a stronger leadership and used this expectation very well. He centralized power effectively. Countless steering groups and commissions, all headed by him, were established. The groups and commissions, which are above party and government departments, enabled Xi to become literally the final decision-maker for everything.
It’s an open secret that in the Chinese party and government bureaucracies, nobody is clean. One of the first major moves Xi made was a massive anti-corruption campaign. Millions were investigated. Heavyweight figures purged and imprisoned in the campaign included his arch-rival Bo Xilai, potential rival Sun Zhengcai, and two top military leaders, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Officials of lower levels close to them were subsequently also removed, leaving vacancies to be filled by Xi’s own people.
Xi also introduced a system under which all officials must report annually to the party the amount and sources of income of themselves and their family members and any economic activities in which they are involved. Random checks are conducted. Incomplete, inaccurate reporting will be punished. But the information is not open to the public. It’s for the use of the party only. These measures put the entire party and entire bureaucracy under constant fear.
China’s most corrupt group are the incumbent and retired senior officials and their family members and cronies. But these people were almost all left intact in every round of anti-corruption campaigns, including the one launched by Xi. Grumbles over the selective approach started to be heard.
To counter the backlash, a term was coined for a newly invented offense, “irresponsible criticism of the leadership 妄议中央,” which was written into Party rules. Offenders would be disciplined. Even the slightest punishment could mean the end of an official’s political career.
Despite this, criticism about Xi’s overly authoritarianism still surfaced sporadically, particularly among the retired former top party officials. To inform these people that they are not immune to Xi’s iron hand, a hostage tactic is often employed. First, a member of the targeted person’s entourage – their driver, for example – will be arrested as a warning. If it still doesn’t work, the secretary will be the next one, then the children. When children are taken, all would surrender.
The entire party, which has 98 million members, was tamed. When the proposal for scrapping the term limits for the country’s president was put on the table in early 2018, only one small disagreeing voice – from Li Datong, a senior editor of the Communist Youth League’s newspaper – was briefly heard online. But his influence was way too small, and he was immediately put under house arrest. The constitutional amendments were smoothly passed, sealing the deal for Xi’s life-long service to the Chinese people.
Josh Chuang is now Sales Director Greater China Turck, a supplier of automation technology from Germany. He comes from Taiwan.
Stephan Lampel has been a member of the Bosch Mobility Board China at the Shanghai location since January. He comes from Bosch Digital in Stuttgart, where he was Executive Vice President Finance, Administration and HR.
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Fancy a tasty treat? Instead of boring conventional drinks like Pumpkin Spice Latte, Starbucks China is currently offering coffee specialties with crispy pork belly nibbles as a topping on the milk foam, lovingly decorated with syrup, of course. Or is that gravy? Dear baristas: How about chicken foot oat cappuccino or cardamom garlic coffee next?