We have already seen something very similar under Donald Trump: US President Joe Biden wants to impose high punitive tariffs on Chinese products. There are plans for a 100 percent levy on electric cars from the People’s Republic.
In practice, the levy is currently almost irrelevant, as all major Chinese EV manufacturers avoid the US market. And yet China’s reaction shows that a new trade conflict is likely to break out between the US and China, as Joern Petring analyzes. The Europeans should realize that the EU will again be dragged into this conflict.
It’s also Europe’s business when Chinese fleets fish in the Indian Ocean. Because what the British Environmental Justice Foundation has discovered should spoil every consumer’s appetite. Cruelty to humans and animals is commonplace and puts a strain on supply chains – long before the goods end up on European plates. Marcel Grzanna took a look at the EJF investigation. Our analysis shows how the Lidl Group responds to allegations of ethically questionable fish in its supermarkets.
The impending sharp increase in US tariffs on Chinese electric cars will likely further fuel the trade dispute between Beijing and Washington. Beijing reacted with sharp criticism to reports that US President Joe Biden will increase tariffs on electric cars from 25 percent to 100 percent on Tuesday and target other green products such as solar modules. A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman in Beijing said that “all necessary measures” would be taken to defend its own interests.
It looks as if the dangerous spiral of tariffs and counter-tariffs is starting up again. This dangerous cycle began under Donald Trump. The former US president imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese products worth 370 billion dollars in several stages, particularly in 2018 and 2019. In each case, the Chinese responded with counter-tariffs, most recently on US imports totaling 120 billion dollars.
So far, almost every Chinese EV manufacturer has avoided the US market. They are aware of the difficult relationships and do not want to take any significant risks. So, these tariffs would hardly affect the current Chinese business. However, they would kill any future expansion plans in the United States. As there is currently hardly any business with Chinese EVs in the USA, Beijing’s counter-attack could also be restrained for the time being. After all, the Chinese have always lagged behind the US customs volumes in the past.
The Chinese argue that Biden’s move is mainly a political maneuver. “The idea of levying high tariffs on Chinese products is more politically motivated to win votes for the elections,” Chinese media quote Gao Lingyun from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The fact that both Democrats and Republicans want to win votes with a hard line against China in the election campaign is not a new phenomenon. Beijing is well aware of this.
Above all, however, China’s state media see the upcoming US announcement as a sign of Washington’s weakness. “It shows that the US manufacturing industry is in a defensive position and can only maintain domestic industry’s development through high tariffs,” Beijing economist Tian Yun is quoted as saying in Chinese media.
However, the state newspaper Global Times suspects another strategy behind the Americans’ actions. The tariffs are also intended to exert “pressure on Europe.” The theory is that higher US tariffs would cause other Western partners to follow the Americans’ lead and prevent Chinese manufacturers from expanding even further into these markets.
Chen Qi, Director of the Center for China-US Relations at Tsinghua University, accuses both the US and the EU of “hypocrisy.” While condemning China for alleged irregularities, “they themselves engage in a global subsidy race to bolster their own EV industries.” For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act alone grants around 369 billion US dollars in tax breaks and subsidies for the clean energy industry. “Chinese-made EVs are highly cost-effective because of China’s efficient supply chains, technological prowess and market dynamics,” not due to subsidies or dumping policies.
He further argued that the measures taken by the USA and the EU contradicted their declared commitment to environmental and climate action. Barriers against inexpensive Chinese electric cars would not do justice to their leading role in the global fight against climate change. “Faced with the prospect of losing their privileged positions in the global economic order, they are resorting to desperate measures to maintain their stranglehold on key industries,” said Chen. The investigations into China’s EV sector are just a symptom of this “broader malaise” and “a last-ditch effort to maintain their economic dominance.”
Should Beijing act as it has done in the past, it is likely to target US farmers primarily. Even in the first rounds of the trade dispute, the main targets were agricultural products such as soybeans and pork from the US. Beijing hoped that this would prompt the US leadership to rethink its position. After all, agriculture is an emotionally charged issue. And the first US politicians are already sounding the alarm. “I can’t be sure that China would hit agriculture the same as they did in the Trump ones, but they’re going to hit back,” Bloomberg quoted Republican US Senator Chuck Grassley.
Knowing about the practices of Chinese distant-water fishing can ruin one’s appetite for seafood. Apparently, hunting protected species, animal cruelty, violence against crew members and slave-like labor are commonplace on Chinese ships – long before the goods end up on European tables. A recent investigation by the British Environmental Justice Foundation (EFJ) has further deepened allegations of drastic animal welfare and human rights violations by Chinese fishers.
Months of research in the southwest Indian Ocean, along the east coast of the African continent, revealed 177 suspected or confirmed criminal activities on the vessels of the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet. These include the capture of endangered species, illegal fishing methods, and, in some cases, excessive violence against crew members by command personnel, who also happen to receive poor wages. The allegations are similar to the conditions that EJF had already identified in the past on ships of the Chinese distant-water fleet along the continent’s west coast.
According to the EJF, the Chinese authorities are deeply involved in the process because they do not want to impose overly strict regulations on their own industry for economic reasons. China supports the sector with generous investments in fishing infrastructure and subsidies worth millions. “You have to actively look away not to recognize the system behind it. And it’s hard to believe that Chinese officials don’t know about it,” EJF Managing Director Steve Trent told Table.Briefings.
Although Trent emphasizes that it is not just the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet that uses illegal methods or pays its workers poorly, the problems in other countries are “minimal compared to China.” A crucial difference is the willingness of governments to intervene. Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand have reacted to corresponding accusations against their distant water fleets and have significantly increased monitoring and transparency. But China’s authorities have ignored the problems despite the overwhelming evidence.
Consumers cannot retrace the supply chains. Certificates such as MSC or Safe give the impression of sustainable fishing. However, environmental organizations have been lamenting gaps in the certification processes for years, overlooking serious animal welfare or human rights violations. The circumstances under which a fish was caught before it ended up canned or frozen in European supermarkets often remain unknown.
EJF founder Trent accuses European retailers of not taking consistent action against the potential risks in their supply chains. A few weeks ago, the organization reported on the disastrous conditions at the Zhejiang Ocean Family (ZOF), one of the most important suppliers to the international fish wholesale trade. Using data from a canceled IPO of ZOF in 2023, EJF managed to trace the supply chains to major retailers such as Amazon, Rakuten, Carrefour, Iceland, Lidl, Marks & Spencer, and El Corte Inglés. However, it remains unclear which of these companies actually have ZOF catches on their shelves.
The German supermarket chain Lidl assured that it works intensively to “minimize negative effects in our supply chains.” An investigation into the matter has been initiated. However, the company cannot provide any further information due to the ongoing investigation. The company refers to its code of conduct. “Should we become aware of specific facts regarding violations of these provisions, we will investigate and take appropriate action,” the company said in a statement to Table.Briefings.
In any case, catches from the Indian Ocean are primarily bound for the global market. EJF therefore strongly recommends that wholesalers disclose their supply chains so that consumers can decide whether they want to eat fish that may have been caught under illegal or inhumane conditions.
In recent years, EJF has interviewed almost 400 crew members of Chinese ships, most of whom came from Indonesia or the Philippines. The organization stresses that the testimonies are strong indications, but not proof. Although EJF has obtained photographs and film footage showing concrete violations, the organization says that obtaining such material is becoming increasingly difficult because the ship’s captains are increasingly preventing crew members from using mobile phones.
This is why the organization also sends its own teams out to sea to track down ships and document their illegal activities with film footage from a distance or from the air. To this end, the activists analyzed extensive satellite footage that shows how ships spend long periods in waters where fishing is prohibited. Trent does not believe in coincidences. “Anyone who zigzags through these waters is not doing it for fun. The cost of diesel alone is far too high for that.” EJF employees wait in the harbors and observe the ships as they unload to identify possible illegal catches.
The Chinese distant water fleet appears to enjoy ample political backing. China has subsidized the industry in recent years with tens of millions of dollars. Between 2019 and 2021, the operators of the distant-water fishing fleet received over 34 million US dollars. ZOF, for example, is also networked in the highest political circles. Its owner, the Hangzhou-based Wanxiang Group, is a conglomerate that also manufactures car parts, among other things. Its primary shareholder is billionaire Lu Weiding, who is also a delegate to the 14th National People’s Congress.
It wasn’t long ago that Cai Qi presented himself as close to the people and sometimes even critical of the communist party state. During his time as a Party official in Zhejiang province, Cai gained millions of followers on Weibo. He found the Facebook ban in China “regrettable.” When the mother of a local official contacted him online because superiors often coerced her son into going drinking together after work – a widespread problem in China’s working world – Cai Qi stepped in to help her: “Your son won’t have to drink from now on!”
In 2012, Cai published a book with a collection of his Weibo posts under the name bōlí fángjiān (“玻璃房间 – glass room”) in which he called for greater transparency and open dialogue between the Communist Party and the people.
A decade later, Cai Qi has made his way into the upper echelons of China’s leadership. He is Chairman of the Central Office of the Communist Party – the main organizational unit of the Party leadership – and Vice Chairman of the powerful National Security Commission. Above all, however, since October 2022, he has been one of seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party’s closest power circle headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Here, Xi has installed a loyal following – a selection of old companions.
Not much is left of Cai’s former grassroots approach. The Party doctrine stipulates that a lack of transparency forms the basis for maintaining political stability in the country. The Standing Committee and the Security Commission meetings are not discussed publicly and decisions are only communicated sporadically. Cai now operates in a black box, at the heart of a completely opaque political body. The only signs of life he gives from there are via the state media, but no longer via Weibo. He deleted his account ten years ago.
Apart from his former online presence, Cai Qi’s rise to China’s center of power resembles a classic CCP career. Over 30 years in his native province of Fujian and later in Zhejiang, he worked his way through the ranks of local CCP and government offices, which are closely intertwined in China. In 2014, the Party leadership brought him to the capital at the age of 58. Cai first became mayor and then Party General Secretary of Beijing – the next big step. Because at every decision-making level, the Party function is more powerful than that of the administration.
During this time, Cai was responsible for the displacement of tens of thousands of migrant workers, who suffered more government harassment than ever before in an attempt to discourage them from living in the capital. To this end, Cai pushed ahead with the construction of a planned city about 100 kilometers southwest of Beijing called Xiong’an. Xiong’an is expected to become a new development engine for the capital region by the middle of the century, following the example of earlier centrally planned economic hubs such as Shenzhen or Pudong in Shanghai.
Xiong’an is also considered Xi Jinping’s personal prestige project. Cai’s dedication to Xiong’an can, therefore, be seen as a sign of his loyalty to Xi. In Fujian and Zhejiang, Cai Qi has already worked under Xi, who has promoted several of his subordinates from his time in the provincial governments to high office in recent years. Like Premier Li Qiang, Cai Qi is counted among the so-called Zhejiang Clique.
Many observers regard Cai as Xi Jinping’s closest confidant; some even see him as the secret number two in the internal Communist Party hierarchy, even ahead of Li Qiang. It is impossible to say how close Xi and Cai’s relationship really is. Outwardly, however, Cai Qi serves in his Party positions as the mouthpiece of the official ideology, above all, the Xí Jìnpíng sīxiǎng 习近平思想 – Xi Jinping thought. Leonardo Pape
The Haikui No. 1 is China’s first floating production, storage and loading facility in cylindrical form. It left the port of Qingdao over the weekend and made its way to the Pearl River Delta, where it will be deployed in the Liuhua 11-1 oil field at a water depth of 324 meters. The Haikui No. 1 is designed to withstand heavy storms and will only have to return to port for its first maintenance after 15 years at sea. The steel construction has a length of 90 meters and can process around 5,500 tons of crude oil per day. Almost 60,000 tons can be stored on board.
We have already seen something very similar under Donald Trump: US President Joe Biden wants to impose high punitive tariffs on Chinese products. There are plans for a 100 percent levy on electric cars from the People’s Republic.
In practice, the levy is currently almost irrelevant, as all major Chinese EV manufacturers avoid the US market. And yet China’s reaction shows that a new trade conflict is likely to break out between the US and China, as Joern Petring analyzes. The Europeans should realize that the EU will again be dragged into this conflict.
It’s also Europe’s business when Chinese fleets fish in the Indian Ocean. Because what the British Environmental Justice Foundation has discovered should spoil every consumer’s appetite. Cruelty to humans and animals is commonplace and puts a strain on supply chains – long before the goods end up on European plates. Marcel Grzanna took a look at the EJF investigation. Our analysis shows how the Lidl Group responds to allegations of ethically questionable fish in its supermarkets.
The impending sharp increase in US tariffs on Chinese electric cars will likely further fuel the trade dispute between Beijing and Washington. Beijing reacted with sharp criticism to reports that US President Joe Biden will increase tariffs on electric cars from 25 percent to 100 percent on Tuesday and target other green products such as solar modules. A Foreign Ministry spokeswoman in Beijing said that “all necessary measures” would be taken to defend its own interests.
It looks as if the dangerous spiral of tariffs and counter-tariffs is starting up again. This dangerous cycle began under Donald Trump. The former US president imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese products worth 370 billion dollars in several stages, particularly in 2018 and 2019. In each case, the Chinese responded with counter-tariffs, most recently on US imports totaling 120 billion dollars.
So far, almost every Chinese EV manufacturer has avoided the US market. They are aware of the difficult relationships and do not want to take any significant risks. So, these tariffs would hardly affect the current Chinese business. However, they would kill any future expansion plans in the United States. As there is currently hardly any business with Chinese EVs in the USA, Beijing’s counter-attack could also be restrained for the time being. After all, the Chinese have always lagged behind the US customs volumes in the past.
The Chinese argue that Biden’s move is mainly a political maneuver. “The idea of levying high tariffs on Chinese products is more politically motivated to win votes for the elections,” Chinese media quote Gao Lingyun from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The fact that both Democrats and Republicans want to win votes with a hard line against China in the election campaign is not a new phenomenon. Beijing is well aware of this.
Above all, however, China’s state media see the upcoming US announcement as a sign of Washington’s weakness. “It shows that the US manufacturing industry is in a defensive position and can only maintain domestic industry’s development through high tariffs,” Beijing economist Tian Yun is quoted as saying in Chinese media.
However, the state newspaper Global Times suspects another strategy behind the Americans’ actions. The tariffs are also intended to exert “pressure on Europe.” The theory is that higher US tariffs would cause other Western partners to follow the Americans’ lead and prevent Chinese manufacturers from expanding even further into these markets.
Chen Qi, Director of the Center for China-US Relations at Tsinghua University, accuses both the US and the EU of “hypocrisy.” While condemning China for alleged irregularities, “they themselves engage in a global subsidy race to bolster their own EV industries.” For example, the US Inflation Reduction Act alone grants around 369 billion US dollars in tax breaks and subsidies for the clean energy industry. “Chinese-made EVs are highly cost-effective because of China’s efficient supply chains, technological prowess and market dynamics,” not due to subsidies or dumping policies.
He further argued that the measures taken by the USA and the EU contradicted their declared commitment to environmental and climate action. Barriers against inexpensive Chinese electric cars would not do justice to their leading role in the global fight against climate change. “Faced with the prospect of losing their privileged positions in the global economic order, they are resorting to desperate measures to maintain their stranglehold on key industries,” said Chen. The investigations into China’s EV sector are just a symptom of this “broader malaise” and “a last-ditch effort to maintain their economic dominance.”
Should Beijing act as it has done in the past, it is likely to target US farmers primarily. Even in the first rounds of the trade dispute, the main targets were agricultural products such as soybeans and pork from the US. Beijing hoped that this would prompt the US leadership to rethink its position. After all, agriculture is an emotionally charged issue. And the first US politicians are already sounding the alarm. “I can’t be sure that China would hit agriculture the same as they did in the Trump ones, but they’re going to hit back,” Bloomberg quoted Republican US Senator Chuck Grassley.
Knowing about the practices of Chinese distant-water fishing can ruin one’s appetite for seafood. Apparently, hunting protected species, animal cruelty, violence against crew members and slave-like labor are commonplace on Chinese ships – long before the goods end up on European tables. A recent investigation by the British Environmental Justice Foundation (EFJ) has further deepened allegations of drastic animal welfare and human rights violations by Chinese fishers.
Months of research in the southwest Indian Ocean, along the east coast of the African continent, revealed 177 suspected or confirmed criminal activities on the vessels of the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet. These include the capture of endangered species, illegal fishing methods, and, in some cases, excessive violence against crew members by command personnel, who also happen to receive poor wages. The allegations are similar to the conditions that EJF had already identified in the past on ships of the Chinese distant-water fleet along the continent’s west coast.
According to the EJF, the Chinese authorities are deeply involved in the process because they do not want to impose overly strict regulations on their own industry for economic reasons. China supports the sector with generous investments in fishing infrastructure and subsidies worth millions. “You have to actively look away not to recognize the system behind it. And it’s hard to believe that Chinese officials don’t know about it,” EJF Managing Director Steve Trent told Table.Briefings.
Although Trent emphasizes that it is not just the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet that uses illegal methods or pays its workers poorly, the problems in other countries are “minimal compared to China.” A crucial difference is the willingness of governments to intervene. Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand have reacted to corresponding accusations against their distant water fleets and have significantly increased monitoring and transparency. But China’s authorities have ignored the problems despite the overwhelming evidence.
Consumers cannot retrace the supply chains. Certificates such as MSC or Safe give the impression of sustainable fishing. However, environmental organizations have been lamenting gaps in the certification processes for years, overlooking serious animal welfare or human rights violations. The circumstances under which a fish was caught before it ended up canned or frozen in European supermarkets often remain unknown.
EJF founder Trent accuses European retailers of not taking consistent action against the potential risks in their supply chains. A few weeks ago, the organization reported on the disastrous conditions at the Zhejiang Ocean Family (ZOF), one of the most important suppliers to the international fish wholesale trade. Using data from a canceled IPO of ZOF in 2023, EJF managed to trace the supply chains to major retailers such as Amazon, Rakuten, Carrefour, Iceland, Lidl, Marks & Spencer, and El Corte Inglés. However, it remains unclear which of these companies actually have ZOF catches on their shelves.
The German supermarket chain Lidl assured that it works intensively to “minimize negative effects in our supply chains.” An investigation into the matter has been initiated. However, the company cannot provide any further information due to the ongoing investigation. The company refers to its code of conduct. “Should we become aware of specific facts regarding violations of these provisions, we will investigate and take appropriate action,” the company said in a statement to Table.Briefings.
In any case, catches from the Indian Ocean are primarily bound for the global market. EJF therefore strongly recommends that wholesalers disclose their supply chains so that consumers can decide whether they want to eat fish that may have been caught under illegal or inhumane conditions.
In recent years, EJF has interviewed almost 400 crew members of Chinese ships, most of whom came from Indonesia or the Philippines. The organization stresses that the testimonies are strong indications, but not proof. Although EJF has obtained photographs and film footage showing concrete violations, the organization says that obtaining such material is becoming increasingly difficult because the ship’s captains are increasingly preventing crew members from using mobile phones.
This is why the organization also sends its own teams out to sea to track down ships and document their illegal activities with film footage from a distance or from the air. To this end, the activists analyzed extensive satellite footage that shows how ships spend long periods in waters where fishing is prohibited. Trent does not believe in coincidences. “Anyone who zigzags through these waters is not doing it for fun. The cost of diesel alone is far too high for that.” EJF employees wait in the harbors and observe the ships as they unload to identify possible illegal catches.
The Chinese distant water fleet appears to enjoy ample political backing. China has subsidized the industry in recent years with tens of millions of dollars. Between 2019 and 2021, the operators of the distant-water fishing fleet received over 34 million US dollars. ZOF, for example, is also networked in the highest political circles. Its owner, the Hangzhou-based Wanxiang Group, is a conglomerate that also manufactures car parts, among other things. Its primary shareholder is billionaire Lu Weiding, who is also a delegate to the 14th National People’s Congress.
It wasn’t long ago that Cai Qi presented himself as close to the people and sometimes even critical of the communist party state. During his time as a Party official in Zhejiang province, Cai gained millions of followers on Weibo. He found the Facebook ban in China “regrettable.” When the mother of a local official contacted him online because superiors often coerced her son into going drinking together after work – a widespread problem in China’s working world – Cai Qi stepped in to help her: “Your son won’t have to drink from now on!”
In 2012, Cai published a book with a collection of his Weibo posts under the name bōlí fángjiān (“玻璃房间 – glass room”) in which he called for greater transparency and open dialogue between the Communist Party and the people.
A decade later, Cai Qi has made his way into the upper echelons of China’s leadership. He is Chairman of the Central Office of the Communist Party – the main organizational unit of the Party leadership – and Vice Chairman of the powerful National Security Commission. Above all, however, since October 2022, he has been one of seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, the Party’s closest power circle headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Here, Xi has installed a loyal following – a selection of old companions.
Not much is left of Cai’s former grassroots approach. The Party doctrine stipulates that a lack of transparency forms the basis for maintaining political stability in the country. The Standing Committee and the Security Commission meetings are not discussed publicly and decisions are only communicated sporadically. Cai now operates in a black box, at the heart of a completely opaque political body. The only signs of life he gives from there are via the state media, but no longer via Weibo. He deleted his account ten years ago.
Apart from his former online presence, Cai Qi’s rise to China’s center of power resembles a classic CCP career. Over 30 years in his native province of Fujian and later in Zhejiang, he worked his way through the ranks of local CCP and government offices, which are closely intertwined in China. In 2014, the Party leadership brought him to the capital at the age of 58. Cai first became mayor and then Party General Secretary of Beijing – the next big step. Because at every decision-making level, the Party function is more powerful than that of the administration.
During this time, Cai was responsible for the displacement of tens of thousands of migrant workers, who suffered more government harassment than ever before in an attempt to discourage them from living in the capital. To this end, Cai pushed ahead with the construction of a planned city about 100 kilometers southwest of Beijing called Xiong’an. Xiong’an is expected to become a new development engine for the capital region by the middle of the century, following the example of earlier centrally planned economic hubs such as Shenzhen or Pudong in Shanghai.
Xiong’an is also considered Xi Jinping’s personal prestige project. Cai’s dedication to Xiong’an can, therefore, be seen as a sign of his loyalty to Xi. In Fujian and Zhejiang, Cai Qi has already worked under Xi, who has promoted several of his subordinates from his time in the provincial governments to high office in recent years. Like Premier Li Qiang, Cai Qi is counted among the so-called Zhejiang Clique.
Many observers regard Cai as Xi Jinping’s closest confidant; some even see him as the secret number two in the internal Communist Party hierarchy, even ahead of Li Qiang. It is impossible to say how close Xi and Cai’s relationship really is. Outwardly, however, Cai Qi serves in his Party positions as the mouthpiece of the official ideology, above all, the Xí Jìnpíng sīxiǎng 习近平思想 – Xi Jinping thought. Leonardo Pape
The Haikui No. 1 is China’s first floating production, storage and loading facility in cylindrical form. It left the port of Qingdao over the weekend and made its way to the Pearl River Delta, where it will be deployed in the Liuhua 11-1 oil field at a water depth of 324 meters. The Haikui No. 1 is designed to withstand heavy storms and will only have to return to port for its first maintenance after 15 years at sea. The steel construction has a length of 90 meters and can process around 5,500 tons of crude oil per day. Almost 60,000 tons can be stored on board.
