The late fall one year after a Chinese Communist Party congress is always the time of the so-called 3rd Plenary Session of the Central Committee. Between the National Congresses, which only meet every five years, the entire Central Committee only convenes around seven times; each of the numbered plenary sessions, therefore, only takes place every five years. In the CP calendar, the 3rd Plenary Session is traditionally the one at which the party sets the future course of economic policy: more opening or more control? Strengthening private companies or state-owned enterprises?
The upcoming 3rd Plenary Session is overdue, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk explains. The fact that no date has yet been set signals that head of state and party leader Xi Jinping must balance the party’s internal ideas on reforms.
Meanwhile, the relationship between China and the US has been in the spotlight since the summit between Xi and US President Joe Biden. The hope is that the two superpowers will finally manage to stabilize their difficult relations. Michael Radunski spoke with US historian Meredith Oyen about what mistakes both sides have made. And what the USA can do better.
It is currently completely unclear to the outside world to what extent debates are still ongoing inside the Chinese Communist Party. Even experts can only speculate. The events surrounding the upcoming 3rd Plenary Session of the Central Committee now indicate more disagreement about economic policy than it appears, at least in the ranks under ruler Xi Jinping.
The focus is on economic policy. The party leadership traditionally sets the economic direction at third plenums. Exactly ten years ago, at the 3rd Plenum in 2013, Xi agreed to a reform program, which, however, he did not implement out of a thirst for control. Now, accusations are being raised that he is squandering opportunities to dynamize the economy. After all, China’s growth is currently slowing down.
The CP Central Committee consists of 205 of the most powerful cadres from across the country and forms the party’s core. As a rule, they convene at least once a year for a plenary meeting: a Plenum. Each Central Committee serves for the five years between two party congresses. Currently, the 20th Central Committee is in office.
The seven plenums of each Central Committee are each loosely assigned a meaning. The 3rd Plenum traditionally focuses on the economy. Expectations for an economic reform program are therefore high. There is an almost magical belief that a 3rd Plenum is associated with a market economy, openness and the unleashing of forces. The contradiction between expectations and actual policy is obvious and is apparently also being discussed in China.
A superficial sign of this is an article in the business portal Caixin, available in English and Chinese in slightly different versions. Though it indirectly criticizes Xi, the text has been online uncensored for a week and a half. The expectation would actually have been that such an article would be impossible in Xi’s system or quickly deleted.
The lengthy opinion piece mainly focuses on the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee in 2013. Xi’s rule was still young, and in 60 articles, the Central Committee had set out to give the market a more significant role.
The key takeaways from the Caixin article:
The criticism of Xi is hardly hidden. A “distribution of powers” across more shoulders is the opposite of what is happening. Xi alone is chairman of all commissions in which power is increasingly concentrated.
Remarkably, the Chinese version contains the quote: “The Yangzi and the Yellow River will not flow backward 长江黄河不会倒流.” It is a quote from Li Keqiang and refers to the reforms in China. Social media posts with this quote were censored after Li’s death because political reforms came to a standstill under Xi and were even rolled back. Mentioning this quote is an open provocation to the censors.
The 3rd Plenary Session often meets in November. Not this time, half a month has already passed and there is still no sign of the summit. Apparently, Xi needs more time to prepare the votes in his interests.
This also indicates that not everything is going as smoothly as it looks from the outside. The talk is that the Plenum could be held in December – or even in January. The next Politburo meeting at which the Plenum could be convened will take place in late November.
Economic policy is a crucial factor in China. As is well known, the CP defines and legitimizes itself through development and achieving prosperity. However, China’s economy is currently experiencing a structural crisis. For this reason, it is questionable whether Xi will allow deregulation.
This is exemplified by the resolutions passed at the Central Financial Work Conference earlier this month. In it, Xi focuses control over the financial sector on himself. There is no sign of freeing the market forces.
Therefore, the possible discussions about future economic policy are probably rooted in a real dilemma between different goals.
However, there is a risk that supporters of a liberal economic policy overestimate the short-term effect of unleashing market forces. Their generation’s experience is that a phase of upswing and incredible growth in prosperity immediately followed liberal reforms such as those under Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji.
However, China still had a lot of development potential at the time, which could easily be tapped into. Processes and technologies from developed countries could be transferred with great effect; after all, modernization in China was many decades too late. Many business models and industries were untapped. Whoever came first made their way.
Added to this was the release of enormous capital, which triggered a new boom in 2009, especially in times of global economic weakness. However, these stimulants are no longer effective today; they have worn off.
On the one hand, the private sector already has a significant role; more initiative alone will not change as much as it did 20 or 40 years ago. In fact, many young people seem to be waiting for others to provide them with jobs.
On the other hand, the capital-driven development model focusing on infrastructure and construction only works up to a certain point: until everything a society needs has been built.
Perhaps Xi does not want new growth based on borrowed money because he realizes that this time, he will have to bear the consequences himself. After all, he has secured power for life. If he ignites a debt-financed wildfire, he will have to personally sweep up the ashes later.
Xi Jinping and Joe Biden met last week; one of the topics discussed was the technology sanctions Washington has imposed on China. Is the US trying to stop China’s rise?
I’m not sure the US is trying to stop China’s rise. There is an ebb and flow to the extent to which US interests are aligned with China. We have had periods where we were strategic partners in various issues. Then there were times when we were strategic competitors. Now we are in a moment where we have a lot of disagreement. That probably gives the impression that when the US does things in its own interest, it might be aimed at China.
So a false impression?
There are certainly people in the US who think it is an important policy to stop China’s rise. But most people are just concerned about particular things like the Belt and Road Initiative or China’s outreach within the global South. In general, I do not think that there is a China policy that says: Let’s keep China down.
Nonetheless, US-China relations are at a new low – and many people around the world are concerned because of that.
Indeed, it’s hard not to be pessimistic right now because we’ve had a really sharp downturn. I’m somebody who lived in China during the happy years and it’s a little shocking how different it feels compared to the early 2000s. Some already say we are in a new state of Cold War with China. I don’t like that analogy because I think it draws out too much from the Soviet-US conflict and that’s not helpful.
How big is the danger of a military conflict?
I don’t think that the United States and China want to fight a war with each other. There’s a recognition that that would be catastrophic and everyone would lose. We still have things in common. The biggest danger to me is the danger of an accident or a miscommunication that escalates.
Some in China believe that the time is ripe to bring Taiwan ‘home.‘
There have been times of increased heat before. We’ve seen at least three Taiwan Strait crises since the 1950s. But yes, today is different. The heat around the Taiwan issue increased dramatically. China has a military that is reaching parity with the United States and is capable of making an assault like never before. This is a moment where we can’t just assume that the United States is so much superior militarily that China wouldn’t dare.
So it’s China’s fault?
Not at all. The US also has its share of blame as it has undertaken a number of policies which China has viewed as very provocative in terms of how the US relates to Taiwan. China has responded to that provocation with its own provocations and done some things that have been dangerous. I think that the United States has been in some cases needlessly provocative or needlessly confusing about its Taiwan policy.
In what sense?
My understanding is that for most people in Taiwan the choice right now is to keep the status quo and not move too far in either direction. At this point I think the US has created a lot of confusion about whether we are deviating from the one-China policy – and that’s not productive.
Why?
China takes advantage of this. Whenever Beijing needs to rile up the masses in support of something, they simply can point to the United States supporting Taiwan. It’s an instant winner for Beijing. I think we could do a much better job that would instantly feel less provocative, even if we continue to have certain kinds of contact with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping claims that the US is encircling and containing China. And we certainly see US military patrols around the Chinese coast and in the South China Sea. Just imagine there would be so many Chinese ships around the US coast.
We have. Chinese ships do sail on occasion near US held territories in Alaska. That does happen the other way. The thing is that China is a signatory to the UN Law of the Sea, which says sailing in international waters is allowed, also freedom-of-navigation-voyages in the South China Sea.
The USA regularly conducts such ‘Freedom of Navigation’ missions. To what end?
The reason the US is doing that is simple, it’s one of only a few countries capable of doing it. China’s claims are not uncontested in the South China Sea. And the United States is in a position to continue to reinforce the idea that there is freedom of navigation there.
You have a very critical view of US policy. What could China do to prevent further escalation?
Dialing back the sort of near misses would be very helpful. Also engaging in military-to-military dialogs. The tendency of China to respond to anything related to Taiwan with such a heavy hand is not helpful. Beijing also could take a step back and choose not to escalate. We’ve seen that in the past. But in the last few years, China has been flying further and further over the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. It creates a greater likelihood of an accident that could escalate.
And the USA?
As China’s economy is struggling, the US and China could make some strategic decisions about tariffs. There are industries that the United States is pursuing to have back on US shores, which is logical and makes sense. But we don’t have to continue on with the full extent of the tariffs that launched the trade war.
Some in China are hoping that a Republican president will take office again after the election, turning the US more inward and giving China more breathing room. A fair bet?
I wouldn’t run this risk. The United States might turn more inward with this American First policy. But you also run the risk of amplifying the voices that are quick to blame China for everything and that see China as the center of evil in the world.
So despite all the tensions, is this a good time to approach each other?
I think that we have a better shot under a Democratic president to negotiate for some of these things necessary to stabilize the relationship. But President Biden has not helped the situation with all of his gaffes on Taiwan. There has to be somebody within the Biden administration who’s willing to both rein in that talk and also reaffirm the one-China policy. I think that without that, you’re not going to have a good outcome there either.
Meredith Oyen is a historian specializing in relations between the US and China. She is a professor at the University of Maryland.
China’s second-largest motor show kicked off in Guangzhou on Friday. Domestic and foreign car manufacturers present 1,132 vehicles at the Guangzhou Auto Show, 469 of which are electric models (NEV). 119 of the EVs belong to foreign brands. This shows that EVs are continuing their advance on the Chinese car market.
In October, monthly NEV sales approached the million mark with 956,000 cars. According to the car manufacturers’ association CAAM, monthly sales were 34 percent higher compared to October 2022.
The brands presented these new models worldwide for the first time at the Guangzhou trade fair:
The new electric brand HiPhi also presented the prototype of its so-called “hypercar” with 960 kilowatts of power and innovative technology, which the manufacturer claims accelerates to 100 kilometers per hour in two seconds and reaches speeds of 300 kilometers per hour. The vehicle is set to roll off the production line in small numbers from 2025. The manufacturer behind HiPhi is Human Horizons from Shanghai. ck
Gerd Boesken heard about Taiwan for the first time in a Dominican monastery in Warburg, Westphalia. Over the years, Gerd, a six-year-old altar boy at the time, repeatedly met a missionary there who told him about Taiwan and the “poor heathen children” there. When he started his studies, Boesken traveled to Taiwan for the first time for a language course. “Back then, I grew up in Taiwan, with Taiwan and in discussions with this missionary,” says Boesken today. Although he has left the Catholic Church behind him, his enthusiasm for Taiwan has remained. Today, he carries on this enthusiasm as president of a Hamburg-based group of Taiwan friends called “Bambusrunde.”
The Hamburg association has been around since 1969, and its 230 members seek to strengthen relations between Germany and Taiwan – culturally, economically and socially. To this end, they organize regular meetings with party politicians, members of the Senate and the Taiwan representative office in Berlin. Boesken has been the association’s president for 27 years. “Our members are very active,” he says. This is also due to the nature of the association’s events: “Everything is very personal here – we enjoy singing and eating together.” In April, 13 members traveled to Taiwan together.
At university, Boesken researched temples and popular theaters in Taiwan. “As academics who might ask unpleasant questions, we were not particularly welcome there in times of martial law,” he recalls. “A lot of resistance energy broke out in the popular theaters. Not everyone liked the fact that we took a close look at this at the time.”
Today, Boesken works mainly as a translator, interpreter or consultant for German companies looking for access to Asian markets. However, Taiwan is not part of his business. “My business focus has always been outside Taiwan,” says Boesken, who holds a PhD in Sinology.
He speaks all the more passionately about Taiwan and the island of Formosa: “When the Bambusrunde was founded almost 60 years ago, Taiwan was known in Germany as the beautiful island where canned products for Hawaiian toast were made.” A lot has changed since then; Taiwan has become an important economic partner for Germany. The current German government was the first to include support for Taiwan as a like-minded partner in its coalition agreement.
However, Boesken would like to see more. “For forty years, Taiwan has regularly applied to be an observer and non-voting member of the World Health Organisation (WHO) – the People’s Republic prevents this,” says Boesken. “We are calling on the German government to ensure that Taiwan is also represented in UN organizations.” Germany should not underestimate the importance of the island state: “The Western community of states is always on the lookout for like-minded countries. Of all the East Asian states, Taiwan’s position is closest to Germany’s.” Svenja Schlicht
The winter sports season has begun, and so has figure skating: Here, China’s Peng Cheng and Lei Wang perform their short program in pairs skating at the Grand Prix in Espoo, Finland.
The late fall one year after a Chinese Communist Party congress is always the time of the so-called 3rd Plenary Session of the Central Committee. Between the National Congresses, which only meet every five years, the entire Central Committee only convenes around seven times; each of the numbered plenary sessions, therefore, only takes place every five years. In the CP calendar, the 3rd Plenary Session is traditionally the one at which the party sets the future course of economic policy: more opening or more control? Strengthening private companies or state-owned enterprises?
The upcoming 3rd Plenary Session is overdue, as Finn Mayer-Kuckuk explains. The fact that no date has yet been set signals that head of state and party leader Xi Jinping must balance the party’s internal ideas on reforms.
Meanwhile, the relationship between China and the US has been in the spotlight since the summit between Xi and US President Joe Biden. The hope is that the two superpowers will finally manage to stabilize their difficult relations. Michael Radunski spoke with US historian Meredith Oyen about what mistakes both sides have made. And what the USA can do better.
It is currently completely unclear to the outside world to what extent debates are still ongoing inside the Chinese Communist Party. Even experts can only speculate. The events surrounding the upcoming 3rd Plenary Session of the Central Committee now indicate more disagreement about economic policy than it appears, at least in the ranks under ruler Xi Jinping.
The focus is on economic policy. The party leadership traditionally sets the economic direction at third plenums. Exactly ten years ago, at the 3rd Plenum in 2013, Xi agreed to a reform program, which, however, he did not implement out of a thirst for control. Now, accusations are being raised that he is squandering opportunities to dynamize the economy. After all, China’s growth is currently slowing down.
The CP Central Committee consists of 205 of the most powerful cadres from across the country and forms the party’s core. As a rule, they convene at least once a year for a plenary meeting: a Plenum. Each Central Committee serves for the five years between two party congresses. Currently, the 20th Central Committee is in office.
The seven plenums of each Central Committee are each loosely assigned a meaning. The 3rd Plenum traditionally focuses on the economy. Expectations for an economic reform program are therefore high. There is an almost magical belief that a 3rd Plenum is associated with a market economy, openness and the unleashing of forces. The contradiction between expectations and actual policy is obvious and is apparently also being discussed in China.
A superficial sign of this is an article in the business portal Caixin, available in English and Chinese in slightly different versions. Though it indirectly criticizes Xi, the text has been online uncensored for a week and a half. The expectation would actually have been that such an article would be impossible in Xi’s system or quickly deleted.
The lengthy opinion piece mainly focuses on the 3rd Plenum of the Central Committee in 2013. Xi’s rule was still young, and in 60 articles, the Central Committee had set out to give the market a more significant role.
The key takeaways from the Caixin article:
The criticism of Xi is hardly hidden. A “distribution of powers” across more shoulders is the opposite of what is happening. Xi alone is chairman of all commissions in which power is increasingly concentrated.
Remarkably, the Chinese version contains the quote: “The Yangzi and the Yellow River will not flow backward 长江黄河不会倒流.” It is a quote from Li Keqiang and refers to the reforms in China. Social media posts with this quote were censored after Li’s death because political reforms came to a standstill under Xi and were even rolled back. Mentioning this quote is an open provocation to the censors.
The 3rd Plenary Session often meets in November. Not this time, half a month has already passed and there is still no sign of the summit. Apparently, Xi needs more time to prepare the votes in his interests.
This also indicates that not everything is going as smoothly as it looks from the outside. The talk is that the Plenum could be held in December – or even in January. The next Politburo meeting at which the Plenum could be convened will take place in late November.
Economic policy is a crucial factor in China. As is well known, the CP defines and legitimizes itself through development and achieving prosperity. However, China’s economy is currently experiencing a structural crisis. For this reason, it is questionable whether Xi will allow deregulation.
This is exemplified by the resolutions passed at the Central Financial Work Conference earlier this month. In it, Xi focuses control over the financial sector on himself. There is no sign of freeing the market forces.
Therefore, the possible discussions about future economic policy are probably rooted in a real dilemma between different goals.
However, there is a risk that supporters of a liberal economic policy overestimate the short-term effect of unleashing market forces. Their generation’s experience is that a phase of upswing and incredible growth in prosperity immediately followed liberal reforms such as those under Deng Xiaoping and Zhu Rongji.
However, China still had a lot of development potential at the time, which could easily be tapped into. Processes and technologies from developed countries could be transferred with great effect; after all, modernization in China was many decades too late. Many business models and industries were untapped. Whoever came first made their way.
Added to this was the release of enormous capital, which triggered a new boom in 2009, especially in times of global economic weakness. However, these stimulants are no longer effective today; they have worn off.
On the one hand, the private sector already has a significant role; more initiative alone will not change as much as it did 20 or 40 years ago. In fact, many young people seem to be waiting for others to provide them with jobs.
On the other hand, the capital-driven development model focusing on infrastructure and construction only works up to a certain point: until everything a society needs has been built.
Perhaps Xi does not want new growth based on borrowed money because he realizes that this time, he will have to bear the consequences himself. After all, he has secured power for life. If he ignites a debt-financed wildfire, he will have to personally sweep up the ashes later.
Xi Jinping and Joe Biden met last week; one of the topics discussed was the technology sanctions Washington has imposed on China. Is the US trying to stop China’s rise?
I’m not sure the US is trying to stop China’s rise. There is an ebb and flow to the extent to which US interests are aligned with China. We have had periods where we were strategic partners in various issues. Then there were times when we were strategic competitors. Now we are in a moment where we have a lot of disagreement. That probably gives the impression that when the US does things in its own interest, it might be aimed at China.
So a false impression?
There are certainly people in the US who think it is an important policy to stop China’s rise. But most people are just concerned about particular things like the Belt and Road Initiative or China’s outreach within the global South. In general, I do not think that there is a China policy that says: Let’s keep China down.
Nonetheless, US-China relations are at a new low – and many people around the world are concerned because of that.
Indeed, it’s hard not to be pessimistic right now because we’ve had a really sharp downturn. I’m somebody who lived in China during the happy years and it’s a little shocking how different it feels compared to the early 2000s. Some already say we are in a new state of Cold War with China. I don’t like that analogy because I think it draws out too much from the Soviet-US conflict and that’s not helpful.
How big is the danger of a military conflict?
I don’t think that the United States and China want to fight a war with each other. There’s a recognition that that would be catastrophic and everyone would lose. We still have things in common. The biggest danger to me is the danger of an accident or a miscommunication that escalates.
Some in China believe that the time is ripe to bring Taiwan ‘home.‘
There have been times of increased heat before. We’ve seen at least three Taiwan Strait crises since the 1950s. But yes, today is different. The heat around the Taiwan issue increased dramatically. China has a military that is reaching parity with the United States and is capable of making an assault like never before. This is a moment where we can’t just assume that the United States is so much superior militarily that China wouldn’t dare.
So it’s China’s fault?
Not at all. The US also has its share of blame as it has undertaken a number of policies which China has viewed as very provocative in terms of how the US relates to Taiwan. China has responded to that provocation with its own provocations and done some things that have been dangerous. I think that the United States has been in some cases needlessly provocative or needlessly confusing about its Taiwan policy.
In what sense?
My understanding is that for most people in Taiwan the choice right now is to keep the status quo and not move too far in either direction. At this point I think the US has created a lot of confusion about whether we are deviating from the one-China policy – and that’s not productive.
Why?
China takes advantage of this. Whenever Beijing needs to rile up the masses in support of something, they simply can point to the United States supporting Taiwan. It’s an instant winner for Beijing. I think we could do a much better job that would instantly feel less provocative, even if we continue to have certain kinds of contact with Taiwan.
Xi Jinping claims that the US is encircling and containing China. And we certainly see US military patrols around the Chinese coast and in the South China Sea. Just imagine there would be so many Chinese ships around the US coast.
We have. Chinese ships do sail on occasion near US held territories in Alaska. That does happen the other way. The thing is that China is a signatory to the UN Law of the Sea, which says sailing in international waters is allowed, also freedom-of-navigation-voyages in the South China Sea.
The USA regularly conducts such ‘Freedom of Navigation’ missions. To what end?
The reason the US is doing that is simple, it’s one of only a few countries capable of doing it. China’s claims are not uncontested in the South China Sea. And the United States is in a position to continue to reinforce the idea that there is freedom of navigation there.
You have a very critical view of US policy. What could China do to prevent further escalation?
Dialing back the sort of near misses would be very helpful. Also engaging in military-to-military dialogs. The tendency of China to respond to anything related to Taiwan with such a heavy hand is not helpful. Beijing also could take a step back and choose not to escalate. We’ve seen that in the past. But in the last few years, China has been flying further and further over the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. It creates a greater likelihood of an accident that could escalate.
And the USA?
As China’s economy is struggling, the US and China could make some strategic decisions about tariffs. There are industries that the United States is pursuing to have back on US shores, which is logical and makes sense. But we don’t have to continue on with the full extent of the tariffs that launched the trade war.
Some in China are hoping that a Republican president will take office again after the election, turning the US more inward and giving China more breathing room. A fair bet?
I wouldn’t run this risk. The United States might turn more inward with this American First policy. But you also run the risk of amplifying the voices that are quick to blame China for everything and that see China as the center of evil in the world.
So despite all the tensions, is this a good time to approach each other?
I think that we have a better shot under a Democratic president to negotiate for some of these things necessary to stabilize the relationship. But President Biden has not helped the situation with all of his gaffes on Taiwan. There has to be somebody within the Biden administration who’s willing to both rein in that talk and also reaffirm the one-China policy. I think that without that, you’re not going to have a good outcome there either.
Meredith Oyen is a historian specializing in relations between the US and China. She is a professor at the University of Maryland.
China’s second-largest motor show kicked off in Guangzhou on Friday. Domestic and foreign car manufacturers present 1,132 vehicles at the Guangzhou Auto Show, 469 of which are electric models (NEV). 119 of the EVs belong to foreign brands. This shows that EVs are continuing their advance on the Chinese car market.
In October, monthly NEV sales approached the million mark with 956,000 cars. According to the car manufacturers’ association CAAM, monthly sales were 34 percent higher compared to October 2022.
The brands presented these new models worldwide for the first time at the Guangzhou trade fair:
The new electric brand HiPhi also presented the prototype of its so-called “hypercar” with 960 kilowatts of power and innovative technology, which the manufacturer claims accelerates to 100 kilometers per hour in two seconds and reaches speeds of 300 kilometers per hour. The vehicle is set to roll off the production line in small numbers from 2025. The manufacturer behind HiPhi is Human Horizons from Shanghai. ck
Gerd Boesken heard about Taiwan for the first time in a Dominican monastery in Warburg, Westphalia. Over the years, Gerd, a six-year-old altar boy at the time, repeatedly met a missionary there who told him about Taiwan and the “poor heathen children” there. When he started his studies, Boesken traveled to Taiwan for the first time for a language course. “Back then, I grew up in Taiwan, with Taiwan and in discussions with this missionary,” says Boesken today. Although he has left the Catholic Church behind him, his enthusiasm for Taiwan has remained. Today, he carries on this enthusiasm as president of a Hamburg-based group of Taiwan friends called “Bambusrunde.”
The Hamburg association has been around since 1969, and its 230 members seek to strengthen relations between Germany and Taiwan – culturally, economically and socially. To this end, they organize regular meetings with party politicians, members of the Senate and the Taiwan representative office in Berlin. Boesken has been the association’s president for 27 years. “Our members are very active,” he says. This is also due to the nature of the association’s events: “Everything is very personal here – we enjoy singing and eating together.” In April, 13 members traveled to Taiwan together.
At university, Boesken researched temples and popular theaters in Taiwan. “As academics who might ask unpleasant questions, we were not particularly welcome there in times of martial law,” he recalls. “A lot of resistance energy broke out in the popular theaters. Not everyone liked the fact that we took a close look at this at the time.”
Today, Boesken works mainly as a translator, interpreter or consultant for German companies looking for access to Asian markets. However, Taiwan is not part of his business. “My business focus has always been outside Taiwan,” says Boesken, who holds a PhD in Sinology.
He speaks all the more passionately about Taiwan and the island of Formosa: “When the Bambusrunde was founded almost 60 years ago, Taiwan was known in Germany as the beautiful island where canned products for Hawaiian toast were made.” A lot has changed since then; Taiwan has become an important economic partner for Germany. The current German government was the first to include support for Taiwan as a like-minded partner in its coalition agreement.
However, Boesken would like to see more. “For forty years, Taiwan has regularly applied to be an observer and non-voting member of the World Health Organisation (WHO) – the People’s Republic prevents this,” says Boesken. “We are calling on the German government to ensure that Taiwan is also represented in UN organizations.” Germany should not underestimate the importance of the island state: “The Western community of states is always on the lookout for like-minded countries. Of all the East Asian states, Taiwan’s position is closest to Germany’s.” Svenja Schlicht
The winter sports season has begun, and so has figure skating: Here, China’s Peng Cheng and Lei Wang perform their short program in pairs skating at the Grand Prix in Espoo, Finland.
